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P E M I N S U L A  W A R ,  
B00K THE TWEKTY-THIRD. 
CKAPTER 111. 
E A Y O ~ ,  although a mean fortress, mas at t h i ~  pcriotl tmly 
desiginted by Yfipdeon as ane of tlie great bulwarks of 
France. Covcrctl by mi entrcnched camp, mhich tlie decp 
muntry and inundntionrr rendewd nearly imprepable while 
lield by m army, it could not t e  assailed; and t o  pasa it wonld 
llave left the cnemy free t o  cnt off the allies' communicpttions 
witli tlie aea-cmst nnd Spaiii. To force %ult t o  abmdon 
&yonne nnd adopt a ncw front o£ opcrations ms thercffire 
Wellington'u design, and the pnssage of the Nive and the tiv.e 
diiys' fighting effected the first steli tomarda its accompligh- 
rncilt. Sliose erenB 11nd cut Soult's direct communiclitirin 
with St. Jcnn Pjcd de Pordgave  acccss to a fertile count,ry 
fer tlie cnvnlry, mennccd tlie nrivigntion of the Adonr by wliicl~ 
Snult obtained his stippliec, nnd opcned o way fm intercourse 
witli tlie malcontentfi cif ll'rance. It was however oiilj* a step, 
for tlie coantry beyond the Nive wns of the aame deep clny, 
snd traversed by many rivers, flooding with every shower fn 
the mountnins and offcriiig in tlieir coumcs fo thc Adoiir 
~ncccssive bnrriers, bcliind wbich Soult could oppose Welling- 
ton's right nnd still be connected witli St. Jem Bed de Port. 
He wou!d thus liem in tlie itllies as before, liewwe the wide 
operzitions necessay to force khose rivera and tw the Fwncn 
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rirmy from Bayonne, could not bs undertaken until fine 
westher hardened the roads, and the winter had been peculinrly 
jnclcmmit, 
To nourjsh thcir o m  armies und circumvent tlieir adversarics 
in that recpect were tlie objecta of h t h  generals. Xoult, 
nimed t o  mrtlre Wellington retire into Spain, Wellington to 
inalw Soult abaudon Bayonne, or so reduce his f o r ~  tliat tlie 
eritrenclied mrnp rnigl~t be stormed. The Prench general's 
recsnh losses forbd extended positions escept during tlie wet 
season-tliree days' fine wenther made him tremble-and his 
cnmp wtis still too unfinished for a mal! force. The bad 
r o d s  nnd want of transport threw his amy iipon water- 
carriqge for subsistente, and hia grmt mnprrines TFFre there 
forc cstubliahed at D m  on the Adour and at Pcyrchorade on 
tlie Qnve o€ Pau, the latter being twenty-four miles from 
Ihyonne. Tl~ese place8 he fortified to resist sudden inciirsion~, 
aiid he threw a bridge across the Adour at tlie port of Landes, 
just above its confluente with tLe Gave de Pau. Rui the navi- 
pitcioa of the Adour below that point, especially at Urt, 
the stream bcing confined there, could h interrupted by the 
ailies who were nom on the left bauk; wbereupon Iie ordered 
Foy to pass the Adour at Urt ~ n d  conFttruct a fortifieci brirlger 
I\'dlington menetced Foy with a superior forcp, he re 
crossed thc rivcr, nnd thc navigation was then m i c d  on at; 
night by stealth, or g n d e d  by the French gun-bata and 
exyosed to the fire of the dlies; provisions becamo a m e  aud 
tlie stipply wo~~ ld  Iiave fuiled, if tlie French coasting-trade, 
iiow revived between Bordeaux and Bayonne, had been inter- 
rupted by the navy, but thia \vas stiIl unheeded. 
Soult, enrbmrassed by Poy's ficrlure, reinforced liim with 
Royer's md I)'Armapac's divisions, mhich were e~tended to 
tlie Port de Lantles; then lcarjng Rcille with four divjsions 
in the cntrenclicd camp, he oornpietd the  garrison of h y o n n e  
aiid tmnsferred his Iiead-qiiarters to Peyehoracle. Clauscl 
with two divisions nf infantry and the light cawilry toolr post 
Iin tlie Bidouxc; being supported with Trielharcs hewy dra- 
guons, and liaving bis left in commuiiicntion with general 
Psris, and 6 t h  St. Jean Pied de Port, where fhere wes a 
garrison of eigllkeen hundred men besides nntional guards. 
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Pushing dvanced posts to the Joyase and thc Amn, Btreams 
which unite t o  fdl into tho Adour nmr Urt, he ulso occupied 
Hellette, llendionde, Bonloc, and the Bastids de Clcrence. A 
bridge-liead wm constructed at Peyreborade; Eaetingues waa 
fortified on tlie Gave de Ynu; Guiche, Bidache, md Carne, on 
the Bidouze; and the works o£ ~ & r c n s  msre augmented. 
Soult tliirs tlircw liimself on a new line ag~inst the allie~' 
right. Wellington made correaponding dispositions; for having 
strengtlieiied I i ia ivorks at Rarruuilliet, he shifted some of 
1-Iope's troops tomards Brmngues, and pIaced tlie sixth dipi- 
sion at Vjllefranque, whicli permitted Hill fo  extend his right 
up tlie Adour t o  Uit. Tlic tliird dividon WRB nlso posted 
near Uiciimy, tlie liglit cavalry on thc Joycusq and a chain of 
telegraplis wus estthlislid from the right of tlie Nive by tlie 
iiill of San 14arIie to Sh. Jean de Luz. Freyre's Gdicians 
were in reserve about Bt. Pé, Morilla wm acnt to Iteassii; 
wliere, tiiipported by tlie Andnlnsisns rapd by Freyre, he 
gutarded tlic vnIlcy of the upper Yive and watched Phris 
hyond the Umouia mounbin. 
Such ivas istlie general state of affairs tlie 1st of Janaary, 
but previoiisIy tlie rninor c ~ e n t s  had beoorno complicated. 
The allieri liad seized tlie isInnrl of Roiriapte in the ddour; 
Foy kept prxssession of t l ~ e  jslnids of Rerens and Rroc 
liiglicr up the river; Wcllingtan's bridgcs of commnnication 
on tlie Nive wera destroyed tiy floods; and Morilla, with a view 
to plunder, far lie had not ordm to more, obtained from 
Yictor Alten two squatlrons of the eightcentfi ~ U R R R ~ R  under 
pretcnce af cxploring &tic cncmfs position towards M~ndionde 
nnd Mnccny. Their commander, mujer Huglies, reinforced 
with some Spanisli cnii.ndores, having crossed t he  bridge of 
3Indionde cornmenced a skirniish j but Morillo retreated 
~vitliout notice during tlie action, tha cnqadores fletl in a 
sliamcful ninnner, and tlic BritisIi m~nlry amped mith difi- 
culty, linving liad onc eaptain kilIcd, two otliei-A, s licutcnant, 
and Ruglies bimself, tiaxlly woundd. TIiis disaster WM f~~lseIy 
r~porkd at the time m ttlie remlt of the liussars' bad conduct; 
and tEiey Iiad in Iike manner been previously, from the same 
source, misrepresented at hhead-quarters as more Iicentioue 
t.iian othrs  at Vitoria; whereas they had fought as well and 
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plundered leaa than many who were praised for orderly 
demeanour. 
Abozrt the snms time Mina, pmseed for provisiona, invderl 
the Vd de Baygorry and tlie Vd des Oases, and oornmitted the 
gatest enormities, pEundeFing and bnrning, and murdering 
nien women and children without distindion. The peopla of 
these valleys, distinguislied moug-st the Basquehi for their 
warlike qualities, immediately took ame uiider t h ~  commlind 
of one of their principal men, namerl Etchmery ; and being 
reinforced with two hundred and fifty men from W. Jean Pied 
de Por$ surprised one of Mina's brittalions nnd attmked the 
rest with grcat vigour, Thia cvent gava Soult hopes of excib 
ing euch a war ~rs tlie Baaques lmd cmietl on during tho 
French revolution; and he liad fui. two monthe hen  expecting 
tlie arrival of Earispe, whose courage md talentri have been 
frequently noticed in tliis IIistory, and wlio being the head of 
an ancient Basque family liad great Iowl inflnence. If 
Rarispe had come as expeded in November, Wellington being 
thcn unknown to the pcoplc, a formidable warfam would havc 
comrnenced in the mounttains; non. the Englicih general% 
attention t o  al[ complninta, his proelamation, and the sendi~ig 
the Spaniards away for miscontluct, had, in conjunction witli 
tJie le-re o£ gain, that master passion wítli aU mountriineers, 
tamed thc Eascpe spirit and disinclind them to exchange 
ewe and profit for tiirbulcnce and ravage. Ncverthcle.ss 
Mina's mudcring innirsion nnd hTorilIo's licentious conductj 
awakened the warlike prnpensit.ie.9 of tlia Val de Baygorrp 
Uasquea, and Hrtnspe wss enaMed to  make a levg with whicli 
he irni~iediortely comrnenced active operatiuns. 
Soult, So aiJ. Earispe, to widen liis own cantonmenta and 
restrict tliose of tlie allles, resolved to drirre the 
latter altogether from the side of St. Jmn Pied de 
anii uniera, Port and fix Claueel's 1eft at Eicl letk,  tlis culmi. 
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nant point u€ ths gsentroad to tliat fortress. T3 
eKed tliicr, he caused flanse1 on the 3rd to  estnblish two 
divisions uf infantrgr at the beiglits of La Costa, ncar tEie Bas 
tidc de Clerence bqond thc Joyei~se. Buchan's Portugncse 
bripde I V ~  thua forccd to retreat upon Brismns; and Paris, 
admncing to Bonloc, eannected liis rjght witli Clauscl'a lefi at 
Ayherre, while the light cavalry rnennccd al1 the Iine o€ 
outposta. Informed of this mo~ement by telepph, Welling- 
ton, thinking Soult vas seeking a general b s t h  on the side of 
Hlispxren, made the fifth division and lord Aylmer'a btipde 
relieve the lighglit division, which marched te Arauntz; the 
fotrrth division then passed the Nive at Ustaritz; the sixt11 
division marle reaiIy to march from Villekanque by the hidi 
rond of St. Jean Pied de Part towads Hwpnren, as s reserve 
t o  the third, fourth md seventh divisions; anri the latter was 
coiicentrated lieyond Urcuray the 4th, itt left i n  communi- 
cation with Hill at Driscons, the right aupported by Moriilo, 
mho adíi~nwd from Itzassn. 
Wcllington meaned to fa11 on at once, bnt fhe h l l ing  oT 
the #mal1 rivcrs prevmtcd him aud on thc fifth ho ascertftined 
tlia trua objcct and dispositiom of the enemym Howevcr, 
liaving twenty-four thousand infantry a division of cavalry 
and five brigndes of artillery in hand, he redved to atta& 
Clousel on tLe heights of La, Costk Le Coi's Portupese 
rnrarclied against the French right, the fourth division matclied 
ngainst their centre, the t ,hM division, aupported by cardry, 
ngainst thcir Eeft ; tlir! rcmninder of tlie mvalrp and tha scvmth 
division, the whoIe under Cotton, wera posted at Hasporen ta 
ivntch Ptiris, Soult was in person rtt the Eastide de Clerence, 
and a general battle rreemed inevitable ; but Wellin,..tods 
it~tent mw merelp to drive Clñnsel from the Joyeuse, and 
fionlt, who khouglit the whoIe allied army was in rnovement, 
witlidrew fighting to tho Bidouzíe : khas the affair tennimted 
with a sliglit slcirmish on tho evtsning of the 6th. The wllies 
tlien r m e d  tiieir old positions on the e h t  of the the 
Andalusians went Iimk to ths Bnsha, and Carloa d'Esp&afs 
Gtillicians m e  ta  Aacain in their place. 
Clausel finding nothig  ~erious wwi designed, sent Es hom. 
nien t o  drive away Rill's detwhmentq which had tkea  
rrlvanhge of the great rnovementa t o  forag on the l o m a  
lmrts of the Joyeuse and Aran rjvem. Soult rieeing hia 
advemry so gensitiva to a demonstration beyond the  Bidowg 
ilien resolved to maintain those two rivera and in that view 
rduced Lis defence of the Adonr to a line drawn fmm the 
clonfluence of the Amn t o  Bayome, which enabled him to 
reinforce CIausd with Foy's division and nl1 t11s Iiglit cavalry, 
Meantime Harispe, having Pnris and Danturc's b r i s J e  placed 
under liis orders to support liis rnounihineers, fixed his qunrtei-a 
at IIellette ltnd commenced an active partisan marfare. On 
the 8th he fell npon Mina ia B e  V d  des Osses and drove him 
with loss into Rnygnwy; the ZOth, returning to HclIeftc he 
mrprised Morilla's fornpiri d h  fiome Rngligli drtipons on tlie 
$de nf Mnccaye, nnd toulc a few prisoners; t he  12th he ngnin 
nttacked Mina and dravo hirn np intu the Alduirles. During 
tliese affairs Eieyond the Nive nu ineflectual etfort \vas made to 
launcli some zrmed craft on tlie Adour, wliere Boult Iiad 
inrressed Ks flotilla t o  twenty pn-boats for tlie protectiou of 
his conwip, yet they were still oompelld t o  run pact Urt 
under Hill'g battery, 
WRile bhc French mtlrrihfil was enqagcd on the Ridonze and 
Joyeuse rivcm his entrcncl~cd eamp a t  Bnyonnc rnight h n ~ c  
been stomcd; hiit as it could only ho hcld undcr the Sre 
of the fortwss, and notliing mm propared for a siege, tlie 
alIiea remained quiet; for tlie ~veatlier. qain Eiecome terribli, 
would not pemit a general movement against JXarispe in tlic 
1iig.h country, m c l  to avoid irritating the rnountaineers by a 
counter partisan warfare he was unrno1ested. WeILEngton now 
drcading the &cta lilraly to result from Mina's and BforilIo's 
excesses, for the Bnsquea were lieginning to spealr of vengennce, 
put Torth his tiuthority ia repression. Fkbiilllng 3IorilIo 
for liis unwsrranted dvnnee upon Mendionde antl for tlre 
mi9oonduct of his troops, he ordered him to keep the latter 
con~tsntly under arma. Tliis mas resented genel-allp by the 
Spanish officers, and especially by Norillo, whose sawe, 
uirtractable, and bloody disposition, since so horibilily displayyed 
in South America, pwnpted him to encourqe ~iolence; he 
wserted falsely thut his troops were starving, rleclnrd that a 
settled design ta ill-use the Xpaniards existed, rana that tlie 
Britisl aoIdiers were suAered to commit every crime with 
impunity. Tlie bglish general in repIy, explained himself 
both to Morillo and to Feyre, mho had ailuded to the libels 
abont Snn Sebastian, with a clearness and resolution tli i lh 
sbowod how hopeIm it wouM be to strive against him. 
' He h d  no&' he aaid, ' lost tliousanda of mm t o  ennble the 
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Epaniads to pillage and ill-treat the French peasanm; he 
preferred a small army obedient to a large ane disobedient 
itnd undisciplined. ff his measures to enforce good ordm 
dcpriverl him of the Spnnish tmops thc fault would re& with 
those who sufered their soldiers to mmmit disordem. Pro- 
fessions without corresponding aetions would not do; he was 
determined t o  enforce obedienca one way or another and 
w ~ u l d  not commanci insubordinate hoopa. The quection 
betmeen tlicrn waa whether they should or should not pill~ge 
tlic Frcncli peasanta. Hia rnenmrca wcrc taken to prevent it, 
anrl ti10 conduct wliich called them forth wm more dislionouring 
t o  tbe Spanitirdls &han the meiiaures tliemselves. Fur libeIs lie 
cnred nob, lie was used to them and he did iiot believe tlie 
union of the two nations depended upon such thingz; Imt if it 
did he desired no union fonnded npon sticli m infamous 
intcrwt ns pillap. He had not lost tiventy thonsand mcn in 
the cnmpuign to enable hl'orillo to plunder md he would not 
permit it. If tlie Spaniards w ~ m  resolved to  do so let tbem 
march tlieir grmt armies into Frsnce under their own generala; 
he would meanwhile covtir Spain itself and they would find 
thep could not rernain iu France for fihen days. They had 
neitlier money nor nia-mines, nothing to m h t a i n  an arniy in 
the field, the country behind wns insnpllble of mipporting tlicm; 
and were lie scoundrel enougli to  pemit pillage, Fxance rich as 
it )vas could not sustain tlie Lurtlien. Even with a view to 
Iiving on Zbe enemy by contriliutions it would be essentkl to 
prevent plunder; and yct in defiance of dl these retisons he 
mas d l e d  an enemy by tlie Spanlsh genemls because he 
opposcd mch conduct, and his meamra t o  pre~ent  it were 
comidered dishonouring l Something also he conld aay 
against it in a political point of view, but i t wns unnecwstiry, 
bccnuse careless whether he commnncled e lar& or a smdl 
a q ,  he was resolved that it ahould obey him ltnd should not 
pilfage. 
' Gcneral Jforillo exprensed donbb of his right tu interfere 
d t h  the Spaniarda. It was his right and h% duty, and nwer 
hfore clid he hear that t o  put soldiers under arma aas a djs- 
grtice. It m7as a niewure to prevent eviI and misfortuna 
ñíiu could teil by recent experience what a wrarfare the 
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lircnch peasirnts cnuld carry an, and Morillo was openly 
mcnnced with a like triaL It wns in vnin for tliat generiil ta 
palliate or deny the plundcriring. of bis rlivision, aftm hnving 
acknowledged t o  generd Hí11 that iit wan irnpossilile to pre- 
veut it, 1:ec;tuse the officem and soldiers received by eevery 
post letters from their friends congmtulating them upon thcir 
good lucli in entering France, sud urging tliem t o  seise the 
opportunlty of making fortiines. General MorilIo assert.ed tlmt 
tlie Rritish troops were allowecl ct coommit mimes mith 
iinpunity. N~itlier he nor any otlier man could produce an 
instsnce of injury done wliere pruof being ddnced the perpe- 
trators liad escaped piinishment, Let him inquire how many 
soldiers hd been lianged, Iiow many st.riclícn witli rninor 
cliastisements and mnde to pay for clnmagea done. But Iiad 
tlie English troops no canse of complnint apiiist tlie Spaninrdsl 
Officers and soldiera were frequently shot and robbed on tLe 
higlli roads, and a aoldier h d  been latetelp murdered between 
Oyarzun aild Lesaca; the English stoxes and convoys were 
plundered by the Spanish soldiers, a British oficer l i d  
been put to dmth at TVitoria and othew were ill-treated at 
Smbnder.' 
A sullen oberlience followerl this comspondencc for the 
inoment; but the plunrlering system mas soon renewed, and 
the inliabibnh of Bidmar as well m those of the Va1 de 
Baygorry were pnivolced to action. Welliugton, incensed by 
tlieir activity, then issucd a proclamation caiiing upon them 
to  talre arma openly and join Soult ar s t q  peaceably at home, 
declaring Iie wouId atherwise burn tl~eir villagw aria hang 
al1 tlie inhabitmts. Slius, notwithstanding tlie outmjca 
ripimt the French for Cliis ~~ystern of reprmsing the partida 
wnrfare in Spain, jt mas considered by the  Endish genernl 
jiistifinble nnd necesaarg. Tlie threat however sufñccd; the 
Bmquw set tlw pecuninry ndventages derived from tlie frien& 
sliip of tlie British ~ M O P B  and the m b r y  of m ,nwnaging 
warfare, against the evils of Spanisli plunder, and generally 
disregnled TIariqe's appmls to their patriotism. Soult also, 
expectinp reinforcements, seeing little te be gahed by insur- 
rectinn, and desiraua to resume the offenaive, ardered Harispe 
to leave only tlio troopa slisolutely necessary for tlie defenw 
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of St. Jean Pied de Port and its antmnched camp, with a hw 
Basques as scouts in tlia vdlep, to concentrate his force at 
liendionde, 3IelIette ancl La Houssoa, liem in the right. of the 
allies and make incuraions byond tbe upper N i ~ e ~  Tliis 
mas on the 14th; the 23rd Ettrispe, lrnowing MoriIIo was 
Lo fornge on the &de of Ridnrrny, fe11 on him, and thougli 
the supporting troips rcpuIscd his f i r ~ t  attnclr he hally 
pushed nli back with s o m  loss. About the same time ons 
of Hill'n posts near the confluence of the Aran with t h ~  
Adour was surprised by some French, mho remained until 
fresh troopa forced them to repass the river agtrin, This m 
in retaliation for the surprise af a French post a fem daya 
bcfoirr by the sixth division, which was attended witli circum- 
stances repugnant to the friendly habits long established 
Setween tlie French iand British troops at the outposts, The 
value of such a generous interoourse old soldiera well nnd~r- 
stand, anrl some ilIustrations of it 3 this period may he 
qnoted. On the 9th of December, the forty-third ms assem- 
blcd on an opcn apnce withi twenty prds  af tlie cncmy'e 
out-sentry; yet thc lattcr mntinucd to walk hiri beat for an 
hour, relying so confidently on the customary ~ s t e m  that he 
placed I~is lsnapsaclr oa tLe gronnd to a s e  bis sliauldera. 
When tlie ordcr to  advanco mas given, one of tIie soldiers 
Iiavingtold him to go away hdped him t o  repI;bce Ls pwk, wnd 
thc finng t3ien coinmenced. Next rnon ing  %he French ia 
Pilre rnrtnner warned a forty-tliiril scntry to  retire. h mora 
mmrlcrtble instance happened liomever, aheu Welliwon, 
clesiroua of getting to the top of a hill occupid by tlie 
enemy near Dnyonn., rirdered somc riflemen tv drive tlie 
FrencZi away; seeing them stealing up too close as he tliought, 
Iie cnllcd out ta fire; brit with a loud voice one of those 
old eoldi~ra rcplied, <no f.rlngl' and holding up tho butt of 
bis riflo Gnpped it in Ipeculiar way. At tiie well-unde1.8tood 
siqnal, whicli meaned ' m m& I .va hiJ! fw a a l w t  time,' 
tlie Fiench, mlio tliough tlrey cuuld not maiatain would 
not have relinquished the post withont a fight if they had 
been fired upan, quletly retircd. h d  this signpil would never 
' hnve becn madc i f  the post hnd been one capnble of n permra- 
nent defence, so well do vetemns undarstand wair and its p m  
prieties. 
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The English chjef now only wnitcd for practicable roada t o  
take tlie offensive witb an a m y  ~uperior in e v e l  point of 
view to Soult$; for thah marsliak nurnbers were alioiit to be 
reduced, bis conscriptsi were deserting, and tlie inclernency 
of tlie weether was fiiling l i i ~  haspitala; but tbe bonrxd 
veteraas of his dversary, impssive t o  fatigue, pdient t o  
endtrre, fierce in cxemition, wcre frec from serioua malaclier;, 
and ablc fo  plnnt their coloiira whcrewr thcir gcncrlil listctl. 
Al1 tho country was howemr a vnst qungmirc; it waa witli 
difficulty prot-isium or even urders could be convcyed t o  the 
diferent queuters, and a Portuguese bripde on the right of 
tlie Nive waFi several d g s  withaut food from the swelliiig of 
the rivulets wliich stopped tlie mmmisslinat mula. At tlie 
sea-side the troopa were better aff, yet with a harrible connter. 
poise; for on that iron-bmnd const storrns and shipwreckri 
wcrs so freq~ient, thak scgcaely a dny paslred but some vessel, 
sometimes muny together, sere seen embayed and drifting 
tawnrds the reek, wliich ahoot out like n e e d h  for severnl 
niiIw. Once in this situation there wm no huwn help ! a 
Crint cry migllit be Iieard at intervds, Iiut the tal1 ahip doated 
slowly and svlemnly onward~ until tlie first rocIr arrested her; 
a roaring surge tben dashed her t o  pieces and the shore vas 
streired with 1iroken tiniliers and dead bodies. December 
and J anun7  mere t h u ~  pmsed by tlie aKes, but P e b r u a ~  snw 
Wellingon break into France tlie eucmssful lnvader of that 
inighty country. Tet neitlier his nor Soult's militnrp opera- 
tions con be unilcratood without a previorts d~cr ip t ion  o£ 
110liticriI affairs, which sh1l be given in the next chfippter. 
BOOK XXII1.-CBAP. 4. 
CHAPTER . iV* 
Portwd.-When Beresesford qnitted Lisbon to rejoin tlie 
army, tlie vexatioiis conduct of thc governrn~nt mns rcnewd 
witb grenter violente; nnd its ill.will wns venkd upon the 
Euglisli rcsidents, mlir>se goods mmei arbitrnrily seizeci and 
tlieir persons im~risoned without regad to justice or inter- 
ntttionai law. The suppl? and reinfoi+cing of the army were 
tlie pretences for tliese exactions, yet th8 armp was neitlier 
stipplierl nor recniited; for though BeresforSs 
new re,nullntions prodnced nine thousand trnined E:h*g 
soldier!rs, they were, in contcmpt of tlio subsidis- 
ing t re~ty,  sehined in tlie d6p8k. At first this was attrihutd 
to ~vant of means for marcliitig, and Wellington tlien olitained 
shipping to conrey them; but the regency still witliheld tlie 
greakst numlier, alleging in excuse, tlie ilI-conduct of the 
Spaninrds relative to the mil i tary convention establirrhed 
Iietmeeii thc h o  countrics. 
Tliis conrention liad heen ~nclucled in 1812 to enabIe the 
Portuguess troops to establigl~ bospittils and draw certain 
irnoui+ces from iS1iain npoa fixed conditions; one of these waa 
that supplics migfit be priich&.;ed, Ldf l f th  rendy money, baIf 
with bills on tlie Portug~ese trewisiiry; yct in Deoember 1813 
the SpanfsIi envoy informed tbe reency, tlint to give np the 
sliclla of ccrtain public building3 for liospitnls wns nll thnt 
would be done under th8 convention. MTherefora a8 neitlier 
troops nor liorses could marcli tlirougli Xpnin, and the supply 
of tlioae alresdy with tlie army became nearl~ impossible, the 
repency detained the reinforcements. Wellington reproaclieri 
tlic spxnisli government for tliis fd conduct; yet observed 
mith p n t  foree t o  the Portngnese repncy, tliat tlie kenty by 
mliich a ccrtnin nnmber of soldicrs mero to bo constnritly h 
the field wm mnde with Enghnd not nith Spain; aud thut 
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tlie former had paid the suhsidy and provided ~11ipa for the 
transport of the tmops. His remonstranees, Bcrcsforri's 
ordcm, and Mr. Buart's cxertions, Ii~cked by the menace8 of 
lord Castlereogh, lvere alike pawerless; tlie Tegency emlutrIced 
only tIiree thousand men out of nine tlioumnd, and those not 
uutil tha month of Marci when the war was on tLe point of 
tenninathg. 
Thas inskad of  thirty thousancl Part.uguese Wellington l i d  
leas than twenty thoumnrt; annd yet Mr. Stuart affirrned, tliat 
hy doing away with the militia and introrlucing the Prnssian 
sgstem of p n t i n g  furloughs, ona hundrcd thaurrand troops of 
tL line might bave been furnished and mipported hy hrtugtsl, 
without pressing more ~overely on tlie finances of ths cuuntry 
tlian the system mhich suppIied these twenty thousand Tlia 
regency were however more than usually importunate to have 
the subsidy paid in qecie, in which case their mny would 
Iiave disappeared altogether, and Nr. S t r i a ~  firrnly opposed 
their importnnity. J t  wag indecd pcciil i d y  ill-tirn~l when 
thcir troops wero withhdd, and Wellingkon, Ixa6ng to pay 
rendy money for his sup11Iies in Fsance, mnted al1 the specie 
tliat could tie procured for the militwy chest Buch m tlie 
Portupese ingratitud$ tand if the war liad not terminated 
iinmediatdy afterwards, tbe alliance could not haw continued. 
The British army deserted by Portugal, and treatcd hosfilely, 
as we shaU find, by Gpain, murit then llave abandond the 
Peninsirla. 
X'wim-The rnnliee evinced t o w d a  the Engli~h pnerd 
by tlie Bpanish government the  libels upon him and his 
m y - t t e  T ~ C ~ Q U S  system of supplying the Spanisli treops, 
and tlieir e ~ i l  propensities, exacerbated by neglect and ~Uffer- 
ing-the intrigues of politihns inimicnl t o  Ghe Britisli 
nlliance-the insolente and duplicrty of the minister of war- 
tbe growing enmity between Spaibin and Portugal-the vira- 
Icnce af al1 pnrties and tlie absolute hmtility of tlie loca1 
nuthorities against thc British officers ancl soldicm, who mero 
trrated rnthor ns invarlers thua friends, drove Wcllington in 
tlie latter end of November to extremity. He thought tlie 
general dispositioa of tlie people still faveurable to tlie alli- 
anoe, and 4 t h  fhe aid of the serviles hopd t o  put down the 
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liberals; but rrn open rupture with the gevemment he judb~d 
Inevitable; and if the liberal influenoe ahould proTe most 
pomedul with the people he could not efeet a ietreat into 
Portugal. Wkcrcfore Ir e recommendcd .tho Britkh ministe~  
to talíc rncmree with a view to e wrir against Sp& ! And 
tGs d e n ,  victorious ia every battlq he seemed tu have placed 
tlie cnrise Iie snpported beyond the power of fortunel Wio, 
mhen Napoleon w a ~  defeatad at Leipsic, wLen al1 Europe and 
part of Asia were pouring their arrned hordea into the northern 
and enstcrn pnrts of  France, when,Sonlt rws unable to defend 
thha wcvcehcrn fronticr-who thcn coutd h n a  m~pposed that 
'IVellington, the long-enduring general, vhose profouad d c u -  
lations and untiring v i s u r  had brought the rvar in tlle Penin- 
d a  fo its apparently px-perous &ateI wbo wuld have sup 
poaed that be, tlie victorious commrtnder, moda thus describe 
Es omn sitnation t o  his governmentt 
Mstters are becoming so bad betweenns and the Spanlmds 
that 1 think it necessary t o  draw your attention seriously fo 
the sul~jcck You will have seen thc! lilids nbout Snn Ecbiwtian, 
ahicli I knom were written and published by an officer of the 
war dcpartment, m(? 1 Lelieve uder  the rlirection of ths 
minlster at aar  Don Juan O'Donojn. Advantage hss been 
tnkcn of the iinpr~cslon made hy these libels t o  circulate 
other~  in whicli tlie old stories rtar ecpeatcd about the out- 
mgcs committcd iiy sir bolin 3loorc's amy in Gallicia; nnd 
endeavours nre mnde t o  irritate the public mind ahmt our 
still keepining gnrrisoris in Ctidiz nnd Chrtliagena, and purtim- 
Inrlp in Ceutn. Tliey eexggerzte tlie conduct of olir tm(lera 
iu South America, nnd erery little concern of n master of a 
diili, mlro bellaves ill in a Spanish port, is represented as an 
attaek upon tlie sorcreignty of the Spnnish nation. 1 believe 
tiiese iibela 1111 procced from the mmc sourm, the govcrnment 
und their immedinte servants md officei~s ; and nlthough I 
lime no reason to  believe that they have as yet made nny 
iriipremion on tlie niitioii at large tIiey ceitainly llave npon 
tlie oficers of tlie goverament, nnd even upon the principai 
níñcers of  tbc sririy. TLesc persona must see that i f  the 
libclti are not written or eiicoumged hy tlie government they 
nrc n t  lemt not discournged; they know tliat w e  are diom to 
the government and they tmt us accodingly. spani~h 
troops pluncier everything tliey approwli, neither tlieir o m  
nor otrr m a , d n a  are sacrd. Until reoentIy tbere wa9 some 
semblante of iqu1r;p md of a desire to pnnisli offcndem, lately 
these ~ c t s  of disardcr bave been left entirely unnoticed; unlesa 
when 1 have interfcred with my authority m commnnder-in- 
chief rif the Spanisli arrny. The civil mngictrates in the 
country have not only refused u1 assistance but have pnrticu- 
lsrly odered the inliebitants not to  give it for payment; and 
wlien robberies Iiuve been discovered md the property proved 
t o  telnng ta tlie comrniseariat tlie Iaw lina been violntd and 
possession witlilield. Tliis )vas the case lately at T o h  
' Then wliñt is more extraordinary and more dificult to 
anderstand, la a tran~nction mliich occurred lately at Fuente- 
rabia. It m settled that the British and Portupese hospitals 
shouid go to that t o n  There is a building tliere which has 
bmn a Spnish  hospital; the Spanisb aubutliorib mho gavc it 
OVeF wanted to carry it off, in order to hurn as fire-wood, thc 
bcds, thst our soldiers rnight not have the use of thern; and 
tliese are people tu raliom we have @en medicines instm- 
menta and ather rtids, d i o  when woundd and sick we have 
talren into our hospitais, md t o  whom we have ren- 
dered every service in riur power after having recoverd 
tlieir country f o m  tlie enemy I Thase are not tlie people of 
Spain bu$ tlie oficers of government, mho would not dare to 
conduct themselves in this manner if they did not know that 
fIieir conduct wns agreeaMe to tIieir employem. If this spirit 
is not cliecked, i f  me do not show that we are sensible of ths 
injury done to our chsractcm, and of the injuatict; and un- 
friendly nature of such proceediiige, we must expect that the 
~ieople at large will soon belinve towards us in tlie sume 
iuanuer arid we sliall have no frieiid, or none wlio rvill dwe 
to avew himself aa such in Xpain, Consider w h t  wiI1 be 
the consequence of this stnte o£ aff~irci if any reverae shonld 
Tiappcln, or if an aggavntion of tlie insults and injurjes or any 
other cause ahould cause the English a rmj  to be witlidrawn. 
L thmlr 1 should expcricncc grent dificulty, the Spnnisk 
people being hostile, in rctitiring tliroiigh Epain into Portngal 
from tLe peculiar nnture of our equipuients; and 1 thinlr I 
miyht be nb1c t o  embark the army at Passagea in spih of al1 
tTie French and Xpanish amies uniterl. But 1 s'to~dd he much 
more certílin o€ getting c l e ~ r  off as we origiht if me hed pos- 
srnsion of Snn Sel~nstian; rtnd tliis viem of the subjcct is the 
riiotive for t l ie atlncc 1 lam &out t o  &ve yon as the remedy 
Tos tile eviIs with whicli 1 hnve m d e  you acquainted, 
' Fiwt tlien I recommend to p u  to  aItw the nature of your 
political relatioiis wlth Spain and t o  have nothing there but a 
clmrgP-d'qfii~w. Recondly, to oompIain seriouslp of the 
cuidiict of tlic govmnment nnrl their servants, to remind them 
tlmt Cadix, Ciirtb~gcnit, and I believe, Ceuta, mere pmisoned 
by Eritish trnnps u t  thcir earnest requmt, and tbnt the troopa 
were noG ~ e n t  o tlie two former till th government a-med to 
certain conditions. IE me liad not gxrrisoned tlie 1 s t  it would 
before now Eiave fallen into t l ~ e  hands of tlie Jfoom. Thidly 
to demand, as security for the safety of the kiug's tmps 
apinst the criminal disposition of tlie pvernment and of 
tliose in ~uhliority uniler tliem, that a British ggnrrison shonld 
bc fidmittcd into San fkbsstinn, gi~ing notice that unless this 
demmrl waa complied rvivith the troops slkuld be witlidmwn. 
FourtIily, to wit l idm the troops if tliis demand be not com- 
plicd ivith, be tIie conseqiiences sliat tliey mlty, and to be 
preprtred accordingly. Ton may re13 npon thk, that if yoa 
take s fim decidstl line antl show your determination to go 
througli with it, yon will hnvc tha Spaniali nntion mith you, 
nnd wil1 bring tlic government to tlieir scnses; and you wlll 
put nn end at once to al1 tlia petty whls and countei-actiozi 
esisting nt  tlre preaerit moment, and you will not be under the 
necessity of brin& mntkn to extremities; if yoa take  any 
other tlian a decirled line anrl one which ia ib conaequenm 
u411 iiivol~e tlicm in niin gou may dcpend iipon it you wilI 
goin notliing antl will o d y  make mnttcrs worse. I recom- 
inend tlieso measures wliatever mny bo tlio decision respetting 
my coruiiinud of the army. TLcy are prolialily tlre mora 
riecemriry if 1 dtould keep my command. Tlic truth ia that .tii 
crisis i s  nppmachiiig iii our connexion ivitli Bpnin, and if p u  
do not bring the government and nmtion to th& mnses 
beforc thcy p 6.000 fnr, you wiI1 inevjtably tose al1 the advan- 
t a g ~  mhicli. you might expect from services rendered ta them,' 
TIit~s Wellington at the end af tho war deecribed thc 
Spraniards preciscfy ns 8ir John Noore descrihed them at the 
beginning But the seat of pvernment was now traiisferred 
to Madrid, and the new Cortes, aas aheady noticd, decidd, 
apinst tlie wishes of tlie regency, tllat the Englisli general 
should keep tLe command of tlie Spnish m i e s .  The liberals 
indeed sougl~t to establish a qstcm of control over tha Cortes 
by rneans of tlie populace of Madrid as they liad done at Wix; 
and they were eo active and createil RO miich nlam by thcir 
sppnrent sncocsa, that tlie senriIes, backed by the Americans, 
\rdere ready to make Carlotta solc rcgent as the onl y rcsource 
for stemming the pogre85 of democmcy. However, when 
they h d  proveil their strength upon the qaestion of Welling- 
tun's command, they ileferred the princess's sffair nnd resolved 
to oppose their advermries more PEgorously in the assembly; 
bsing encoumged by a tumult which fiappened at Madrid, 
where thc populrice, instigted by their agwts or disliking Yhe 
new constitution, for the measures of the democratic parby 
m-ere genertllly considered evil in the ved towns, mse and 
forced the authoritim to impriaon a nmber of obnoxioiia per- 
sons. Tbc ncw Cortca then arrivd, the ~crviles got the upper 
hnnd, and hriving resolved to  changc the rcgcng took as tlieir 
p n n d  of attack ita conduct townrda the English general, 
Pumuing khis sclierne of opposition with ardour t1iey caused 
tlie rninister of mar tu be dismissed, and were redy to attack 
the regency itself, expecting Ml mccess; wben to  their arrime- 
ment and extreme anger, Wellington, far from desiring to 
bave hia personal eiicmiea thus tlinist out of power, expresd 
Tils earnest desie  t o  keep them in their stations I 
To mcn dcvoid oF patriotism or prineiplo, whoso only rulo 
~f asction wnEi the momentary impulse of prission, mch a pro- 
ceeding was inoomprehensitile ; yet it was a +se and well-con- 
sidered politicaI chrige un his par4 showing tliat primts 
feelings were never the p ides  of his condnct in publicmatters; 
and that he ever seemed to bear in mind t11e maxim wliicli 
Sopbocletl ha8 put into the mouth of A j u ,  can$ng ?~imJf 
W w k -  h& frim& m t h j  mP:ght m day becoma emm.ieSI 
a& t&ing hk fm C ~ B  dw mi&! b m e & m & ?  Tbp 
new opirit l i d  &en bi no Iiopee of riny ulterntion of tbe 
system, nor mm he le& con6nced that sooner or Iakr be must 
come ta extremities sitk the Spaniarifs; but he mas averse t o  
any appearance of  disunion becorning pulilic wlien he waq 
inv~rling France. lest it ~hould check hifi projacts of raising an 
nnti-Napdeon pnrty in tliat country. He thcrcfore ndvised 
tlie British govcrnment to keep his bostiIe propositions in 
abeynnm, Ieaving it t o  bim and to 1Us brother to put tliern in 
execution or not as events mi@ dictate. hfcan~vhile lie aent 
orders to evacuate Cadiz and Carthagena, aod opposed the 
projected change in the Spanish gowrninent. He said, that 
os ' the rninister of war was dismissecl, tlie most obnorjons 
opponcnt of militrsry arrangement wm gane; that the mob of 
Madrid, werked upon by tlic snme press in the Iiands o£ the 
snme people wlio litid rnatle tlie mob of  Cadiz; so ungovem- 
ablq woulrl become as h d  as these last; and tliaugh tlie mer- 
cantile titerest mould not have so much power jn the capitd, 
tbey wmld not wnnt partisans when desims o£ caming a 
queation by Golence. The grande= were too poor to retain 
thcir forrner nntuml influence, and tlre constitution p v e  them 
no politial pomer. The o d y  chance wliich tho scrvjlcs liad 
waa to conduct themselves with prudente, and when In tlie 
rig11E witli ra firm contempt for tlie elrorh of the presa and tlie 
mob : but tliis was wliat no pemon in Bpin wer did, and 
tlie smaller party being wiser bolder and moro active mould 
Boon goyern tlie Cortes at 12uctrid as they dirI at Carli.' 
PYo penntinent cli~ilge for tlie better could hc expected, nnd 
rncnnwlii!~ thc nictuaI government, drarmcd by the tumulh in 
the cnpitd, by the strengtli of tlie serviIes in tlle Cortes, by 
tIie rebubes and remonstmilces of tbe Znglispi general and 
ministcrs niid by the cvident danger of an open rupture, &- 
playcd, according to Wellington, the ubmost pmrlenw. and 
f a i ~ n e ~ s  on a niost importnnt erent wliicli occiirmd at t.hia 
time. Tliat ia to sap, thcir own views nnd intcrcsts coincidiiig 
witli tliose of t6e Englisli cominander rsnd governmeut there 
was B iiioruentsry ngreeinent, nnd tliia olieiiiiig for conciliutioii 
wa* lrcferred to tbe more dettigrous mode before recommended. 
Tliis event ISKIS tlie secret arrival of tlie duke of Bnn Carlos 
~t lllndrirl in Decemlim. Re broudit with lrim a trenty nf 
penrc, proposcd by Nopoleon aud nccc~itcd by Ferrlinaiid, 
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d l e d  the treaty of 'lralencxy, It acknmledged Ferdinand 
kig, and the integrity of the Spanish empire vw recognised: 
he waa in retnrn to  make the Englis11 evacuate Spain, nnd the 
French were to ahandon the ooiiiitry nt the same time. Tbe 
contracting powers wcre to maintain their rcspeetive maritirne 
rightsi as they bad bccn ~tipulatctl by thc trcnty of Utrecht 
tird ogserved. until 1792. TGe salee of national d o m k  L j  
JosepL were to be wnhrmed; al1 Spaníards attaclied to the 
Freuch wcre to be reinstated in their dignities antZ propertr, 
and those who clioae to quit Spain were to b a ~ e  ten years to 
dispose of their psessions. Prisoners, includinp those ddi. 
vererl by Spain to the English, were to he sent home on both 
sides. The king was to pay annually thirty millions of reab 
to liis father Charles IT., two millions to his widow, rtnd a 
trmty of commerce was  to he xrranged. 
Ferdin~nd here actcd with thnt cunning which mmked hiq 
infamotts cnrecr through lifc. Hc gara Snn Cnrlns hiccict 
instrnctions to telI tlie serviles, if hha found thcm nll-powerful 
in tlie Cortes, t o  rtbtify tllis treaty with a ~ c r e t  resolution to 
break i t when time served; but if tho jacolrins were stronpt 
be was merely to ask tliem to mtify it, FerJiiiand in iliat 
case reseming to himself the fmk oE violating it on hia om 
autliority. These secret instnictions were maíle known to 
the English ministeru and general; but they, put-ting no t,md 
in sncli a negotiator and tliinlring his intention was rnther ti 
deceioe Qie Jlies than Napoleon, thmrirterl hirn ns miicli E 
they could, and in tliis tliey were joincd by thie Portitpao 
DTr. Shmt'e government. The British stntesmcn W m B  nato. 
C O = . C S ~ O ~ ~ -  rally TittIe pleased with the pmspect of being 
enae, JlSS. forced t o  abandon Spnn under n treitty wLiw 
would g i ~ e  Napoleon great iníiuence in after times, and at 
the present enablc hirn to concentrate dl tthe olrl troop o2 
his eastcrn frontier : nor N= the jacobinicd Epanish govem 
meiit content to have a mster. Wherefore, dl parties bein; 
agreed, tlie regency kept the rnatter secret, ~ n d  ismissel 
San Carlos the 6th of January with a copy of tlic d r m ~  
prmsed by the Cartcs; which rendcrcd nulI nnd roid al1 acts c f  
Ferdinmd while a prisoner, and forbad negotintion for peiice 
w M e  a Frencli army remained in the Peninsula And that tb 
king might fiilly understand them, they told hirn [the riaolastw 
dspntkm J i d  bem dkvera j rmn  thz t 7 ~ r m  of 8pairi.l Mean- 
a-liilc doxeph P~llnfnx, it priaoner aince the aiege of 7~mgnaa, 
ww firut sent to  Tdengny, and then, cloaely following San 
Carlos, amived at JMnxIrid fonr days a f t a  the I;itterYs clep~rturc. 
ñiii iieptiatioiis were equally fruitless, and in tlie secret 
s i t t inp of lhe Cortes mcasures were discussed for watching 
t1ie king's rno~ement~~ nnd forcing Iiim to swear to the con- 
stitdion nnd to the Cortes before he passed the frontier. 
ltrellington was alarmcd nt the trctlty of VtJenqq. He 
hnd, lie smid, Ion,: ~uspcted  Xapoleon would ndopb auch an 
expedient, and if Iie had shown less pride and more common 
sense i t  wvuld llave succeded. TLis ciarcasm was perhaps 
well npplied to the measure as it appeard at the time; but 
the emperor'a real proceedings he a a s  unaqudinted witb, and 
tliis splenetic ebiillition only indicated his own rexation ak 
npprmliing misdiief. He acknowledged that the project 
nrns not unlilrcIy even tlien to uucceed, becnuse thc rnincry of 
Spnin lvt~s so greut; and 80 clcnrly t o  ba traoed to tlici viem 
ol ille governtneut and of the new c0nstitu;ution that many 
1)emonmmsUSt liave been desirous to pnt an eiid to ths general 
siifl'wing under the annction of tliis treaty. 'IE Napolmn,' 
lie sriid, liad witlidrami thc grrisons from Catnlonia and 
Valencia nnd scnt Ferrlinand, wlio must be as ecseless a pwson 
im Fra~ce iz~ Ae ~muld prd)ohly Zio h S p h ,  at once tu the 
frontier, or inko tha Peninsula, pemm mouliI h m  beon rnade, 
or tlie wnr nt le& rendered ao dificult as to be almost i111- 
practicnble and wltltout Lope of great success. Now tliia 
wiis prmisely n'Fiat Kopolcon liad designccl, and i t seemu 
nenrly ce~tnin tliiat he contemplatcd khc trcaty of Vdcncny na 
eiirly ns tlie buttlc of Tibriii, if not before. 
His scEieme dctnandcd sccrcsy, tht it inight. be too mdden 
lor tlrc Eriylisli iirifluence. He h d  tlierefure designd tliat 
Perilinnnd should enter Bpnin early iin hoveml)er, when it 
irould hava been most injurions to  the English interest; 
Iieca~~se tlien tlie rlispiites in Cortes bctween thc serviles and 
jncoliiirs wcrc rnost rnncoious, nnd thc hostilitg of thc iyen-  
cies in PortiigtiI rtnd Spiain townrds the English nndi8guised. 
Sucliat 1 ~ i 1  then also proved lii superiority hto the alliea in 
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TIlns TelIington at the end of the war describerl thi? 
Spaniard~i pmisely as sir John Moore described them at the 
bqinning. Buut the aeat of government wss now tmaferred 
t o  Madrid, snd the new Cortes, RS filrendp noticed, decid~l ,  
ngainst tlie wlshefi of the rpgencp, tlmt the Englirili genera1 
slioiild keep the eommand o€ the Sponishsrrnie~. The liberals 
i nded  sought t o  eatatilish a sg-stem of control aver the Cortes 
by m e m  of the populace of Madrid as thep had done at Cdiz;  
nnd they were so active and ~reated so rnucli alarm by their 
npparent sucwss, that tlie semiles, hcked Iiy the Arnericans, 
.ii.ere ready to make Carlotta aole regent as the only resource 
for stemming the progreas of demomacy. However, whee 
they h d  provcd tlieir strength upon tha question of W~lling- 
toda cornmitnd, t h q  deferred the psncwds affair and re~olved 
ta oppose tl~eir ndvcmarics more vigorouslp in tho aaacmbly; 
being encoumged by a tumult which happened at Madrid, 
where the populace, instigated by tlieir apnts or disliking tlie 
new constitution, for the measures of the democrnti~ pnrty 
were generally cansidered eviI in the p a t  toms, rose and 
forced the autliorities to imprison a n~tmtier of ohnoxioua per- 
sons. Tlse nev Cortes then mrived, the scrvilcs got tlie upper 
hand, and hming resolved to change the regency toolr as tbeir 
p u n a  of attack its conduct townrtls the English genera!. 
hrsuing this schcrne of opposit,ion with ardour tliey catised 
tlie minister of mar to be dismistrcd, and wcra ready to attack 
tho repncy ikclf, cpccting full succcss; mhcn to thcir amaee- 
rnent and extreme anger, TVellington, fur Srom dehiring tu 
have bis perso~ld eiiemies thus thrust out of power, eupressed 
hia earnest desire to lrccp them in tbeir stations! 
To men devoid of patriotism or principie, whose only nzle 
of d o n  was the momentary impulse of pwion, mch a pro. 
ceeding wsis incornprehensible; yct it wtui a +se and well-con- 
sidered politiml chchnng on hia part, showing that privnte 
feelings were never tlie pides of bis conduct in p~bli0 matters; 
and tIiat he ever ~eemed t o  benr in mind tlie d m  wl~icli 
Sopbocles has put into the rnouth of Ajm, ' m y i q ~  J a i d f  
t.ow& Ais f . d s  as if mi& m &y become e m m i ~ ,  
& t~eattny h2s fm as m who mipht Iiecm~%&.' !Clip 
new spirit lid given him no hopea of my aItemtionof the 
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syatem, no= wns he 1ek convinced that aooner or Intcr Iie rnue 
come te  estremitics with the Xpaninrds; but he wna avcrsc to 
my appeurnuce o£ disnnion Liecoming puliIie when lle was 
invnding Fmce, Iest it should check Lis project~ of mising an 
snti-Niapoleon plirty in tliat ccountry. He therefure advised 
tlie DritiFiZi government t o  keep hia liostile propositions in 
alieyrance, lcaving it t o  him and fo  his brotlier to p ~ i t  hem in 
exectition or not as evenh rnight dictah. Meanwhile lie sent 
orders to evacuate C d i s  rand Cartliqenn, nnd opposed thc 
prqjccted chtln~e in the Spanish governinent. He said, that 
aa ' the ministcr of  war mas dimissed, tlis most obnoxions 
opponcnt of mi l i t q  arrangement waa pne;  that the rnob of 
Madrid, worked upon by thc same press in the hmds uf t h  
same people mho liad made the rnob of Catliz so ungovern- 
alilr, would become as harl as these Imt; rana thoirgh tlie mer- 
cantile intercst would not llave m much power in thc capital, 
tliey would not want partisans when dwirous o£ mrr$ng o, 
question by violenoe, The grandees were too poor t o  retain 
their former natural influence, aand tke constitution gave them 
no political power. The only chanca which the servilw luad 
waa to conduct themsdves with prudente, itnd when in the 
nglit nith a firm contempt for tlle efforh of tlie prws and tlie 
mob : biit this was mhat no pET8On in f p i n  ever did, an(l 
tlic srntillei p~rtrty heing wiwr bolder and more alachive would 
soon govern the Cortes at Madrid as they &d at Cadiz.' 
Pu'o pcrmunent clmnge for the better could be expected, snd 
m e n n d d e  the actual government, abrmed by the tumulb in 
the cnpital, by tha strength of the serviles in the Cortes, by 
tlie rebukes nnd rcmonstmnccs of tbe Englisli general and 
mini-t~m nnd by the evideni danpr of fin epen riiptiirc, dis- 
playcd, according to WelIington, the utmost prudente antl 
iiiriiess on a must important evont wliich occurred at tlifs 
t e  TIiat is to sny, tllieir own v i e i ~ s  and interests coincidiiig 
witli tliose of tlia Englisli cornmander and government there 
wavar; R rnomentary agreenient, and this opening for ~onciliaf~ion 
was pre femed to thc morc clrtngerous made l~efore recummend~l. 
Tliis cvent wos t.he clewct arrivnl of bl~e dulce of San Cnrlos 
at 3Iadricl in December. He brought ívitli hm a tre3ty of 
peuce, pru~iosed by hrrtliolew aud acceyited by F~enlinliiid, 
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king might fully understanrl them, tIie;g toltl liim 'the mm~tw 
dqotisna Aad Iim &ven from {?te t71rm.z of Spain.' Mean- 
while Joseph ~ l ~ f o x ,  a prisoner since tbe siege of Xarngozs, 
mns fiiot srnt to Y~~lenray, and then, closely fnllowing Snn 
Carlos, nrrivd nt Madrid fotir days aftcr the lattcr's depnrture. 
Bis negotiations were equally fruitless, and in tlic secret 
sittinps of tlie Cortes rneasiires sere  discussed for watcliing 
tlie lring's movemeuts, and forchg liim to  srvear t o  the con- 
stiti~t~ioii nnd to the Cortes hefofore he p a ~ ~ e d  the Frontier. 
Wcllington wns n11smed at the trenty o€ TTnlcnpy. Re 
Iiacl, Iie sitid, Iang suspceted Nnpoleon worild adopt such m 
erpedient, and if Ire Iiad sliown lesa pride and more common 
senTe it mould have sueceeded. Tliis earcasm \vas perlinps 
~ t ? l l  applietl to tlie meastire as it appewed nt the t ime; Biit  
t he  cmpcror's reel procceding he mw unncqiitaintcd ivith, and 
this splenetic ebullition only indiated liis awn vexation at, 
approacliing miscliief. He acknowleclged that tLe liroject 
was not unlikely even tlien to succeed, lsecauae the mi se^ of 
S p i n  wm so greñt; nnd BO clexrly t o  ha trnced to  tlie v i e w  
of tlie govcrnment nntl of tilo new constitiition tlint many 
persona n~urit liuve becn dcsirous te  put nn ciid to the genernl 
siifl'eriirg under tlre aanction of  tltis treaty. '3Lf Nnpolenn,' 
Iie said, , ' l i d  witliilcnvvn tlie g~rrisons from Catnlorzia and 
Valencia and scnt Fcrdinanrl, nrho must be as zcseles~ a persm 
in F ~ a m  m IL-S eoozllrk prohbl, be in Spain, nt once to the 
frontier, or into tlie I'eilinsula, penw would hnvc been nide,  
or tlie wir at lenst rentIered no dinicult ns tu be alnose im- 
prñcticnble ltnd witIiout hope of great sucoess.' Now tliis 
 as prwc"1y ivliat Ntlpolcon liad rlmignrd, ~ntE it seemii 
nrerly wrtnin tliiit Iir: contrmplnted t;he trcnty of vatencoy os 
c:irIy as tlia Iiattle of Vituriia, if not bcfom. 
11 is selieiiie deinariiled sccrcsy, tlmt it iniglit be too snddeii 
for tlie En:nplisl~ inffuence, He liad tEierefore designed thnt 
Ferrlinnnd sliould cnter Spjpxin carly in No~ernber, wlien it 
would havo bccn must injurious to thc English intcrest; 
Iiecause tlien tlie disputes in Cortes luetween tlis seniles and 
jmoliins wcrc niost rnncorous, aud the liostility of the regen- 
cies jn Portiigal anrl [Slixin townrds the Engliish undiguised. 
Snciee M then &o proved his superiority to the alliw in 
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that the Spanish govement  ~houId explicitly declare i tn  
intentions. Negotintions for rs general Iieace were said to be 
o o m m e n d ;  of that he knem notliing; Iiut he supposed, su& 
being the m e ,  that ;t bbasis would be emhdied in a p d h i -  
nnry treaty whicli al1 the be1ligerent.s would rntify, cacli power 
thcn to srsangc its own peculiw trenty with France under 
protection of the general confetferation. Napoleon would 
nscessariIy put forwürd bis treaty with Fertlinand. It could 
Iie got rid of by the statement that the latter was a pri~oner 
when negotiating; but new ssticles would then have to  be 
framed, nnd therefore the Spnish governmcnt ahodd be d e d  
npon previously t o  declare what ttlieir iutentions ivere as ta tlie 
tivo articles in the treaty of Vdenpy. IIis objeetione to them 
were that t l ~ e  allomance to Chnrles IV. mris beyond the 
finnnciol menm of Spain, and mere jt not BO, Napolcon shoi~ld 
not be allowed Eo stipulnte for rmy provicion for h h  Neither 
sliould he be suffered to embody or eatahlisli a permanent 
French party in Spain under protection of a treaty, an article 
of which provicled for the restoration of the Spaniards who 
had talren p ~ r t  mith the Frcnch. It wonld gire him the 
right, which he wodd not fd to exerci~ie, of interfering in 
their favour in every qudion o f  property or other intereet, 
and tlie Spmish goaemment wodd be involved ie perpetua! 
disputen ivith Franoe. It was probable the allied sovereigns 
moiild be desirotia of getting rid of  this queation and would 
tliinlr it dcsirnbl~ that @nin shanrd pardon Iier rcbellioab: 
subjects. Por Ghis reason ke liad before advísed tlis Spaniah 
government t o  publisli a general t l e s t y  with the view of 
removing tiie dificulty when a geneml p w e  shouid carne t o  
ba ncgotinted, nnd this diffimlty and dnnger he enhanccd, if 
not before provided for, by t he  desire which each of the allied 
pomers would feel whea negotisting on their separate gtounda 
t o  aam their finances by disbanding their armies. 
This recommendation of an amne~ty, mde ten d n p  before 
the battle of Yitoria, illustrat~ R'ellin,aton'e wcity, his long 
and provident. rench of mind, his discrimhating and msgaai- 
mms mode of viewing the errors and wesknegses af human 
nature. Let it be xemenhred that ia the fa11 tide of sncceas, 
after h a v i q  p d  the Iloum, when Jwph surpriae8 rind 
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bewiIdered was %fig befar* him, that Le wlio has Seen calld 
f h ~  iron duke, in the midd oE his biwuac frri?s, found time ta 
mnsider land Iiad sufficient humaniky and pmdeur of mind 
thus h tidditesa tbe Spanish governmcnt on tlie subject. 
A largc number wf RpaniarJs who h a ~ e  talten the sida of 
the French are now with tlie enarny's army, rnaliy of tliese tire 
higi11g meritorioua ancl Rave renrlered most essentixl semice to 
the canse even diiring the period in vhich tliey have been i~n 
tlie servite of tlie enamy. It is also a knomn ftact tliai fear, 
the misery hnd di~trma wliicli they ~~tRcrt!d dnring tlic con&$ 
and despnir of t8hc rcsult, wem thc motives whicli intluccd 
mmy o€ t.hese nnforknnntc pcrsons to tzkc Be pnrt which thry 
hwt: tnlrcn; nnd 1 wonld su3gest for consideration whcthcr it 
is experlicnt t o  involve the couatry in al1 t l ~ e  consequenm of 
a rigid adherente to the existing law in arder to puaial~ such 
pcrsons. I am the l ~ t  m311wlio aitl be found to diminidi 
t l ie  merit of those Spaniards who have dzdhered to  tlie cause o:" 
tlie conntry duriug h e  severe trid wliicIi 1 hopo Iias p s d ;  
particutarly oE tliose, whq having remninerl amongst t h e  
enemy without entering ttieir sei+cc, hnvc semed their 
country at the rislr. of their lives. But at the same time that 
1 can appreciate the me& of tliese individuals and of the 
nittion at Jarge 1 cm furgive the wealrness of tliose who hare 
been induced Eiy terror by distress or by detiptiir to pumue s 
difereiit line ~ i f  conduct 
1 entreat the pvernment to  ~ d &  fo the circum&ances 
of the commenoement nnd of the different stages of this metful 
contest; nnd t o  the nnnierous mwions ia mhich al1 men musd 
Iirtve imngined that it was impossilile for tlie poñers d tlie 
Peninmlra, dthnirgh iiidetl by Grcat Britain, to withstanrl tho 
oolossal p m e r  l y  whicli thcy were. naanilcrI ~ n r l  nenrly over- 
toiiie. Zct thcm rcflcct upon tlic wcraIrnes~ of thc country iit 
the commenccmcnt of the conkst, upon the numerous rsnd 
aimmt invrrrinble disasters of tlie armies, aiid urroa the ru in  
md disorgmization tliut followed, and let them dccide whetlier 
those wlio were witnesaea of t.heso events aro guilty bccause 
they cauld not foresee mhat has since occurrod. The majoritf 
are cerhinly not guilty iu any otlier manuer; and many, nod 
deemed guilty in tlie eye of the law as having served the 
pretended king, have by that very act acquised the mems 
of uerving and Iiave rendwed important services to tlicir 
conntry. 
' It is  my opinion tliat the policy of [Spain ~hould l e d  tlie 
governmenk and the Cortes t a  grmt a gcneral n m n e q  ivith 
certain txceptions. Tliia sitliject deserva considcrntion in tlie 
trvo views of failing or ~uccecding in freeing thc couutq- from 
its oppressors. If tlro offort fail tlie e t m y  ~nll bp an nmnesty 
be delirivd of tlic principal means now in hia liuids nE 
oppre3sing thc country in mliith his arniics wiil Se statior:ed; 
he will sco ctcnrly tlint Iic cnn plnm no rclianee on aiiy 
partisans in Bpnin, antl 1re mil1 not have evec n pretence for 
supposirig thak tlie muiitry i s  divided iri oyiiniori. II tlia 
effort siicceed the objcct of tlie government should be to 
pncify tlie country 811id to Iiexl tlie divisiotis whicli the conkst 
Iiss unnvoidnblp accasionerl. J t  ifi inipossilile te nccomplidi 
tIiis ohject ~vliilo thcre exista B great h d y  oE t,he Sponish 
nntioii, Kome posssssing t?ie largeat. piuiperty in the ciiuntry urid 
ethers endowed witli considerable taltsnts, wlio are proscriiietl 
for thcir eondiict driising tLe contest, oonduct whieli Iias baen 
caused by tlie misfortunca to wliich 1 llave ariove ridvertcd. 
Sliese peraoris tlieir frierirls, ltnd rel:itioas will if persecuted 
naturally cndeavour te perpetirnte tlie divisiom in Uic country 
in the hope a t  some time t o  hke advnntqe of tlicrn; and 
adverting h tlieir nuinlier rind to tliat poiver which tliey muqt 
derivo frum tIici: prolicrty anrE connesions it must be fcarctl 
tliitt they wiIl he tou successfiil. 
cBut  tlicre are otlier ini l iohnt  vieim of tlii~ qumtion. 
Firct, shonld tlie effort t o  frce tlie country from Os oppreasom 
succcccl, nt somc time or ritlier approachcs to pclict: must he 
made Iietween t.lie two nntions, nnd th amnesty tc tlie pervons 
atuve rlescrilierl will remove tlie greatest. llifficulty in the iv,iy. 
of such rrn mangement. Seconrlly, sliould even Spain be nt 
p a c e  mit.h h n c e  nnrI the proscription against tlirise persons 
be eontiniicd, tIicy will remnin in Francc a perpetua1 iiistru- 
ment isi t.be hnnds o€ t,lint restlesa power to disturb tlie internnl 
tranquiLlity of iSliniii; aiid in cRTe of a renewal of tlic wvar, 
whicb will Le tlieir +sli nnd object, they will Le the moct 
miscl i ie~o~s and most inveterate enemies of their countrj.; of 
t h t  ccouritry which witli rnistdcen sevesty aggravntes her 
misforttmes by casting ofl from Iier thousands of hcr ziscful 
~ubjects, On evcry ground tlien it is desirnble tIint tbe men- 
sure ~hould be adopted and tlie present rnoment should be 
aeiaed for ariopting it' 
Tlien pointing out with great itcuracy and judice tliose 
w h  aliould be exempted from an amnesty, he thus tcrminxtcd 
this record of his own trae greatneas and of tlie littleness o! 
tlie people to mhom it wss fmitlessly ddressd, 
' In biinging this suhject under the consideration of tlie 
government, 1 am perhaps jntruding my opiniun on a subject 
in which ns a stranger 1 have no concern; but liaving lid 
advarttage enjoyed by few of being acquainted with the con- 
m m  of the country since the comniencement of the contest, 
and having been sensible hoth in the last and p~esent m- 
pai.ign of the disacivxnt~s su f f ed  by Spain from tlie want of 
a m w r e  of tliia description, 1 hme thouglit it proper i s  
a wcl!-wisher to the cause to Bring it under ttie consiileration 
of tlie governrnent, wfiuring them at  the anme time that 1 hnvo 
ncver htid the slightest cornmunication on the snbject wjth 
the governsent of my count~g, nor do 1 hclieve that thv 
have ever Curned their attention $0 it. Whnt 1 havo above 
shted are my own opinions ta which I mny &tribute more 
weigbt tlian they rnerit, but they am founded upon a sincere 
devotion to tlie interest~ of the country.' 
Suclr wss  tlie general politid stah of the Peninsula ss 
beariiig upon tlie military opmtians at tlie close of tlie year 
1813, atid tlie date of Xnglrtnd and Frruice sh l l  be shown in 
tLe next chaptem. Dut however hateFu1 and injurious bo 
EngIand the C O ~ ~ U C ~  of the Peninsular government appears, 
and Iiowever just and well-foundd were tl ie p a t e s t  part of 
,llrcTlington'a mmplaints, it is not t o  be assumed that the 
Bpanisli p v e m e n t  and Cortes were totally without excuse for 
their hostility or ingratitude. It w a ~ i  not solely upon milita7 
grounds tliat they were obnoxions to tlie EngIish general, 
He united heartily with tbe English governmant in hatrcd of 
democratic ktitutions nei apposcd to ariatocratic dominri. 
tion. Spain with the forrner aeemed scarcely worti~ 
from Franoe, and in a letter written about that peiiod to 
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H. OrDonncl, who it would appear propmed sorno irnmcdinta 
stroke of vjolence xgainst the regmcy, he openly avowed that 
he s a s  inimical to  tlie constitution, because it admittd s free 
press and refused t o  property any politicd inflitence beyond 
what naturally belanped t o  it. Thah is, iit refuwd to heap 
uudiie Eionoiirs privilcgc~ nnd pomcr upon thosc who drenrendg 
posoessed al1 t he  l n n r y  and Fiappinese whicli riches cnn 
bcstoiv,-it refused to admit tlle princilile that tliose wlio have 
mncli shouId have more-hat tlie indolence corritption and 
insolente nsturaily attendnnt upon wmlth shonld Le ~upporkd 
and incrcriscd by irrespnsible powcr p t l i a t  those mho laboumd 
and prorlucecl al1 tliinga ~liould enjoy notliing-tliat tko ficli 
shoiild be tyrants the poor alaves. Bu€ these esaential prin- 
ciples of nristocratie government h ~ v e  never yet been, s,nd 
nevex mil1 be quictly received and siihmitted to by any think- 
ing people-where they prevail there ie no real freedom. 
Property inevitably confers pomer on its possessors, and far 
from rtdding t o  that natural power by political pprimieges 
iE slioidd be tlie objecG o£ al1 mmen d o  lovs liberb to halance 
it by ntising the poorer cl~sea to politicd importrtnce: t.he 
influcnci? nnd insolente of richen oiiglit to be tamed and sub- 
dued insteud of lieing infiated and excited by political institu- 
fione. Tbis ivas tlie guidiug principie of the most cdelimked 
Greelr Icgislators; tbe opposite principle pniduced domestic 
dissensions with tlie Iloninn~ and wm the ruin of Carthsge. 
It n*os tlio causc RIBO of thc French revo1ntion. But nfter many 
years of dwkness, t,he Iight of  rmon is now breakieg forth 
apiii, nnd tliat anrient principle of justice which places the 
ri~l.lit of mnn in liimself ahove tlie iinht of property is begin- 
nitig to be understood. A clcm pcrception of it has p~oduced 
tlie Arnericnn repulilic, Fntnce and Spnin have ndmitted it 
and Eiiglnnd riliens for its adoption. Yet puro and Iiriglit 
and Iwautiful and healtliful as the light of freedom is iu itself, 
it fe11 ~t tliis time in Spnin on mcli foul and stngii~ri6 pools, 
BU& hnrrid rapiiisive objccts, thnt rnillions tnmcd a< fir& 
from its radiance with r l i sp s t  and wislied for d a r h e h  a,pin. 
NAPOLEON'~ cncrgy wnrr kinccd in a mamllous mannw by 
the rapidity ivith whicli. lie returned to Gennany at tlie h d  
of an eoormous ormy before liis memies liad time cven t o  
understand tlie extent u!? Jiis misfortuaes in the Ruwian cam- 
. pign,  Tlic victories of Lutzen and Eautzen theu seemed t o  
reinahte him asthe arbiter of Europe; but those battles were 
fought with tlie heads o£ ~ I u m n s  the rear of which mere still 
filing out of Fi%nce, and with pung troops. Wherefore when 
he Id @ven himself a fixed and rnenacing position ia Ger- 
many he more readily listencd to the fraudfi~l negotiations of 
his tremliling opponents, partIj in hope of fnir de~ l ing~  ppartly 
t o  orffenixe anrZ discipline 16s soldiem, oonfidcnt in liis own 
nnmatchcd skill in dirceting them if war wodi finally to decido 
his fate. Re counted nlso upon the fi~mily tie bctween bim 
and Amtriri; he rcaw indeed thnt with her liope to regojn 
former posseesions waa uppermost ond ho was prepared t o  
concede them; yet he seema t o  Iiave been qnita unsuspecb 
ing of the long courso of Austriaii treacliery. He knew not 
that wltile negotiating witli France ita offetsive and defensive 
treaty in 1812, the A u s h  a t l u e t  was secretly a i h g  the 
pIan of a vact insurrectioa exte~idi~g frorn tlie Tyrol to Cal, 
bria and the 1l:yrian proviiices. The r n ~ n ~ m e n t  of thio 
scheme was entrusted by tlie English cabiiiet in concert with 
thnt of Austria t o  gcneml Niigent md Rir. King at Yienna, 
whiie their agent.s went frorn thence to Itnly and the Illyriaii 
eonst. Mnny Austriiin officem wcm einploycrl, and It,nlians ef 
p a t  fmnilics entercd into comme~ckil houscs t u  
Apenrlix 14. ennble tIiem with morc facility to mrrg on tbis 
plan. Moreover Austriq whilo mtudtlly sigiiing 
the treaty witli Hslpuleon, ww witlr unce:ising irnportunity 
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feeble opemtiom of Prince Swiritzenberg, thc mnnncr in which 
he uncovered tlie empeiur's right flault aand permitted Tehit- 
diquff to  muve ko tlie Beresina in tlie Russian campai, 'm , were 
hnt coiítii~nitt~iona of  this deceitful policy. And it sa~ dtw- 
wards opeulj- advanced as n me& by the Austrian cabinet, flint 
lier offw of rnedintion after tlie battlo of Bautzen was made 
soluly with tlle vicm of gaining time to orpnize the army 
wliicIi was to join tlie Itussians , a?d Prussians: finaitp tba 
nrmistice itselr wns violated, liostilities being commencerl 
before its terminotinn to ennble the Itusshn troopa safdy to 
joiii the Austrin~ip. in Roliemia. 
hícvertliclcss Nnpalcon'a gcniirs triumphed at Drcsden ovcr 
tlio unslcilful operations of ihe dliea dircctcd by Xmrtaen- 
berg, wwboso i~icapacity ris a commmder was mxde manifcpt in 
tliis cnmpaign. Nor ~vould ttlia af'cer misfortuna of Tan- 
d a m e  and h.iacdonaId, or the defent of Oudinot sud Xey, 
1i~tve prevented final succeñs, but for tlie continu~tion o f  a 
trcaclicry wliich scciiicd at thc time ta be considcrcd ib virhie 
14 sovereigns wlio were rincecsingly iiccusing tlieir more noble 
nrlversary of Ilie very bmeness tliey w m  pmctising so unlilush- 
iiigly. IIe 1id conceived a project so vast, so original, so 
harrly, so far above the imaginatiom of liis contemportiry 
generala Uiat even Wellington's sapcity f n i l d  to pierce it, 
and he censiircd Napoicon's long atuy on tlio Elbe as an 
ohstiuacy un~vai-ranted by the rulcs of art. Yet he urged aa 
a renson for not inmling Prance the emperor's tenacity in 
holding Dresrlen; tlius showinp how widelp tlie moral influ- 
ence of t h ~ t  position vn3 fclt. Kapolcon 11nd more pro- 
foundly judged Iiis own situation. Tiie largo forces hc lcft at 
Dwsdeii, at Torgau, and JVitternberg-, blamed by slialloiv mili- 
tary criticq >\*ere essentid parts of lis g i p t l c  plan. He 
q u i t t d  Dresden, appureutly in rctrcat, to deeeive bis enemies; 
liiit witli tlie intention oF marching down tlia Ellic, recmkng 
tliat rivcr nntI tfiroiving his opponent~ into a ft~lslse position. 
Tlien lio mould hnve acizecl Berlin and re-opening his commu- 
nicatitiona mitli Lis bwrrisons botli ou tlie Elbe and tlie Oder 
hnve opemtd between tliose rivers; and with an amy much 
au,pented in ponw, because he would iiave recovered many 
thoupiand ala ~oldiers cooped up in t l~e prrisena--an army 
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more compnct md firmly cshblished nlso; bccnuse he wonld 
have been in direct aommunicntion mith tlle Danes and with 
Devanst's force at Hamburgh, and both his flnnks wonld hava 
lwen secured by bis chains of fortreases on tlie t ~ v o  rivers, 
Alreacly harl Rlucher rtnd tlie Swedes fele Iiis first stroke; tlie 
next would b w e  tauglit, tlie allies that tlie lion was still 
a h d  in his strength, if at t.be very moment of exemtion, 
his marshals had not opposed his viem, and t t e  Bavarians, on 
whom he depended to clleclr the Austnnm ie tlie valley of 
the Danube, h d  not made common cause with thcir oppo- 
nents and marched together towwds the Rhine. Ths battle 
of Leipsic foIlowed, the well-known treacon a£ tlie Saxon 
troopa Id to the victory pined thero by the nllies, itnd 
Napoleon, now t.he p r ~ y  of misfofortune, renehed France uitll 
anly ona-third of liis urmy; having on the way however 
trampIed in the duet tbe aiwrian Wreede who attempted to 
stop his paBarige at Bannau, 
Meanwhile tbe allied aovereigns, by giving hopes to their sub 
jectg that constitutiond libedy would rewwd tlieir prodi~ow 
exertions agrainst Franne, hopes which with the most detet. 
able bmeness they Iiad previously reaolved to defraud, assembled 
greakr forces than tbey were able fo wield and prepared to 
pass tbe Rhine. Y& distmsting their immense superiority of 
numbem they stiU pnrmied their faithless system Wben 
Xapoleon mnrcheil pto Leipsic he sent orders to St. Cyc to  
ahandon Dresden and unite d t h  the garrisons on tIie lower 
Elbe; the rnessengera were interoepted, and St. Cyr? too Eittlo 
enterprising to execute auch a plrtn of his own w r d ,  aur- 
rendered on condition of being dlowed to regain Francc. 
The capitulatiun wm broken and general and aoldiers remnined 
prisoners. 
After the Leipsic Ei~bttle Napoleon'~ dherents fe11 may bj 
nations. Xwat tlie busbrtnd of bis skter joined Austria md 
thus forcled prince Eugene to abandon bis position on tlie 
Adige. A successful i~surrection in favour of the prince of 
Omnge broke out in Holland. !be nentdity of Xwitzerland 
was then violated, and more tlian hwlf a million of amed men 
were poured amNs the frontiera of Fmnce in al1 the violen@ 
of brub force; for thejr milihy combinations were an- 
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tmptiblc and their couree mnrkcd bymnrdcr ttnd dc~astntion. 
Bilc previous to this tEiey g w e  one more notable emmple o' 
tlieir hitli las citnning 
St. dignan the Freuch rcsident minister at Gotha hail been 
taken at Leilisic nnd tmated at fimt as a prisoner of war; he 
rcmanstmter1 nnd being knom to entertnin f i  de~ire for pcnce 
wns judgcd s good tool with which to practiso deception, 
NapoIcoii Lind ollbred on tlie field of hipsio to neptiule, no 
notice mas taken of it rit tlic time, but now tlie Austi4nn 
Metternicli and tlie Rnssian Nesselrode iid an intemielv Ritli 
St. Aignali nt Frnnkfort nnrt nswred Iiim tlie l'mssinn ninister 
agrecd in al1 things with tlicm. Thcy hrtd previously tbrrnngctl 
tliut Lord Ahrdeen s1iould come in during tlie conferenm m 
if by auccident; and tliougli riotliing was put down in writing 
St. Aiguiiii wns suff'ered t u  nialce minuta  vf theis proposala iu 
reply to tlie etnperor's ofer t o negotiate. These were generally, 
tliat the nllinnce of thc sovereigns >vas indissoluble-that tliey 
woiild Iiave only a gcneml peacc-thnt' Frnnca 
Seclpt D i p l ~  \vas to be coiifiiied to her natural limits, B e  Alps, cur- 
tEie Rliine and the Pyi~necs- t h t  the indepn- g13ydenw- 
dence of Germany was a tiiiitg not to be disputed 
-tliat tlie Spanisli Peninsiilx slioiild be free riid tlie Boiirbon 
dyansty be restored-tliat Austria must have R fcontier iii 
Ituly the line o€ mlticti conId be afterwarda discussed, but 
ltaly itself mas to Iie intleyienderit o€ ttuy 1irep0uCIeratitig 
power-tliat Uollaild was to be independsnt a ~ d  her fruntier 
t o  he matter for after disctission-tbat it.E:ndrliid was rently to 
nuilrc grcnt ~ncrifices for pcuoc upon tlrcsc bases nnd wonld 
uuktiuwlerlge that freeduni vf cummerce atid of iilaviption 
N I ~ I  Pr~tice hud a tiglit t o  pretenrl tw-aiid wbrn &L. 
B i p a n  cilscwed tliat Napuleon believcd England was resolvd 
t o  resti<et Fraiice to tlie possession of tliirty sail u f  the line, 
lord1 dberilren rc.plied dint it wns not triie. 
Thiv coiifcmiicc liad plncc iit tlic emperor of hst.rin's Iieatl- 
qiiurtei* riri tlír; l O t h  u1 Xuveiiilicr, iiurl laid Aberdccn eiicIoaeJ 
tlie iicmuiit uf it iir a d~spntcl i  tlated at Brrialcalde ttie 16th 
of h'ovciiitier. He had ol?jectetl verbally to the passage 
relatiiig to the maritime question with Eiiglantl, nevertheless 
Le l)crn~ittcd it t a  rernnin in St. Ai,wnoa minutea It \ni8 
deciderl also that tl ie military operntions diaitld go on noh 
withstmcling t,he ncgntiation, antf in truth tlie allics hnd not 
the alighhst deaign to make pcace. Tlicy thouglglit Frspoleon 
wouId refuse the baqis proposed, wliicli lvould give them nn 
opportunity to  denouncc liim us opposed ta al1 rcasonahlc 
modcs of putting nn end to tlie \var und thns wark upon the 
Frcnch peupl. Tliis u-as proved by wlir~t follorvcd. Ftir 
when coatray t o  tkcir expechtions it was sigiiified, on ttie 
1 6th of No~cmber, tliat lie a c c e ~ i t d  tlie propositions, obsenr- 
ing that tlie independence of al1 nations a t  sea as wcll a9 liy 
lana hatl been alivsiys liis orijeet, MetteriiicIi iil rcply, on tlie 
25th of Noveinlier, pretended to consider tliis m w e r  aa awid- 
in; the acceptation of tlle bnsk. Napoleon however put tliat 
obstacle aside on the 2nd of December by zcceptiag expli- 
citly the Gnsis generally and siimmaril;v, siicli ss it h d  been 
presented to him, ridding, that Frnnce would make g m t  
sacrificeg, content i P  by like sacrifices on the part of England 
that general pace  whicli ~ * n s  the deelarerl object of the allies 
could hc ohtnined. Mettcrnicli tlius driven from his subkr- 
fUgc rcquircd Napolcon to acncl n lilre dcclnrdon to ench 
of tho nllies separatcly, whcn ncgokiationa might, he said, 
eommence. 
Meanwliile lord Aberdeen, who liad permittd St. Aipati 
t o  retain tbe article relating to lnaritime riglits in his rnirfutee 
of conference, presented to Metternicli on tlie 27th of Novein- 
ber rt note declaring tliat Engl.lanrE woulrl not dniit  tlie turn 
givea by France to lier sliare of tlie negotiation; tliat she wiis 
rady to yicld al1 tlie rights of ofminercc and navigation whicli 
Fmnce liau a, right. to pretend to, brit the question would turn 
upon what that right was. England would nevcr perrnit her 
navigdioik laws to  be discussed at a, congress, it nas a matter 
mentklly foreign to tlie nbject o£ such an zssemblg, and 
Englrtnd monld never dcpertR fmm the great principie thereby 
annoiinoed as to hcr muritime rights. Mctternicli npproved 
of t h ~ s e  viewq saying they iverc his own and thosn of liis 
court, t h s  proring tbat the negotiation liad been n deecit 
hwm the beginning, Tliis fact was bowcrer pliiced beyond 
doiilit by lord Castlereugliti aimultmeoue proceedlngs ia 
h d o n .  
In a note dated 30th November, that minister told lord 
Abertleen, Ezigland admittcd as a basis tlic Alps tlie R h i i  
nntl tha T'y-renees as the frontier of  France., siibject to snch 
m<idificatiens might he nocmsary tn give a aceure fmntier 
fo Hollnnd; and to Switmrlmd nlari., altliougIi t l ~ e  lattcr had 
not h c n  mentioned in tlie proposala given by St. b i p a n .  
He appla~~iled the reaolution to pumue rnilitzry opemtions 
notwitlistanding tlie negotintions, and he npproved ot clcmand- 
ing notliing hut what tIiey wwere resolvml to have. Never- 
fhelesg he xaid thnt Iiny saerifice to ha marle hy Englanrl was 
only to seciirc thc indepeiidence of Hollnnd and Switaerland, 
and tlie former hliaving wliLedy Jeclaretl far tlie liouse uf 
Nassau wm now out of tlle pnls of rlicussion. Finally he 
recommended that Rny unriecessary delay ar equivocation on 
the part o€ the enerny should be consider~d ~9 tnntrtmount t o  
a xcjcction of the basis, and that tho alliss ah& th pd 
f w ~ d  t7ie q#k of paaw i o  slaow Ilml it was mi tImj M 
Pmnce tlmt o p p o d  am 1mwurabk taPne'n.dim of tlw wm. 
Raving thus t11ron.n frest obstaclw Iii the way of that peam 
the alliea pretended to have se mucli at lieart, he, on t1ie 21st 
Deccmlier sent notes to the diffmenb finibw~arlors of tlie allied 
powers tlien in London demanding explicit msiverri nbout the 
intentions e l  tlieir coiirts a3 to Eiiglnnd's maritime code. T o  
tliis khey al1 respontled that tlieir cabiuets would not suffer 
aniny questioa relative to tliat code to be enterhined at a 
congccss in wliicli Eiigland mas reprcscntcd, and tliia on 
tiie express ground tht it -rvould mar t h s  great objeot of 
pace. 
Lord Costlerezgh pro6lcd with tliette doerirneut~ declareti 
tliat France slinuld bc iiiforrnerl of tlieir resoliitions before 
acpotiiitions conimenced. But twenty dnys I-icforc tliis Nopo- 
leoii bnving decreed a fretili levy o€ tliree liuudred tlionsand 
oonscripts, tlie allics h d  piillislied a manifesto treating t l ~ k  
mensiire, so esseiitinlfy a defensive one ~ ince  thcy mould not 
sus~)cn"dlieir militnv opcrntions, as a fresh provoeation on 
bis part; becuuse tlie motives msigned for tlie conscription 
contitined n justand powerful description of tkeii p& deceitti 
nnd violence ~vith a view t o  rouse tlie niitioual virit of France. 
Thus htiíing first by a pretended desire far pace and a pre- 
tended willingnegs on the pnrt of Englaiid t o  consent to an 
arrangcmtlnt abont Eier maritime code, inreigled the French 
emperor into nephiations, tlicreby nscertnining that t l~o 
maritimc qnestion ros  uppermost in his mind and tbt! onl! 
obstada t o  pcace, tliey declared that vital qucstion shonld not 
evcn be discussed. Aiid wiien by this subtlehy pence IYIX 
rendered impossitile tliey prodnirned th& btq~oleon done 
resisted tho desire of túe world for t.ranquillity! Yet at tliut 
rnoment Austria was gecretly endcawuring to obtain Eii? 
landla consent to her seizing upon Alsnce, a project oidy 
stopped by Wellington, who forcibly poiiitetl out tlie 
danger of rousing Prmce to a general inaurrection by sucli a 
proeeeding. 
The contrast between tliese d e s  t o  gnin a. rnomentii? 
axlvantage, and the manly vigoroiis policy of lord Wellhgton 
must make honest men of all. nations Iiludi for tlie cunning 
mhich Jiplomatists cal1 policy. On one side tlie arts of 
guilefuI negotintion masked mith fair proteshtions but 
accompaaied hy a savagc and revolting sy~tem of warfare; on 
the otlier a broad o p n  hostilitg decInred on rnanly and jiis! 
p n d s  folIowed up with a atrict regrcl t o  humanity rind 
good farth; notliing put formara with an squivoml meanins 
and the aetion~ true to tlie word. On the e&mn frontiur 
tha Cossaclr let Ioose tu ravage with al1 thc barbnriv of 
Asiatic d a r e ;  on the western fronti~r tlie Sprtniards turned 
back into their o m  country for dzring ta pnss tlw bounds uf 
discipline prescribed by the wise and generous plig oE their 
commander. Terror and desolation, and the insiirrection of i 
people reind~red frantic by the cruelty oC tlie invaden, marlíed 
t ie  progresa of the ferocious multitudes whe crohised tlie 
Iiliine. Order and tranquillity, prufriund even on tlie very 
edge o£ thc battle-field, athnded tlie marcli of the civilked 
armp whicli pnssed tiie Bidassaa And what it-ere tiie ini l i tn~ 
mttions? Nripoleon, rising even above Bimself, hurtled ugaiiis: 
tlie armed rnyriads opposed to liiin witli sucli a terrible enciyy, 
that ttti~oiigh ten times hia nuniber they were rolled bnck on 
every side in confusion and diarnuy. IVelli ngton aílvnnc~il 
wkhout n chcelr, victorioue in t v e y  hnttle, nlthougli onc liiilf 
of the veterans opposed to  hirn wouId huvo dccided tlie cun* 
paign rin the enatcrn froneier, Nor can thia be gainsaiQince 
Napoleodri w e e r  in thia mmp~ign mas onIy s t g c d  by the 
defcction of Lis brothcr-in-lam RIurat, and by tlie sickening 
trewliery of two marslials t o  mliom he had been prodiga1 of 
benefits. It Zs undeniriule tliat Wellington with sixty t h -  
snnd dnglo-Portuguesc effected in the south more than half a 
iiiillion of the nZlics coiild effect on the opposite side ol' 
Frnnoe; nnd yct Soult's nrmy on tho 10th of Novmnber was 
stronger tlinn thut with wliich Napoleon fought the battttla of 
Brieune. 
That -ment man w m  nmer deceivd by the simulated nego- 
tiation of the allied powem. Ee joined isgue with tliem to ~atiefy 
the French people that he w~ not avcrue fo peace, but liis 
iustructions to Cauluincourt tlie 4th of Janmry prove at onoe 
liis mgxity and fimness. a I tliink,' iie said, 'tliat the dies' 
good fnitli ~ n d  the mish of EngTand t o  make peace are doubt- 
fui; for my part I desire peace, biit it must be golid and 
Iionoureble. 1 hnve acccpted ttie 'oasia proposerl at h n k f o r t ,  
yct it is more than probable tlie nlliw l i n w  other notious. 
Tliese propositions are but a mask, tlie negotiations are placed 
under tlie influence of the rnilitary operations, a$ it is 
easy to foresee mliat tlie rxinseqirences of such a syatem mnst 
be: it is nceen.qary tliereforc to liskcn to ancl observe every- 
tfiing. It is not certnin even that you di be admittd 
to  the Iiead-qnarters of tlie alliea; tlie Russimuip and tlie Eng- 
Iisll watcli to  prevent any opeaing for explanation and recon- 
ciliñtion ii.ith tlie emperor of Austria. Yon must tlierefore 
enrlearour to  nacertnin tlie rcal vioma of thc nlliea; and let me 
knom d q  by duy tyv111tt you leüm that  1 m g  fmme instnia- 
tiuna for wliich at present 1 have no suse grounde.' 
Tlie intemnl state of France \vas more disquieting to his 
mind thnn forrign riegotintions or the numlmr of inwder~. 
"Lc rcpuhIiciins mcrc avcrsa to him ris tlir: restorer of 
monnmriy; yet tliey sbonld have feIt thnt tlio sovcreign w h o ~ e  
ruin  ras so engedy soiig1:t by tlie legitimnte lriilg and nobles 
of Europe could not be rcally opposell to liberty. The adv* 
cates of legt i rnng sliritnk from Iiirn as an n ~ r p c r ;  and a11 
tlioae tired of mar, and sbey wcre a mnjority of the nntion, 
judging fmm tho stupeiidom power of hia genius that he M 
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wly to will pesa tu attain it with security, bIamed his tanli. 
nem in negotiation. An unexpeded opposition to his wi~iiei 
was also displayed in the 1egisIat.ive body, ancl khe partiwns o[ 
the Bourbons were endetivoi~ring to form a great ounspir~q 
in favour of thah fitmily. There were many triiitors likewiac 
to him nnd tn tbeir country, rnen devoid of prineiple patriot. 
ísm or honour, wlio with extinctive hatred of s fniling muge 
plotted to thwart his projects for the defence of the nration,- 
in fine, the men of actiun and the rnen of theories mere nlike 
combined for miscliief, Nar is this outbreak of passion to ba 
wondered st, when it iri winsidered llow recently Napolaon hnd 
dopped the mlamhy of revolution and rehuilt the social and 
politid stnrcture in France. But of al1 who by their un. 
timely opposition t o  the emperor hurt their conntry, tiie most 
pernicious were those silly politicians, whom be so felicitousl~ 
deticribed as discuasing abstrud q 8 & m  of g w ~ t  wIm 
th batterhgam was d the goh.' 
Sucli however has bcen in al1 ngea the conduct of excited 
and (li~iturbed nations, and it aeems t o  be inhercnt in Iruman 
nature; because a savÍng p i c y  can only be undcmtood m7 
worlred to gaod by master-upirits, and they are few and iar 
between, their time on mrth short, their task immense. Theg 
have not time to teach, they must command, altliough tliey 
knom tbat pride rand ignoianoe and even honesty rvjU carp A$ 
tlie despotism whicli brin@ general safety. It was  ti& raii 
sliort-siglited impatience that drove HannibaI into exile, 
caused the asswsindion of Cesar, strewed tliorns beneath tlie 
gipntic footsteps of Cromwell. B raged fiercely in Spun 
against Wdlington, in h n c e  against Napoleon, antl aIwy3 
wit.11 the most &evona injury to tha several nations. Tima 
only hallewa human instihtions. Under that guamtee men 
will yicId implieit obcdicnce and raapcct to &o wildest caprieci 
o€ the most ~tupid tgrant that ever dispnced a throne; and 
wanting it thcy will cavil at rsnd rejcct t l~e  wiseat measures of 
tlie most eublime genius. The painful notion is thus excited, 
that if go~ernments have jast tlie degree of staliity and t r a ~  
quiility which they deseme, the peopIe of al1 nnations, mucha 
they mrty be oppressed, enjoy upon. an average of years pw 
ciaely b e  degeee of liberty they are fitted fm. Natiod 
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dismntents mark, aceording to their bittemesa and constancy, 
not so much the oppresriion of the rulers as the wl progress 
of the ruicd in civilization niid its attendant politimi know- 
ledge. 'cWen &om peculiar cimm~tcnceai those discontenta 
explodei in violeni re~0hti0n9, sliattering tlia fabric of society 
and giving free vent and activity to al1 the passioas and fdies 
of mankind, fortunate is the nation mhich possessea a Napo- 
leon or an OIirer CromwelI ' ts stq iruro tl&v of hSnfm,  
d h ,  yfKt to control cmd capad& i% mbdw tb fmEim of 
J w  acnd mcme.t& th f r w  ofreasdb govmmmt.' 
Great tw t h o ~ s  two mnderful men were in the field of 
battle, they were infinitely greater when they plawd them- 
selves in the seab of power, mling with the might and des- 
potism of genius essentiral to the completion of tlieir haly 
work. Wmliington cannot be jashly deemed compfimble t o  
either of those men; his situation wais af infinitely lea5 Wi- 
culty; and tliere ia no mson Do believe hia capmiby w ~ u l d  ~IRVB 
been equal to the emergencies of a more formidable crisi~i than 
he had to deal with. Wttsliington could not bave made him- 
self ma~ter, had it been nneem;silry and he so inclined, for he warr 
ncither the foremost general nor tlia forcmost shtesman of hi 
nation, Bis forbeamnce was n matter of necessity, and bis 
love of liberty did not prevent l i ia from beqneatliing his Iilack 
daveti to bis midow. 
Su& was h'apolaon's pituation : and as he m d  the signs oP 
the times tmly hc knew tliat in his milifary ski11 and the mga 
of the peasanta at tbo rawiges of the enemy ha mnet find the 
meana to ~xtricate liimself from his diifrculties, or rather to 
extricate his cutintry-for self lid no pltkoe; in his policy &ve 
as Iiis personal glurg was identifid with France and her 
prosperjty. Ncver bcfore did tho worId see tb man soaring 
ao high EO devoid of al1 selfish ambition. Let those who, 
honestlg aeeking truth, doubt this, atndy Napoleon cnrefuliy ; 
let them r e d  tlia record of his second abdimtion ptiblicihed by 
his brothcr Lucicn, t h t  stern republimn who rcfused Iring 
doms as the price of his principies, md tliey will doubt 
no longer, It is not homever witll these matters tliat this 
History has to ded, but d t h  the emperor's mwures affecting 
his lieutennnts on the Spanisli frontier o f  Franca. Ttiere dis- 
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&&ion t e  his government was extcnsivc fi.m I o d  causes. 
Tlie coascription ww peculimly hateful to tlie wild moun. 
taineem, wlio like most Ziordem clierj~h very independmk 
iiotion~; the war witli Englgland had m i n d  the foreign com- 
merce of tlie pent towns, aiid tlie d v m t a g ~  of increased 
tnffic by land on tlie erist m s  less direchly felt in tlie south- 
thcre eilso tlie recollection of kllc Vendenn strug-$e stilllingered 
and the part.isrrns of tlie Bourbons had many comex!onx 
But the cliief danger arose from the politic eonduct of Wel. 
lington which, ofering no cause of anger and much of privrite 
admntage t o  the pmple, gave no hope of Xnsurrection from 
sufferlngs. 
While Franca was in thia state England presenhcl a scene 
of universnl exdtfition. Tory politim werc triumplinnt, oppo- 
sition in parlrllnment wns nerarly cnislid by cvents, thc prm 
was silbducd hy pemecution ar in tlie pay of thc miniatcm; hnd 
thil lattcr 6 t h  nndisg~hed joy hniied the coming mommi 
when arisfocmtic tymnny w a s  t o  be firrnIy estalilished i n  
England. Tlie most enormous subsidies and military supplia 
were poured into the continent, and an act was passetl to 
enahle tbree-fourths of the militia to senre abroad. T3iq 
were not Iiowever very f o d  to volunteer, anrl w new army, 
which ought to b a ~ e  reiaforeed Welhgtan, was sent under 
the commsnd of Graham to mpport tlie insurrection of BOL 
lmd. I t  m fhere on1y engaged in trifling or nnmiecessful 
opmtionsi in no mmner affecting the peat objects of tlie 
war, and rnemwhile thc irnporbce of Wellington'a a m y  md 
viems wae overlookd or misundentood. The miniskrers still 
pressed hG removing t u  another quarter of Europe; and at tho 
same time, instigater1 by ttlie amliassadora of the allied soab 
reigns, were continually nrging him to pnsh Ks opcrritiong 
with more Pigour in Francc! as if be was tha man whe had 
done Ienst ! 
Eis letters were thmefore fillcd with strong well-founded 
cemplninta t h t  hh army m neglectd He had, with n 
political view and t o  meet the wisliea o£ the allied sovereipq 
backed by tlie iniportunities of his omn pvernment, placed 
himelf in ra confined and difficult di&& of France, w i w  
hia operations ñrere cramperl loy rivera and fortreses, and by 
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a stmng army accupyhg strong positions on his fronk and 
flmh. Unlibla t o  acf at al1 in met wenther, lie mas dqendmt 
npon tho ocean for ~upplies and reinforcements, and upon the 
Spmish authorities for hospifaIs d6pCits and couimunic8tions. 
Numbers were sequisite to balance the adwntage~ tlie enemy 
had in the mnformation of the country and in the fortresses; 
money dso wns wanted for eapplies; wliich he couid not carry 
with him and must p y  for exnctly to woiíl insurrcction and 
ruin to tlie politiml objciject in ~ m v .  Hs had unrlertrtlren tlrs 
invasion of Frarice at khlie express desire of tlie government, 
~ e t  the latter were alike ignorant of its importan* and of 
the means to accomplish it; at one moment urging progres 
beyond rewon, ~k annother rcady to chango lightly what they 
had propoaed ignornntly; thcy could not comprchcnd the 
mture of the great tide of events on wIiich they floated rather 
thau aailed, M'ellington wa& forced day by day t o  teach them 
the vrtlue of their own schemes, and tlie true bearing of ths 
poiitical and military a a i m  they pretended to direct ! 
' Aasurc,' he m o t e  on tlie 2lsh of Dcrxmher ta lord Bathumt 
in reply to one oT thoir ill-foundod remonstrances-'assure. 
the Rus& mkassador tliere is notting 1 can do to f o m d  
the general iuterest thnt 1 mil1 not do P Wmt do thep reguirel 
1 am a h d y  further sdvanced on the French tenitory than 
any of the nllied powerri; and better prepmed to talte advan- 
hgo of any opportunities wliich rnight ofcr na a consequeneo 
of my ewn ~ituation or of their procee&ngs.-t In mititary 
operntions there are some tliirtp which cm not be done, and 
ons is to move troops in thia cuuntry during or immediately 
nfter a violent fall o£ min. To nftcmpt it will bo to losc 
niore men thm can be replaced, a gvilty waste o£ life." 
' Tlie proper scene of  nction for the army vas undoubtedy 
a quesiion for the government to decide; but with thirty 'chou- 
snnrl men in the Peninsuln, be hnd for five yenrs hdd two hun- 
dred thousnnd of Napaleon's bcst soldicrs in elrccl;, since it 
mas ridiculous to  snppoae tliat the f5pankids ancl Portupwe 
could have resisted for a moment i f  tlie British troopfi h d  
&en ivithdraivn. The French zrmiw actually employed 
againeit him could not be l a s  thm onc hnndrcd thousnnd 
men, more' if he includd parrisons, and €he French news- 
papers qwke of odem to f m  n h ~ h  rereserve of one hnndred 
tliot~and at Bordenux. WM there any man weak enough tu 
suppoae onethird of the nnmber fiwt mentiond would h 
employed against the Spaniards md Portngume if the Bitbh 
were witlidramn? They would, if it were an object with 
Buonaparte to conquer the Peninsula, slnd he w w l d  in that 
m e  mcceed; brrt he warr more likely to give peace to the 
Feninada, and turn sg-ainst the allied sovereigns bis two hun- 
i l d  thousmd men, of which one hundred thousand were such 
troops as their armiea bad not yet dealt with The war evey 
day affered a crisis the resuH of which mi$ affect the world 
for agcs, md t o  change the scene of operationa for the Briti~h 
omy would rendcr it bmpable of fighting for four months, 
even if the cicene were Holland: md it wodd epen then bs a 
deteriorated rnachine,' 
' Tlie ministem rnigbt maaonably ask how by remaining 
where he was he could induce Napoleon t o  make peme. Tbe 
a m e r  wss ready. He lield a commanding situation on the 
most vulnerable frontier of Prmce, probahly the only vulner- 
able one; rand if he could put twenty thoasand Spanlards in 
activiv, and he could do it if he had muney and was properJy 
supported by the fleet, Bayonne the only forh.ess on tbe 
fmntier, if it could be called a fortresa, would fa11 to him in a 
sliort tima If hc could put forty thousancl Spnniardri in 
motion his posta wonld rioon be on the Gamnne; and did aoy 
man believe that Xapoleon would not feel m amy in soch a 
poaition more than be would feel tIiirty or forty thousand 
Britisli troops Iaying siege to one of his fortresses in HolIandP 
The resources in men and money of wEch the emperor wonid 
be thns deprived, arrd the loss of reputation, wouId do ten 
times more to procure peace than ten a d e s  on tlie side of 
Flanders. But if be was right in believing a ~trong Bourbon 
party existed in France and pmprrndemted in the sonth, what 
miachief would not an advanco to the h n n e  do Xapoleonl 
What ~acrifioe~ wouId he not make t e  gct rid of tha d a n p ! '  
' It was for the govemment nat for him t o  dispose of the 
nntion's resouxoes, he had no rigbt +.o @ve m opinion upon 
the subject; but military operations in HoIland rrnd in tbe 
Peninsula c d d  not be maintained at the mme time with Bíi- 
tkh troops, one or otbw mwt be @ven np; the British 
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d i t a r y  estabSi1iment was not equal to  maintain two m i e a  
in the field. He hd begun tha recent campaign with aeventy 
thousand Anglo-Pofiug-uese, and if the men got fmin the 
English militia nnd the Portnguese recruits wliich he cxpectcd 
had bwn added t o  his foxce, wen thongh the Gemans were 
removed fmm his amy aocording to the ministers' plan, Le 
miglit bave taken the field early in 1814 wikb eighty thousand 
rnen. That was now impossible. The formabion o£ a Hlano- 
rerian army mas the most rearionsable plan of acting on the 
continent, liut the withdrnwvd o€ tho G e m n s  woulcl rerluce 
liis Zotm t o  fifty thousmd mm, unless he received real and 
efficient aesistance to bring np tlie Portuguese recruits, This 
would inerme liis numhsrsi t a  fif~y-five or even sixty thousand 
if hk own wounded reco~ered wel1 and he liad no more battlca, 
but he wouId even then be twentp thousand less t h n  he had 
calcnlattterl npon, and it maa certain thnt if the government 
extended tlieir oporations to  other countrics n m  menns must 
h pnt in rtctivity or the war mmt be stinted on tAe oId 
~tage. Ha did uot desire to  complain, but every branch in 
the service of tbe Peninsula was alresay stinted, especially in 
what c o n m e d  the navg and the suppliee which carne directIy 
fiom Ihgl~nnd !'
While thus combating tlie falrie viewa of the English mb'met 
as to the genemil date of d a i m  he had also t o  struggle witL 
itsi negligente and even opposition to his measurea in details. 
The clatbeg of the Rpnnich troops and the p a t  coats of the 
Britisli soldieiw for 1813 mere not ready in J a n u q  1814, 
beceuse the inferior departments could not comprehend that 
new ricenes of exertion required nem means; and khe soldiera 
bad ih brave the winter h l f  naked, drst on t h e  mowy mwn- 
taina, then in the more cLlIing damps of tlie Iom conrrtsg 
about Brayonne, The clothing of tlie Brikish soldiem for 1814 
sliou2d have arrived in the end of 1813, when the m y  lying 
inactive near tbe coa& by reason of the bad neatlier mdd have ' 
received and fitted it withaut &ficulQ. It did not arrive 
untit tlae t o o p  werc in progres4 t a n d a  tlie interior of 
France; and then, no mertns of traasport; exihing, many of the 
best regiments were compelled to xeturn te tlie ceast to remive 
it, and the arrny, aa will be seen, liad to fight a gieat battle 
mithou t t h a  
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Wellington Ziad on enkring Prance issued n. proelamation 
promisiog protection to persons md property; this was con- 
strued by tbe Prench to cover their vessels in tlie Nivelle 
when the battle of that nrime gwve the allies St. Jean de Luina, 
Sncrificing personal profit b &e good of the service, he 
ulrnitted fhia claim as tcnding to rendcr thc people amicable; 
but it cicinshed witli the prize-money pretensions of lord Reith 
who comrnandecl tho fleet of which Collier'a quadron fomed 
a detnchd portion ; nnd tliougli the serious evila apringing 
from defnnlt of naml nssistancc hntl bcen treatetl as o€ slight 
iuportance, A trifling pemond p i n  for the navy excited a 
mawellous nctivity nnd vigorous intcrference on the pwt oi 
&e governmcnt. Upon these mhjects, and others of tt E0 
vexatious nature affecting his opemtions, he repeatedly and 
forcibly declmed his discontent during the montlis of December, 
Jebnuary and Eebruary. 
Ae t o  the naval affairs,' he said, the reports of the number 
of ~llipri ou tlie strttions, striking off those coming out and 
ping Iiome, mould ~ h o w  hether he had just ground of oom- 
plaint; and, whatever their numbers, tlierr! iernainetl the right 
o£ complaint because they did not perform the scrvice required, 
Tha French liad recomenced their oomt nmigation from 
Bardesux t o  Bayonne, and if tlre bloclrade of Sritona hd 
been maintdned the plaoe would liave been f o r d  to siirrendet 
s t  an early period. The praclamation of prohection whicli he 
h d  issued, and the licences whicli lie Bad granted to French 
veamlg cvcry sct of that dwcription, and two-thirda of tlie 
scts which he performed cvery day couId not he knew be con- 
Bidered of nny a d  8s dccting thc lring's govcrnment, unIess 
approred of and codrmed by the pxince s~gent;  a ~ d  be h e w  
fhat no power short of ths repnt's could save the property of 
French subjeds on the mas fratn the Eritisli navg. For that 
reason he had requested the sanction of tlie government t o  the 
sea passporh which he hatl p n t e d .  His procla-mation d 
protectionhad been constnied,wliether riglitfully or wrongfuIly, 
to protect the Freinch ships in the rivers ; bis personal interest, 
greater $han others, would lead him to dcny tliis, but he 
sacrificed 1ii8 profit to the general pod .  
Were lord Keith md sir George Collfer, becauso the late& 
1818.] BOOK XXID.-CHAP. 5. 41 
brappend to hafe a brig or two cmizing off the coa&, to claim 
as prizes al1 the vessels lying in wery river which the army 
might pass ia its operations? md this to the detriment of the 
cause mhich required the strictmt renpact for private prapertgr. 
For the Test five yeam he hncl been acting in the confidenw 
t h ~ t  his oondnot would be ~pproved of md mpported, and he 
concluded it wouId be so still ; but he waa placed in a nwel 
situation and mked for 1-1 dviwi tu determine wliether lord 
lFeith and the channel Aeet were to be cunsitlered as engaged 
in a conjoint expedition with the army nnder his command 
@nst the aubjeeta of Francq neither hrsving any specific 
instructions from government and tbe fleet having nothfng 
t o  do with tlio operations by 'hd, Bo only rcquired tlmt 
fleet to give him a free communication with tlie mast of Xpain, 
and prevent the enemyh sea communication between the 
&nome and the Adour, and tliis last was a part of its duty 
before the army ai-rivwl. WM his proclamation of pmtaction 
to hold p o d  as regarded the ~ h i p ~  in the Svers? He desired 
ta have it sanctioned by tha princc rcgcnt, cw that he d g h t  
be permitted to isaue another declaring tbt it m of no 
value.' 
This remongtrance caused lord Reith to relinquish hi~l clairn~, 
and admira1 Penrose waa sent to command upon the station 
instead of Collier The immediate intercourse mith .the navy 
was thus ameliorated by tbe superior p w e r  of fhis officer, whe 
was  rernarkable for his miaviky; yet the Iicences givcn to 
French vmsels were strongIy condemned by tlie guvernment, 
and rendered null; for a e  find Wellington again complaining 
that he had granted t h m  only in bopes o f  d r d n g  money 
and aupplies fmm fiance, and of intercsting tlie Frcnch mer- 
mntiie men to uid tlie army ; but he fenred tlie govemment 
were not aware of, and &d not feel the difficultiea in wliich he 
was placed at all times for want of money, and judged his 
m m m s  without d ~ e r t i n g  to the necessity mhich occasioned 
them; hcnm thcir freqncnt disapprobntion of wliat he did.' 
Strmge al1 this m y  sound t o  those who seeing the veat diiEre 
the fulnwa of his glory Iinve Iiem iiaccustomed to regara liim 
as tlie stnr of Englmdg grestness; but those wYio at that 
period frequcnted the society oof ministers knem wcU thnt 
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he was then lookcd npon by those eielf-mficicnt mcn nri a person 
whose view~ were wild and vidonary, requinng the corrobora- 
tion of older and wiser heads before they muld be a060IIt~d to. 
'I'eal evw at the eleventh Iionr wae the giant Wellinggn thna 
meaaured by the poIitical dwtarfs. 
He gabed sometliing by making San Jean de Luz a free 
port for al1 nations not at war with Frasce, but hi~i financia1 
slbation m nearly intolerable; and nt the rnoment of greakt 
pressnre, colonel Bunliury,under secretary of state, was sent out 
t o  urge amongst other mattem the d8imilty of providing 
specie, and the expcnse of conveying forap for Iiis cavalry 
from Enghd and Ireland. One hundred thousand pounda a 
month mr~ to be the maximum of apecie mipplied, when be 
was so ovemhelmed wikh debe he coulcl ~carcely quit liis houe 
for the multitnde of creditors hesieging his door. In reply 
he thua deseribcd his poriitioa. 
'Some of hia mulcteem were twcniy-six months in arreas, 
and recentIy, iinstigated by 13ritish rnerchnnts, 
Wdm@on" thep bad beoome so damorou~ tht rnther tlian 
h p a t c l i a .  
lose their services he h d  given tliem bilis an tlie 
Treasnry for a part of tlieir claims; though he knew tliey~~ould 
aell these billa at a discount h the s h b ,  who hsd urged them 
to  be thna BO importunate, snd who were saiting at tlie ports 
t o  tdce advantage of the public clistrases: tlis very dan- 
gerous meaanre he desired not to rep& It might be trne, 
that the supply o£ one hundred thousand ponnds a month had 
k n  even execeded for some time pest, hInit it was incontestable 
that the English amy and al1 its depmtrnentq and the 
Spmish and Porhtgaese armiea were iat the mornent petrnlyzed 
for mant of money. The arrears of p q  to tlie soldiers was 
entering the ~eventh month, the debt wm immense, and the 
king's cngdgements with the 6panish and F O F ~ U ~ B S ~  gwem- 
menta wero not fulfilled, Indcbted in evey prart of Spain 
+ he was k o m i n g  so in France; the prico of nll oommoditiea 
incressing in proportion ta tho M a y  of payment, t o  tlie M- 
culty of getting food at d, m,nd to the want of creditinto which 
al1 tlie departments of the arrny bd fallen. Of two hundred 
tlioumnd dollars givm to 13eresford for the pay of liii tmopa 
cm account , of the Portugueae subsidy he hd been forced to 
hke  back fifty thonsand fo keep the Spanlarda together, and 
WM even t h m  fmd to witbhold ten t'housnnd to prevmt the 
Briti~h cavnl ry from peri~hing. Money to pay tbe Xpaniards 
had sailed from Cadie, but the vessel conveyingit, and another 
mntxining the ~oldiwd great-coatg were by tLe Admimlty 
hrrangements obliged to go first t o  Coruña, and neither had 
arrived there in Jannay although the mong had been ready 
in October. Bnt the sh$ o€ mar dwigned to c ~ m y  it did not 
amive at Cadiz unta the end o€ December. Xixteen thoiisiand 
Spanish troops were thus renrlered nseless becau~e without pay 
tbey oouid not be tntsted in Fsance.' 
a The oommissary-in-chief in Englnnd had been replarly in- 
formed of the state of the supplies of the military dieat and of 
the wants and prospecta of the army, bnt those manta were not 
nttended to. The menthly hundred thousand pounds spoken of 
as thc m a h u m ,  even if lt hrid been given regularly, would not 
cwer tho ordinay expensea ofths trompa; and t l i~re were bcsidea 
tlie sutisidies uther outlaya requiriqready money, such as meat 
for the soldiers, hospital exponses, commissariat iabourera, and 
a variety of minor enpgements. The l'ottuguese government 
had been rduced t o  a monthly snm of two liundretl thousand 
dollam out of a suhsidy o€ two rnillions sterling. The Spmni~h 
government got what they wuld out o£ a subsidy of one 
million, And when money wm abtained for the govemmeut 
in the markets of Lisbon and Cadiz, it carne not in due time, 
because, such were the Admiralty arrangements, there were no 
ships tO con~ey the tmasure te Glie nortli coa4 of Spain. The 
whole fium which had passcd throngh the rnilitary chwt dnring 
the pmt yesr waa scarcely more t h n  tmo millions four hnndred 
thousanil poundq out of mhich part of the subsidies hrad heen 
paid. This was quite inadcqunte; the gowrnment hed demred 
liim to push hia operations to the Garonne during the minter; 
be was prepmd to  do ~o in every point excepting money, and 
he h e 8  the p t e s t  advantages wouId nccrne from ~uch a '' 
movement, bnt he codd not stir. llis posta were ~lready so 
d i h n t  from the coa& that 1tis means d tmmgort mere daiIp 
degtroyed by the janrneys) he had not a shilling $o pay for 
anything in the country and his credit was gana He had 
been oliliged pripately to borrow the expeniie of a singIe 
c d e r  sent t o  general Clinton. It mne not his duty to suggest 
the fitting mmmrea fer relief, bnt it was obvious th t  an imn-te. 
diate and large supply from England was nwessriry, and that 
ship shorild be provided to convey thak wrích was obtained at 
Lisbon iind Cadis to the amy.' 
Such mas the denided stnta of the vihrions Tellii@on at 
a time when milliona, and the worth of more millions mere 
beiag pauretl by tlie EngIish ministcrs into the continent; 
when erery pctty Gcrman sovcrcign, partisan, or robber mho 
r a i d  n band or a cry apiinst hpolcon, mns oupplied t o  
satiety, Bnd al1 tliis time thero was not in Englnnd one 
pulilio salay rducetl, one contract check~l, one a b u ~  cor- 
re&$ one public samnt w h k d  for ncgligence; not ri 
wr i te~  dared to  expose the mischief Iest lie shodd he crushetl 
by pcrsecution; no minister w ~ e d  to c1ai.m and to  receive the 
boasting congratnlntione of the toriea; no wliig lid sen~e to
discover or spirit t o  clenounce the iniquitous system-the 
voiw oE repreliension was never hmrd from that sdfisli fmtion 
unlesa it mre in meering contempt of tEic general rvhose 
mighky pniüs  mtained Zngland undcr tliis Ioad of  folly. 
Nor were these diñiculties al1 that lie liad t o  contend with. 
WLie the Portupese regenq mithheld liis reinforcemenks 
tlre duke of York insisted upon WitIidrn~ving his provisional 
battalions, which, being h11 composed of ola soldiem ths 
rem& of regiments reducad by tlie caeunltics of mnr, wcre 
of more vaue in a whkr mrnpaign tbm three times their 
numbers of new men. Por the serviees of the Englisli militia 
regiments he bad no desire; thep posscsserl, he said, al1 the 
worst fnalts of the regalm and some peculiar ta themsdves 
besides; mhat hc degired wm hhat cight or tcn tliousand mea 
should be drnfted from thcm to flll np his ianks ; hecould then 
withont much injury let liis foreip bnthlions bc trbken amay 
to reform B EEanoveritnn anny on the oontincnt. Ancl thig 
" plan he wns inclined to, beclbwe the Gcmnns, brave and 
stiong rioldim, wem yet addicted to desertion and in that 
particular set a bsd example t o  the Britisli : tliis suggesiiion 
ww however ilismgmded, aud othor reinforcement~ were 
promised tu him. 
3ut the most serigitg of aU the rrecondary vexatiom sprung 
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%m&, amd t h  d& of the m, aps d e  l o  d& 
wpm tL of m fm &pwan.b  idiugdzcals, wlio Imw 
+kd a nmmuw wmnemmy IMpd 7 w h  &ut advmh'q 
to its o@eets or mmpmw, m d  w e l y  w12h o &m 10 t h e i ~  
per8m.d intBrmta d m v e n k a '  
They mrried it into execut.ian nlso with tho utmost hard- 
ness caprice and injustice, reprdless of the loss of ships and 
lives which mnst folloa; and f iudy  desired lilm t o  sermquish 
the harbow and town of hntandw nltogether as a dEpGt1 
However hii vigorous remonskrances sGopped this nefarious 
proceeding in time t o  avert the danger which it menaced. 
Be it rememberd now, that these dmgers and difiiculties, and 
vexations, although related in snccession, happened, not one 
after anather, but altogetlier; that it nas when crossing t h ~  
Bidassq b d n g  through the mounbin fortifimtions o i  
Soult, pasaing the Nive, fighting Ghe btrttles in front uf 
Baponne, and when still peater aud more intricatc comBinc 
tions were b be arranged, that a11 theae vinls of folly and 
enmity were poured upon his I i ed .  Who then shall xefuse 
t o  admire the undaunted firrnness, the nnwearied temper and 
GgiInnoe, the piercing judgment with which h0 steewd his 
pllant veme1 with ia flowing sd unhud through thia b o w i i i  
storm of pwion, thh tumuLtuous sea of foUy, 
CONTXNUdTIOlF OF THE WAR W THE EA- PbB2b 
OF SPMN. 
Waw general C7inton mcceeded Iord William Bentinck, h i ~  
whols force, cornposed oE the Anglc-Ricilians, Whittinghnm's 
and Garsfield's Spaniiirdtl, and two bathlione of Roclie'rr divi- 
sion, did not furnish quite nincteen thonsand men 
nnder arme. Copona, blochding Mequinenza, AppcnmL 
Zerida and Monzon, and having garriaona in Cardona and 
the Seu d'Crgel, the only plltoea in his poeiiession, could no$ 
bring more thau nine thowmd men into tlie field. Eliu brul 
nomlnslIy twenty-fi~e thous~nd, but thi inclucled Sarsfield's 
and Roche'ri troeps, the greater part of which were with 
Clinton, It incIuded l&cwim the bandri of Villa Cnmpa, 
Duran and the Empecinado, scattered in Cmtillq Aragon and 
Valencia, and actinp wcording to  the mprice~ of their chiefa. 
Bia foroe, daily diminishing nlso from the extreme unhealtlii- 
ness of tlie connt ry about Tortoza, was ~carcely sufficient to 
rnaintsh the blockadm of the Frencli fortmaea bgond the 
Ebro. 
Copons' a m j  having no bwe bnt the mountaina wbout 
Kch and Monsemtj having no magazinefi or dép6ts or place 
oE sarms, having very little wtillwy and mcarcely any (t&\*alry, 
liwrd as it could from day to day; in likc mannm iilived 
Sarsfield's nnd Whittingham's troopa, and Glinton's army waa 
cLiefiy fed on salt provisiona from ths shipa; the two former 
having no rneans of tmnssporb were unatile ta make even one 
day'~  masch with ease, they were continualIy upon the point 
o€ starvation and eould never be reckoned ns a moveaMe 
foroe. Nor indeed could the Psglo-8iciliianri, owing to their 
sctuity meam of transpod, mmake abow twa or t)iree marches 
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from the sea; and tlley were at tliis time more than m l l y  
hampered, h h g  witliout pay and altut ont from their prin- 
cipal d é p b  tst Gibraltar and Malta: by plrgue at tthe first, 
yellow fever at the aecond. Tlie coiuagc aud discipline of 
the British and Germans set aside, it would be difficult tu 
find armieri less efficient for un offensive mmpaigu tlmn those 
of the dlies in Catnlonia. Clinton'a command over rlie 
SpanTarda was restricted t o  Wliittingl~arn'a and Samfield'a 
tmops; and thotigh he strove to conciliatfi Copons, tliat 
generalyo indolente and incapacity impcded or bnffled dl 
nseful mawra. . 
. This analysis shows that Elio being cntirely cngnged in 
V~Iencia, and Sarsficld and WIiittingIiam unprovidcd with 
thc mmna of movcment, tlie army of  Copons and tho Anglb 
Sicilians, together furnisliiag mhen tbe posta and escorta and 
the Iabonrem employed on the fortificatiuns of rfarqona were 
deducterl not more t h n  eigliteen tliousand meu, were tho 
only troops ta oppose Xuchet, who nitlrout drawing a man from 
bis pxrisona conld a t h k  them with thirty tliousanrl Copons 
and Uinton bd also Werent bases and lines of retreat; tbe 
5rst depended upon the mountxins and the interior for 
semirity and mbsistence, the wond on Taragwa, and the 
fleet. The only mode o l  combining on a single line mas to 
make Valencia a commen base, and throwing brilrges over 
the Ebro constmct workti to defend them. This wm m m -  
mended by Wellington to lord Williram nnd ta Clinton; but 
tlie former had seved times lost his bsdges, paray from thc 
rapidity of the stream, pnrtIy fmm the ~ t t i v i t ~ r  of the g d s o n  
of Torhza; md for (3linton the difimrfty rvas cnf innd  by 
distante; becnuse Tamgona, wliere al1 his rnnteiinls wert 
deposited, was sixty milca from Ampost4 and al1 liis artificers 
were required to restore the defences of the former p l w  
The blockaxle of Tortozra was therefore dways lialila to he 
raised, ami the troops employed there exposed to a ciudrlen 
and fatal a t k k ,  since Bucl~et, sure to  aepaxat~ the AngIo- 
Sicdiana from Copons arrben lie advanced, couId penetrate 
between them; and while tile former rallied at Tnragona and 
the latter at Igualada his mmch wmld be direct npon Torhza 
He could thus either carry off hii strong garrison, or paasing 
the Ebro Xiy the Xiridge of the fortress; move *out Tet or 
hinclranw upon PenisooIa, XHguntnm, and Valencia, driw Elio 
back to Alicant, collect his garrisons and return tori powerful 
te be meddled &h. 
This s h t e  of affairs Ied Wellin,$an to recommend that the 
blockade of Turtoza should be given up, and the two armies 
acting on their own pecrrliai linee shonld harass the enemy's 
flanks and rear altemntely if he attacked either, but together 
if ho m o v d  npon Tortozn. Te bcsicga or bIoclrade thnt 
place with snfety it wap nocessary to tlirow two britlges over 
tlie Ebro below, to enable tlie &es to avoid Eucliet by 
either bank when he sliouId succour the place, as he wm mre 
t o  do; but as it was essentid Copons shonId not ahndon 
Cntdonia, it wouId be sdvisabh to m&e Tanigona the point 
of retreat f o i  both amiea in the 6iot indance, after wbich 
they codd sepamtc and infcst the Frcnch rcar. 
Thiiilring the difimilty of bcsicging Tortozn hpcmble ,  he 
desired it ~hould be well considered beforeliand, and, i£ 
invasted, that the troops should be entrenchd Al1 hia 
Instnictions tended towarda defence, and were foauded upon 
his con-riction oT the weak nnd dmgerous posftion of the 
aUies ; get ha believd them t o  have more rcfiources thnn theg 
redIy liad, and to be superior in number to the French: a 
great error aa nlrcady shomn. Notliing tlicrefore coiild be 
more prsposteruus tlian Bucliet'a alarm for tlie frontier of 
Fraace at this time; his persona1 reluctante was the onIy bar 
t o  ailling Soult either indirectly by marching on Torhza 
anrl Valencia, or directly by adopting that marshal's p a t  
project o€ uniting the two armies in hriigoa hdeeci Clin- 
ton felt the difficulties of his own situation so atrongly 
tliat he only retained tlie commmtnd from a strong sense of 
tluty; md Wellington even recornmendcri tlirat tlie Anglo- 
Sicilian army should be broken up and employed in o'ther 
places. Suclzet's innctivity was also tlw more injuriow to 
tlle intcrests of his sovereign, hccausc any rcvcrsc or appcar- 
ance of reverse te the dies would at tliis time havc gone 
nigh ta destroy tlie allianw Lietween Spain and Englttnd; bt 
personal jealousy, and the preferente @ve11 to local momentaiy 
interests before general considerations, hurt the French cause nt 
al1 periodri in the Peninsula antl cnabled the allia to mnquer. 
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&ton bd no thoughts of besieging Tortoza, his effurts 
were directed to the obtaining a secure place ~f -E; re4 
despite of Ziia intrinsic meahess  he resolved to show a con. 
fidenb front, hoping tlius to  keep Suchet at am'a length, In 
this view he endenvonred to render Taragona once more defen. 
xible notwithstrandig the niiieteen brenches wliich had bcen 
broken in its wnlls; but this work was tedious, becaase he 
depended for materiale upon the Spanish authorities. Tbus 
immersed in diffimkies he could make little change in hia 
positions, which were genemlly aboat tbe Campo, 8nmfieldb 
division only being puslied to Villa Franca; 8uchet meariwhile 
heId the Llobregoit, and apparently to colour Iiis arisertion aa 
ta the &ren$h of tlie allieg d e r e d  CIinton to remajo in 
hnquillity. 
T o d  the end of October rcportg that the French were 
Oebober. concentrating, for w h ~ t  prpom m8 not known, 
csused the English gencrnl, alithough Tnrepna 
was still indefensiblg to make n fomarcl rnovment. He 
dared not provoke a bnttle, but nnwilling to yield the iresonrm 
of Villa Franca and other ditricts puslied an advnnoed guard 
t o  the fomer pIace. He even fixed hia bed-quarters there, 
appearing rmdy to figlit; yet his trmps were so dispoaed in 
sumeasion at Arbog Pendrills, nnd Torredembarra, that be 
mnId rebreak without dishonour if the French advanced in 
force; OF could concentrate at Villa Franca in time to  b a m  
tlieir flank ant1 rear if they atiemptd to  cnrry off their garri- 
sons on tlie Segre. Xuciiet then marle s e v e d  demonstrations, 
sometimes agninst Copoas sometimes against Clinton, bnt 
the latter maintained his offensive attitude with firmness, rind 
cven in opposition ta Wellington'a i m p l i d  opinion th t  the 
line of the Ebro waa the most suitctble t o  his wenkness; for 
he liked nut to nbandon Tnrapna, the rcpniis of ~vhich wcre 
now advancing though alowly to cornpletion. His psrseyer- 
ance mas crowned rvith success; he pmscrved the few re. 
sourcea Ieft for t h e  support of the Spanish troops, and furnicbed 
Suchet with that sembl~nce of excuse wliicli he desired for 
keeping aloof Irom hult .  
In thk manner October and November were passed, but on 
tlie 1 s t  o€ Dcccmber tle Frencli generd attemptd 
to surprise the alliea' cantonmenta at 'Villa Franw 
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aud Bcjer, with a view to maslr +he mmch of a large convoy 
coming from Uppr Cahlonio, to Barcclonn : they tlienresumed 
their foimer positiom, and at tlie same time Boult'~ and Wel- 
lington's letterri nnnoundng th0 defection of tbe Nrtssau 
Iiattalions arrived. WeElington's cama first, and enclosd a 
communicstion from coloneI Kmse t o  his countryman colonel 
Meder, whe waa seming in Barcelona and as h a a  snpposetl 
willing to abandon the French, But wlien Clinton by the aid 
of Msago transmitted the Ietter to Meder, that officer handed 
it to Habert w11o had mooeeded Maurice Mathieu in the eom- 
m d  of the city. Al1 the German regiments, pfincipally 
crrpalry, wcre immediately d i m e d  and sent to France; Seve 
roli'a Italians were at the Fame time recalled ta Ihly íind 
a nurnber of French soldiers, selected to fi11 the wasted ranks 
of the imperial gua~ds, rnarcii~d with them, Two thonsmd 
oficem and soldim mcre l i k c ~ i 3 0  dctacherl to the d 6 p h  of 
thc inkrior to orpixc  the conscripts of the new lcvy dcstined 
te rciuforco the army of Cahlonia; nnd besidea these draft! s 
ttiousand gens-d'itrmes hiilwrto emploged on tbe Spanisrl fron- 
tier in aid of the regular troops mere witladrawn. Suchet tliiis 
Iost sewn thousand veterane, yet he luid stilI an overwhelming 
pomer c o m p a d  to the allies. 
It wm in this state of affairs that the dnke af ;5an Car104 
arri~ed secretly at the fiench head-quarten on hismyto &dnd 
witli the treaty of TTaIenqriy. Copons Knem thiq and waq 
only deterred from openly accecling to the views of the French 
emperor and concIuding a rnilitmy convention, hy thc decirled 
coiiduct of tlie Cortcq ~ n d  thc ascendnncy di icl i  Wellinghn 
liad obtnincd over him in comrnon with the otbcr Spunish 
ofñcers; an necendmcy which liacl not escapped Soult'u sngacity; 
for he ezrly ñ m e d  the l?rmcIi. minider that notliing could Ire 
expecled from tliem wliile mder the powerfuI spelI of the 
English general. Clinhn, geiting informatien that the French 
troops were diminished in numbers, especially in Eront of Bir- 
eelona nnd on the Zlobregat, proposd b pnss thet river md 
invest B~rceJona, iif Copms, wlio waE in the mountains, would 
nndertnlre to provision Sarsfield's divlsion md keep tlie French 
troops betwecn Barcelona and (Tcrona in checlr. For thg 
purpom he offcred the aid of 8 C3panish regiment of cavalrg 
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which Elio hnd lent for the operations in Cntalonin; but 
Copons, infiuenced by San Carlos' mission or knowing tho 
enerny were reslly stroager t h n  Clinton imagine4 declareir 
he m unable t o  hold the French troops between Qeiona and 
Barcelona in check, and could not provision either hrsfieldg 
division or the regiment of  mvalry. Re suggcsted instead, a 
comlrined attack upn  seme of Suchetk posta on tbe Llobre- 
gat, promising to send Manso to Villa Franca to confcr upon 
tlie exeeutioa Clinton's proposnl was mdc early in January 
yet it m w  the mirlJle of that moiith before Copons roplied; 
and then he onlp sent h1anso to offer tlie zid of his Srigde in 
a combined attack upon two thousand Frencli who were at 
Molino del Rey. It. was however at last arrnnged that bianso 
should af daybreak on the 16th seize tl ie higli ground above 
Molino on tlie Ieft o€ the Llobregtat, to interwpt the enemfs 
retieat npon hrcdona while tho Anglo-Sicilians fe11 upon 
tliem from tlie rig1it bank. 
Suocess depended upon Clintnn's remaining quiet until ths 
moment of execntion, nad he coulcl only use the troops imme- 
diate'ly in band abaut VilIa Franca, ie al1 ,llx thousand men 
with three piecesi of artillery; but with these he made a night 
rnarch of eighteen miles, and waa close to the ford of Sun 
vicenh two rnilcs bclow Gha fortified bridge of Xolino del 
Rey liefore daylight. The Frencli were trunquil and unsus- 
picions, and he mxionsly bu$ vainIy awaited the signal o f  
Manso'# arriva!. When the drq broke, the Prench piquets at 
San Vicente descr+g bis troopa commencerl a, skirmish, and 
at the snme timo s eolumn with a picco of rutillcry, coming 
from MolinoJ advanoed to attack him thinlring there wris only 
a patmlliig detachment t o  deaZ witli, fur he haJ. conwald his 
main botly. Thus prmed he opened his guns per foroe mil 
crippled the French piece, whereupon the rejnforcementa 
retired hastily to thc entrenchments at hIolino; he could then 
wi1y have forced the pnssw at the ford and attncked the 
enemfa works in tlie rear; but tIiis wuld not have ensured 
tl ie capture of their troops, nhrefore he still itwaited Manso's 
arrivitl, relying on tbat partisan's zeal and knowledge o f  the 
cnuntr~í He appcard at lmt, not ns agreed ,upon nt St. 
Filieu, letween Xrilino tuid Bttrcelonii, Iiut a t  PapioI above 
llolino, and the French jrnmdiateIp retreated by San Rlieu 
Parsficld and tlle crivall, wliicIi Clinton now dctnchcd ncross 
Zhe Llobreg-at., foll o w ~ l  thcm Iiard, bnt tlie conntrg waa rliffi., 
cult, thc diñtancc short, and tlicy soon gnincd rt semnd 
entrcnchcd camp above San Filicu, A smnIE prrison remainotl 
in the mowonry-worlrs n t  Molino; Clinton entleuvourcd to 
reduce it, hut his guna wcro not; o£ n calibre to break the  
mrla nnd tlie enerny lvas atronglg reinforcet1 townrda wening 
from Barcelona: hfanso tlien iveiit to the mountains, and Cli~i -  
ton returned to Villa F~ruiica haring liilled and woundetl aliou& 
one hundred anil eiglity French, and lost only aixty-four men, 
al1 Bpaninrds. 
Manso's failure surprised the English general, because, 
u~ilike the generality of his countrymen, lie was xenlons, 
slrilful, Ggilant, raodest and humnne, and a sincere clr- 
operatotor witli the British offiwm. Hc hoivevcr soon cleared 
hiniself o€ blame, asmiring Clinbn that Copons, contruy to 
his previous dcclarirntions, hail jeined him with fuiir thousand 
inen, and tnking the control of his troops not only commenced 
the rnnrcli trvo Jionrs too late, brit ~vitliout nny retison h~ited 
for tliree houm on the wny. Nor did Copons offer Rny cxcirm 
or explanation of his mnduct, mercly obscrvin,~ tlint the 
plan baving fniled he u i i i s t  return t o  his motrntains nboiit 
17icli. A mrtn of any other nation mould h a ~ e  been arcased 
of ti~achery, but ivith the Spiiniurds tliere is no limit to 
aibsurdity, and from tbeir actions no conclusion can be dmwn 
as to tlieir motives. 
Tlie ge~t  events OS the war  be,^ now to  aiTect tlre struggIe 
in Qtaloiira. Suchet finding Copons d m d  not agree to t l i ~  
military convention dependent upon tlie trenty o£ Valencay, 
resiped a11 thonglits of carrying off his prrisons lieyontf tlre 
Ebro, ancl mcretip insLnicter1 tbe governor of Tortozg that 
wlien his provisions, ealculated to last nntil April, were 
exbauñted, lie sliould mar& upon Mequinenra and Lenula, 
nnite the g~rrisons tlierc to  liis own, and m d ~ e  way hy 
Tenmqua into Francc. Hc then increnc~d the garrison of 
BurccIona to ciglit thousnnd mcn nnd prepnred tci take the Iine 
of the Fluvia; for the allied soverci,p were in Pmnce, and 
Napoleon had recaIEed ten rhousand men with ejg1ity piexes of 
artillery from Catdonia, desiring they trhould march as soon as 
the resulb expected fmm the m&sion af San Carlos were fdt 
by the allies. Suchet preprired the troops but proposed that 
insted of maiting for tho unccrhh reault of San Carlos' 
mnission, Ferdinand rihw2d bimaelf be sent to Spuin tbrougli 
Catalonia antl be trustod on liis faith to restors the garrisons 
in TTalencia, Then he said he could march with liis whole 
m y  t o  Lyons which would be more efficacious fhan sending 
detaehnienk. The restoration o€ Ferdinand was indeed the 
cmperor'rr olvject, but thin plausible proposition waa only a 
colunrable countcr-project to Soult's plan foo r junction of the 
two amies in Bearn, a i n ~ e  the emperor was nndoubtedly khe 
'best judge of wh& waa required for the warfare immediakly 
nnder bis own directian. 
Tf; was in the mida* of these afairs CIinton a t t d e d  Molino 
del Rey and would bu& for the interfeneuce of Capnns bave 
striclren a grent Mow, which wna howevcr soon infiickd in 
another manner. 
Them WM at tlii~ t i m ~  in the b c h  aerPics, a Spniad oE 
Flemieh descent called Tan tnalen, a liandsome 
Notes by person, and with a natud genius for desperate H, I V ~ ~ I ~ ~  
treasons. He was at fimt attaclled t o  Joseph's ::!? 
court, and aftcr thnt rnon~rbrcfi's retrent ft-om 
Spdn was phmd by $he duke of Feltre on Sucliet'g staff; bu* 
tl ie French píarty was now e fsiling one antl Van Balen only 
sought by Borne notable treachery to make hi pace with his 
couutry. Thiough the medium of a young widow, who fol- 
lowed him w-ithout d e r i n g  their mnnexion to ~plpliear, he 
informed. Eroles of his object, and trmsmitted returns of 
BuchetH farce and other m t t e r ~  of  interest. At Iast having 
~ocretly, opened Sucliet'a portiolio he cripid the key of bis 
ciplier, and trunsmi&d thst alm, with an intimation that Le 
would saon piiw over and endeavour to periorm some dher 
servite at the anme time. The epportunitg soon offernd. 
Xuchet went fo h o n a  to meet Eaan C:trlos, leaving Van 
Halen at; Barcelona, and the latter immediately taking an 
eswrt of fbree hunssrs wcnt to Granollers wliere the cuiras- 
siws sere  quartered, Uaing the mmhai's m m e  he ordered 
thm t o  escud him to the Spanish outpots, which being iri 
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the mountdns could only be approaclied by a long md m w  
p w  where mm1rg would be lielpless; in this pass he ordered 
the troops t o  bi~onax! for the ni& and wlien their colonel 
expressed his nneasiness, Van Hden quietcd him and m d e  
a solitarp mil1 their common quarters. De had before tiiis, 
however, sent tbe  widow t o  give Eroles inforrnation of tho 
situoition into wliich he wouId bring the troops xnd witb 
rrnxietp awaited his athek; the Spanish general failed to 
come, and at dnybrmk Van Halen eitill lireteiidiiig he cnrried 
s. flng of tmee from Suchet, rode off with liis fimt mmrt of 
h n s m  and a trumpctcr to the Spanisli lincs. Tlicrc he mcer- 
taincd that thc widow hzd bccn detained by the outposfq; 
wherenpon he dclivered ovcr hia hussrars t o  thcir cncmies, nnd 
gavo notico of the sitnat,ion of tbc cuimssicrs mith ra view to 
t h e i ~  dcptruction, but thcy escnpcd tlic dnnger. 
Tan HaIen and Eroles then furged SucLet'~ sipahre, and 
the former addreaed Ietters in cipher to the govmom of 
Tortozq Xarida, Mequinen- and Monzon; talIing tliem thnt 
the emperor, in conaequence of his revenes, rquired lxge 
dmfts of men Erom Cahlonia, and hd given Siicliet orders 
t a  negotiate a wnvention by which tlie garrisons soutli of tlie 
LIobrept were to join the army with arma bagpge and fol- 
lowers. The result was nneertain, but if the cnn~ention cotild 
not be effected the governors were t o  join tlie army by force, 
and they were therefore immediately to mine tlieir pincipl  
bastions and be prepared to seilly forth at an appointed time. 
The manches and pinte of junction {verere al1 given in dehil; 
yet they mere told that if, the con~ention toolr place ths mar- 
rihal wodd immediately send an oficer of his stnff t o  them, 
nith mch verbal in&tructionfi as might be necessary; the docu- 
ment finished with deploring tha necessiiy ivliicli calIed for 
B e  sacrifioe o£ conqueata acliieved by t l ~ e  vdour of tho 
troops. 
Spies and emirisaries who act fnr hoth sides nie common in 
dl wam, but in the Pcninmlnla so mnny pretended t o  serve the 
French md were yet tme to khe Sprtniurd~~ thnt to avoid ti10 
dsnger oof betrayd, Sucl~ct used ta pIace a very small piece of 
light-colonred hair in the ciphered Iiapsr, the latter was tllen 
inclosed in a quill, aeded and m p p ~ x l  in IettS, When rewivd, 
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the small parcel wari arefully opened on a ~heet of mhite p a p  
and if the h& w a  dicavered the communication mas good; 
if no& the treachery wm apparent because the hair would' 
e m p  the vigilnnm of uninitiutd persons nnd bo Imt by nny 
intmmedinte examinntion. Pnn Hnlen knew this ~iecret also, 
tand when bi6 emiswies had retnmed after delimring the pre- 
paratory communication, lie proceeded in person wititli z forged 
convention first to Sortaza; for Sucht has erroneously stated 
in his hIemois that tbe primary attempta were made at 
Lerida and hfeguinenza. He m s  accompanied by several 
Spanish oofcers and by some Frcnch desertem iIresscd in the 
uniforms of the liuesnrs he had Betrayed te tlie Spanisli out- 
posh. The govcrnor Ilobert, though a vigilant officer, wasi 
deceived md prepared to evacuato the place. During t11e 
niglit however a tme emissnry arrived with rs Ietter from 
Suchet of a later date tlian tlie forged convention. Robert 
then. endeavoured to entice Van XIalen inta tlie fortress, Iiut 
tlle other waa too wnry md pmceeded at once to Mequinenxa 
md h r i h  whcre lie completely overreached tlie governors 
m d  thcn went to Monzon. 
mis mal1 furtress h d  now been besiqed ~ i n c e  tlie 28th 
uf Sepkmber, 18 13, hy detaclments from tha Cztalsn anny 
antl the banrls from Ampn. Its means o€ defence wePe slight, 
but there was w i t h  a man of resolutian and genius called 
Xt. Jacques ; a Piedmontese by birtli, Iie was o n l ~  B private 
rioldicr of engineers, but the commandmt apprcchting liis 
worth wns so modest and pmdent ari te gield the direction of 
the defence eutirely to him. Abounding in resources, Le met, 
and at every point baffled the besiqers whe morkecl principilly 
by mines, and beFnj as hrzve as he \vas ingenioua always led 
tlie numerous couiiterattctcks wlth whicli he coiitrived to ' 
chack the appronches above and below ground The sisge 
continued until the 18th of February when tlie subtle Van 
Ralen arrived, and by liis Rpamsli wiles otitained in a few 
hours wliat Spanist conrage and persevernnce had vsinly 
Btrived to p i n  for one Iii~ndred nnd forty dnys. The com- 
mandant was m~ipicious nt first; but when Van Ralcn sufcrcd 
bim t o  ~ n d  oxi O ~ ~ ~ F C F  to asccrtain thut Lerida and hIequi- 
nema were evamtated, he  vas beyi led like tlie otEiem and 
marched to join the gwiaons of those plaosa Clinton had 
been informd of this project by Eroles as early as the 22nd 
of January; snd tliough he did not expect any Frendi general 
wouid be so egregiously misled mdily pomised the assistance 
of Eiig a m y  t o  capture the garrisons on their march. 
Suchet was then falling back upon the Fluvia, and Clrnton, 
seeing the fortified line of  the Llol>regat wealrened and being 
uncertain of Suchetys real strength &nd designa, renewed his 
fomer proposrtl to Copons for a comhind attack which shonld 
force the French general to  dfscover liis real rcituation and 
projects. Ere he coulrl obtain an answer the want of foingo 
com pelled him to refuso thc Spanisli cavnlry Icnt to Km by 
Elio, md Sadeld'o division was rcdumri to ita lmt ration. 
The French thus mnde theii retreat unrnoleeted, for Clinton's 
project nece~anrily involvd tlis investment of Hnrcelona after 
l~assing the Llobregat; d tlie AngIo-Siciliae cavalry, rnnunted 
on ame11 E,.yptian animds the greatest pmt of wliich were 
foundered or unserPicable from mnd-cracks, a disease very 
common amongst tlie horses of that eountry, were too weiik 
t o  act without the aid of Elio's borsemen. Moreover, as a 
division of infmtry wm IeR itt Taraama wwaiting the efTect of 
was indispenmble. 
i Van Halen's wiles against Tortoza the ted of Smfield's tmops 1 
Copone accepted the pmpogEtion t o w ~ d s  the end of the 
month; the  Spsnish cavalry waa then in tlie rear, but S w  
fidn haoing obtnind some provisions the army was piit in 
mowment tbe 3rd of Fehruw; and as Sudiet ms near Geronn, 
it p w e d  tlie Llohreget at the bridge of Molino del R q  with- 
out resistance. Oa the 6th Xarstield's piquets were vigorously 
attmked at Ron Filieu by the g~rrison of Bmdona, but he 
supported them with his whole division, snd being relnforoed 
with some cavalry repulsed the French md pnmued them to 
the wlls. On the 7th the uty was iuvested on the land 8ide 
by Copns  aided by ~Iruiso, and oli the seaboard by Hdlo- 
weU, who, Eollowing the movementat of tlie army, bloclraded the 
barbonr aPitIi the Castor frigate &nd mchored tlie &me off 
Matan>. On the 8th intelligence &ved of Van Balen's 
failure at Tortozx, yet the Iilockade o£ Bilrcel~na continiied 
anintemphd antil the 16th whcn Ciinton w a ~  inionned by 
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Copons of the siiocess ~t Lerida, &Iequinenm, and Monxoa. 
The garri~ona he said wniild march upon Igunl~dri, find Emla  
who, under pretcnce of cnusing t2ie convention t o  be obsemd 
hy the somntenes, wns to follow in their renr, proposd ta 
undeceive nnd disnrm them at that place. On the 19tli. he 
sent notica tliat Mnrtorel had been fixed npon in preferente to 
Iguahla; aod as tlie Frencli wauld be ab the formes place tliat 
evwing Cllnton was desired t o  wnd some of Lis troops there 
to ensure the auccess oE the project. 
Tliis ehange of plan and the short warning, for Martorel 
ms a. long march from Barcelona, together mith the doubta 
irnd emharms~ments wliieli Coponsi condiiet almyfi cansed, 
inclincd the English general to avoid meddling with the matter 
a t  rtll; jet fearing it mouId fui1 in the Spuniard's han& he 
finally drxfteil a atrong division of troops snd rnmhed in 
pemon Lo Martorel. Tliere he met Cupns who toId him the 
Fiencli would not pass Esparapera tliat night, that Eraloles 
was close in their mar, and another division of the Catalan 
army at Bispnl bloclíing the bridge xt Martonel. Clinton 
inimcdiatcly undertnok to pam the Llobrept, meet tlie French 
column, antI block the road of San hdnrni; and he arratlgcd 
with Copons the necessary precuutions and sipaIs. 
kliout nine dclock Isidore la Marque timived with the gar- 
r b n s  at 3Inrtorc1, fullowerl at a ahort distance by Erola. No 
otlicr troops were to be seen, and after a short kalt tlie French 
continued their mmcIi on the flgIit bank of tIie LIobregnt 
whem thc BarceIona rond entem o. nnrrow pase betwcen the 
rivcr rtnd a precipitous hill. When they wero eon~plctcly 
enbngted Clinton seiit ttn vfEcer to Eurbid tlieir furtter pro- 
gress, d referred tIiem ta Copons who was at Martorel for 
an explanation ; then giving tlic s ipaI al1 tl~e lieigllts around 
were instantly mirererl witti amed men. It wrm in vnin to 
ofer resistnncc, m d  $wo gcnernls, bming two tl~ousnnd six 
liundra1: men, four guna, and a rich militnry cties. capitulatea; 
but apon conditions, wliicli werc granter1 and immediately 
violittd witll circunistances of grcat linrshness and insult to 
tlie priconers. Tlie arlium uf tliis ~ R C I I E M ,  ~vhicli wrss quite 
ptuitons, since the Prench hel~iless in the defile must Iiava 
submitted to any terms, atbclies atirely to th Sriuilkds. 
Clinton nefu~ed to meddle in any manner with tlie conveukion. 
Be Iiad not been a party to Tan Ilnlen's deceit, be appeared 
ody to ensure the snrrender of an m e d  force in tlie field 
which tlie Spaninrd~1 could not h m  mbdued witliout l is  aid; 
he refused even to be present at ~ n y  consulhtioii previous to  
Str Willlnm the capitulntion; and notwitlistauding an asser- 
Ciintm, tion t a  the contrary in 8uchet's Memoira, no 
MSS. apped on the suliject from thht marslial ever 
m h e d  him. 
Dnriup ihe mhole of these tramactions tbe infatuation of 
the French Iearlers was extreme. The chief of one of the 
bttalions, more ~agacious than his generd, told Lamarque in 
the night of the 16that Igualada that he ww betrayed; at the 
same time he urpd him to abandon Iiis artillery and baggage, 
and marcb in the direction of Vicli t o  shich place they could 
force tlicir way in despite of the Spaniards. It is rernarkabfe 
$SO that Robert, when he bd' detected the impoature m d  
failiiled to entice Van Ralen into Tortoxrt, did not make a snd- 
den mlly upon him nnd the Spanish ofñcera d i o  were withhim, 
al1 cIose to the worlca And ctill more notable is it tbat the 
other governors, more especiaily as Tan Halen vas a foreiper, 
did not insist upon the bmrcr of such a convention remnining 
to aecompany tlreir marcii : it was we1l observeil by Gucliet. 
that Tan Halen's refusal to enter tlie ptes wiis done sufIicimt 
ta  prove his treacliery. 
l'he troops recnlIed by Napoleon now moved into Franca, 
md h Marcli a second column oE equal foxce wae diseeted 
npon Lyons, hut tlie amival of fellington on tbe Geronne 
caused, aas we shalI heredter 61-14 a cliange in itg des t idon ,  
An o ~ k r  of the minister at war then caused Suchet to  open a 
fmsh neptiation with Copons, to  deliver up al1 the fortreaes 
held by bis troops except Figueras and Rasas, provided the 
prrisons were allowd to rejoin the amy. The S@sh 
commander assented and the nuthorities generally were ansious 
t o  atlept the promal, but the regency mferred the matter to 
Wellington who rejected it mithout hecitation, m bsnding to 
inmse; the force immediately opposd ta Iiim. Thus baffled 
and over-rcnched at al1 pointa, 8uchet dwtroyed t h ~  mo~ks of 
0106 Beadu, Br~~cybrn and Pulzimog, dismantled arono, und 
Bow, and ooncentr~ted his forcen at ~pms.  Re m s  fol- 
lowed by Copons, but thoriqh he atill Iwd twelve thomand 
veterana besides the nntional p n r d a  find d6pbts of t%e French 
deprt.ments he obstinntely refnsed aid t o  Soult, and yet 
remsined inactive himself. The blockade of Bnrcdona was 
thefefore maintained by tlie allim without diíliculty oi danger 
save what mose from their ~ommisariat embmasamenta and 
the efforh of the garrison. 
On the 23rd of February Aabert made a satlywith six %ab 
talions, thiiIcing to ~urprise Samfidd; but ha was bmten and 
Meder the Nassnn officer waa lrilled. The blockade wss thua 
continued unti1 the 12th of Xarch when Clinton reosived 
oders from Wellingtun to break up hii army, t o  send the 
foreign troope to Sicily, siid rnarch with €he British liattmtlions 
by Tudela to join the great armp in France. He wished t o  
obey, hut Eucbet was ~tilE in strength and Copom appeased t o  
be provoIring a collision though he WM quite unablo to opposa 
the Frencli in the field, and to  maintnin thc blockade of Bar- 
d o n a  in ddition after the Anglo-Xicilians sl~ould depzrt, 
was quite impossible. The latter tlierefore remained, and 
on the 19th of Hm& Ferdinand reached the French frantier. 
Wi event, whicli, happening fin or even tIlree months 
bcfore, woulld prohably have cliangcd tho fntc of the mar, wna 
new of IIttle consequcnce. Suchct pmp8ed to Copons t o  eacort 
Ferdin~nd with the French army t o  Barcelona, md put him in 
posseaion oT tliat place; but ttis the Spaiiish general dared 
not assent t o  ; for he fetlred WelIington and his oivn rcgcncy, 
and m ~ a  closely watched by colonel C d n  who liad been placed 
near him by Clinton. The French general then pmposed +A 
thc lcing a mnvention for the recovery of his gmrifions, to 
whicli Perdintirid agreed with tlie fwi1ity of a false he&; for 
his ,mat anxiety WM t o  r e d  Valencia, tecause Uie detemi- 
nntion of the Corteti to b i d  him io conilitions before he rem- 
vered his tlirone w ~ s  evidenh; the Spnisli generals were 
'upparently faithful ta the Cortcs, nnd tIie BritisIi influence 
wss sure +m be opposed to kim wble he wris burGhened with 
French enpgements. 
Suchet was to demtlnd securities for tlie restoration of his 
garrisona prePiow to  Ferdinund'e entry into Spipuin, but time 
waa pwcious and he escorted liim at once witli tlie whole 
E'rench arniy to tlie Fluvia, having received his promise to 
restore tlie ganrisoiis; he ddso retajned Don 
- 
Carlos as a Iiostsigc; yet even this security he Memoira. 
relinqiiished when the king mritinq from Gerona, 
corifirxed hic fisi promise. On tlie 24tl1, in presenee of the 
&talan and Freneh amica, rangcd in oider of battle on either 
bank iif the F!wia, Ferd i ind  ptsscd tht river md becnme 
once more king of 8pxin. He liad been rt reliellioiis Ron in  
the pnlace, a ~ilotting tmitor nf; Arnnjuex, a dastnrd nt Bayoiine, 
nn effcniinnte sulicrstitions fnwning sInvc fit Tfilcncrzy; 11nd 
now aft,er six ycaic' mptivity Iie returneri h his own conntry 
nn uisgrateful und crucl t p n t ;  he would have been tho most 
odiow nnd oontemptible o£ prirces if his favoiirito brother 
Don Ct~rlus hsd not existed. ReacEiing Clintonk s m p  tlie 
30th he reviewed tIis troopq and thcri proceeded to Zaragoza 
alid finally tt> Suchet mys tlie lionours 
Bleemoitñ by 
sbr winm of mar were paid to liim by al1 the French gorri- 
C1intoq soi~s, ht tliis waa not tlio case at Dmelona, no BlSS. 
man hppeared eren on the walls. 
Artw ihis erent the Freiicli mnrslinl liriving rcpasced the 
Pyrenws, leaving L'niy a clivision at Fiperas, Clinton desiped 
to break lip 11:s amy, but was again stoppd by tlie vexntions 
conduct ~f Copuns n~h9 woiild not relieve tlic A nglo-Sicilitins 
at, the litocka~lle, nor r~otice finp commiinictttion~ on tlic silb,ject 
licfore the Iltli i;t' Aliril. Ot tlit 14th howevcr tlie trciops 
marchcd, purt to embarlr at T ~ y o m ,  port to join TVclling.ton. 
CO~OIIS  tiien bccnma terrificd iest hlrert, tibantloning Tort~rn, 
sliouid coms te BarceIona, nnd enc!osc Iiim Iictwecn thcm nnJ 
tlle division at Fipem, wliercfore CIiiiton once more hiilted. 
Tliere was reason. Fur I-Xubert had transniitkd to h b e r t  
the emperor's orders to brealr oxt of Tortoxa antl gain Barcs- 
h a  iiistmd of pasing by tlie valley oE Venuqne as Sucliet 
l i d  prescrilied, and tlie twcIve tliousaiid men tlius uiiiled were 
thcn t to pus11 into hance. Tliia Ictter wns interceptcci, cqied 
and scnt on t o  Roliei+t, ivhosc ansrver iieing lilrewise inter- 
cepted showed he hud no iiaclintition for tlie enterprise; 
Cliiiton thcrefore continiied his embarkation 8x11 completed 
his Itououmtle biit difficult taslr. With a force in nura- 
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h e d o ,  s considemblo town lying at the foot of a mounhin 
on the opposite point of the harbonr, A mrrow entrmce 
to tlie inner port m between s spit of land cdled tbe 
Puntal, and the low istlimua on wliich tlle toivn of Santona 
ie built. The natural strength of t.he ground w ~ i  very great, 
but tlie importmce of Santona arme from its peculiar situa- 
tion as e harbour and fort of support in tlie Nontaña de 
hntantfer; by holding it the French shut ouk tha British 
shipping from the only place whicli being defensible oa tlie 
land side fumislied a. good harbour betrveen San Seh t i an  
and Comña, Thns t h g  protected khe sea-flrtnk of their long 
line o€ invnsion, obtained a port of refi~ge for tbeir own 
coasting vessels, and a post of support for the rnovenbIe 
columns wnt to chase the pnrtirlns, who ahounded in that 
roiigl~ district. ' And when the battle af 'Frjtoriti plilnced the 
allics on the Bidasson, there  issued from Santona a number 
of privateers to intercept Wellington's ~upplics nnd jnterrupt 
bis comrnunication with ComGa, Oporto, Lisbon, antl even 
with England. 
To obtain Santona mas an object of early interest with 1 
both parties. She French seixed it at once, and althougli 
the Spaniards recovered possession of it in 1810 tliey were 
driven out qain immediately. Tl~e  English miniskm thea 
commenced deliberating anrl concocting extensive, and for 
that reason injudicious and impracticabIe plans of offensi~e 
gerations, to be based upon tlie po~session of the place, but 
Mapoleon fodfied it and kept it t o  the end of the war. In 
Aug1s4 18 12, its irnportance was better anderstood by the 
Spnnids ,  and it mw continually menaced by the numerous 
hantls of Biscay, the Asturiaa and the Montaña. Fouhen 
hnndred men, including tha crcw of n. corvctte, then formed 
its garrison, the morks wcre not very strong and only forty 
pieces of arhil lq werc monnted. Napolcon however, fore 
sccing tho dismtem wliich Mumont wm provoking, sent 
'geneml Lrtmeth to take charp of the defence; he aupmentd 
the worlcs and constnicted advonced redoubt~ w two hillq' 
d l e d  tlic Gromo and the Brusco, which lilre San BarhIoxseo 
at &u Sebastian closed the isthmus inlnnd. He alyo e r e c d  
ri strong redoubt and blockhourre on the Puntal to command 
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tlie strnits, and sweqi  the mndsterd in conjunction mith ths 
fnrt of Lardo ñrhich he repnircd; minor bnttcsa a l ~ o  he 
mde ,  nnd Iiaving m& a cIlain to sccure tlie mrrow ent.rnnm 
to tlie inner Iiarbuur, Iie covered tlie rocky promontory of 
Santona itself witli defensive works. 
h e  dismountml guns remaind in tlie arsenal, 0 t h ~ ~  
which had been tlirown i n h  tlie sea by the Spaniards, mhen 
they took the plxce in 1810 were fislicd up, and tlie $mison, 
. feiiing trees ln the vicinity, made carriages for them; by these 
menns ñ liundred and trventy p n s  rvere finally plmed in Iint- 
tcry and tliere WRS ab~intlsnce of nmmrrnition. TEic corvette 
iaas not sea-worthy: but h m c t h  estalilislied n flotilla of grin- 
lioah and other smalI crnft, mhich sdlierl furtli mhenevcr tha 
sipal-posts on tlie headlund gave nritlce of the npl~rowli of 
~ e s s e h  liable to attack, or of Prench coaskig b~iiiging prw 
dsions and storeu. Tlie garrison liad pretiously lost many 
men, Lilled in a barbarous mmner by the partidras, and in 
repenge tliey nmer gnve qu~rter to tlieir enmnfw. Lameth, 
shocked at this inliitmnnity, forhad nnder pain of dcath any 
further ~p14salg rewiidcd thoee mon wllo bro~ight in pri- 
soners, and treated tlie latiter with geotleness; the Blimiartls, 
peroeiviiig tliis, srlso clianged tlieir ayshm and civilixation 
resumed itri rights. fiom this time military opcrations 
mere incessant, tlie garrison sometimes made sallies, some- 
timea snetitiiietl partini ~ t t a c k ~ ,  o m d i m e ~  nirled thi: movraliie 
columns em~iIoycd hy the diffcrcnt gcncmls of tlic nrniy of 
the nortli t o  put down tlie parti~mtri warí'ure, wlilcli seldom 
was even lulled iii tIle i!Iontar?a, 
After the Fattle of Vitoria, Santona m in-iested on the 
lnnd side by a part of the troops cornposing the foiirtli Gpuiii~Ii 
army. It wus MoclcnrIcd nlao rin tIle scn board 1iy tlie I<ri~lisli 
slii~is of war; but only nominallg, for tFie gfi~~ison received 
supplieg and Lametli's RotiIIa took inuny ~torc-~liilis alid 
otlier vessela and dcIayed convoys; tlie Iand lilocknrle tlius 
became ia ~ d l i t y  snd tIie Epnnish oficers coniplninetl with 
rcniion tliat tliq suffcrcd privlitions anrl cndurcd linrrlsliips 
without an object. Tliese complainta and liis own embarms- 
rnents, caused by lord Rlelville'~ neglect, induced Wellington 
i i i  October, lal3, when he could ill spare tmops. t o  tliink of 
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empl'loying a higade under l o d  Aylmer iii thci nttaclr. of Xan. 
tonti; that project, ris nlrcady mentioned, waei Iaid mide; Iiut 
Tiotoirte et un Englist engiaeer, cuptain Wells, was sent 
Cnn~Etea h with Borne gappers and m i n m  t o  quicken tlie 011% 
Iirancnisea. rationa of tlie Spanish oficem, rtnd his smdl 
detaohment hss been by rt FrencEi miter magnified into a 
lvhole babtalion. 
mella remained six months, for the Spmish genemls tthough 
brave and wiiling were tainted mith tlie nati~naI defect of 
promstination. The siege tlierefore made no pro,mrrq lan- 
guislhg nntil the 13th of Februav, 11814, d i e n  Barca tbe 
Spxnisli commancler carried the fort of Punta1 in the night 
by escalade, killing tliirty men and talcing twenty-three pri- 
sonen; yet the forb, being under the fise of tlie Santona worlrs, 
wm necesarily dismantled and abndon~l  tlie next moming. 
A piquet m 3  Iefb tirere, hnt Lameth embarked a detachment 
and recovered h i ~  fort. In the night af tlie 2lst Barco 
ordered an rtttmk t o  be made with a pwt of Iiis force ripon the 
outposh o€ El Grumo and Brusco oa the 8lsntona side of thi: 
hurbour, rtnd lcd tlte reniaindcr of his t r oop  in pcrson to 
storm the fort and towm of Laredo. Be carried tlie lattcr and 
Boma other defenccs of the fort, which being on a rock uas 
only to be approacl~cci by an istlimus so mmw as to be closed 
by a single fortified liouse; in tliia assanlt lie im IdIed sod 
tlie attaclc ceased; yet tlie troops rct.ained what tlley liad ivou 
and establislied tliemselves at tlie foat of tlie rock n.1iei.e they 
were coverd Erom h e .  Tlie attack on tlie otlier side, wn- 
ducted by mIone1 Llorente, was succcssful; he carried the 
smallest of the two outworka on tlie Brusco, rtnd cloaely 
investd the largest dter an ineffectual attempt by mine 
and assault to hke  it. A Iarge breach wm homever made and 
the cornmantltint seeing he could no longer defmd bis pos., 
vzliihntly brolte tlirough tlie investment and saved himself in 
the Grumo; but next da7 tlie Grumo itgelf ww abandoned by 
die French. 
Weiis, who had bcen woundcd ad %he Puntal esmlarfe, now 
stronuously urgcd tlic Spaninrds t o  crawn tha counter*curp 
af tbe Eort 3 Laredo and uttack vigorously; they prderred 
etalilbbing four fidd-pieces to batter it in form at the didan@ 
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of six huntlred prds, but their guns w m  dismounted the 
mornent they b c p n  to he, and thus carrected, the Spmish 
generala committsd the direction of the rtttwl~ to Wells. Be 
opened a heavy muaketry 6 r e  on the fort to  stifle the noke of 
l i s  workrnen, pushed trenches up the hilI clme t o  the oounter- 
s c q  in the niglih, and was proceeding t o  burst open the pte 
with a few field-piecrs and cut down the palisades, when the 
Italian pmm, whos~  muskets frorn constant use were so 
injured that fenr won1d go ofT, mutiniecl apainst thelr com- 
mander and making him A, priwner mrrendered the place. 
TLs event gnve the Spaninrds the comniand of the entrnnce 
to the harliour, and Lamcth orered tu wpitulate in April 
upon condition of returning to  Frtinee with Lis garrison: Wel- 
lington refused this proposal, and Santona remained a Preench 
fortress unti1 the general cecsation of hostilities. 
Raving now tenninated the namati~e of ,al[ militciry and 
palitical evenh which happned in the P~nin~ii l% the reader 
will henceforth be enabled to foIlow witliout intempkion the 
events of the war in the south of fiancc which sliall be wn- 
tinued in the next boolr. 
WELLZNGTOI~S dificnlties were great. Tlilose of his advemry 
were even more embarrassing, becairse tlic evil mas a t  the 
root; it waa not misapplicstion of pomer but tlie wrant of 
power itself which paralysed Soult's operntions. Napoleon 
trlrsted much t o  the eKe& of liis tlenty ivith Ferdinand, but 
the intrigue8 to rebrd his joumey continued; and though 
the emperor, afier the refusal of the treaty by the Spani~h 
go~ernment, permitted him to  return mithout conditionti, 
thinking his presence would done emhnrrncrs and perhap? 
brenlr the English nllimcc witli Spnin, lic did not as beforc 
shewn nrdve until hfnrcli. Bow htipolcon's views were fruc 
trated by bis secret enemieg is one of tIie obscura prts of 
French history which time m q  gossilily clear, but probablp 
only with a feeble and uncerbin liglit; f{ir trntli m nwcr 
be expected in tlie memoirs, if any should appcar, of snch 
men as Talleyrmd, Fouché, nnd otlier politicians of their 
stamp, whose plots rendered his supernatural efforts to F ~ s m i B  
Frnnca ficiru her invders abortive: meanwlile there is 
nothing t o  checlr or expose the political and literary empirics 
who never fail on mch occnsions to poison the sonrces of 
historgr. 
Relying on Ferdinnnd's joiiney, find prmwd by t8he necw 
sity of nupenting his own nenk amy, N~,pIeon m  toId 
Soult ho must ultimately talíe from him two diaisions of 
> idantry and one of ca~dry.  Tlio undecided nature of bis 
fimt battle at  Erieniie muwd Eiim to eriforw ttiiri notice in  
t.he beginnhg of February; biit he liad previously sent 
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~ 4 t h  inatmctionei to hastcn the new conscription, t o  f o m  
nationnl and urtian p a r & ,  to  draw forth the mources of 
tbe oountry, and aid ths opemtiotiona of the armies by tlie 
action of the people. These measmes hiled generally in 
the south. The urban eohorts w e o  readily formed as a 
m a n a  of police, and the conccription me succeasful, ht the 
~ieople remPiined sullen and apathetic; and tha SodL NSS, 
civil comniisanrics are snid t o  hnve heen, with 
aome exceptions, pompous, declamatory, 8ad afecting great 
s t n t e  and d i p i t y  withouout energy and rtctipity. 111-will was 
&o produced by the vcxatious and corrupk conduct of tlte 
subordinate govemment agents; who, seeing h the general 
distrws and confusion a good opportunity t o  forward their 
personal intcrestri, oppremd the peoplo fos their o m  profit. 
This it was easg to do, becnum the extreme mant of money 
rendered requiaitions unavoidalile; and nnder tlie eonfused 
direckion of civilians, partly ignorrmt and unusd t o  diEcuIt 
times, p d l y  pmipt md partly disaffwhd to the emperor, 
tlie abuses inevihbIy attendant upn  such a aystem were 
nummons; rtnd t o  the peoplc so offcnaivq, thrat numbers to 
avoici them passed willi. tlieir carts and utensiIs into khe Iínea 
of the alliea An oficial IeGter mritten from Dayonne at this 
pe6od run thus : She English generd'a policy and the gootl 
discipline ho rn~inteins does i i~  more hurm tlinn ten bnttles; 
every paaaant wishes to be unJer bis protection.' 
Anotlier :rm of mgcr m= Soult's worka near Bayonne, 
where the r i c h  inhabitants coald not bear to have their 
county villas and gadcns dcstroyed by the engineer, he who 
qares not for beat~ty or for pleasuro. The merchants, a clasa 
nearly al& in al1 nations, ~ 5 t h  whom profit shnrls for 
eountrp, had been with a few exceptions Ion, averse to 
Nnpoleon'a policy, whicii from nwessity interfered mith their 
wmmerce. And thia feeling must h m  bcen v e y  ~trong in 
Bayoune and Bordeaux; for one Batbdat, a banker of tlie 
former place, baving obtained leave to go t o  St. Jenn de Luz 
nnder pretence of settIiag the nccoi~nts of English o&erq 
prisonem af war, to wliom he bnrl aclvnnced money, offerd 
Vellington to wliply Lis srmy nith vrtnons commodities and 
men provide money for Liils on the Eiigliih treasury. In 
return he demanded lieences fot twenty veasels t o  go from 
Boideaux, Boehelle and hlanb, t o  St. Jem de Luz; and they 
were given on condition that lie slioulrl not carry baclr coloninl 
produce; but as the Engliih navy wouId not respect tliem, 
the banker md his coadjutora Iiesitatcd, rind ths saved tbeir 
sliips, f o ~  the Engliah ministers refuaed to sanction the 
I ~ n c e s  and rehnked WeIlingbon! 
During theac cvente thc partisans of thc Bourbonri, mming 
from Brittany ond La VcndGc, sprcd tlicmsclvcs dl ovci tha 
6011th of Fmnce, nnd ono o£ tlic hemic fitmily of Ea Roche 
Jsicquelin &ved at hsd-qnartem, Ecrnadotte nlso sent an 
agent t o  tliose parts, aad the count o€ Grummont, a nptain 
in tbe British mvalry, wag nt thc desire of tIie rnarquis de 
Mailhos, another of the dcon t en t s ,  sent to EugYand to caU 
tlie prinoes of the touse of Bourbon forwsd Findly tlie 
duke af Angoul~me rrrrived at Iied-qunrters and mas received 
with respect in priiate, tliougli not snffered to attend tI~e 
wrmy. The English general indeed, persudcd that tlie p a t  
body of the Frcncli people, especially in tlie south, meye 
Enirnial to riapoleods governine~it, was sanguinc as to the 
utiliky af encouraging rt Boiirbon pafiy; yet he held h b  judg- 
mcnt in abeyance, sagaciously obseming he could not Mime 
tu  a ~ a f e  conclusion merely from the feelings of some people 
in one corner of France. And as the allicd sovereigns seemed 
blickward t o  take tlie matter in Iirrnd unlesfi Bomo positi~e 
gcncd rnovement in favour of tlie Bourhoiis wns mndc, and 
there wcrc ncgoti~tions fox pence acttidlp going on, it mould 
be, he wsid, unwise anrI ungcnertius to preciliitotc the partisans 
of tlic fallcn hourie hito n prcmaturc eutbrcdc und then leave 
them to  the vengeance of tlle enemy. 
Ttiitt it1e1lington s1;liould think puhlic opinion ms a@t 
Mitpoleun is nut mrprising, it seerned t o  be so, nnd r very 
ritrong Bourbon party, and eue still dronper, avtversa to tlie 
contriiuation of war, existed: but notliing is more dangerous, , 
more deceitffi than the ontwa~d show and declarations on 1 
mch oceasions. The grmt mass of men are ody endowed 
with moderate mpacity md spirit ; tbeir thoughts are for the 
pieaemtien of theii families and property, they bend t o  
circumsttinceri; fear anrl suspicion, ignoran# basenes~ and 
good fceling, al1 combine to urge men in troubled times to piit 
on tlie mmlc of cntliusimm, for the most po~vcrful and selíiali 
Irnaves mcr sliout rvith tha loudcst. Lct the wcne change antl 
the  multitude will turn with the fcility oI a weatIiercoc1~. 
IlrellingQn soon dkco~ered t h t  Viel Chastel, BernatEotte's 
apnt, nliile pretending to aid the Bourbons was playing n 
dutible part. And one year after this period NapoLon re- 
ti~med fiam Elbn, mhen neither the presence of the duke of 
AngouTbrne, nor the cncrgy of the ducbcas, nor nll the activity 
of their partisans, ccruld r u i~e  in thia very country more tlian 
tlie aernblznce of an opposition to Km-tlie triwIor was 
cverywhere hoiskd and tlie Dourhon pmty vanihed. This 
w3s the trne tes t  of mtional feeling. Fos in 1314 the 
wl~ite colours mere supperted hy foreign mmies, and rniafor- 
' tunc had bowcd tho great democmtic Aicf t o  thc mrth; but 
whn rising in his wondroii6: might he carne h c k  done 
from Ellia, the poarer people, with wliom anIy patriotism ia 
ever reallp ta be found, and that because tliey are poor and 
therefore unsopiiiaticated, crowded to mect nnd haiI h i i  aa a 
father. Mot because thely helnhim entirelg blarndess. Who 
born of wornan js'l Tliey demandsd redreas of grievanccs 
even while they clung instinctively to hirn as tiieir stay md 
lnatection apinst tke Iocust tyranny of ariritocracy. 
Tliere mas however at this period in f i m c e  enough of dis- 
wntent, of passion and intrigue, enongh of treason, and 
enorigh onf grovelling qirit in dversiby, fidded fo the nnti~rtd 
desire of escnping the mvagos of war, adesire carefully fostsrei 
by the ridinirable policy of tlie English general, t o  render the 
Frencli general's position extremely dangeroua Nor Is it tlie 
least rernarkable circurnstance of this rernarkable period, thnt 
~vhile Boult expectd relicf from Spnnish avcrsion t o  the 
' English alliance, 14eliin&on received from the PrencEi seuet 
anc1 emest  warnings to  b e m e  of mme great act of t r e d e ~  
meditatea by the Spaniards. It was at this pmiod also that 
tlie Spanish general8 encoumged their ~oldiem' licentiausness, 
znd displayed their o m  ill-will by sullen disconhnt and 
captious complainta, d i l e  the civil autliorities tlisturbed the 
communications m d  m d e  ww in their fiishion apinst the 
hospital$ and magafines. 
72 PENXNsUSA WAR. [JAN. I ~ I A  
Wellington's apprehensienu are plninlp to  be traced in I I ~  
comspontlence. Writing about Copoiis lie cnys, liis conduct 
is qriite unjustifiabIe both in concealing wliat Iie knew of tbe 
duke de fizn Cnrlos' arrival and tlie nnture of Lis missim' 
l n  another Ietter he observes, tliat t.11~ Spanish niilitary 
peopIe aboiit liimsclf desEreiI peecc ~vitli hT:qiolcon acoortliiig 
to tlie treaty of I'¿~len!~ny; tli;tt tliey aa[l h i r ?  some notion of 
 lid Iintl ocCtiw~rl anil yct Iiíul Iieen qtiitc: silcnt aliout it; thtlt 
he l i d  mpcr~ted intclligcnce frnin tlic Frrnr:h of fiomo nct of 
trrnchcry mcditatcil by tlie SyilaninriIw; tliiit swcn~l  persoriii of 
t1int nation Iind come frorn Piu-yonne to  circiilrtte reports of 
peace, and cliarges ,i~.;~inst the I h i t i a l i  wliicli 110 lcnew would 
lie well received uu tliat fniritier; tlirit lic 1i;td tirrestd a man 
crilliiig Iiinisdf an icgent of urid actiirilly Lcaring a letbr of 
credeiice from Ferdinand. But tlio must strikiiig p m f  of 
alxrm was liiu great satis~actictiou at the coiidtict. uf tlie Bpnnisli 
gowrnment in rejecting tlie trenty brought by Ran Ciirlos and 
I'aitlafox. Samificing al1 liis fornier grest and jririt resentment 
he changed at once from an enemy to a friend of the regencyj 
rinpporteil the members of it ragainst the servila, spoke of tha 
matter as thc most important. tht  11ad engagerl liis attention, 
and whcn O'O'Donnel prnposed sonie violent ~ n d  ecided actfon 
of hostility wi i iñ t  tlie rcgcncy, wlvliicli n fciv weelrs befm 
wenlcl hlive been reccived rvitlr piensure, Iie clicclred and 
~oftcned liiin, sayiiig, tlie coiiduct of tliat boily nhut  tlie treaty 
sbotild content cvpry Spnniard : it was not pussililc to act with 
more fiuiiknass nnd loyalty, itnd tliey liad proctired honm for 
tliemselves und for tlicir nittion not oiily iri Eiiglimd but 1i11 
over Europe. SucIi is tlie liglit niotlo ir1 ivliich words are 
applied by piililic meu, sveir by tlie nulilcst and grmtest, 
wlien tlieir wiulies are ri1lfilIed. Sliis glurious nnd I iauou~~1i1e 
aoníluct of the repncy was ~imply a rcsorution to  uphold 
tlieir personal power and tliat of tlieir fiiction, both of whch 
would llave been dectroyed by tlie arrival of the king. 
Ynpdeon Iiopiiig much from tlie eñect of these machina- 
tioiis, not only intiinaktl to h u l t  thet be woirld reqiiire ten 
thousmd of liis infantry immcdiatcly, but that twice t l int  
numbcr 7vitl1 a (Iivisinn of m~dry wodd be d f c d  awtty if the 
Spniwds fcU off from tlle Englisli ullimco. Tho dulre ol 
hlrnatia then foreseeing tlie ultimate resuIt of bis own opera- 
tions against Wellington, conceived a vast general gIan oE action 
wliich erinced his capacity to h e &  the greatest questioas of 
milita7 policy. 
Neither Lis numbers nor rneans of suppIy rtftcr Wellington 
had gained tlie bnnlrs of  the Adour abo~e  Rñyonne woultl, 1ie 
said, miffice to mnin t i n  his positions coverirq that f o r t m  and 
menacing tho nllics' riglit flmlr; the time npprozched wlicn Iie 
must, even without a rehction of  force, abtindon Btnyonne to 
ika own resourms and fight on tlie numerous rivers wLch run 
mith concent~ic courses frorn the Pyrenew to tlie Adoar. 
-val's and Boycr's clivisions ef infantrywere t o  join the grand 
8miy on the eiistern froiitier; hhbé's divisioa to lnis% 
the gnrrison o£ Bayonne and its camp to fourtccn thousnnd 
men, but, considering tliis force too great for a simple 
general of division he wislicd to give i t to Eeilla whose corps 
would be Sroken up ty the deli~rture of tlie cletacbments. 
That officer was however dtogcther ayerse, and as an undl ing 
onmmaocler would he hwlf beaten Isefore the battle mmeneed 
Iic desircd DErIon should talte Rcille's plncu.' 
' The active a m y  could not then fight pitclied riattlee, nnd 
he recommended tlie throwing it ris a great liartisan corps on 
the left; touching a1waq.s upon t t e  Pyenees antl ready to FJI~ 
upon Wellingtorlk fi ank and rersr if he sliould peneti.de into 
Frnnco. Clanfiel a native of tlioso parts and spmking tlic 
country lanpago, wwns by lliis müitary qunlities and knowledge 
the most ~uitable person to command. Beille could mnrch 
with tbe troopa called to t11e p a t  amy;  and as tliers would 
be notliing left for liim, SoiTIt, to do in tliese pmtrts he desired 
t o  be cmployed mhere Iie could aid tlie ernperor with more 
cffect. This Fie presaetI iirgently, because, notwithstanding tliu 
refusa1 of tlie Cortes to receive Ihe trenty of hlenqa); it w.w 
probable tlie war on tlic emtern frontier monlrl compel tlia 
empcror to  recal dl flie troops dcsignnted. It wouPd tlicn 
become imperative t o  clinnge from s xgulnr t o  an i r rcplnr  
wnrfare; in wliich 5 numerous corps of partisnns would t e  
more valunhle tkan tbe diatloiv o€ a reglar amy without 
valíre or confidente and Iikelp to be destroyed in the first 
great battle. For tbese pnrtisnns it wus ncceusn. t o  hwe o 
central power and dirmtor, nnd Clausel was the man most 
fitted for tho t ~ k  He ought t o  hnvc under him the general8 
mho commanded in tha military departrnents Lietween tlie 
Garonne and the Pyrenees, witli power to foree tlie iuliabihts 
t o  take a m s  and act under h i ~  directitions, 
1 am sensible,' lie continud, ' tliat tliis syetem, one of tlie 
least unhappy consequences of wliicli would be to Ieave tlis 
enemy apparcntly niaster of al1 tlie country between the 
mauntains and the Gaonne, can only be justified by the 
necassity of forming an army in tlie centre of France paffi- 
ciently powerful to fend off B e  multitude ofenernies fmm tlie 
capital; but If Paris MLs al1 mil1 be lost, ~berelrs if it be mved 
the loss of a few large towns in the south can be repaired 1 
popose then to form a g r ~ a t  army in front of Paris by a d o n  
of al1 the disposabIe t roop~ on the diffcrent frontiem, and Zo 
sprcad what rcrnains ns pnrtisnns mlicrcvcr thc enemy threatcns 
t o  pcnctrnte. AIl thc marshals of Francc thc gcricds and 
other oficers, in activity OF in retircment, tlwho sltall not be 
rattached to tlie great wntruI armq-, should orgunize tlie prtisnai 
corps and bring those noh actively useful as such, up to tlie 
grezt puint of union; and they should Iiave military pwer  to 
inalro al1 men able to bear ams find them a t  tlleir o+vn 
expense.lc Tliis rnensure is revolutionary Iiut wiEl produce 
imporhnt results, mliile none or a vcry fceble effect will b~ 
eaused by the mujority of the imperial cclmmissioners alrearlg 
sent to the milihry divisions. They are grand persons, they 
teniporize, rnalce proclnmations and treat everything a8 
civilians lnstead of acting -4th vigonr to  ohtain promptly a 
resul t wliich would astonisl~ tlie world ; for notwithstanrling 
tlie cry to the contrary the ~CSOUTCCR of Prance are not; 
cxhnirsted-what is wanted is t o  malte tliose who possess 
rcsourccs usc thcm for tlic dcfenco of the throne and the 
cmpcrot' Having thus cxplained bis vicwg he ng& requ&ed 
to  s e m  near the emperor, but declared Iiimself r c d y  t o  obg 
any arder aud serve in any manner; al1 be demanded m 
elear instructionti with referente to tlie events tliat migbt 
CKXUF. lo. WJiat lie shliould do if tlie treaty with Ferdiumd 
bad no ioect and tiie Xpanish troops remained with 'iVellingtoa 
So, If those troopa retired and the Britkh seeing the Prench 
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weakened by iletachments should done penetrate into France. 
39 If the b n g e s  ia SpXyain shouId cause the allies to retire 
aItoqether. 
This great pmjec€ mas not adopted and the empemr's 
reasons for neglecting it have not bccn mndo known. Nor 
can the morkinp of tliat capncious mind be judged af withont 
R IcnowIedge of 811 the objects and canditions of his combina- 
tions. Yet it is probable that at this period he did not 
despair of rqecting the d i e s  be~ond the Ehine either by force 
of arms, by negotiation, or by working upon the fhntily pride 
of the emperor of Austria. Wth this hope he would be 
nyeree to risk civil war by plncing Fmcc  iindcr mnrtial Iaw; 
aveme t o revive the de~wr ing  fire of revolution wlijch it h d  
Gem his ohject for ao many yeara t o  quell-and it seema 
nearly cert-ain, that ons of Lis reasoas for repking Perdinand 
on the Spanish thone  ñ.ag his fear l& the republican dactrines 
which Iirrcl gained ground in Spiprtin should ~prmd to France. 
Wm ha wrongl The fierce democmt wilI mswer yes! Thom 
wlio think real liberty was never atbined under a singIe 
nnmixed form of governmcnt giving no natural ~ent t o  the 
tiveliii pride of honoux b i h  or riclies-those who mensure 
the weaknesa of  pare repuhlicani~m by the mieerahle &ate of 
Frauco at homa and iibroad whca Napoleon first nssumcrl 
p w e r  t o  sxve lier;-t2iose who sttw Amcrim mitL her militia 
and licentious Lberty, anable to prevent tliree tliousand British 
soldiers from passing tliree tl~ousand miles of ocem nnd burn- 
ing their mpitnl-tliose pcrsons will hcsitate to oondemn him. 
h d  thii without detrirnent to the domocrntic principie whicli 
in subshnce may and aliould zlways govern under judiciow 
forrnbi. Wapoleon emly judgd, md the evcnt hm proved he 
judged trulg, that the democratic SpiI'ih of France wm tlien 
unahlo t o  overbear thc nristomatic rtnd monarcliic tcndencies 
o€ Ewope; wisely thercfore wl~ilo lio precerved tlie essence of 
tlie first by fostering equality, he endeavvured to blend it with 
t,iie other two; thus ~kLti+'ing ns fnr as human institutiona 
n-ould permit tho conditions of the great prob1em he hnd 
wdertaken t o  solve. His ol3ject Tas tlie reconstruction of 
the social fabric which had been shatkred by the French 
revoIution, mixing wit IL tlie ncw mi~terinls wfiat remnincd of 
the old anficiently unbroken to buld with again ; if he failed to 
render his structnre ~tRble it wm bectbuse his d m i p  wag 
misnndeiritood, rand tlie terrihIe passirins let Ioose by the 
prcvioiis stupendous cxplosion were too miglity cvcn for him 
t o  compress. 
To have mecpkd SouWs p-jcct would have been t o  saíle 
himself at the cxpense of liis ~yctem, and proliably to pIunge 
Frnnce into the anarchy from wliicl~ ho Iiad with so much ctire 
md lahour drawn her. But Nal>oleon's ambition was for tlie 
greatness and prosperity of Frnncc, for the regeneration of 
Euiopg for tlie datility of the systea whicli he had Sormed 
with that end, nwer for hirnsdf persunally. Eence it ia tliat 
multitudes of many nrations instirictively revere his memory; 
and neitlier the mona& nor tlie aristocrnt, doiniuant though 
tliey be by his fnll, feeE tlicmuehcs so esay in their bigh placeti 
as tu rejoice much in tlieir victorp. 
fioults project mns not ridopted, and in Febrnay two divi- 
sions of infant y and Trielhard's avalry, with many batteries, 
were wjthdrawn; tmo tliousand of tlie best solcliers were ale0 
selected t o  join the imperial p r d s ,  and d l  tlie gens-d'mes 
were sent to  the interior. Tlie total number of ola aoldiern 
left, did not, including the division of Paris, h~ceed forty thon- 
eand exclusivc of tlle garrison of Bnyonnc aad other posta; 
the conscripts, bcardleñs youtlirr, wcre generally unfit to  enttr 
the linc, ntir were tlierc enougli nf miislrets to arar them. It i.3 
rcmarknhlc dso, m dionting hoir ea~ily milihry operntions may 
be affcctcd by dishnt comtiindions; tht  Soule expected md 
drended at this time the dcsccnt of n, grcnh English ihmy upon 
the const of La Tcnrldc, led tlieretn liy hmring of an expedi- 
tion, preparing in England under Grahram, r d y  t a  aid tbe 
Dutch ievolt, 
Vhjle Lis power tliua diminisIiiag, Weliington'ri situs- 
tion \vas ras auddenly amelioi.wted, First by th arrival uf 
reinforaeinents, next by t110 security 1ie felt from the rejectian 
of the tresty of Tnlencay; lastly by the approach of better 
lveather and the acqnisition of a very laqe sum in p ld;  which 
enabled him to pub Ms AnglatPortugume in acti~ity, and tb 
bring the Spxniards agnin in to  line with less damger of their 
plundering the conntry. Dnring the cessation of operationa 
he bd prepwd tlie mmns tci enter France ~ 4 t h  power and 
sccurity, scnrling bcfor~ him the farne of s just discipline and 
ra wiw oonmdmtion for tlie people who mere likely to fa11 
under his power; for there mas nothiq  he so mucli dreatled as 
the partisan and insurgent warfare proposed by Xoult, The 
'peasants of l3aygorry and Bidnrnty l id  done Iiim more mis- 
chief tlian the French amp, snd his terriblemenace of dwtroy- 
ing their villages, and han& di the popnlation he could lay 
his han& upon if they ceased not tlicir hostility, marks his 
apprelensions in the strongest mmner. Yet Ite left nlI the 
Toca1 authorities fi-ee to carry on the interna1 pverninent, to 
drriw their tislarias, nnd raiw iehe necessmy taxw in the 8&mB 
mode md with as much tranquiIlity a3 if perfect peace pre- 
vailed- He opened tlieports nlso tand drew n Iarge commerce, 
which served to mpport Iiis own army and engap  the mer- 
cnntile interesta in his favour; he establislislied many sure 
climels for intelligence political and militnrg, and wonld 
hnve extended his p l i c y  further and t o  more rt~lvnntn,ne iif tlie 
Enghh miniski8 bnd nof so ignorantly interfercd ivith his 
prooeedings, Finnlly, foreseeing tlint the n o n q  he mi&€ 
receive wouM, being in foreign coh, creato emburrassrneiit, 
lie dopked an expedient which he had before practiscd in 
lndia 
Knowing that in a British rirniy a wondmfol wiriety of 
knowlcdgc mand vocations, good anrl bd, mny be found, he 
secretIy caused tlie minera and die-sixilrers amongst the solcliers 
to be songlit out; and onco wsured tliat no niiscliief wau 
intended them, it waa not djfficult to prsiiadc them to 
acknowledge their peculiar talwts. With t81iese inen lie esta- 
hlished a secret mint and coined gol:l Napnlconq mnrking 
tliem with a private stnrnp and carcfi~lly prescnjng tlicir just 
fiueness and weiglit to enaliIe tlie Ymnch goveiarimeiit ivEien 
peace shoulcl be estnblished to cal1 tliem in agnin. He tlius 
ltvoided dl tbe difficiilties of excliange, and removed n friiitful 
graft of quarrels and jll-wi31 Iietwecn tlie troopa niid the shop- 
keepers; for the latter ara always fnstidious in taking and 
desirous of alititing the cumnt worth of strange coin, and the 
fomer attribute to fraud my declination from the vahe at 
which they receive tlieir money. This sudden increage of tlie 
currsnt coin tended nlrro to diminish tlie pressure necessarily 
attendant upon troulileii tirnea, 
Nor ms Ilis prori(1ent sagacity less manifest in p u ~ l y  
military mstters tlian in administrative znd political opera- 
tions. Daring the brad wcatlier he hnd forrned lnrge mngazines 
at tlie ports, examined tlie murse of tlie Adour, and carefully 
meditated upon his future pIaiis. To enter Fmnce and rally 
a great Bourbon party wns bis misli. Tliis tast point depended 
upon the political proccedings and succcssea of tlie dlied 
sovereigns; yet the rnilitzry operaiions most gnitzble at the 
rnoment did not clasli mitli it; to drive the French from 
Buyonne aria blockaxle or besiege tliat place was tlie firrit etep 
in either case. But tliis required extensive md daring com- 
binations. The fortress anrl its citndel, comprising in their 
cirmit the conffixence of the Nive and tlie Adour, wulil not be 
safely h m s t e t l  with less than tliree times the nurnbcr neces. 
aary to resist the garrison at any one point; because the Irttteh 
commnnications were short, interniil and secure, tlioae of the 
invmtera externa1 diíñcuit and iinpafe, and ench division sliould 
he able to resid a arilly of the wliole pmfflson. The forces 
operating towarda the interior wauId thus be seriously 
reduced. 
How aad whm t o  moas tlic Adonr dt l i  a viem to the 
inrestment wari also a s u b j ~ e  of ~olicitude. It was a genk 
rivcr mith s strong carrent nnd mcll guardcd by troops and 
gun-liorits above Bqonnc; still ,matcr m s  it bclow thetown; 
there the cbb tida run seven niilcs an hoiir; there alao tliere 
wera pn-boats, a sloop of war, nnd rncrchant-vessels which 
coiild he m e d  and employed t o  ínterrupt the passngh The 
nurnber of pontoons or otlier bowts requireri d bridge tlie 
~ t r e n m  across eitlier abuve or below, and hhe carriag-8 of them 
would iaevitnbly give ncticc of tlie d e s i p  sud render it 
,. 
abortive unless the fiench army was first driven msy ,  and 
tlien the troops at Bayonne, fifteen thousand, might baffle. 
tl~e attempt. NevcrtheIess he resolved to p w ~ ,  tlia meam 
tidopted being proportionate to  tlie greatness of the design. 
To tbrow liis bridge above Bayonne invoIved the w j j n g  
~f his makrials across the Nive and througli the deep eonn- 
tq on ea& side, md tlie driGng of Soult entirely fmm the 
Adour nnd nll its confluents ; but hia 0q.n  convoy^ between klie 
1nrlg.e aria thc scn-port rnng~zincs would thm bo unsafo nnd nn- 
certain, having t o  lend tlieir ff~nk t o  Bayonne wud cross severnl 
rivers liahle tu floods-inoreover, his rneans of tranaport; were 
unequltl to the weenr and te= of the dwp road~~.  TO throw 
tlie bridge Iielow Dayonne would gire h i i  tiie lower Adour 
for a harbour, md Gis land convoys codd use the royai 
enuseway mliich led close tri t h t  nver md wils not nffected by 
rnin; hia line nf rctrcnt dcro wonld be more Becure if unforeseen 
misfortiinc forced him to relinqui~h the inaestment. But 
the rnpidity and breadtlli of tbe nver below Bqonnc dcnicd 
tlie use o!? common poiihona, and the inouth, aix mile3 from 
tlie town, was so bnrred Tvith san&, so beaten with mrges, so 
difficult of navjgation even with lrrnd-marlrs, some o f  w1)icli. 
the French h d  removed, tliat it aeemed impoasiblc for veasels 
fit for a bridge to enter from the sea; and o, strong Ilcfensivc 
force would inevitably bar the conutruction if tliey could. 
Tliess dificulties however Wellin,rrton with admkal-ile jiirlg- 
nient rendered subaervient t o  his purpose. For judging they 
would appesr insuperable t o  the Prencli, he tliouglit Boult 
would readily aalianantlon the mre af tlie lomer ArIour to defend 
tlie ri~ers beyond tlia Nive if liis left was ~ t h c k c i i ~  and thrrs 
thc lower Adour would be laid opcn for iiis cntcrprise. Nor 
did he fear t.hnt the Prencli mnrslial, in rotiring bofore tlre 
troopn dsstined to foroe tlie rivers near flie root~  of tlie 
Pyrenees, would gain the bound~ry rod and come clown on 
tlie investing force nt Rayonne; hemuse t o  do so he must enter 
tlie sandy wildemess of the Lnndcs, and rnighh be ~wevenkrl 
from gctting out again, ! h o  natural obstncles rcniuined, and 
to surmount them Le =de tlie fvllowing arranptnents. 
Having coIlectecl forty large sailing-boata of from íifteen to 
twenty tons burthen, as if f o r  tbe commiss~ri& service, be 
riecretly londed them witli plmka and other mnterisls far his 
bridge; dcsigiiing that they sliould be joined by some p n -  
boats and mn up tlie Adour to a fixcd point, on wliicli Iio 
would previously Jirect tire tronps and artillery, rneaninn 
with liawsers and pontoons t o  form rafbs, and pass a force tn 
destmy a s m d  baf,tery nmr the moiith of the river and c o m  
the eperution. At thk t ime thc French truding-mcIs in the 
Adonr Ilnd priwteiy offercd tn  come ciiit q o n  licences md 
seme tho commissnrint) and thcir aid wouId Iirb~c greatly 
facilitf cd liis project ; bnt lie wns compcllcd to forcgo tFie 
ndmntnge, bemuso of tlie Eiiglisli rniniated previoue folly in 
mfusing to ratify l i s  formcr ~iassports; ~ n d  W~IS thcrefore 
foroed to trest as enemiea mcn ivilliiig to he friends, mí1 pre- 
pare dditional means to burn those vessels wliich he miglit 
have nsed for bis proje~% ! 
While tlie Englisti general waa sccretly a m g i n g  this 
great offensive operation, CSoult wm dilip~itly iucrmsing riin 
defensive means and iortiíied al1 the ~iriiicipal paasages o€ 
tlie rivers cirissing tlie main roacls Iearling sgainst his left; 
Tiut the diminution of his force in Jaiiiiaiy com~ielled Iiim t o  
withdraw 111s outposts from Anglet in froiit of Bayonne, which 
eiiabled WelIington closely to examine t l ~ e  lower Adour and 
preprire with more artainty for tlie 1ixss:qe. Boult homwer, 
m pmuance of Napoleon's maxim of covering ph ysical weak- 
ness by mord audacity, concentrnted troops on his left, renew- 
ing the partiisan w d a r e  against the allies' right, and ende* 
vourcd to keep thcm entirely on the defensive. In thc eoursa 
of khese operatioq finding tbat Morillo had assumed a fomard 
post, he, with a view to test tlie Spanish feeling towards the 
Ji;ngl.lisli, directed Htiriape, under pretence of remonstmtinfi 
to sound him as to a defection; he did not respond anil 
Hnrispe then dmve him bnclc i i th  a slarp figlit. This mr- 
fnre however could not altirnntdy clieclt tbe allies, nnd tlie 
French mwshal sceing Mrcllingtan mas rcsol~ed to gtiin the 
lino of the Qmnne, nnd that llra omn retreat mnat ultimakly 
be parallcl t o  thc Pyrence~, pmcecded t o  ogari iee a strong 
defcnsive pystem, to  mver Bortlcuux imqcctiva of his own 
operntions. In this viem he scnt Daricnu, a ntitive of the 
hndes, t n  prepare an insnrgent les. in tbat wilderneog and 
directed lhrtuisin t o  the liiglter menees  ta extend tlie 
i n m c t i o n  bepn by I3arispe in tlie lower  all le p. Jaca was 
st ill held by eigM b u ~ d ~ i i  men, but thcp rvcro starriag, ~ n d  
a convoy collected fox their relief at Navarrem was stopped 
by snow in tlie pass. It  vas an error to retain the pIace, for 
tliough the particlag would have descended on khe French side 
t.o the very mar of the army, wnd perlinp have ntvaged p* 
of tlie frontier if the garriaon hnd been withdramn, thcy eould 
Lave done no essentittl lrurm, and tlieir excesaes would have 
cEispomd the peeple ol thoae parta ta iusurrection. 
dt Bordeanx there  as a smll  reserve comrnanded by 
general L'Xluillier, and Soult urged the minister of war to 
increase it witli conscripts from the interior. Meanrnliile he 
senG artillerpnea from Bayonne t o  nid fifteen hundrd national 
guards aa a gñrricon for the citadel o f  BIaye, ~nnd dmired thtlt 
tlie M6dm and Patá forts d the b~tteries dong the banka o£ 
the Garonne shlhoiild be put in s s b t e  of defeince. Al1 vessels 
fit fortho purpose hc desiredmight bc aimed, nnd a flotilla of 
fifty gun-boats estalilished belom Bordeaux, witb a lilte numbcr 
to navigtite the iiver as far as Toulouse. But tliese ordem 
ivere Ieebly executed or entirely neglected, for there KM no 
public spirit, and treason and &&ection aere rife in tlic 
city. 
On the side of the lower Pyreneefi he improved the morka 
of Nnvñrrem and desiperI an entrenched camp in frunt 
of it; the wtle of Lourdes in the liigh Ppcnew maa alrcatfy 
defensible, and he gave ordem to fortify tlie cwtle of Pau; 
thus providing aupporting pointa for tbe retrent wliich Iio 
forectam. At Mauleon 1ie put on foot some partisan corps, 
and tha imperial commissary CaffareIli gave liim hopes of 
a rewpvc of rieven or eiglit thousand nntional pnrtls, g w  
d m n ~ ,  and artillcrymen, at Tarbcs. Dex, contnining Fiis 
principal dépbts, wae being Eortified, m d  the cornmunicntion 
with it was maintained tacross the rivers by fortified bridge$ at 
Purt de Lnndes, Rastiiigues, Pereyhorrde, and Bauvcterre; 
but the flooda in the beginning of February c~rried a w q  his 
permanent bridge iit tlie Port de Landcs, anrl the comrnnnica- 
tion bctween Bayonne and tlie left of the army was thus 
iiiterrupted until he established R flying-bridge. 
Al1 tliese preprtrationa \vere marle in tlie supposition that 
Flrellington had one hundred and twenty thousantl infantry 
ani3 fifteen thonsand c~vaTry, for SouIt knew not of the political 
and financinl oascscr whicli had rctluccd that genemi's pomer. 
Hissmissaresi told him Clinton'~ form mas actualIy broken 
up, and tbe British part in msrcli to join Wellington; thnt tho 
gadsons of Cartiirtgena, Cadiz, and Ceuta, wrt: on thc point 
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of rrrriving, and reinforcernents corning fmrn EngIaiid and 
Pofiugal. Inferring fram this tliat the war in Clitotlonia moizld 
*ase and al1 +,he troops be united to rnarch ttgainst hirn, he 
apin urgd tliut Suchet should join him; that tlieir united 
forces rnight form a 'dike against the torrent'which tlirentened 
to ovemhdrn the south of Fiance. Tlie r d  power opposed 
to him was however much below his calculations. Tlie twentp 
thoiisand British nnd Portuguese reinforcements promised, hd 
not arrived, Glinhn's army was still in htalonia; and though 
the exact nambers of the rjpnniards anno t  be stated, their 
forces available, and tliat only pmtiall y and with great mufion 
on acoount of their licentious eondnct, did not exoeed the fol- 
lowing approximation. 
Fmyre had, including Kspafin's diviaion, tmelve t'housand 
rnen, Mari110 four tliousnnd, O'Donnel six thousand, and the 
prince of hg lona  eight thousnnd. The Angla-Forti~pvc 
pment under arms were by the morning staka ou tlie dny 
the advance wmmenced, seventy thoiisand of dl ma, ten 
thonsnnd being cavuly. The wliole force, exdusfve of Mina9 
bnds  which aere spread from Navane to the borders of 
Catalonia, was tlierefore one hundred thousand with one huu- 
dred guns, ninety-five Iieing Anglo-Portuguese. Tlie French 
numbcrs opposed it is difficult to fix with precisibn, became 
the imperial muster-rol14 owing tu  tlie troubled &te o€ the 
emperor's aff'airs, were not con ti~uetl Seyond December 181 3 
or have beeii lost. But Srom SouTt's correspondente and other 
documents it vould qpear that r.xc?usive of his gmrisonq bis 
resmes, and detschments at Eordeaux and in the deprtment 
of the high Pyrenecs, exclusive alñci of t l i e  conscripta of thc 
second levy wliich were now bcginning to mive,  ha could 
place in Iine tliirty-five thousand saldiers of al1 a m ,  three 
tbonsancl Iielnp cavalry, witli forty piecee of artilllery. But 
Bayonne alone, witliout reckoning tlie fortresses o€ St. Sean 
Pied de Port xnrl Nn~mcns ,  ocm~pierl twenty-eight thousimd 
of the dlies; and by tliiri and otlier drdns %*ellingbn'a supc+ 
~ioritg in tlie field wns so reduced, that liis penetrating into 
France, thnt Fi.:ince, ~vhidz 11b1~1 mmiide id1 Europc trenihle lit 
3ier mms, must bc viewcd ns a surprising cxitinlile af cuur%* 
and fine conduct. 
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In the stlcond weelc of February the wccather set witb a 
strong frost, the rods became pmcticable, and the Englisli 
general seized the opportunity h dvance; but the clotliing 
so Iong delqed in Eiigland had just tlien arrivd, and th 
Rritish regimenta being .ivitliout carriqe were compelIed to go 
for it to t be  stores in siicoession. ñenm tlie first operationil 
were merely t o  turn tlie riress beyonrl the Mive rtt their sonrces 
mitli HilPs corpq whiIe Bereaforri held the Frencli centre in 
clieclr lower dom.  This it wns hoped woirld draw Soult's 
~ttcntion from the Adour below Baponno, where the parrsqe 
was t u  be mde; liut Wellington, uncerbin if lis could form 
the tr ihtwy rivers witli Iiis r+t, de~igned in that case, if liis 
bridge was Iiappily tlirawn, to  operate on tliat line m d  turn 
tiic Frencli army by tlie right of the Adonr-a fine conception 
hy mhic11 he woiiFd seize Dnx and tlie Port de hndes, and cut 
off Soult from Boi~rdeilux. 
On the 12tli nnd 13th HilI, hnving tmenty thousrand c m -  
hatanta with sixteen guna, was reliemd hy the sixtli aud 
~eventh diviions at hIousseroIes and on the Aduur, and took 
post &out Uxcnrray and Hasparen. Tlie 14th he rnnrched in 
two columns; one by 130nlm t o  rlrive the French pi, 10, 
posh hcyond the Joyeuric, anokher by &e p t  V O I . ~ ~  p.387- 
rnnd of 8t. J w  PictI de Port t o  dislodp Hnrispe, wlio aas at 
Hellette; thia column liad ths Ursouia on tlie right, md 
3Iorillo marclied OII the otlier side of tliat mountaia againat 
tlie same point. Hnrispe who hnd only three Iirigdea, princi- 
pi~lly conacripta, retired skirmishing in .the direction oE St. 
l'nlhis and twlc a pnsition for tlie n i k t  at 3Ieh:hnrin; the 
Joyeiise mne thus turn~d, thc direct commnnimtion mith 8t. 
J c ~  Pied do Port cut, and tliat place ivas immediately invested 
Ly hlim's bnttaIions. 
On the 15th Hill, lexving the fiftpseventh mgiment nt 
Hcllcttc t o  obseme the roarl to St. Jean Pierl tls Port, marclid 
tlirough Mcliarin upon Garris, eleven miles diBtant; Ziut tliot 
r u d  being impmcticrible for artillery tlie guns movcd by 
drme~daritz more to the right. Harispe's rear-para was 
overtalcen rand pushed baek fighting, and meanwhile Bwesford 
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i v ~  directed to send a brigde of tLe seventh division fram 
tlie heiglits of h Costa across the aamboury to the 13astide 
de Clerence. The Eine lieing thus extended from Udj by 
Brisloona, the Bastide and Isturitz, towiirds Garris, a distance 
of more than twenty milen) wns too attenunted, md the fourtli 
division mcnpied La Costa in mpport of the troops ht kthe 
krttide. At tlie samc time the Frcnch weakened tlieir fom 
nt 31ouswroles, and Wdlington tliinking it miglit be ix con. 
centrate on tlie heights o€ Anglet, mliich would liwe frustrrrted 
the castirig of his bridge ovcr the Adonr, direeterl E o p e  
ñcerctly te occupy thc hacl~ of thoae hcigh-hts in forca nnd pre. 
vcnt any intercours~ bctwccn &yonnc nntl khe country. 
Soult knem of the intended opemtioiis apinst liis IeR on 
tlie 12th) but hmring the aliiefi had collected bonh, had con- 
stiucted a freB brtttery near Urt) and tliat their pontoana had 
reiiclid Urcurmy, he: thought Wellington designed to turn liis 
lefh with HiU's oorps) to presa hiin on tlie Bidouze ivitli 
Berdord's, and keep the prrison of Bayonne in check witli 
the Spaniads w11iIe Bope mossed tlie Adour aliave thab for- 
tress. Wherefore, on the 14th he was near the Bastide de 
CIerence making dkpositions to  dispute the Didouse and tbe 
Gave of Nauleon first, aiid then the Qave af OIexon. He had 
four divisions in hand with wl~ich he occupied rt nosition on 
Soalt, BISS. tlie 15th along the Ridouze. General mho 
was then in movement d l i  the convov to relieie 
Jaca, a= reealied to watcl~ Mina between #t. ~afsirc and St. 
Jem Pied de Port and Jaca capitulated on t,he 17th, tlie p- 
risan to return to Francc and not seme ti11 cxchrangcd. Thifi 
condition was broken by the Frencli, but tha rcccnt Spnnish 
violntion of tho convcntion madc with the dcIuded garrisons 
of Lcrida, llequinenza, and Monzon, fmished a repl?, 
Harispe, having Paris under Iiis mmmand and being supported 
by Pierre Boult with a brigade of light mvalry, now covered 
the r o d  from Et. Jean Pied de Port with liis lefb, and the 
upper line of tlie Bidouze with his riglit j lower down, SlUatte 
ooeupied aliarre, Taupin was on the beights of Bergoney beloa 
Villatk, md Foy guarded the Gver from Carne to its e o d u e n ~  
with the Adour. The imt of the army remaiained under D'Erlon 
<m th right of the Adour. 
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O& af GvPP?s.-Harispe had just bken a position in 
dvance nf the Ridauze on a height called the C h i s  moun- 
tain, which stretched to St. Palnia, when his mr-gumd carne 
plunging into a deep mine in his front closcly followed by 
tlie liglit troopa of the sewnd divlsion. Upon tiie parallel 
counter-ridge thua gained by the allies, Hili's mrya was irnme- 
diately established; and though the evening mas beginning to 
close Iiis alrirmishers descended into the rnvine, and two guns 
playcd over it upon the French, wha t o  the number of four 
thuusantl wera drawn up on the opposite mounbin. In this 
sbte  of afairs Wellingtun arrived. He was anxious t o  turn 
the Iine of the Bidouze before Soult could strengthen himaelf 
there, and seeing the communication with París by Xt. Palas 
WM not m11 niaintained, sent MoriIlo by a flnnk march dong 
the ridge now amupEed by the sllieri towarrls that place; then 
menaing the enemy's centre with Le Cor's Portugnese divisioii, 
he direeted PrrngIe to atta& witli the tlirty-ninth. and t~veverity- 
eighth resmenta, saying Mth a concise energy, " g m  nzwt 
take th ?~1iU &f.t. &k! 
TEiis expression caughf the attention of the froops and WWI 
rgieated by done1 OGallaghan, as ho rand Ringle placcrl 
tliemselves at the hend of the thirty-ninth, wliiclr, followeci by 
tbe tweath-eighth, rushed with Iond arrd prolonged diouts into 
the mt-ine. The French fire was viaIent, Pringle fe11 wounderl 
and most of the mounted officem hnd their horses killed; yct 
the troops, covered by the thiclr wood, gaincd with Iittlo losa 
tlte summit of the Qarris mountain on tlie Ngbt o f  tkc enemy, 
who thought h m  the shouting thnt a larger force,was coming 
@nat them and retreated, The thirty-ninth then wheeled to 
tlieir right intendiag to meep the surnmit, but the Freuch 
having discovared their error carne back at a cliarging pace, 
sustainwI a volley without fiincliing and tried tlie bayonet. 
O'Callaghsn, distingniahed for ~trength and cuurage, received 
two strokcs of that wcapon, rana repnid them witli fatal p w e r  
iii each instance; then the Frcnch, neurlg al1 conscripts, were 
beaten off. Twiee they Cttme baclc and fought until tIie fire 01 
tl ie tn~enty-eightli ñ-as Lieginning k be felt, when Harjspe, 
seeing the remainder of the second division rendy to support 
the attaBk, Le Gor'a Portupese arivuncing qninst  tlie 

line was prolonged by D'Erlon towards Dax; yet Soiilt stil 
kept advanced parties on tlie Iower Bidouee at tlie different 
entrenched polssages of that river. One brigatle of canlry was 
in reserve at Sauveterre and aaother m Jistributed on tlie 
line; head-quarterc were transported to  Orthes, the perc ol rirtil- 
lery went to Aire. Tlic prilicipal magaaincs of nmmi~nition 
were ot Rayonnc, Kavnrrens, and Dax; und the French gene- 
ral seeing IriR communicxtions with tliose ~ilaces likcly to be 
ii~tercepted before lie could remove Iiis stow,  ~iiticipnkd 
di&ess and v ~ o t e  to the minister of war ta form new 
d6p6tn 
On the 16th Wellin,@n repaired fhe bmkcn bridges of St. 
Palairr, after a ~kimish in wliich a few men werc woundd. 
Hill then crossed tlie Bidowe, the cavalry and artillery by the 
repaired brid,~ tha infantry hy tlie forde; but the day being 
spent in the operation the head of tbe colnmn only mwclied 
heyond St. Palnis. Mennwhile the fourth and par€ of the 
sevcnth dwsions occupied tlie Bmtide do Clcrcnce on tlie 
riglit of the Joyeuse, and tlie liglit division mme up in sap- 
purt to h Costa on the left bank of thnt river. Tlie 17th 
HiIE, marching at eiglit e'cloek, pnssed througli Domenanin 
toivards the Soissons, while the third rliviofon a t lmced  an his 
left by Mespmwte to the beighta of Sotalierrnute; both corps 
con~erged upon Fa&, who wa$ at Arriveriete to defcnd tlie 
8oissons above its cenfluence with the Gave of Oleron. Tlie 
French outposts were immediately driven across tha Gave and 
PLna attempted t o  destroy t l i~  bridge of Arrivcrieta; Wel- 
lington wns too quick; tlie ninctysecond regiment, covcred 
by the fire of some guns, crossed at a ford abovs tlic liridge 
md beating two French battaliom from the villuge mcured 
tlie paasqe. T h e  allies then hnlterl for the day netir Arrive- 
rictc, liavjng marehcd onlg five miles md Iost one man killcd 
witli twenty-Bree wounded Paris rolinquislied tlie Soissonq 
pet did not retire until the morning of  tlie 18tl1, and tlit 
nlliee then seized the great w d  m n i n g  from Siluveterre to 
Navnrrcns up the lcft bank of the Oleron Gnvc. 
Harispe, Villatte, and Paria, supported by ?y brigade of 
cavalry, were now at Sauveterre occupying the 
bridge-hed on tlie left bank; Taupin was opliosite Sodt, M6S. 
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the Bastide de Benm lower down on tlie rjght; Foy on the 
right of Taupin ; D'Edon on tlie left of tlie Adour above its 
mn08uence with tFie Gave de Pau. Xn thia date tlie íourth 
division dvanced to Bidache on the Bidouze, tlie liglit division 
ioIIowed in support to the Bastide de Clerence, tlie seventh 
diGsion remained in tliat vicinity, its left being extended to 
the Adoas, Tlie a ~ a l r y  of tbe centre under Cotton arrived 
also on the lianks of the Bidouse, connecting t l i ~  fourth s i t h  
the third division at Somhrraute. Bill gent Morilla up the 
Soissons to g u d  the fords as Ligh :bn Nnbaa; and then 
spreding Fanne's crrvalry snd tlie BritisIi and Portu~iese 
infantry betwcen thltt sivc~ and the Gsve of OEcron, occiipied 
al1 the villqes along the rotid t o  Navxrrens and cannonnded 
tlie bridge-liead of S ~ u v c t e m  
Soult, tlirown by the fir& movcrnent upon the defcnsivc, WIU 
ROW at a losa t o  digcovcr his adversary's oliect. The sitnation 
of the aeventh nnd t h s  miirch of tlio fourth and ligl~t divisions, 
led him to  tliink bis works at Hastinpes ~ n d  Peyreliorade 
would be assailed; and tlie weaknecs of liis line, having only 
Taupin'a division to p a r d  tlie river b e t w n  Bauveterre and 
Bordes, a dislance of ten miles, made Iiim Tcar tlie paseage of 
tlie Qave wouId be forcd  near the Bnstide de Bearn, to which 
post tliere ww a good road from Cfimc and Bidache. On tlie 
otlier band tlie prolonption o f  Hill's line tomtuds Navarrenc 
indiwted a design to  i n m h  on Pau; or it migl~t  be tu keep 
liim in check on the Q w e s  >v11iEe tlie cnmp at Bayonne ~iaviis 
msaiilterl. In tliis unceifdnty lie sent Pierre Soult 6 t h  a 
mffalry h r i g d e  and two httclions of inbntry to act between 
Oleron md PRII, muid Irmp open a communication with the 
partisrin coqw fnrming rtt IMfitileon. Tlint done he decided tu 
' Jiold tlie Gavm ri9 long OS he: conld, but d i e n  they wera 
f o m l  to  atituidon tlio rlefensive, concentrate his whole foree 
at Orthes and fnll suddenly upon tlie first of the allies'con 
werging colurnn~ tliat upproaelied lilm. 
~OWLT's conjettures embraced every projcct but the tm one. 
WelIinghn did indeed deaign to k e q  him in check upon the 
riveiri, not t o  obtain an apportunity of assaulting the camp of 
Bnyonne but to thow his stupendous bridge over theAdour; md 
tliat fLiiling he could still pursue hia operations on the &ves. 
MTlierefoie when he had established t i s  offeasive line atrorigly 
beyond the Soissono ~ n d  tlie Bidouze, nnd bis pontoon-train 
was well dmnced towtirds Garria, he returned q i d l y  t o  
Xit. Jem de Luz. Everytliing there depending on mnn >vna 
reittly, liut the weatlier way lioisterous with snow for tivo 
days, and, fearfuI DE Ietting Soult strengbhen hirnwlf on. tlie 
Qave of Oleron, he returned tlie SPst to Qarris; thia delay 
hnvIng deciderl him to rnal~e thfit hiis principal operation, 
lettving the bridgc to Hopo md admira1 Penrose. 
PASSAUE OF T H E  ADOOR 
[Plm lo, Vol. V., page 887.1 
On the 13th, t l ~ e  heighb of Anglet had been occupied by 
the parda  and Germsns, amall part ics merc caiitionsi y piishetl 
tawards the river t b u g l i  tlie pine-forest cmlled the w o d  of 
Bayome, aud the fifth division, uow under Colville, occupied 
Bussnssary artd the bridge cif U ~ R ~ S .  Oa tlie 2 l g t  Colville 
reIieved tlie aixth division in fmnt of hlonsseroIes, rtnd FEJ-m 
mas cnlled aver the Bidrasson h rcpl~ce bim at Bussussnry. 
The 0 t h  Sprtniardo and thc heavy mvulry remained ia 
8pili"n. Hopc Lad tLorefore ouly two BritisL and 
Original 
two rjpnnish divisionfi, three independent bripdes arorning 
o£ Anglo-Portuguepie in fnn try, and Vandcleur'a f:iF 
briga:atfc of liglit mvnf y) nltogetlicr iwenty-cight 
thousand, with twenty pisces of artiky.  Two regimenta 
wliich bad been sent t a  tFie rear sick and severd othere 
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In the night of ths 22nd tlia first di~~ision, six eighteon- 
pounde4 rind tlie rocket tat tery,  were catitiously filfd froni 
tbe causewq near AngIet tolvnrds the Adour; Iiut tlie road 
was deep and heavy, and one of tlie p n s  fnlling into a, ditcli 
seriously delnyed tlie march: nevertheless at daybrcalr tlie 
whole foree renclied some ~ a n d J o m s  wliich extended behind 
tlie pine-forest to tlie river. The Frencli piquets were then 
driven Lnto the entrencbed c n m ~  at Be+s, tlie pontoon-tdn 
and ficld a r t i l l e ~  were broiiglit clown t o  t l~e Adour oppositc 
to tlie village of Boucaut, antl tlie eigliteen-pouiidem placed in 
IinGtery on tlie banl~ Tlie liglit troops closed to the etlge of 
the mamh mhich eovered the riglit of tl~e Frrnch crtmp, and 
E:~pañ$~ clii-kion, hlni(ing poxt on tlie heiglih of Anglet, iii 
concert with the indclientlcnt brigdcs; ~vliich mcrr! nt 
Arcangnes nnd t he  b~+lge :ef Urclainsj att,mcted the enemy's 
attcntion by false atattncl;~ which werc prolongcd ticyond the 
Kivo by tho fifth division. 
It wa9 inteiidd tliat tlic arriptll oE the gun-bonta nnd 
chaese-mmhs at tlie moutli of the Adorir should hnve becn 
simultaneous with tLat of th troops, but the mina conhucd 
contrary, none were to  be seen, and Mvpc, wlioss firmnesti no 
uiitowarcl event could ever ~hd~e, resolred to attemlit tlie 
p n s s q  with the amy alone. Tlic Freiich flotilla openecl its 
fire about nine o'clock; Hope's artillery and rocketü retortd 
so fiercely tht I.luee gun-hoats werc destroyed, m-nd tlie &loop 
so hardly banclled tliat the whole took refuge hi&er up tlre 
river; meanwhile sixty men of the 31iinrds were rowed ia ri 
pontoon across t.he mouth o£ t l i ~  rivm in tlie face of a French 
liiquet, ñliich, peemingly bewildered, retired witliont firing. X 
raft being then 'formed with tlie remnincler of tlie pontoons, 
b hawser ~ 8 8  st.wtched aerocs, and six liundred of tlie gizwds 
aiid the sixhietli regiment, witli n prt of the rocket biittery, 
tlie whole under coloncl Stepford, passcd; yct ~Ioivlly rind at 
slwk watcr only, for tl:e tide run strongly anrl tlic waten nera 
wide. 
During this operation general Tlioavenot, doceivd by spies 
and prisoners, i,liouglit tIie liglit division wns with 
f i o ! ~ v ~ ~ ~ ~  Eope as welE rts the first division, and tliat fiftcen 
Report. thousand men were embarked at St. Jenn de LUZ 
to lanS between Cape Breton nnd the Adour. tVhcrcfore, 
f~wing to endarger hifi garrison by ariending a strong force t o  
any diptanm down the river, when he heard St.opford's de- 
tachment was on the riglit bank be detaclied only tlvo bat- 
talions under generd Maucomlile to ascertain the sbte  of affaiis; 
for the pine-forwt md a p a t  beiiding of tlie river prevented 
him froin obtaining aay viem from Briyonne. 3ia1tcomble 
m ~ d e  a show of attnclcjng Stopfortl, but the lotter, flnnltcd hy 
tiie field-artillery from the left bank, reeeived hiin with a 
discharge of rockets; projectilea which, Like tlie eiepliants in 
nncient mrfare, ofkn tnrn upon their own sicle. This time 
liowever, ameiiable to their directom, they smote the French 
colnmn and it fled arnaxerl, and witli n loss of thirty woundetl. 
If Tlionvcnot h d  lrcpt atrong guards with a ficld-bnttery on 
the right baak of the Adou., Hope could nat hnve pasad  
over tlie troope, nor could sny vessds have ccrssed tha bar; 
no resource nave that of disembasking between tlie river and 
Cape Breton wodd then have remaind. Tlii~i error wris fatnl 
tn the French. Tlic Rritiah continued to pasa al1 night nnd 
until he lve  o'clock on ths  24th) when tlis flotilla wns aeen 
under a press of sd maling with a strong Iireeze for the 
rnoutli of the river. 
To enter the Adonr ia from the fl~tneas of fhe ooast never 
an w y  tmk; it ww now most dificult; bocausc thc higli 
winda of the precedig days hndl mised a great sea ttnd tlic 
snemy liad removed one of tlie guirling Aag-staves by whicli 
tlie navrgation was ordinltrily directed. In front carne the 
boats of the men-rif-wnr, and R-hml of 811, the naval mptnin 
O'ReilIg run bis cr&ft, a choaen Spnish vessel, inte t.he midst 
arif the breaker~ which solhg in a fcightful mnnner ovcr tho 
bar &slied her on to  the beacli. That tirave oflicer strctcbed 
~enseless on the shore wonld have periahed with his crew but 
for thc rmdy sumur of the soldiers; homever a folv only wcre 
dromed nnd the remninder witli an intrepid spirit Itiunchd 
tlieir baat again to aid the p s q e  of the troops ivliidi iras 
still going on. O'Willy waa folIowed wccessfully by lieute- 
nant Debenfiam in a six-oared cutter; hut tlie tirle \vas fdling 
and the remaindcr of tho boitts, tha impossiliility of pnsc- 
ing until the next high water Iieiiig evident, dmw o& mil a 
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pilot was Isntled to direct the Iine of navigAtion by concerted 
aignats. 
When tbe water Tose agnin the mm w r e  p m i ~ e d  rewarde 
in pmportion to tlieir pncc~sful daring, and tlie whole flotilla 
approwhed iu close urder ; huiut with it ¢ame blaclr clmids and 
a driving gale which covered the whoIe line of coa& with I
m g h  íxmLiIing sea, dashing nntl fonming withont m interval 
of dark water tu mmk tlie entrance of the river. The men- 
uf-war's Loats fimt Jrew nmr this terrible line of surge, and 
Mr. BIuye of the Lyra, Jinving tlie cliief piIot d t h  liirn, 
heniically lerE i n h  it; but in an instant his t a r p  m en- 
gulphed and he and al1 with him were drowned. Tbe Lp11'8 
boat lieing thw ~wallowerl up, the following ~essels siverred 
in tlieir course and aliooting up to the right and lcft kept 
hovering undecided un the alge of the tormenkd waters. 
Sudden1 y lieutenan t CIaeyne of the Woodlark pulled a-liead 
and striking fhe right line, with cuumge ~ n d  fortune combined 
sdeE J passd the liar. The mind tlien lulled, tlie maves as if 
conque~ed aliakd somewlrat of tlieir rage, and the chasw 
marges, manned with Spanish seamen and Iiaving m engineer 
oEcer with a party of sappers in each wko cornpelled them to 
fullow the men-o-mr's boats, a m e  pIunging one after 
mother through the huge brealrers and reached the point 
designed fur tbe tritlpe. Thus wss acliie~ed tliis periIous and 
gloririns exploit. In eííccting it mptain Elliot of the hlartid 
with his launch and crew ítnd tliree transliorts' boats perished 
dose to the shore in dss~iite of thn most violent effurt~ mde 
b j  the trogs to save thern; three other vesseIs cast on the 
beach lost part of their crews; and one l a r e  chasse-marée 
full. of men, after passing the line of aurf safely wac m e d e n  
by iy tbwift bdlying wavo which breaking oa her deck dashed 
her to piecea 
Al1 the first divisien rand Bradford's Portapme, eight thon- 
snnd men, being now on tlie nght bank took post for the night. 
Next day, sweeping in a half circIe round tlie citadel and 
its entren~hnients~ they plwed their lefi on tlie Adour above 
tlie fortress, and their riglit on thesame river h low  it; for tlio 
water herc made mch a bend iii tlieir f m u r  that their fmnt 
waa litble more tlim two d e s  &de, and fer the most patt 
mvered by a rnar~hy ravine. This nice operation m q  cffectd 
without opposition, becausa the entrenched campa, mmmed by 
tlie tmops on the otIier sirle uf the Adour, were so wide tlirit 
Thouvenot's force m s  smrcely sufñcient t o  rnaintain tliem. 
The bridge was then conptmcted thiee miles belew Piayonne, 
where the river WAS contracted to eight hondred feet by retein- 
ing malla, built with the view of s5vcopinp away the bar by 
increasing the force of the current. TIie plan of bridge and 
boom were the conception of colonel Bturgeon and mnjor 
Todd; But the exemrtion was confided entirely to the Intter, 
ivlin, dtli a mina less lirillinnt than Sturgeonh Iiut more inde- 
fatig,nble, veiy ~bly acrved his country tfiiougIiout this a R r .  
Batteries were immediately constmcted to fire liot sliot, and 
so drive the sloop and p-11oats lvfng in tlie river awny 
from the bridge, which was thua constnicted. Twenty-six 
chns~icsmmBea rnoored head and atern at distnnces of forty 
feet, reckonieg from centre to centre, wcro first bound 
together with sopes; two tiiick cnlileri were then cnrrial 
loosely across their dects; and the ends being cnst over tlie 
walls on m h  bank were atmined and faatened in vsrioua 
modes €o the sands. Thpy were siificiently Jnck to meet tlia 
spnng-tides, which rose fonrteeii fcct; nnti plnnlis mcre lnid 
upon them without any supporting beaw. TIie boom, moored 
with ancliors above a ~ a  hlow, w a p  a doiible line of mmtts 
cmneckd with china and cables, so as to form a series of 
squam ; hence, if ai vessd broke through tbe oiitslde, the 
sliock wouId tuni hcr round in the squrtrc and sho would become 
enhngled with the flontinting wreclre through whidi siie I i d  
hroken. Gun-lioats, nith aiding bntteriea on tlie Iinnks, mere 
tllen stationed to protect the boom, and rolv-boats were fur- 
iiishecl with pppling-irons to tolv off firevessels. Ry the 
uiiiteti 'labour of seamen and soldietw al1 wm fini~hed on tlie 
26th ; and, contrary to tlie gcneml opinion cin such mattem, 
riiajtjor Todd acsured tlie autlior of tliis Historg t ha t  1i0 found 
tlie soldieq with minas quickensd by the wider range ancl 
vdety of knowledga attendant on their service, more ready 
of resource, and tlieir efforts, eombined by a more regular dis- 
cipline, af more ami1 and with leas loca of time, t h  the 
iricplar aetivitg of tlie seamen. 
The agitation a€ the river hem the force of tha tides was 
generally so great thxt to maintrtin a pontoon-bridqe on it 
\as impossil~le; I knomledge of this h d  rendered tlie French 
aftjecrn tm cnrcleas of mtch and defence; nnd this year the 
sliifting snnda had @ven t,he Adour such a slunting direction 
towards tlie west that it mn for some distsuce alrnost parallel 
to tlie &ore; the outer bank Zliue acting as a breakmter les- 
sened thc agitatien within, and enabled tLe large two-rnasted 
boats employed to ride snfely and support tlie heaviest artil- 
, 
lery and carriqw. hrcvcrtheIess this fortune, the errors of 
tlie enemy, tthe matchlem ski11 and daring of the British sea- 
nien, the discipline and intrcliidity of tIic British soldiers, al1 
.combined by the genius of ?Telling.ton, were neceasaq b the 
auccms of this atupendons nndertnking, whicli mu& alrvnyn 
ranlc amongst the prodigics of war. 
When the bridge wns finished Rope resolved t o  contrnd his 
line of investmcut round the citadel. Thii was e aerious 
affair, for the French po~ition outsirle waa exoeedingly atrong, 
The flanks rested on ravines co~ered with fortiíied villas, and 
in the centre a Aclge, along which the great roads fram Bor- 
dea- and Pepehorade led into Bayonne, wras occupicd by the 
villa* and church of St, Etienne, both situated on rising 
pointa of ground ~trongly entrenched and under the fire of t l e  
citadel guns. Advaneing in tliree canverging culumnri, covered 
by skirmisliera, thc wings of thc dlics casil~l nttained thc 
edgcs of the rnvines at eithcr riidc, resting thcir funlts on tlio 
Adour above ~ n d  below tlie talan, at about nina liunrlrod y d s  
from the enemy's works; Sut a severe action took pluce in 
tlie centre. Tliere tlie Germans and a higade of gumls 
should lisve attaclred simultaneously in tliree mames, tlie 
paras  on the left, tlie ligl~t hattdions of Qermans on Zhe 
Tight, thtir lieavy infantry in tlie centre; bnt an acciden~ 
retarded the d n ~ ,  and the centre first attacked the heighta 
a f  St. Etienne. The ~ilcirrnishing wm shnrp, tlie guns from 
tlin citacFeI opened, t,he church and village were stometl, an 
cntrcnclicd line of bousm wus earricd and a p n  wns takcn. 
When tlio wings cnme up, ths action censed for n time, but 
the pople  oE Bayonne were in such consternation tlint 
Thouvenot to reassure tliem saiiied, rind b r g i n g  the hrrnaiis 
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t-iw W ~ S  wonnded and lnst the position of St. Et.:cnne. Thc 
lnsa of tlie allirs coulrl not hnvc bcen lcss thnn five hnndrcd, 
fwr-fiftl~s being Germnns, and the lratter aero dissatisfied at 
being umoticed in tlie despatch-an omission somewhat 
reinnekable tecause Hope haíl oopnly cammended their vatour. 
This nem position had the ravines on eacli ffank, and tlie 
centre being c lo~c  tO the snemj-'s work~  on tlie ridge of St. 
Eticnne mas entrrnclietl. Prcpnmtions for bcsieging tlie cita- 
del were then commenced unqler tEie direction of tlie C*erman 
colonel Hartmann, a code of  signnls w a s  estalilisliecl, md infi- 
nite paim taken tu protect tlie bridge and secure a unity of 
action between tlie three invcsting Iiodies. The communicn- 
tions homcvcr requirctl cornplicahrl orrengemcnta; for tlic ri$t 
bank of thc Adour Iieing lom mas overflow~l evcry tidc, and 
would llave occasioned grent diiriculty but for the retaining 
rvall, which being four feet tbiclr was mads use of as s carr iqe-  
road. 
ITljile thcsc events happen~d nt Bayonne Wellingtnn pushed 
h i ~  operations on the G~b~res witb grent vigonr. On the 21st 
his pontoons liad reached Gariis, and tlie 23rd were cnrried 
beyond tFie Clave de IIauleon. During Es absencc tlie Gixtll 
and ligl~t diviaions liad come iip, rrnd tlius six divisions o€ 
infantry antl two brigadm of cavnlry mere conccntrated beyond 
thmt river on ths Gave #Oleron, Sctween Sauveterre and N&- 
vcrrens. Beresford still held the lino of tlie Ridouze down to 
ibs confluente with the Adour; and to distract the enemy 
thrcw a bzttdion over the Eatter ~ c n r  Urt, antI collccted bo11t.9 
as if to form rs bridge. In the evcning 11c rccal~ed his dctodi- 
ment, yet continueri the prepratiotis for a Sridge until lnto in 
tlie 23rd; tlren Iie moved forwartl and drove Foy's po& from 
the works at Oeyergavive and Hmtingiies, ontlie lomer prrirEs of 
the Oleron Gavc, into the entrenchments at Peyrel~tiornde. 
The ollies lost fifty mcn, prineipdly Portup~e-ic, iiut Soult's 
rig11t cnd centre were trius 1ieId in check; for Bcresfortl liad 
the fourth ~ n d  seventl divisions, and Vivian's caralry was 
strong enougli for Foy at reyrehorade and for Taupin nt tlie 
Easticle of Bearn. Tlie rest of tlie French amy \vas distriiiuted 
at Orthm and Sauveterre, feeIing totmrda Navarrens, tind onm 
thc 24th Wellhgton put hia troops in motion to puss tlie Gave 
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d'0leron. Hia movements and the arrivd of his reinforce. 
. menta fipin deceivd Soult, mho scems to have known nothing 
of the liglt division, una im@nd the fimt diviaion wm at 
Cume on tho 22nd aa well aa Uie fourth and seventh divi~ions. 
Howwer his dispoeitions wouId hliw been tbe ernme, he diR 
not expect to hold the G a ~ e  md looIred to a final concentra- 
tion at Qrthes, 
On the 24th Morillo, reinforced wi th cava1 y, moved to the 
Lausgetk, a ama11 river mnning in front of Namrrens, where 
rough ground concealed his real force. Hia ~couters beat h c k  
tlie French outposts, and n b~tittnlion marching I-iigher up 
menaced tlie fords of the Gave at Doguen, to draw the &en- 
tion o£ the garri~on of Nararrens from the f o d  of Villo h'ave 
tiiree milea h l e w  Doguen; for there WeIlington dmigncd 
to pass, md a grcat conccntric movemcnt wae nom in progreas 
t u w ~ d s  it. Le Cor's Portupese marcbed from Gestm; the 
light division from Aroue, crossing Uie Soiisons at Nahae; ths 
second division, three batteriw of artillery, the pontoons, sud 
four mgiments of cavalry moved from other poinh, Favourecl 
by the hilly nature of the oountry tZie columna were well wn- 
cealed from the enemp; and the sixth division advanced 
toipards the fords of Montfort tbree miles below that of Ville 
Nave. A bathlion of fhe ~iecond division was aent ta  menrice 
tlie ford of Barraute below Monfort; but tthe third division, 
reinfomd wjth a bripde af huwrarct and the bhtteriea of 
the second clitisian, rnarched hy Osserain and Arriveriette 
npinst  the bridge-heed of Snuvetem, wikh orders to  m k a  a 
feinh of forcing n pwsnge them. The bulk of the light cavdry 
rernained in reserve under Cotton,tiut Vivian'~ hussar~. coming 
up from Beresford's right, tlirerttened al1 the fods  between 
Pict~n's Ieft ind  the Basticle of Bearn. Below ttiat Bustide m 
some detachments were dwected upon tlie fords oE Xindos, 
Castagnhede, and Hnuterive. Dnring this mtivement Beresr 
Tord kept Foy ia. check at Peyrehorde with the seventli 
diviion, and sent the fourth towards Sordea snd Leren, above 
the condnence of the Uavea, to aeek a frt place for 8, bridge: 
tbiw tha French front mas menaced on a line of twenty-íive 
 mil^^ yet tlici great form was abrive Saiiveterre. 
These openitions wcre not v q  hrnppily exmr;d The 
columna directed on the side of Siidos missed the forda; and 
when Picton, opening a c a n n o d e  agaiest the bridge-hed of 
Sauvetem, made four compniw of Keane's 11irigaJe and some 
cava1.y pass the Ga* in the ricinity of tbc bridge, the first 
were imrnediately beaten km& with a Iass of ninety men 
and officer~ : some were drowned and thirty made prisoners, 
whereupon the cavalry returned f o  the left brvnlc and tlie 
mnonade cearied. Reverthcless the diversion m complete 
ond the generd operatlons wero mcccssfu1. Souh on thc first 
nlarm drew Harispe from Sauveterra to ?lonstrucig on tlie 
Orthes road, wliere a mnge of hills running pmllel to the 
Gave of Oleran separates it from that of l'au; thus only s 
division of iiifantry nnd Berton's wvnlry remained under 
Tillatte at afuvckrre ; and that geneml, notwi tlistnnding his 
mcccsa against tlle four companies, was ao alsmed by Picton's 
demonstrations, ihat he abandoned bis worlre on the leSt bnnk 
and destroyed the bridge. The sixtli division Iiatl passed 
without opposition at Montfort abo~e  huveterre, and the atlier 
troopri, coming down upon the ford of Tillenave, m& only witb 
a ~irnall cavalry piquet and crossed wIth a Eoss of bnt two men 
drowned-a hnppy circumstance, for t,he waters were deep nnd 
rapid, the cold intcnae, and the fod so nnrrow thnt the peasnga 
was not completed before dark. To hnva f o r d  it in tho face 
of an enemy would htave been exwedin,Iy difficult and 
dmgwous; and it is atrange that SDUI~, wlio mas with Rnrispe, 
o n l ~  five mi les  from Montfort and semen from Villenave, 
ahould not have opposed the passage. Tlie heads of tlie allies' 
colnmns imrnediately seized the m g e  of fiIb beforc spolrcn af, 
the right near Louhcing; the 1eft.towrurl~ Snt~vetcrre, fmni 
whence VilIatte and Derton had been w i t h d m e  by Claiiwl, 
wlio seems to have kept hd watch wheu CIinton pmsed a t  
Montfort, 
h u l t  nom took a position to give time for nupin t a  rclirc 
from the loww p& of the &ve of Oleron towards tlie Iirirlge 
of Berenx on the Gave of Pan ; for hutI~ ]le rtnd Foy lind 
received ordem t o  march upon Orthes ~n(? break d o m  al1 t,lie 
bridgcs as they passed. Whcn the niglit felI, Harispe'a <livisioii 
alno passad tho bridge of Orthes, and I)'Erlon was nIrmdy 
esti~lzslicd in thnt tom: CIausd remnined unti1 tlie moruing 
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at Wo! to cover tha movcment. Pierre Soult) postcd bcyond 
Nravnmeng with his ci~ealry and two Wtalions of infuntry to 
watch th road to Pnu, liad been pressetl by IIorillo, and Iieing 
now cut off by ths passqo of thti dies at Villenave mas 
forced t o  retrezt by Monein. 
The 25tli Wellington, taking some mvalry and gunu, pusIisd 
Clriusel's rear-,oud from Magret into tlie suliurb of Ortlies, 
which covered th bridge of that place on the left limlr; he 
also cannonaded tlie Prench beyond tho river; but tlie Portu- 
pese of the liglit riivision, skirinisliing amongst thc houwa to 
prevent the d~truction of tlie bridgeI Iost twentp-five men. 
Tlie second, sixth and light divisions, IEIUmilton's Poztirguese, 
five regirnents of cavalry, and three bahteries were then massed 
in Emt of Orthes; the third divkion anrl ti bnpde of cavdry 
was in front of tha broken bridge of Berenx frve miles lowet 
down tlie Esve; tIie fourth nnd swenth divisions with Vivinn's 
cavalry wcie in front o€ Peyeehorade) fram whence Foy 
retire(? by the geat  Bnyonne mad to Orthes. 3,Forillo mas 
directcd to invcst Nnvarrena; and ibs Mina mas no sura 
gunmntcc ngainst the combincd cfforts of thc prrison of St. 
Jean Fierl de Port and the wnrlilre inlinbitnnts of Bnygoq, 
five Bntieh regirnents) which had gone for clothinp and mere ' 
now coming up separately, were ortlered to  halt a t  St P&is 
in observation, relieving each etlier in successiori. aci tliey arrived 
at tliat place. 
On the morniiig of tlie 26th, Beresford, findlng Foy hd 
abmrloiied the worL at Peyrehornde, pwsed the &ve, partlp 
by a pontoon-bridgex prirtly by a fortl where the curwnt rua 
so strong tliat a column of the wventh divisioa waa like to 
have bmn cnrried itway bodily. He had previously dctaclied 
the eigliteenth Iiussars to find another ford higher up, and that 
being effected under the p idance  of a miller, the husears 
gnincd thc liigh roed, lislf-way between Pegrelioratle ~ n d  
Ortlics, and drove some Ficnch cavalry tlirongh F~uyoo 
Notr* by Eiimoiir. Tlicy rdlicd on thcir rcscrrcfi niitI I 
miniit.i Ziaclc tlie forcmost of the pursucrq but vould 
H""ll"Sn n~vait the shock of the main h d y  now rcinforced 
eirltl ecnth 
hiissara by Yivim's Iirigade and wmmnded by Bwesfd 




of the stfiff who had frquently distinguiahed himeeIf by his 
~ersanal prowesa, hqpening t o  be without s srvord, pulled a 
lar* shke h m  5 Iiedge and with that wcapon ovcrthrcw two 
h u 9 m  in ~ueecssion, and only reiiiqnished the combat when 
a t h i d  hnd cut his club in twain. 
Beresford now threw out a detschrnent to Habae on his left, 
to inhrcept the enemy's communication with Dax ; and Wel- 
iingtonat tLe same time cewed lord Edward Xomerset's c a d r y  
and the third division t o  cmgs the (Xave by fords below the 
broken bridge of Berenx. T h n  directing Beresford to take a 
position for the night on sorne heiglits near the village of 
Baights be procecded tu cwt Q pontoon-bridge at Berem, 
and thus sfter a circuitoua mrch of more tlian fifty miles 
hia right wing mm again nnited with his centr~ and a [hect  
communication ivith Hope secured. During the 25th and 
26th he hacl wrefully examiaed bult's posilion. Be Eound 
tlie ancient and beautiful bridge of Ortlies, consisting of 
' severa1 archetr, couId not be w i l y  forced, because of a tower 
in the centre the gateway of which m bailt np. Tlie prin- 
cipal arch in front of tliis tomer wis  mined, the homes on both 
sides occupied, and the river new the bridge was d e g  and M1 
of pointed mcks. Above tlie t o w n  howe~er it spread wide 
mith flnt tiankg, pmenting mcans for mssing, anri the fiat 
des ip  wns to do 80 with Hilik troops and tlie liglit division; 
but d ien  it bccame known that Beresford h d  crosscd tlie 
Gave beloiv, the third division pnssed a t  3erenx and tlie 
bridge \vas laid there. Thk operation wm covei~d by Beres 
ford, while Eoult's attention mns diverted by the continiixl 
slcirmish at tlie suburba of Orthea, by the nppearance of IIill'fi 
coliimns abov~,  and by Wellington's hlting cogniaance of the 
position near the bridge ao openly ao to draiv a cannennde. 
It was not howev&x though t tlint Soult, when hc foiind Beres- 
ford nnd Pjctun were over the Gwe ,  wonId amnit ei bnttle, nti? 
tlie emissaries miJ he waas alrettdy in retreat; a circunishnce 
to be hrne in mind because the next d g ' a  operation reqtiired 
success t o  justify it 
Hope's happy p s q g  of the Adour being new reported 
he mas directerl h esddish a Iine of commi~nicabion to the 
pwt of Landes, wliere a perman~nt bridge ww to be formed 
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with boab bronght up from Ud. A direct line of interoou 
would thnii be secured witli the amy at Rayoane; 
Wellingkon felt he wag pnehing his opedions heyond 
intriiisic strength iF Enchet ~houI¿l send reinforcementa to 
Soult; wherefore ho diectd Freym to m s  tIie Adour bdom 
Bayonne with two Spaniah divjsions and a brigade of Portu- 
p e s e  nine-ponnders: and join him by the port of Landeti. 
O'Donnel'a Anddusianine md the prince of AngIonass troops 
.vere alsa warnd to be Ln readiness t o  enter France, liut tlieae 
oders Tvere given with the peatest reluctanoe;. The feehl* 
mistance made by the Prencli in the difficult muntry alrei 
passed, left liim without much nneasinas as to tlie powei 
Sonlt's amy in the beld; bnt his disquietude ww extre 
&out tIie dmger of an inmirgent wfiríare. ' Illiiintriin 
rihicteat discipline, &mt t h t  m? a r e  lo&: WM hi8 expt 
sion t o  Freyre; and he i m u d  a proclamlation ant.horizing 
people of the diitricte he had ovemn ta  urm themselves 
*he presemation of order under the dirmtion of thar mayc 
He invited them ta arrest al1 stmggling soldiem and foliow 
of the army, al1 pInnderers wnd evil-doers, and convey t h e n  .. 
headquartera with proof of their crimes, promking to  pnnish 
tlie culpable and peiy for al1 damagw; and he confirmed al1 the 
1 o d  autboritiea who &ose to retaia their oficea, oü the soIe 
condition of having no political or rnilitiiry intermurse witli 
the c m t r i e s  still possessed by the French army. Nor ivtas 
this proclilmation a d d  letter. In the night of tho 25th the 
inhxbitants of a villagt, aituated n m  thc rond leading fr*- 
Sanveterre t o  Ortheis, sbot one English ~oldier dend i 
wounded a g m n d  who had wme with otliem t o  plund 
tlie wonnded m m  an b g e d  as m exampIe; and an E 
lid colonel waa compelled to quit tbe army for suffer 
hia soldierg t o  destroy the mmicipal mchivm of a sn 
town. 
SouIt had no thought of retreating. His premoas rei 
p d e  movements h ~ d  been effected mith order, his army 1 
concentrated mith its front to the Uave; and every bri6 
escept t,he noble structure at Ort,ha the ancient masonq ,& 
wliich resisEed his mines, had been destroyed. One regiment 
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'eyrehorade, threei mothera with tmo bathlions of iniantry 
er Pierre XouIt watched fhose between Orthm and Pan, 
and a body of horsemen and gendarmes  covered 
tl~e latter town from 3iorillo. Two regiments o!? 
c a v o l ~  rerneined with the armyy and the design 
-as to fe11 upon the head of the first oolumn whicli 
ionld cross tlia &ve; liut the negligente of tke 
Fcer stationed at Puyoo, who had snffered 
ivian's hussars t o  pass on fhe 26th without 
opposition and without reporting the event, 
ennbled Beredoi-d to move in saEety when other- 
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tliirds of the French amy. It mas not until threa o'clock in 
tlie evening tliat b u l t  Geived intelligence of l i i ~  march; tbe 
nllied coluins being then near Daightri on the riglit flmk of 
B e  French iarmy, and their ~iconters on the Dax r o d  in its 
rear; at tlie same time the sixth and Iight clivisions were aoen 
desccnding by differmt roada £rom the heights beyond the 
river pointrng townrds Berena. 
In this crisis the Fiench rnamlid hesitatea whether ta fa11 
upon Beresi~rd and Ecton while the latker ww still passing 
the river, OF tu t&e a defensive podtion. Finally he decided 
upon the ltttter, Wherefom, Ader cover of a 
Sonlt'e 
~ k i r m i ~ h  near BaTghGs mhich hia rnmlry, mming 
~ m ~ , ~ l  
from Puyo% sustnined tigmimt a body of infantry Esb? 
aoming from tlis bridge o€ Berenx, he hastily 
trew D'Erlon'8 and Reille's divisioiis on a new line m s s  the 
md from Pepehorade. Tlie right extended to the heights o£ 
un Roes, along wliich run tlie road from O r t l i ~  to Dax; and 
tiie line wns prhlonged by Clausel t o  Ctiskltarbe a village clase 
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whe 
n to the Gnve. Having thus opposed a tempornry front to 
BeresfodI he made hi dispositions to receive battle next 
morning, and brouglit Villatte'~ Lnfantry and Fierre Soult's 
cavalry from the other side of Orthes t h g h  that town : it 
was this mwement whic'h led Wellington'a emissariea t o  report 
tliut the army was retiring. 
loult's new line mms on 8 ridge of hills partly wooded, 
ily naked. An open munded hiil was in tlie centre, from 
ace one long narrow tongue WM pushed out on the left 
towm{ls the bigh road of Peyrehorade, anotlier on t l~e 6ght by 
St. Bues towarda the higb church of Baigl~ts, the wliolo pre- 
senting a concave to the allies. The front was ganeralIy 
co$*ered by a marshy raplne, broken by two sliort tonguea 
jutting from the principal hill; b e h d  wliich the road from 
Orthes to Dax run so far as the village of St. UoSs, and thence 
aloag the ridge foming the rjgbt flank. 
Rehind the centre a succession af undulating bnre h e ~ t h y  
hills trended for mera1 miles to the mar; but befiiníl &he right - 
tlie country wns low ond deep. The town of Ortliesj rccding 
from the river up the alope o l a  ~ t e e p  hilE anrl terminoting 
with un ancient tower, was behind the left ñring. 
h i l le ,  having Taupin, Roguet md Faris under him, com- 
m d e d  on tlie right anrl occupied dl the greund fmm the 
P i l j q e  of Xt. &$S t o  the centre of the poaitioa D'Edori, 
hnving Foy and D'Armagnac, mas on the left of Reille. Re 
placed the first along a ridge extending towardg the road of 
Peyreborade, the second in reserve. In reat of this last, Vil- 
Iatte's division and the wdry  were posted ahove tlie village 
of Rontun; that, is to say, on the open Iiills heliind the main 
SOuIt, NSS. position: in this situation, bis rig1:t overlooking 
the low country beyond St, BoEs, his left extended 
towards Orthes, he furnished a rescrve t o  D'Erlon and 
Reille. 
Harispe and Tillatte were under .Cla~~sel, who occnpied 
Orthes and the bridge, haring a regiment near the ford of 
Sonas alsove the town. TIius the French army extended 
from St. BoEs to Orthes, but the grmt mass was dispsed 
towada the centre. TweIve guns were attacli~l to Harispe's 
traops, rtnd twelve were on the round Iiill in the centre, aweep 
ing in their rmge the ground beq-ond St. Boca, ~ixteen were 
ia reserve on the Dax road. 
On tbe 27'th, at dqbreak, the sixth and ligl~t divisiono 
~ s e d  the &m near Berenx by the pontoou-bridge thrown in 
tlie night, and wonnd up rr narrow way between high rocks 
f o  the great road of Pepehorade. The third diGsion and 
lord Edward Romerset's cavalv wwere a l r d y  estriblished thexe 
in oolumns of march, havjng a l h i s h m a  gnshed forwards ta  
the edge of the wooded height occupied By D'Erlon's le& 
- EB. 181 4.1 BOOK XXIV,-CNAP. 2. 108 
Beresford with the fou1%11 nnd sevent,h divisions snd Vivian s 
cavalry had then gdned tlie ridge of St. BoCs and nppronched 
the I)ax rmd beyond. Hill rernained witli tlie ~econd British 
divisiou sncl Le Cor's Portupese m m i n g  t1ie bridge of 
Ortlies and the ford of Souam. Betiveen Beresford and 
Pictan, a distance of a mile and a hnlf, there mere w troops; 
biit Iialf-may, exactly in front of the Frencli centre, was a 
Eoman canlp, ccrming an isolatcd peering hill nearly M lofty 
a6 tbe centro of Boult's posítion. 
On tliis cmp,  now corered with vineyarda, but then open 
nnrl grasg with a few trees, Wellington, aftw vieiving tlie 
country on Beresforrl's left, stopped for an hour or niore to 
examine the enemy's disposition ~ O F  battle, During this time 
tlic two divisions wcre coming np from tlrc rivci, biit so 
hcmmed in by rocka that only n fem men couId march abreast; 
and tliejr point of union witli ths tliirtl division lvas little more 
than cannon-shotfrom tlie enemy. Picton did not cenceal his 
diquietnde. WeIlingtoit, calm as tlie deepest sea, continued 
his observtlGions without sccming to notice tlie dnngerous 
psition of h i ~  tmops; md when they Iind reached tlie rnrain 
rond he rc inford  Picten with ths sixtli, and drem tlie light 
division by crosa rods  behind the Rornan mmp, thus con- 
necting bis w i n g  and forming s central reserve, Froin thia 
point bye-way~ lcd ; one on the left t o  tlie liigh cliurch of 
f3aights anrl the Dax macf ; another on the rigl~t o the P e p  
horade raad; snd two went strnight across tho m . s h  to tho 
French position 
Tliia rnarsh, the open lid1 abeut which Soult's gune and 
resemes were principalby gathered, tbe nature of the ridgea on 
the flanks,sll wmbined toforbid m attack in front;andtheflanks 
were scarcely more promi~ing The extremity of the French 
left siink indccd to a gcntla undillation in crossing the Pcyre- 
horade rond; yet it would have bwn eselees t o  push broops on 
tliat line towards Orthes, between D'Erlon and Castel tarbe; + 
for the town was eitrongly occupied by Slarispe and IVM 
covered by an mcient mal1 and the bed of a torrent. Xt mas 
eqt~ally dificult to turn the St. Eocs flank, ns thc troops mould 
h e  to enter the Iow mnrsl~y country beyond $he Dañ road; 
&nd tlie lijlls t r e n d i  bckivitrds Gom the centre oT the Frenck 
J 04 TENIKSULA WAR. ~ F E B .  1814. 
poaiition would hwe ennbled Soult t~ oppse f i  n w  und for- 
midable front at rjght angles to bis actual position. The 
aUied m y  mud therefore have d e  a circuitous flsnlr mow. 
ment in mass, within gun-shot, tluough a dificu2t oountry, or 
firesford's Ieft must llave been dangerously extended aníi i l~e 
whole lime weakened. Nor could the morement bc hiddeq 
because the liills aIthwgh only modemtely bigli were abrupt 
on that sidq affortling a fnll view of t l ~ e  lom coiintry, 
and Soults cavalry dctachments were in o b s e d o n  on every 
brow. 
It only rernaincd to assail tho French flanla dona tho 
ridges, mdcing the principl efforts on the side of Sr,, Roe% 
with intent to ovedap the French right heyund and seiee tbe 
road of St. Sever wliile Hill pas~od tlie &ve at Seuars rtnd 
cub off the road to Paii, thus enclosing the bertkn army in 
Orthes. This was no slight affaic. On Picton's side it was 
, easy t o  obtain e footing on the Aank ridge near the high xoad; 
but beyond t h ~ t  the ground rose rapidly, and the French were 
p t l ~ e r e d  tliickly with a mrrom front and plenty of pns .  On 
Beresford's &le tliey could only be assailed nlong the summit 
of tlie Xt. ROER nrine, advancing from the high clinrch of 
Bnights and tho Dax road Bnt the vjllrtgc oE St. BoEs mas 
strongly occupied, the ground immedintely behind it ~ t m n g l d  
to  a narrow p w  by the rxvine; aad the Frendi reserve o€ six- 
teen p n a ,  placed on tlie Dltx road behind the centre of Soult's 
Jine and well covered from counter-firn, waa ia rediness to 
cmsh the h e d  of a y  column wKch should emerge from the 
go~ge of St. BoEs: 
During the whoIo rnorning a slight skirmish with now and 
thm a cmon-tiliot liad been going on with the third division 
on the right; and the Freach cawllry at times pushed partie~ 
forward on each flmk; but at nine o'clock Wcllington cnm- 
rnencd t l ~ e  rcnl atta&. Th0 third and eixth divisions won 
wkhout difficulty the lower ptirt of the ridges opposed to 
them, mtnd ende~~oursd to extenci their left dong tlie Fmnch 
front ñith a sliarp fire of masketry; yet the main battle waa 
on tbe other flank. Them CoZe, keeping Anson's brigade oE 
tlie fmrrth division in reaerve, sssded St. B&s w3li Rosa's 
Eritish higade antl Vasconcellos' Fortuguese; hiirti ofiject was 
to gct  an t u  the open p n n d  behind it, but fierce md slnugliter- 
ing was t he  struggle: five times bmlring blirough the acac 
tered houeea did Ross carry his battle inte the mider m p e  
beyond ; pet ever as the troops issued forth he French guns 
from the open hill amote them in front, and the reserved bat- 
kiy on the Daa r o d  m p t  tlirough them with pape from 
flank to flank. And &en Taupink supporting massw rnshed 
forwairl with a waating fire, and lapping tlie ffranks with ultir- 
rnisliers, which poured along the ravinc9 :son eithcr han& forced 
t h e  shattered columns back into the villago; it waa in vaia 
tliat with desperate valour tlie allies, time a h r  time, broke 
tlrrough tlie narrow way and strugg1d to spred a front 
beyond ; fe11 dangeroiwly mounrled, and Taupin, whose 
troops weere clnstered thickly rand me11 supported, def id  everg 
effort. Nor w a s  8oult less hppy  on tho othcr sidc. Tho 
rinture o€ the ground would not permit the third and sixth 
divisions to engage many men at  once, so that  no p r o p s s  
mas made; and one smail detachment whieh Picton extended 
t o  his left, having mnde an nttempt to gGn the smaller 
t o n p e  jutting out from the central hill, wns mddenly cliargcd 
$B it neared the summit, by Foy, and driven down in confu~ion, 
losing several prisoners. 
M%en the combat liad thus continned on the side of St. 
Boea foc three liours, Wellington acnt a cacadore regiment 
of thc liglit divlsion from tho Roman camp t o  protect thc rjght 
fiank oI Rosa's, brigada ragninst the French skirmishers; but 
tliis mas of no avail j for Vnsconcellos' Portugueae, unabi~ te 
sustnin the violence of the enemy any longer gave way ia 
dimrder ; the French tlien poured on, and the Bntish troops 
rctrcatod tlirough Xt. BoRs with difimlty. Tbia bappencd 
justas tha detacliment on Rcton'a left wm repulsed and victory 
seemed to declare for the Frmch. &dt, who stood an the 
round apcn hill wllich was &e knot o€ bia position, aeeing 
his enemies broken and rolled back on e ~ c h  sitle, put al1 hia 
reserves in movement fo complete the mccess, nnd it i~l fiaid, 
that in the exultation of the moment he smote his thigh ex- 
claiming, 'At klat 1 l m  ?¿iml V  hether tLis be so or not it wea 
no min-glorious speech, for his battle was then vcry atrong. 
Tliere wnq bowever a ama11 blnclr clond risinfi jnst beneath 
him, Amidct the thundering din nnd ttrmult tiiat sliooIr tlio 
5eld it was at first unlieeded, but soon liursk with h i s t i b l e  
YioIence. 
Wellington, seeing St. Does ww inexpugnable, Iind suddenly 
changetl Lis plan of bzttle. Supportiiig Ross with hnsonJs 
bripcle, rrl~ich hd not Iiitlierto been engaged, Iie liacked both 
vith tlie seventh division and 'Vivisn's cavnlry, now fo~ming 
une hesay body to~rarrls the Dax road. Tlien he ordaerl the 
thinl and sixth divisions to be tlirown in rnws upon Fofa 
left íiank, and sent tlie fift;y-second regiment down frum blie 
Bomnn cnmp ivith instructione to cross tlie marsh in f ro~t ,  
inount the Prench ridge, nnd fa11 on thc flanlr nnd renr of the 
troups engnged with tlio fourth division nt St. BoEs. Slis 
was tlie cloud. Colborne, so often mentioned, l ~ 1  tlie fifty- 
second wross the mnmh under fire, the  men sinking ~t 
every step above the lrnees, in some places to  the middle, yet 
stilI pressing forward mith that stern resolution and orrlcr to 
be expected from the veterana of the ligltt division, rcolcliers 
who had never yet met their match in thc fidd. They soon 
obtained firm footing, nnd nscended tlie heiglits in line at tlie 
moment when Tnupin wna pushing Pigorous1~- tlimugli Sh 
Bo&; d when Foy and D'kmagnac, hitherto more Ohan 
mesters of tlieir poeitions, were being assniIed on the other 
0auk by the t h i d  and sixth divisiom. With a mighty shout 
snd a rolling firo tlbs fifty-second ~oldiera dmhed fowads 
tetwveen Puy and Taupin, beating down a Frencli liattalion 
h tlieir murse and tbrowing everything before them into 
disorder. General Bechaud was killed; Poy hngerously 
nourided; and his troops, d i s e e u ~  by his fdl and by this 
andticn hurst from rs quarter mhere no enemy was expected, 
for tlie marcli of the fifty-second bad been htmrrlly perceivd 
snve by the ~kirrniriher~, i,ot into confusion; thc 
clisorder tlien spreading to Rei11e3a wing he also 
ww forced t o  fdl Lizck rend t&e a new position to restore hia 
line of battle. SIie narrow pass behind St. B o b  was thue 
openeii, and Wellingbn seized the moment to  tlirust the 
fourth and seventh divisions, Vivian's mvdry, and tvo bat- 
teries of arhilIery through :hd spread a front Iieyond. 
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Meanwh.de the third and aixth divisI ons won D'Armagntic's 
position xnd ectahlished a battey of p n s  on s, knoll, from 
wlience tlleir shot ploughed thmugh the French mtisses fmni 
one fiznk to anothm 8uddenly a sqnadron of French chns- 
seurs carne at a hard gallop down the mnin road of Orthes 
t o  cbarge these guas, and smeeping to their riglit rode over 
some of tlie sixtb division wLich had advancd too far; 
hnt tLis chnrp ww pushed madly, they got ínto a hollow 
lane rtnd were nearly al1 deatroyed. The tllird and peveritli 
divisions then continued to advance and tlie winp of the 
army were unitcd. Soult rallicd his forces on the open hiP1~ 
beyond the Dax road; and mith Taupin's, Roguet'a, Parid, land 
D'Armagnac'c's divisions madc stro~g battle to eover the reiur- 
rnatim of Foy's disordered troops. 31ic foes were liowever 
not a11 in front, tliis part of tlie battle mns forig11t 6 t h  only 
two-tliirds of tlie nllied m y .  Rill l i d  remained witli twelve 
tliourinnd comliatants, cawlry and infnntry, before the bridge of 
Ortlies; and W ~ F U  the first plan oí'attnckwas changed liad orden 
t o  force the pamqe of the &ve, partly to prc~ent 'l-Imispe 
falliing upon the flank of the gixth division, partly in hope ol 
a succe~sful issue: the lwt happened. Altliough unalde to 
force the bridge he forcled the river above a$ Souars, drove 
h c k  the troops post& there, seieerl the LeigZits ahove, out 
off the FrencL from the r o d  to Pau, and turnd tlie town 
of Orthes. Ze- thus memced Sodt's Iine of retrerit by 
Sdwpice on the road to  St. Sever, at tlie moment wvlien the 
junction of tha dlics' winga mas cffcctcd on tho French 
position. 
. Clausel ordered Harispe to  ahandon Ortlies and doso 
tomards Villatte on the lieig11ts above Rontun, leaviag how- 
ever some eonscript battalions on n rising point bgoud tlie 
rond of St. Sever cnlld tlic tilfotte & Tarmn~' Tlien he 
endeavwred to keep Hiii in checlt by the menacing action of 
tno ca~alry regiuients and a bBgade of inftintry; l u t  h u l t  
arrived at the moment and seeiug tlie loss of huars lid ren- 
dered his wliole position untenlilile, gave orclers for A general 
retreat. Tliis vas a peilons matter. Tha l ie~thy hills upon 
which he mas now fighting, ultbough for a ~horS distance tliey 
funiislied a succession of prallel positions favourable enough 
for d e f e n ~ ~  soon resolved t h s e l v e s  into a loiv ridge runniug 
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t o  t h e  rear on a Ihe pmllel TPlth the mad of St. Bever; and 
on the opposite side o£ that rond, ahout eannon-shot distante, 
mas a corresponding ridga along which Rill, judging by the 
firing how mattcrs wen$ wna now rrapidly ndvmcing. Five 
miIes distmt WFIS the Lay de B m ,  md four miles bepnd 
tlint the ho/ de Fmm~, two rivera deep and with di6cuft 
banIrs; and hhind time the Lutz, the Qahs, and tha Adour 
crossed the Iine. 
Once m r  the wwooden bridge of Sault de Navailles on 
the Lwy de Rmria, tliose streams wontd cover the retreat; hut 
to  carry off by one road and one bridge s defeated army still 
closely etigriged in front seemed impossible. bTevertheless 
Soult did so. Faris sustained the figlit an hjs ridit until Foy 
antl Tnupin's troops rallid ; and when tho imptuous sssault 
of Be fifty-second nnd the rush of the fonrtli nnd seventh 
divisiona drove Paz& bwk, D'Amagnac interpoeed to cover 
hi until tlie union of tke nllies' winp  waa compIeted ; tlren 
both retiring were wvered in turn by Tillatte. In thig 
manner the French yielcled step by step and wibhout con- 
fasion, the allies advancing with an inceasant deafening 
musketry and cannonade, get losing many men especially on 
the right whcrc the tliirrl division were very atrongly opposed. 
Bnt as the dangcr of being mit off at Salespice by HiIl becnme 
more irnminent the retrograde movement~ wem more hurried 
and confused, and Kll seeing tl~is, quickened l i s  pace; nt 
Iast botll aides begm to nin violently, and so manp men 
iiroke from the Fiench ranks making across the fiel& towarrls 
tlie fods, and snch rr rush wa9 neeeseariIy made by tlie rest tri 
p i n  tlie bridge of h u l t  de Navailies, 'that the whole cxiuntry 
was cmered with scattered bmds. Then Cotton, broke mith 
lord Edwarcl hmersetb mvalrg. thmugh a small covering 
body oppoaed to him by Harispe and snbred tívo or time 
hunched mcn; nnd the ~ e ~ e n t h  huuaaam cut oP two thousand, 
mho threr  down their arme in an enclosed ficld, yet sama 
mismanwment occurred mbnd the gmtest part recovering 
Ueir weapons escraped 
The pursuit ceased at tlie Luy de Bem, and the French 
army appeared t o  Isa entirdy diversed; bnt it wag more 
disordered in sppefbrance than reality; for Soult pamd the 
Lny of Bearn rand deseroged the bridge with tho loss of only 
six p and less than four thoumnrl mea kilIed wounded ami 
prisoiiew. Many tliousands of wnscripta however tlirew away 
tLeir arms, and one rnonth afterwards the st iaglm stiU 
amountwl to three thousand; nor would tlie pzssage of the 
river hnve been effected so hrtppily if Wellington hnd not 
been struclc by a muslcet-hlI just above the thigh, which 
cttused him to ride wihh dificultp, whereby the vigour and 
unity of ths pursuit was neceasarily abxted. The lovs of tlie 
allies was fmo thousand three hunrlrd, fifty being h k e n  mith 
thee offieers. Among the wounded mere Wellington, Walkcr, 
&m, and the duke o€ Richmond, then calleti lord htarch. 
The Inst had ~ervcd on Wellington's stnff during tlic whole 
war without a hurt, but being made a ccptain in the fifty- 
seconnd, like a good goldier joiiied bis regiment tlie ni& before 
tlie battle; shot through tlte chect a fem liours aftenvads, be 
l e m d  by experience tlie Jifference betwem the laboiirs and 
dnngers of Btnff and iegimentnl oBieers, which are gcnerally in 
the invene mtio to their promotions. 
Berton's ca~ralry, ~tationed beiween Pau and Oitlies during 
the battle, liad been cut off by byHill'n movement; 
yet skirting that general's march they retreat ed by 
Mant and Samedet, picking up two Iinttalions of Iicyion, 
mbs. 
conscnpts on road; wliile Soult, linviag no 
position to rally on, cwntinued his retreot at nig1it to St. Sever, 
bra11ing d o m  all the bridgea beliiud liim. Wdlington pur- 
aued at daylight in three columns, tlie rigLt by h c n d 6 e  and 
[St. Medarcl to Eamadet, the centre by the main rond, tha left 
by St. Cricq. At St. Sever he Iiolied to  finrl tlic enelny still in 
confusion, but lie FUE too  late; the Frenclb mere across khc 
river, tlie bridge was bruken, ami the amy Iialted. Tlie 
result of tlie Grittls mas however aoon made lrnunn far d 
e d e .  Daricau who mitb a few hundred soldiers waa enden- 
rourjng to  f o m  an insurgent levy at Dax, the morlrs of ~vliich 
mme incompIdc and still u n m e d ,  immedintciy destroj-cd al1 
tbc storea not removed t o  Mont JIarsan, and retrented through 
tlie Landes to Langon on the Garonne. St. Sever orered no 
position, rand SouIt t u d n g  s h o ~  to tlie right moved upon 
Barceionne higber up the Adour ; but he left D'Erlon with tño 
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divisions of infanhy some cavalry and four p n s  at Cacem 
on the righti bank, axid sent Clame1 to o c q y  Aire on the 
uther side oE the river. Ee thus abandonecl liis mapeines a t  
Mont Mman md Ieft cipen the dire& roatl to Borcleaux; Iiut 
holding Caceres with bis right he commanded another r o d  
by Roquefort t e  that city; while his left, bcing nt Aire, pro- 
te&ed thc ma,mines and artilIery parc at tliat place and 
covered the r 0 ~ 1  to Fuu, T b e  main hody at Bmceloniie equally 
mppdcd Clanse1 and DErlon, and covered tlie pcat roads 
lmding to Agen and Todouse on tha Cfiironne, and to the 
mountaina by Tarbea 
In this situation i E  was dilñcult t o  jndge what line of 
operations he meant to d o p t ,  Veliington liowever passed 
the Adour aboat one o'clocli, partly by tlie repaired bridge of 
5t. &ver, pirtly by a Jeep ford helow, aad immatliately d* 
tached Eeresford 6th $he light division and Vidan's ccnvalry 
ta aeiee the magmines rit Mcnt Mrtrsan; nt tthe mme time hs 
pu&d the hmd o€ a column townrda Cnecres, w11cre e cnn- 
nonde nnd c l iqy  o€ cnmlry had place and a f ~ w  men and 
officers were liurt on both sidea. Next dny HilI, marcliing 
from Sama&, rewhed the Adonr bctmccn St. %ver and Xrc, 
and DErlon aas n p i n  mailed on tEie right bank md dnven 
bnck alrimisliing to Barcelonne. TIiIg event proved tlitat Xoult 
had relinquislied Bordeau2~; yet the pursuit coilld not b~ 
pushed more dgorously, because every bridge was brrilren; and 
a vioIent storm on the evening of the 1 s t  liad f i l ld  the maIler 
rivers aiid torrents, carried away the pontoon-bridges, and 
cnt o ñ  al1 communicatian between the troops and tlieir sup- 
plies. 
On the ngbt bnnlr of the hdour thc mnln body hnlted until 
tlie h n d g ~ ~  C O U I ~  be rgniretl, hut Rill who WM on tlie left 
bnnk mnrclied to sciee tlie rnagazinea at Aire. Moring in tma 
eolumns from St. Suviii t~nd St. GiElics on the Znd, he reachell 
Lis destiiintiuii &out tliret! o'clock with tmo divisions of infan- 
try, a higade of cavalry, and a batteq af horse-arti!lery; he 
expected no serious opposition ; but Clausel had &\red a few 
lioura before, and Ras in order of bathle, covering the town 
ñith VilEatte's atid H~rispe's dividona and piorne guna The 
Prench oocupicd a steep ridge in front of Aire, higli and 
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wooded on the nght where it overlooked the rivcr, yet merg- 
ing on the left into a wide table-la~d aver which the pmt ro~d 
lead to PAU. f l t ~ o n ~ r  fo battle wíls tliis position, yet it cwld 
be renilily ozitflnnked on tl~eir Ieft by tlio tnblc-lmd, nnd 
mw unessy for retre~t on the rigiit, for the ridge nar- 
rotv, the ravine liehind steep and ruggerl witli a mill-stream at 
tlie tottorn : w limncli of the Adonr dso  A m d  Iiebintl Aire 
antl crit it off from Burcelonne, whiIe beliincl the left wing was 
tIie grenter Lees, s rivcr with stacp banks md only one 
lin+ 
COMBAT OF AIRE. 
Riil nttnclced mithnut hcsitation, 'Rfj:linm Stewnrt with 
tmo British brisdes fcil on thc Frcnch rigli*, u Portupese 
Lrig~de nssnilerl tlieir centre, rrnd tlie otlier Liigdes fo1lowed 
in eolurnnrs of march; but tlle action wm very sudden, the 
Portuguese wcre p11shed forwnrd in a slovtnly manner liy Da 
Cmtn, a mnii of no ability, and ITarispc met tlietn on tlic ffat 
surnmit of the heigIit with so ra~~gh n chnrge tliat tlicy pvci 
way in flight. TEis rear of tlis alliea lieing still in march 
the battlc rwg Iikc to be lost, when Stewart, lirtviiip by this 
time uFon tlie heiglits on the Frene11 riglit, where Villattc 
feming to be encloscd made but R fccliIe rmistance, immt?- 
dintely detsclied Rnrneri witli tlie fiftieth and ninety-sccond 
regimenta to the aid of tbc Portupese, Slie veheme~it clinrge 
of tliese troops turried the streain of figlit, the Frencli ivere 
brokcn in turn md bhrown baclc on tlicir remrves; yet they 
ralli~ci witli great coiirnge, fighting obstinately irntil Byng'q 
Britiah FiripIe cnme iip; tlicn Hnrispe was drieen t o n n r d ~  the 
river Leen, and Yilllntte quite thro~igIi tlie town of  Airu: irito 
tlie spnce between tlie tmo branches of the Adour beliind. 
ReiUo wllo wae at Bnrceloiine ivlien tlie ttction begau,brougIit 
np ltcpct's: division to  support Yillntte, find tlie carnliah rvas 
continued nntil niplit rit tliat point iv1iiIe Hsrispc crossed tlie 
Lees and broke tlie bridge, but tlie Frencii lost mtlny men. 
Tmo generals, Daiiture and Gitfrqu- were wountlcrl, n colonel 
of engineem wna killcd, a bulidred prisoners mere talren; 
many of Barispe*~ conacripts threw away tliei~ arms and ded 
to tlieir bumes, and the niagmines fe11 into the conqueror's 
lianda Tbe losis of the Erihh wus one hundred and fifty, 
Brtrnes was wounded and cololiel Hood Iíilled; the loss d tbe 
Portupese was never stated, yet it aiuld not have been Iess 
tlian the British, and the vipnr of the &ion proved the 
French ooumge to be 1iHle abated. by the battle of Orthes. 
Soult immediately retreated up the Adour by b t h  banlce 
towtirds Maubourget md Iillareiilc, ~ n d  he was not tullomd, f ~ r  
new combinatioas wero now opened on both sidee. 
19 On the 14th of February the passage of tthe Claves 
commericed, by Hil's attack on Harispe at HeIlette. On the 
2nd af Mwch the first series of operations was terminrited by 
the mmht at  Aire. In thme sixteen days Tellington tra- 
versed with hi~l righht wing eighty miles, passed five lnrge snd 
several small r i ~ e r %  forced the enemy t o  abmdon two fortified 
bridge-hmds and many minor works, gained one g e ~ t  bbnttle 
and two cornbats, captured slx guns and a thousand prisonem, 
seizetl the magazines at Dax, Mont Maman, and Aire, forced 
Sauli t o  abandon &y-onne, snd dso cut liim ofT from Bor- 
dea= And in this t ime he threw Es stupendous bridge 
below Bayonne, and ctosel~r invested that fortress afber a sharp 
and bloody action. Saccws in war like charity in religion 
cavem a multitude af pins; but suocese often belongs to for- 
tune as much as sikill; md the combinations af Wcllington, 
profound rtnd s a p i o t i ~ ,  might in tliis rnanner be confounded 
with the Iucky operations of the allies on the other side of 
Franm, where the presumptlon and the vaciilation of ignorante 
altemtely predominated. 
So. Xouh attributed the loss of his positions to tlie action 
of snperior forcea. Ia this well founddl His o m  numbers 
cannok be determined esactly; but after al1 his lomes in 
December, &r the dehclimenta mtltle by the emperar's 
Mficial Cor- tircler in Jnnuary* and after com~leting the 
w~ponaenee, pmison OE Baponna to fourteen thousmd men, 
aws. he informed the ministcr of war thnt thirty thon- 
mnd infanty, three thonsand cavalry and forty pieces of 
artiile y were in line. Ti& diíl not include the coasrripts of 
the new fev;  al1 youthe indeed and haatily sent to the anny 
by battalions as they could be m e d ,  yet brave; and eight 
tliousand of them might have joined before tbe bslttIe of 
Ortlies. Wberefore, dedacting the dehchrnents of cava17 
and infnntrp under Bertun on the side of Pan and untler 
Dmicau on the &de of Daa, It may be aaid tht Torty thou- 
sand camhtmta af al1 armB wew engagd in the battle. 
Tliirty-ñve ttousand were v q  excelIent sohliers; the con- 
acripts of tlie old levy, who johed  before the battle of the 
Nivelle, were stont men, and their vigorous figliting at 
Uarris a d  Aire pro~ed it; for of them wns Earisye's division 
cumposed. Wellington's form is knom. He commenced 
operatioas with tlie aecond tliird fourth and seventli British 
divisions, $Le independent; Portrtngnese divisien of Le Cor, 
Morillds Spaniard~i, and .fody-eight pieces of artillery; But 
rritli only four brigadm of heme, for Tanrldeur remained with 
Ropc and al1 the heavy cavalry nnd tho Portupese were lcfi 
in Spain. Following the morning statea of the army, this 
would furaish, exclusive of Morillob Spaniads, something 
more than forty th~usand fighting men of aU arms, four 
tliousand being horsemen. But five regiments of infantry, 
and ~mongat liem two af the strongest Xt i sh  regimenh of 
the light diviaion, were abaent to moeive their clothing ; 
deduct thwe, and tliirty-seven thousand AngbPortuguese 
comhatants remain. It is tme that Mina and Morillo aided 
in the commencement of the operritions; but the fimt imme- 
Biately inveeted St. Jan Pied do Port and the latter invested 
Navarrens, Wellinghn waa therefom in the battle R U ~ W ~ O ~  
by a thousand horsemexl and eight guns; but Soult out- 
numberd him in infantry by four or five thousmd, conscripts 
it is truc, yet nscful. Why then ms tlie pawage of the 
&vea so feebly disputedl Beauae the Fxencli general 
remained entirely on tlie defensive in positions too extended 
for his numhrs. 
39 O$&VB ~ e r a t b m  bB tlis b& of a gmd dfen- 
&m s y t m  Let Soult's operations be tried by this nile. 
On the 12th he h o w  that fhe allies werc in motion for aomc 
operation, and he judged rightly that it was to drive 
him from the &vea, From the 14th to the 18th b 1~dt 
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favourable opportuiiity of giving a counter-blo~ to  escape 
him. The infantrg under KllattR, IEsrispe and Fa&, sup- 
ported by tb brigndc of cnvalrgr, were about Sauvctcrre ; that i~ 
t a  m$, four miles from Montfort and only seven from Villa- 
nave, where the principal pssage mas eeeted, where the f o d  
was deep the strearn rapirl, the left had. not cntirely com- 
mznding tbe rrgLt. IIow then did it Iiappen that the 
operation was eKected without opposition'l Amongst thc 
slliea it WW mmo~rcd tllat fioalt complaincd of the negli- 
gente of n general who had orders t o  marcli agfiinst the 
pagsing troops; antl the position of Harispe at Monstrucig, 
equldistant from Sauveteme and 'FTillenave, would seem to 
have been adopted with that view; but there is no confirma- 
tion of tlie report in Soult3 correspondence, and it is ccrtain 
he thought Picton'a dcmonstration at Sauveterre wss rCnl 
attnck. 
5". Tlie position d o f l e d  at Orthe~i mae excellent fos 
offence; i t was not so fur defence d e n  Z3eresford and Picton 
had crossed the Gavc below in farm. We11ington caiild tlien 
tlirow his ivliole army on tlmt side m d  atrcurc his comniunicii, 
tion with Hope; after diich, out-flanking tlie right of the 
French, he could wiee tlis defilo of Sault de Navaillee, cut 
them off from thcir m a p i n e s  at Dax, Mont bfrirsan and 
Aire, and force tliem to rctrmt by the Pan marI letr-ping open 
tlie wny to  Borrtm~~x. To nwait this nttaclr was cor- 
tllerefore ¿bn error; b ~ t  80uIb'8 original design I V M  rcnpondenm, 
to assail tlie head of the Arst eoluinn wvhich sliould "". 
come nenr him, snd Eeresford's appmrach to BaYghta on the 
26th furnighed tlie opportunity. It iis truc! the Fmcli Iight 
caralry g n e  in te l~ i~enco  of tliat general's rnarch too lnte alid 
inrtrrcd tlie combinntion; yet tli& wm still time to fa11 ora 
thc hwd of tlic coIumn xvEiile tlie ttiird division w.w in tlle 
act of pmsing the river and entnngld in tlie narrow way 
Ieadinx from thc ford to Zhe Peyrehomde roxd: 
S is snid Sodt appenred disposed to do tlii~ nt g:,","&eilla 
Grst, but finally bo!c a Jefensive position in mhich co~oael 
de la C L t u r s  to receive liattle. And mhen morniug carne he nss, 
negIected aiiot,her appodunity. Por tmo hours 
the tliid aivision and the hussars were close to liim, covering 
1 a 
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the m h  d tbe sixth and light divisions throngh the 
mrrow wrtys learling fmm the bridge of Berenx up to the 
m i n  road ; the infantrg had no defined yosi tioq tlic mvalry 
h d  no room to exknd; and there were no troop bctmeen 
them and Beresfod, who w s a  then in march by the heights of 
Baigbts t o  the Dax road. U Soult htad pushed a colnmn 
across the marsh t a  seize the Roman camp he wodd ham 
separated the w i n g  of tbe alliw; and then by pouring dewn 
the Payrehorade road with Foy$ D'Bmapac's and Villatte's 
divisions, he wmld probribly h e  ovemhelmed the third 
division befm the other two m l d  have extricated themael~ea 
from the defila. Picton therefore had grounds for anmi- 
n~s, but he ~howed it too openly, 
69 With a snbtle &ill did Soult take hia p n d  of bnttle 
at Wheti; fierccly nnd strongly did he fight, and mderfulIy 
did he effect his m t m t  amo% t.he Luy o£ &arn ; but twice 
in twenty-four honra he negIected thoee happp ocuisions 
which in war táke  Ziirth and flight ot the same instant : rtnd &s 
the d u e  of his position, essentially an olfensi~e one, waa 
tliereby lo$ s aIowness to strike may be objected to  hia 
genmlship. Yet there is no ~mmander, anless a Hannibal 
or a RBpoleon, wrpasshg hnman proportions, but wiU abate 
riomething of bis wn6denc.e and hesitate after repeated 
defeats : SonIt in this campaign as in many othera proved 
himelf a hrdp caphiin full o€ resoarcw. Wellington, with 
a, vastness of conception and a capacity for mngement  and 
combiiation equal to his opponent, possessed in a high d e p  
that Bi ing promptnws of action, that faculty of in~lpiration 
for saddenly decicling the fata of whole campaip with which 
NapoIeon was  enduwed beyond dl mankitld. Ib is this which 
especially &itutes mili* genius. For go aast so com- 
plicated are the combinatioas of war, ae eady and by ~nch 
slight camm are tbey dTected, that the  hebest generds do but 
pope in the dmk, md they acknowledge th0 hnmillating 
f rutb. By the number and extcnt of ihcir h e  dispoeitiens 
then, d not by their errorMJ the merit of oommandera is to 
be measured. 
79 Wellington dmiped to f m e  Sault over the Gmonne 
and if pcwisible upon Bordwlux; becauw it was the dire& he, 
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the citizenai inimical to the emperor, snd ths town, lying on 
Qie lcft bank of tlie river not t o  he defended; becau~e a junc- 
tion wlth Sucliet wonld thus be prevented; anc% if he could 
throw the f i 0 ~ c h  into the h d e s ,  whera hia own superior 
c a d y  could act, they would pmbably h destroyert To 
operate againat Soult's left tmards Pau waa the obvious 
metliod of preventing a junctíon with Suche$ rand rentlering 
the ToFtified psitions on the Gtsvce neelesri. But the invest- 
ment of Bnyonno required 8 large force; which was yet weak 
against an onter attack, because separated in three parts by 
tlie rivera; lienca a wide mmment  on Pan wouId hava Iet 
Boult phce the Adonr between himsdf and Wellington while 
he fe11 upon Ropc. Thia mnhed it necmsnry $o cross al1 the 
Gaves on a contracted line of operatioss, and to collect t l ie  
principal mass of troops on the right by ttli heIp of the great  
m d  Imding t o  St. Jean Pied de Po& Itapid marches and 
reiterated nthcks then forced the pssage of the rivera above 
the points which Soult had fortified for defence, ~ n d  so turned 
t h 3  gcnerd's left wjth the view of finaliy cutting him off 
from Suchet and drinng him into thewildernma OS tlie h n d m .  
Dunng t h e  marcliefi Bereefod remained on the lower partw 
of tlie rivera to occttpy tbe enemy's attention and comr the 
troops blocknding Mousaerolca; tind by collecting boata fit DI% 
and ether demonritrationa, indicating a des ip  of throwing a 
bridge over t l ~ e  Adour aliove Bayennq diverted attention from 
the point chosen below tlie fortress for that opcration; rtnd at 
the aame time he provided the mmnE of tlirowing another 
bridge at the Port (le h n d e ~ ,  f, asecure the communimtion 
with Hope by the right lirinlc whenever Soult should be forced 
to ahndoa Ilie &ves. Thwe wers fjne combinations. 
8". It has been s h m  Beresford waa so weak at  fimt tlat 
Soult might have stmck 5 coiinkr-blow. 'FVellingtan admitted 
tha error. Wting on tho 15th he says, < If the cnemy ~ h n c l  
upon tbe Bidouee 1 ~ r n  ot so strong as 1 ought to be,' and 
te  ordered up the fonrth and light divisions; yet, this excepted, 
his mvements were conformsble ta the pñnciples ofmr.  fIe 
cliose the be.& atrstegic line of opemtiom, his mtlui atta& 
was made with heñvy mnsses against the enemy'a meake& 
point~, and in execntion he was prompt and darkg. Hie 
conduct mw conformable dao to his peculiar situation. Ea; 
had tWo rljskind operatione in hnnrl, namely, to throw tiis 
bridge beluw Eayonne nnd to force tlie GIIV~S- He liad tlie 
numliers rquired to olitnin these objects, but dnred not use 
tlietn lest he sliould bring tlie Spanisli troops in collision witli 
tbe French people; yet he could not entirely d i ~ p n s e  witli 
them, and tlierefore broiight Preyre up to  Eriyonne, Morillo te 
Navarrens, and Mina to S$. Jean Pied de Port; thus seeming 
to p i ~ t  his whole army in motion otnd gaining tlie appewmce 
of military strength ñtith as lit-tle political danpr as pssihle. 
Feí-ertl~elc~s ao terrible had the Spanirtrtla ~ I m d y  rnnde them- 
s~lveq by their cruel Irawlcsa habits, tlint tlieir mere retiirn 
ncros* the fronticr threw the wholc country into constar- 
nat ion. 
K When In h n t  of Orthes it mould at first sight aplicar 
as if W c l i i i o n  had ehmged his plan of driving the enerny 
itpon the Laiirles: but it wrts not s q  be did not expect a 
liatt.le on tlie 27th. Thiiis is proved by his letter to  Bope jn 
which he tclls Iim ho anticiliated no difficulty in pnasing tho 
&ve of Pau; that en the evening of the 2Gth tlie enemy were 
retiring; and that he desigmed to visit the position at Bayoniie. 
To pms tlie G a ~ e  in tlie quickest and sureat manner, to re- 
edxblish tlie direct communications with Hope anr1 unite with 
Deresford, were his immerliate olijects; if he h a l l y  worked 
by liis left it waa a sudden act and ertraneous to the genernl 
design, whicii m cerhiniy to operate with Hili's corps and 
tlie light division by tlie right. 
10'. On tbe rnorning of the 27th Wellington, after pírssing 
the Grave, first discovered Soult's intention to fight, ~ n d  that 
lic wns himself in a false position. H d  he shown anp hesitn- 
tion, any uneasiness, hd hc cndeavourcd t o  t&e a defensim 
position witli eitlier Bemfod's  or Picton's troops, Re would 
inovitably lime draw-tt tlie at,tteniiion of tlio enemy t a  Iiis 
dangerous situation. In s t ed  of tris, judging %ult wouid not 
on tlie insh t  c h g e  from the defensiva to tlle ofen~ivo, Iie 
confidentlp pushed Picton's skirmisliers forward as if to assail 
the left of the h n c h  pasition, putting Beresford aleo in rnove- 
ment qainst their right; and this with al1 imaginable ml- 
ness. The succesa wm complete. Soult, who etipposed the 

on the let before Clanse1 arrived, rand thw spard the obstinate 
oowbat a t  that place. It may also bB observed that hie arttack 
waa not wdl directed; it should have been towmls the French 
leR; bemuge they were more weakly post4 there; and the 
r i d p  held by their right was so difficult to retiro from, that no 
troops would stay on it if any progrew w s ~ l  d e  on thc left. 
This wabi m aocjdent of war. Hill had no time to inspect; tho 
ground, bis orders were to attack; and to fa11 withont hesita- 
tion upon a retinng enemy after such a defeat wwas riglit; but 
it m n o t  be said Wellington pu~hed the purmit witli vigour. 
Notwithstanding the storm on the evening of the 1st he could 
have reinfoforced Hil and ~honld not h v e  given the French 
amy time to recover from theb reeent defeat, ' The secree of 
war,' sltys Napoleon, ' is to mmch tweIve Ieapw, fight a httle 
and mar& twelve more in pursuit' 
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EXTRWLY perilons now and disheartening wm the aituation 
of the Frencli rnawhal. His ~mgr reducod by lossea in bafAle 
and by desertion of conscripts, hnd also thres thousand 
sitragglers, old soldiers; wllectd by the general8 into whose 
districts they \vandered, they wwe employed to strengthen 
ditaehed mrps instead o£ Wmg restored. All his rnagnzine~ 
were tdcen; discontent, the natural oñayring of nilsfortune, 
prevaileci amongat liis ufficera; a powmfiil enerny was in front; 
no certajn resources of man or money behiid, and his efforts 
were ill-seconded by the civil autliorities. The troop, indig- 
nmt at the peopIe's apathy* behaved with so much violence and 
in~olence, especially during the retreat from Bt. Sever, tllat 
Soult, who mnted oñicere wry badly, proposed t o  &alt. MS3, fill the vacanciee from the national pards, that he 
miglit hme men d io  wodd respect property.' On the otIier 
h d  the people, companng tlie conduct of their own army 
with tlie discipline o f  the Angla-Porlagmese; and contrasting 
the req~tisitions necessnrily irnprised by their countrpen wIt.11 
the rendy nnd copious disbursiements in gold made by their 
enemies,-foo now one commissarp preceded emh divicion ta 
order rations for the troops and anotlier followed to Iimnge 
and pay on the spot-were become so absolutely ayerse t o  the 
French army fhat Sonlt wnting to tlie minister of war tliu~i 
exprmed himeelf. 'Tf the popnlation of the departmentg of 
the h d e s ,  of Cxers and the Lower menees, were mimiateri 
with s god spirit) this h the mom~nt to malro the enemy 
euffer by caqing oiT his convop and prisoners; but tlrey 
uppear more disposd to fa~our tlie invaders thm t o  ~iecond 
the -y. It is scaroely possible to obtain a mrriage foi 
trmsport, and I shdE not be surprised to find in a short time 
theae inhubitanta taking wgainst u@.' 
MUCH, 4.] D x ly -CHAP.
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Soult was Iiowmer 8. mau f o m d  by nature and by expri- 
ence to struggle apinst cliEculties, always appearing p a t e r  
ivhen in a desperate condition than vhen more happily cir- 
curnstanoed. A$ Genoa under Eimsena, at Oyiorto and ;a 
AnclnZusia, ho had been inured to mi1ita.v distrcss; and pro- 
liably for tlmt reson  thc emperor selected him to  sustain this 
dnngerons contest in preferente ta other~i accounfed more 
rentFy tncticians. On tlie 3rd and 4th he rctrcnted hg Pleis- 
manco and Madimn to Rnbwtcns, llarcinc, and Mnnbonrgct, 
mhcre ho hnltcd, covcring Tnrbcs, for his d c s i p  whs to lcccp 
in mass and await the development of  tlic alIies' plana. 
Ln thia riew be mlled in the detnchmentdi o€ cavaI~y and 
iufmtry left on tlie aide of Pau liefora the Liattle of 
Ortlies; and liwring tliat Ilaricnu was at Lsngon with a 
tliausand men he ordered liim ta m=& by Agen md join 
tlie ormy immediately. He likewise put the national pards 
and gm-damw in activit~ on the d e  of the Pyrertees, and 
directed the commanders of thc rnilitaq district.4 in his rear 
to beep their old soliliers, of whicb there were mrany ~cattered 
througli the country, iin readiness to aid the a q  
Wbile thus acting he received a note dictated by the 
m p c w .  
' Fortres~e~,' sairl h'apoleon, ' are nothing in thmnselves 
when the enemy having the cornrnand of the sea can collect 
as many shelIs and bullets md guns as he picases to m s h  
thsm. k a v e  tlierefom o d y  a fem troops in Bayonno, the 
~vay to prevent the siego is t o  keep tlie army close to the 
place, Eesnme tlie oirenuive, Edl upon one ar otlier of the 
e n e y ' s  winp, and though you should have but. twcnty thou- 
s u d  men, if you seue tlie proper moment anrl atttdck l l d i l y  
J-on oughb t o  gain some advantage, 'I'ou h v e  enough talcnt 
to nnderstand my meaning.' 
mis note carne foirrteen days too late. But what if it had 
come beforel Wellington sftcr winning the battIe of 8t. 
Pierre the 13th of Deccmber m s  fimly wltabli~ihed on tlie 
Adour above Byonnc, and &lo to intcrmpt the Fronch 
convoys as they descended from tlie Port de Landes. It waa 
evident tlien that mhen d r y  weatlier mabIed the d i m  to 
mave, Wt must ahandon Biayonne to defend the passage of 
the Gaves; or risk heing turned and driven upon the Lzndea 
from ñrl~ence it  wonId he difficirlt for Iiim to escape, Napnleon 
however d~fiired liim t o  leave anly ri, few mcii in hyonne, 
anothcr ilivision would thus ham bccn d d e d  Eo his fidd 
amy; and this diminution af the &son would not hrtve 
increused Wellington's active forces, because the investment 
of Bnyonne would still have reqiiired tliree separate mrps: 
moreover until the brid,%head at reyrehorade was rabandoned 
fo concentrate sit Odhas, Bayonne waa not, ngorously spe&- 
ing, lcft to its a m  delcnec. 
To the empcror's observat:one Soult replied, that scvml 
months liefore he M told the minkter of wiir Bayonne waa 
incnpable of  austaining fifteen diays open trenches unless t h  
entrenched camp rwts welE occnpied, and he hsd been by the 
miniater authorixed no to  occiipy it. Taking thrrt as his base 
Jic had lcft a gnrrison of thirteen thousand five hnndrcd men, 
snd now he knew the emperor'e wishea it WM no longer in 
liis power to withdmw tliern. With respect to kmping close 
to tlie place he hd done so aa long as he could witliout endan- 
gering the safety of thc army; but Wellingkon'a opemtioa4 
had forced him to abandon it ; and he had only changed h i ~  
liiie of oplierationa nt; 6t. Sever when he wm being pushed 
bnck npon Bordenux witli Iittle prospect of being able to parra 
tlie a r o n n e  h time. He lid for aeveral rnuntlis Ohought 
of establisliing a, pivot of snpport fm Iiis mwements ab Dax 
in the d e s i p  of atill ho1rhg by Bayome; and with that viem 
had ordercd the old works of tlie forrner place to be repaired 
und a camp to be fortified; bnt from poverty oP meuns even the 
body of the place waa no* completed or armetl at the moment 
when the battle of Orthes forced him to relinquisli it. More- 
over the insurgent 'levy of tlie h d e s  npan wliich he de- 
pended t o  man tlie works b d  failed: not more than two liiin- 
d red men hd carne forward, Neit.her w u  he very conficlmt 
of the advantage of such a position, becaneo Wellingten mith 
superior numbers wodd proiiably hava turned bis left and 
fomed liim t o  retire precipihtely towanh Bordeaux by the 
des& of the greater Lmdm. 
The emperar ordered him to tRko the offensive were it only 
d h  twenty thousetnd men. He wauld oliey 6 t h  this obrier- 
d o n ;  tht  from the 14th of Felsmniry to thrrt momeut he 
hita had no power to tsku the initiatory movemmt, Iiaving 
been constmtly rittackd by infinitely superior numbem. He 
had defended himself as he could, but had not expwtcted to 
suoceed against the enormouai disproportion of force. It lieing 
tlius irnpossible, even though he sacrificed his last man iin the 
attempt, to stop the enemy, he now goiight ody to prolong 
the war as mueh m he canld on the frontier ; aod by defending 
every position to keep the inderei in check nnd prevent theni 
from attftcking Borile~ux ar Toulouse, sme hg detachments. 
Ee had hken his line of operations iiy tlis road of Tilrbee, 
St. Gauderia, and Touioufifi, that is to  say, by the roots of the 
Pyreneea; calculating that if Wellington sent small detaeh- 
znents against Bordenux or Toulouse, the generala commm&ng 
st those places would h able if the national gwrda wouid 
fight for their oonntry to defend them. 
If the Engiisli marle Iarge detachmenh, an aíitack in front 
while thue weakened would certaidy bring them back; iE 
they marched in iriw upon Bordean they conld be folloved 
and f o r d  to face about; if they attempted to m& by 
Auch izgdast TouIouse thep might be stopped by an atbck 
in flhnlc ; if they remainetl shtionrrrg they could be provoked 
by nn dvance to dwelope their objccts. Bnt if, ae was to be 
expected, the French army waa itsielf ~ t t d e d  it would defend 
its p0~iti0n vigoroudy; and then rctrcnting by SS t.udcns 
drnw tlie rillies into n, difficult monntain country; there tha 
ground might be diaputed step by ptep, the war be kept still 
on the frontier, and the gasenge of the Guronne be delqet t  
He had meditated deeply npon his bsk and conld find no 
Iietter mode; 6ut  his amy was weakened by wmbats, still 
more by clesertion-the conscript8 ment off so fast tLat of 
five bnttalioes lately caIEed up from TouIouse two-thirdri were 
already p n e  Gthout  bavhg seen an enemy. 
hdt, though in error as tte the real force of the allies, 
here displqed clear views, and quickly re-orgmized his amy 
in six divisions. Cdling in hia detwJmentEi he arged tho 
imperial commissioners and l o d  authoritim fo hastcn tho 
levies and mtore deserters, wMe he formed a plan of &ion 
Sor the partisan6 who had been ormmized in the mountaim 
But the new wnscript8 were for the most pad unarmed, and he 
hd no a m  to $ve thern; the imperial wrnmissary Climdet 
and the ptefect of the Uimnde giitted Bordeaax; and when 
Ii'Huillier attempted to remove the mikitay &res beIonging 
ta tlie ltrmy, from hngon, Podensac, and Bordeaux, the inferior 
authmities opposed him; there was no rnoney tbey mid ta  
pay the expuse: but in tmth Bardeaux m the focur of Bour- 
bon oonspimy, and tha myor, criunt Lyneh, wne eager to 
bstray hia ~overeign. 
Nor mas Veiling-hon withont e m b m m e n t a  The wwther 
had prevented bim following ap his victory rvhile tlie French 
army WRS in confugionj now it ww re-or&$niztxl on a new 
line and conld retreat for many days in a direction paralle1 
to the Pyrenees witH strong defonaive positions. Would he 
prssfi it closely l E a  ampf weakened st every ~tep ,  wanld 
have to meve beheen the mountains andthe Garonne, expoa- 
ing its flrnnh md renr to the opemtiom of my fum which 
t l ~ e  Fsench might be able to oollect on those boundairi~; tht  
is t o  say aU the power of Pmce beyond the Qaronne. It wtas 
esseiltial to bnd some counterpoise and i n m s e  h h  fiad amy. 
To estabIjsh a Bourbon pwty ak B o r d a n  m an obvious 
m d e  o€ t t ~ i n i n g  the firat o%& Nionld he then seize t h t  
city by s dhclimentf Ho mast empIq twclvo thousand 
men and remain with twenty-six thousand t o  oppow Boult, 
wlio he erroneously hlieved m being joined by the ten 
tkonsand men which Euchet had sent to Lyona. Fi1.e regi- 
ments which had been detached for clotliing hrad rejoined 
the army, and al1 the re4erPem of camlry rind rirkillery were 
now called np; bnt the rmnforcementa fmm Englitnd and 
Portugal, amountina ta twent~r thousand men, iipon which 11e 
liad calcuIated, were detained by tlie respective governments. 
Wherefoie, driven by necesgity, ha directed Preyre to join him 
by tha Port de h d e s  with two divisions of &e Qallician 
army; a rneamre mhich was indmtly follmed by Innumerable 
complaints of outmges and excessea, although the Spsniarda 
wcrc cntircly provided from the Rngli~h rnilitary chest. It 
ms at this time also Ciinton hd erders to wnd the British 
m d  Gemm of tlie Anglo-Sicilian army to St. Jean de Luz. 
Resolvhg however to eeize Bordeaux he repaired the broken 
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bridges, bmgM up one of MorilIo's brigades from Navameas 
ta the vicinity of Aire, @ient Qmpbeli'~ Port~iguese dr"i,wons 
to  ]Rocque£oit, Fane with two regim~nts oT cavalry md a 
brigade of infrmty to Fau, and pshed pogts f ownrda Tnrbcs 
and TTic Bigome. Memwhile EonEt, fesring thc general fipnthy 
and ill-will would become fatnl to him, cntlcavnurcri to  arouse 
the cncrgiee of tho pcople and the nrmy by tlie following pro- 
.claniation whicIi hras h n  unremably railcd at 'tiy sc~eml 
Engligh miteni, for it was a judiciow well-timed and powed'd 
adrlress. 
' Soldiers, at the httle of OrLZies you did your duty, the 
enemy'~ Iosses surpassed youq his Mood rnoistened al1 tlie 
ground he pIned, You rnay comider tliat feat of arms as an 
advtbntage* Other mrnhts are at hhand; no repose far ua 
unti1 hls amp, fomed of such extraortlinary elements, shall 
mcaate the French terri tmy or be annihilated. Ita numbers 
and proDms may be great, but at hand are unexpected perils; 
time will tmh  the enemyh general that Freach honour is not 
t o  be ouhaged with irnpunity. 
' Soldiem, he has had thc indecency to pmvoke yon nnd 
your clountr~lmen to revolt and aedition, he qeaks of pence 
but hebrands of ciiscord follow himl He speaks of pence 
and excita the FrencZi to a civil war I Tlianks be to 3iim for 
rnaking known liie project~i; our forces are tliereby ceentupIed; 
ancE he liiaelf ialliw round the imperial ewgles al1 tliose wha 
deceived by appearances bc1iere.d our enemjes would liiake a, 
loyal war. No pelbce witli the disloyal and ~ierfidiouu nation l 
no pmm with the Englisli and tLeir nnxiliariea uiltil they 
quit the French territory ! they bave dared to insult the 
n a t i o d  bonour, tlie infmy to inmte Frenchmen to become 
perjured tawards the emperor. Xwenge tlie oEcnce in blood. 
To armal Let this cry re~ound through the south of Fmnce, 
the Frcnehmnn tliat I iesitnks ahjurc~ his countq and belongs 
t o  hcr encniies. 
' Yet a few days and those who believc in English dclicncy 
and sincerity will leurn to their cost that cunning promises 
are m d e  to  aliak tl~eir mnrage, t o  subjugate tliern. They 
will learn $80 that if the English pay to-clay and are generous, 
fiey will to-morrow retalse, andwith intereat, in contributions 
what they disbume. ht the pusillanimous beings mho cal- 
d a t e  the cost of w i n g  their country remernber that the 
English hnve in view to reduce Frcnclimcn to thc samo 
servitudo as the Spsninrds, Portupeco and Kcilians who grom 
d e r  theii domination. %st history will recd tu those 
unwortliy Frenclirnen who prefer momentary enjoyment to 
the snfety of tlie great family, how tlie English macle French- 
rnen kill Frenchmen at Quiberon ; it will show them at the 
head of al1 conspiiñcies, al1 dious political intrignes, plots oind 
nssassinntrons, aiming to overthma al1 principl~, to dcstroy 
al1 p n d  establishments of t r d e  to satisf~r their imrneasurablo 
nmliition, tbeir inaatialile cupidib- D m  thtlie~e xist upon the 
fme of the globe a poiiit knowti to tlie Englisli where tbey 
llave not Jestroyed by seditions and violence al1 manufactures 
which could rival their ownP Thw they mil1 doto tha French 
esblilislimcnta if t .hg prevaiL 
Devutc then t o  opprobnnm nnd execration al1 Frcnchmsn 
who favovr their insidiuus projects, ay ! even tbom wlio me 
nntler 1Us poaar if they seek not to hurt Iib. Dwote to 
opprobrium and ieject as Frenchmen those who tbink under 
specious pretexts to avtiid serving their aountry; and fhose 
also who from cormption or indolente hide desedera instead 
of driving them baclr t o  their coloum. With siich men we 
bave notliing in common, 8nd liistory will pass thck mmes 
mith mecratione t o  posterity. As to ua soIdiers our duty is 
clmr. Honour and fidelity. This is onr motto and we mil1 
figlit to tlie last the e n e n i i ~  of our emperor anrl Trance. 
Respect persons and property. Gfrie~e for those who have 
momcntnrily fallen nndci tlie enemy's y dce, lin~tctcn tha moment 
of their delivemce. Be obedienk and rliscipline~l~ and benr 
implacable Iiatred towads traitars and enemim of the fiench 
mme l War to denth against those ~ v h o  mitld &vide us to 
clestroy; d to those cowards wlio desert Uie iuipcrid eaglea 
to range tliemselves under another banner. Remember always 
that fiReen ages af glnry, triurnphs innumemble, have illus- 
trttted our country. GontempI~ta %he prorligious cforh of our 
grcat sovereign, his ~iiigml victories which immortnlixe the 
French name. 8 0  worthy of him and we cm then bequeath 
without a, taint to our posterity $he inheritance we hold from 
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w r  fathew. Be in fine Frenchmen and &e u m s  in hand 
wooner t h ~ n  urvi~e dishonour.' 
Lt the time and tho ocmion of this prochmntion bo con- 
&dered. Lct it bo mmembered tliat no l h g l i ~ h  d t e r  orntor 
cir politicim, had for many yeara used milder k m  t h n  mb- 
Fier~, murderers, atlieistg and k a n t ,  when speaking of French- 
men and their sovereign-that itI.veingbon even at t h  time 
refused that sovereign his title of emperor, calling him Buona- 
paste-that on entering Franco he hsd published an order 
of the d q  wnsing the French commrtnders of anthorizing 
and enmuwging the crnelties of their aoldiers in Spain-that 
for six years the Spanish, Portupese and English d a t e  pspers 
were filId with most offensive ribdd abuse of WapoTeon his 
ministertr and commanders. Let al1 tlis be remembered and 
thc aerimony of Soult's proclamation canriot be justly blamed; 
wKlo the noble energy, tho loyalty of the sentimentbi, the 
exciting, gassionste feelieg of ptriotism which perrades it 
must be admired. Ww líe, sprung from the ranlte, a soldier 
of the republic, a genemi of tb empire, after figliting thirty 
yeam under the tricolor to be hme and measured to sqaeam- 
isl~ness in hia phisses mhen he aiaw Es country invaded by 
foreignera; md a pretender to tbe throne ~talking behind tbeir 
bayonets beckoning hia soldiers to desert thek eeagles, inviting 
Iiis muntven to behay their sovereign and diahonour their 
nation l Wby thhe man ira4 sum~inded by t r a i t oq  and prond 
and rrcornful of cLsnger was his spirit to strive no mightily 
rpind defeat and tmson combined. 
It has been said in mnitemnation of him that the b g b h  
general rZid not encourage the Bousbon pwrty. IE~ tliat true P 
Did it so appesr to the Prench general? Hd not the duke of 
AnpuiGme come to the Englbh headquarters with mystev, 
following the i n d i n g  army, and, protected by its arraq assem- 
bling rorind him al1 tlie ancient p r t h  of his honae, aending 
fortli agents, mttering pmhmationa cven in Soult's mmp, 
e n d a a d n g  to debatich hia soldiera and to  aid ptrangem to 
suhjnpte Erance. Soult not only knew this hnt mas ~uffcring 
nnder the effech, On every side he met with opposition trnd 
discontent frem the civil authoritiea, his movements were made 
Hnom to the enemy, kis measurea thwarted in di dimtiona. 
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At Boideanx rr party mm vehemently ealling npon the in- 
mdcm for nid. At Tarbea the fenr of provoking nn action nclar 
t5e town had cauwd tho dispersion of the insurrectiod lcvy 
o p i z e d  by the imperial commissioner Caffarelli. At Pau 
the lwstocracy had gecretly membled to  offer homage to tlie 
duke ofAngoul$rne, and it was rumonred he mas to be crowned 
at the castle of EIenry the Fourtb. Was Bodt t o  disre- 
prd J1 tliese f h  dl-these g i p s  bem~ise his opponent l id  
avoidcd any pnblic dcclnrrttion in fuvour af thc Bourlion 
family2 Wellington wouId h a v ~  been the first to laugh at 
liis simldici@ if Iie had. 
Wliat \vas tbe renson tliat the English genera1 did nof; 
openly cal1 uupon tlic Bourhn parkisans to rnise the stantlttrd 
of  rerolf f Simply tIiat Nnpdeon's nstounding gcnius hnrl so 
linffled tbe lianded sovere ip  md their innumeratilo hordeci 
tllnt a peace seerned inevitable ta avoid fatal disasters; Wel- 
lington Iiad instructions: fcoui his go~ernment nnt 
t a  embarrse negohiatiuns for peace by pledges t o  t:E:clim 
a Bourhon pa*. Henco as an honetit states- f~nm ind 
Diithhurst, 
mnn antl commander he couId nut excite men to Mss. 
their ruin for a momentnry radvnntage; but se 
far from discouragiiig Wwon t o  Mripoleon on 0 t h  grounds 
Le avowed liis anxious clesire for it, and his red iess  t a  
eneourage every enemy of that rnonsrch. He consultcd with 
La Rmlie Jwqiielin, mith De Maillios, and otlicr veheinent 
pnrtisans 'for in immediatc insurrec.tion; nnd also d l  Vid  
dastel, nn ~gelit of Bernadotte'g, until lie found bim intripirig 
apinst tlie Bourbons. He advised tEie duke of AngodUnle to 
form regular buttaIions, promised hii arma, and actually col- 
leehd eighty thousanrl bitand to arm the insiirgents. FiiiiilZy 
he re33nked the tiniir1 policy of the Knglish ministers, wtio 
having mdi an opportunity of assailing Nnpoleon refminerl 
from doing it. Rehre hult's pruelamtltion uppeured b thus 
m o t e  to lord Brttliirnt. 
a I find the ~entirnent as we advance in the county s t i l l  
more strong agrtinst tlie Btioneparbe dynnasty and Ln fawur of 
the  Boiirlione, 6i1t J am quite certnin thcre will be no dccya- 
&ion on t h e  part of the people if the olIies do not in some 
VOL. VI. a 
180 PENNSULA WAR. [Jd~acrr, 1814. 
mt hitting me's mmy aa Wwd as m c m  d im tJw wsz 
Pnclnerable place. 1 m t7~at he d d  no€ 80 GGCt ly m, 
R w&d cwtaiodj &m t ? ~  Britidb ~ t I ~  hIrdmwtd .if 
et ame Cm J¿& power.' 
Soult and Tellington, acted and m t e ,  ea& in the rmnner 
most suitable to their sittiation, but it was not a littla rcniarli- 
ablo thnt Ireland ahodd eio readily occur t o  $be latter M n 
pmnllcI caso. 
In thii &ate of raffairs Beresfod waa detached with twc11,c 
thousand men qainst Bordeaux, h i n g  intitructions £o occupy 
that city and awpire tlre Garonne as a port for the allim; but 
the Prencli anthorities were to declzlre whetl~er tliey mould or 
would not exercise their functlons under the condifiona 
announcetl by proclmatioa. For hitherto Weliington had 
governed as he arlvanced in thi public rnanner to nullify the 
mihireyresentations of politicrtl intrigue- obviate false reports 
and rumours, and malre his justice and rnoderation kilown 
to the poorest p e ~ a n t ;  fhua ñecuring the French local 
authoritiw who continucd to ach nnder him from false repre 
ecntotion of thcir conduct to the imperial govcmment if pcncs 
should Iie made witll Napoleon. This expedition, howevor, 
involved political interests. Beresford w a s  ilistructed that, as 
tliem were many partisana of the Bourbons in that &y who 
miglit ~ 1 i  to hoist the nhite standard and procEaia Lriuis 
the Eighteenth nnder protection of the troopfi, they were t o  
be told fhe Brjtiah nation wnd its dies  nished well t o  thcir 
cause; ami while public tranqui1lit.y was maintained in the 
districts occupied by the troaps them would be no hindmnce 
t o  tlieir political procmlings: they or any party oppocied 
to Xnpolcon wouid reccive assistancc. Neverthclcsg the 
nllicd sovcrcigns mere ncgotiating with the French emperor, 
liowever \ve11 incl ind tlie English general might be to support 
a party qpinst  the latter during war, lie could give no Jielp if 
peace were concludcd, anS this they mu& ~veigli weli befure 
they revolted. Beresford was therefore not t o  merldle with 
any declnration in favour of Louisi the Eightmntli; hut he 
ivm not to oppose i f ;  and if revolt tookplace he was to supply 
tlie revoftw witli tbe arms nnrl ammunition collected nt Dax. 
On tlie 8th Beresford mmlied tawords LBngon with tLe 
fourth anrl seventh divimom, Vivian'a horsemen, and Borne 
guns ; he was joined an the road by some of Vandeleur's 
cmlry from Rrtyonnc; and he had ordera to observe tb 
enerny'~ rnovements tawarrls Agen; for Soult conlrl by a forced 
morch cmss tho Gnranno there, tbnd enter Bordeanx before 
t im. La Hoclie Joquelin preceded h e  troops, and the duke 
of Anpuleme followed closely; his prtisans in .the city, 
frlghtened a t  the danger of their enterprise, now besoughf Bera- 
fd to delay his mnrch; but La noche Jacquelin vehemently 
condemned thia kenitntion; and his influence miyporkr1 by the 
consternation which the battle ofortlies bad created amongst 
tlie Napoleonists decided the queation in ftivour of revolt. 
It has been shoivn that SouEt Iiad pneviously g i ~ e n  orders in 
detail for arganizing the defence of Bordmux, and be h d  
u v d  it agnin wIien the ;rnperiat commi~sioner Cornudet 
ni.nved; but following the . m9tom of al1 civilian~ who metldb 
~ 4 t h  miiitmy mattem, everything wasi promised and nothing 
done. Cornndet md tlie pmfect quitted the city as early as 
tbe 4th, first burning with a aiIly dectation of *ur some 
sliips of  wrar upon tlie stoclrs. L'Huillier, unable to  oppose the 
aTlia, then destroyed tlie fort of Medoc on the left bank of 
thc Garonne, tlisarmcd somo of tho river brattcries, nnd pus- 
ing ixt the ni@ of  the 31th t o  the right bank occupied tlie 
fortress of Blaye, the Paté, and other points. Deresford 
reaclclied Langon the 1 Qth, left lord Dallionsie tliem 6 t h  the 
btilk of tlie forma, m¿i PrrIvancing witli etght hitndred cavairy 
entered Borcleaux tlie 12th. The municipality and a p a t  
body of Eourbonish met liim, and at t h i r  red mu the 
mayor, count Lyncli, decorated with tlie searf of hia ofior? and 
the lepon of honour, both conferred upon him, probabIj at 
his own ~olicitntion, hy the ñovereign he wras then going fo 
bctray. Bcrcsford madc lrnom his iastmctions, snd Lpch 
v e s  justly tore tlie trlcolor, the emblem of his country's glory, 
from his o m  dioulders; the white flag mas tIien dis~iltlycc? 
and tlie aliies took possession of tlie Gity. The duke o f  
Angoul&me arrived the mme day, and Lonis the Zghteenth 
waq proclaimeb Thia W&S not genedly approved, and tlie 
'mayor, C O ~ E ~ O U S  of w e h e s s ,  issued 8dth tlie connivance of 
Angouleme a proclamation, rleclaring tht tke British, Porta- 
~2 
guae mcl Spanish amies were nnited in the sonth; as the 
0th. nat.jons were united in the north, solely to destroy Naph 
leon and repIncs him by a Bourlion king; who was conducted 
tliither by aese generous nlIies: rand anly by accepting that 
king could the French apperase the reeentment of the Spa- 
niard~.' Tben, as if master of the oountry, the duke appointed 
prefects and other authorities in districta beyond tlie limits 
of Bordeitax. 
130th duke and mayor Non xepented of thcir precipihncy, 
Tile EngIish Aeet which shonld have acted simultaneously 
with the troops had not arrived ; the R e ~ n s ,  French seventy- 
four, with s e v e d  inferior vessels of war were anchored h low  
Blnpe, and Beresford was recalled with tlie fonrhh division and 
Vivian'e mvalry. Lord Dalhonsie remained with the aeventh 
divkion and three r iqdrona to oppose L'Huillier'n troopa rind 
other French corps now on tbe Gwonne; he could not p r d  
tho river below Borde~ux, and aome French troops aguin took 
possession of t.he fort of Grave nenr the mouth; a new army 
was forming under Decaen beyond tlie Garonne; the Napo- 
leonists begah t. s t i r  themselves, anda psrtisan ufficer cuming 
down to St. Marnire on tlie 18th, surprised fifty men sent by 
lord Dalhousie 8CKi83 the a r o m e  to sehe a f i w c k  maghzine. 
In the Landes the peasanta burned the housea of the gentle- 
men who had joined the mhite standard, md in Bordeattx s 
oountcr-insurrection mns prepared to aid Decaen. 
Frightened at these a p p h s  of rewtion the p6nce desired 
lord Dalliousie t o  bring his tmops into Bordeaux t o  m e  the 
Nnpoleonists, and each prarty strove ici outvic the othcr in idle 
nimoiire. Trictories and dcfeuk were jnvented or cñaggerated. 
Napoleon ma d a d  from illness, had tdmmitted suicide, wa.3 
poisoned, atah1)ed; and 811 were related with motit eircum- 
shntial details, Wellington, aaiting t o  the duke of Angon- 
ldme, denied the ~eracily of tlie msyoh procIamation, and 
expressed liis trust that t h ~  prinoe was not n party t o  such 
n mendacioufi document; but the latter, with some excuses 
about hurry and confusion, avowed his particfpation in its 
publication and defended the mayor's conduct. He also 
gtated thc dnnger and demandd men and money; supportlng 
Es application by a note of conncü, wliich arped, thnt as c i d  
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governmeiit could not be conducted without execntive power, 
and Wellington hnd suffercd the duke to assume the civil 
governrnent at Bor~lceiix, lie \ltns bound tu pupply h o p s  nnd 
furniuh money until taxes could be levied uder  the protectiou 
of the soldien! 
Holding such aoplii~try in excuse for a brea& of faith to be- 
intoIemb1e, Xrellington replisd, that he was sor7 t o  fina the 
principie by wEct he replakd lils conduct tomards the 
Boiirlion pnrty, tlioiigh oftcn stated, hnd madn so little impres- 
sion tliat tlie dulce could not perceive how inconsistent it was 
witl~ tlic mnyor's proclamation ; mmt cautious therefore must 
be liis futura conrluct, swhg that na the chief o l  m army and 
tlie oonfidentid agent of three independent nations, lie could 
not perrnit his vlews to be misrepresented upon such an 
important qusstion. He had oocupied Bordcaux as a militnry 
point, but certain persons contrnq to hiii advice md opinion 
thougl~t propcr to pr0cIai-n Louis the Righteenth. Thom 
pernolis made no exertions, Fmb~cribed no money, irnised not a 
soldier; yet bemuse he waulrl not extend ths pos& of hia army 
lieyond w h t  $vas propr and convenient, merely to protect 
their families itnd piwperty; exposed t o  danger, not on iiccount 
of  tlieir exertions for they hud mede none, bu! on acoount of 
their premwture declaration ccintrary to his dvice, tliy took 
liim t o  bsk in a document derivered to lord Dallion~ie by the 
prince liimsclf. The miter of that pnpcr and al1 such persona 
liowever might be rissured tlmt notlirng sliould make him 
sivem from what he tliought his duty to the soverelgns who 
employed hirn; he moiild not risk even a cornpny of infantry 
t o  save properties and fiirmilies 1ilnce.d in n atate of danger 
contmv to liis advicc. Thc rItike t,hen h d  bettcr conduet 
16s policy aud compose his manifestoca in such a rnanner ae 
not to foroe a public contrediction of them His roya1 bigh- 
ness was free t o  act as lie pleased for himself; but he mas not 
free tu idduce the name and autliority of tlie allied govern- 
ments in siipporh of liie measures when they 1ind not been 
. consultedi nor of their genai11 when he had been consulted 
and liad given his opinion apinst  those mensnrea. 
He bnd told bim thnt if nnp gres6 tomn or extensive di% 
trict, d&sd in famur ef the Buurlions, he would not inter- 
fere d i G h  the pemment of that t o m  or district; and if 
tliere was a general declaration in famur of his house he would 
deliver the civil pvmnmeat  of al! the coui~try overrun by 
tlie a m y  into bis hands; bnt the fact was that wen at Bor- 
dmux the movement ia favour of tbe 3ourbons was not una- 
nimous. Tbe spirit h d  not spred elsewhere, not even t o  
Iw Vendée, nor in any part occupied by the a r q .  The 
ewnts <xintempIated had not threfore oocurred, and it muld 
be n great bbreach of dnty towards the allied aovereigng and 
cruel to tlie inhabitants, if he mere to  deliver them over to 
iiis roya1 highness prematurely or against their inclinations : 
,he íadvlsed him therefore to withdraw his prefecta and confine 
h i ~  gavernment to Rordenux. He coirld give him no rnoney? 
and nfter what had pairsed he was doubtful if he shouId nfforci 
him any counbnance or pmtection; the argurnent oT ths 
note of councif, affirming that he wns bound to mpport the 
civil govemment of his royd highncss, only rendered it more 
incumbent upon him tu beware how he p v e  farther encou- 
ragement, or to aipeak plainly, pm~w&m to the Bourboniste 
t o  declare themselvea. It ww digagreenble to talte any skp 
which shonId pubZieIy mmk a waut of good understanding 
htween himself and Ghe dnke, but count Lyneh liad not 
treated Iiim d& comrnon fairness or with b1th ; whcrefore 
as he codd not allom the chmackr of tlie died govereigns or 
Iiis omn t e  be doubted, if his rofl Lighnecs did not mithin 
ten daya contradict the objectionable prarts of the mayor's 
procl~tm~tion he would do rro himaelf. 
Thua it appearcd that with the Fmnch as with t he  Spniariis 
and Portuguese, ncither enthusiastic declarations nor mtunl 
insnriwtion offered any pamutes for sense, tmth or exertion; 
and most anrely 811 genemlls md politiciam of erery oountry 
who trust to sudden popular commotione will find that noisy 
deciamations, ~eliement demoastrations of feeling; idle m o u m  
and boasting, the lifc-blood of such &&m, are essentinlly 
opposed to useful pubIic exertions. 
mhen Beresforrl marched to rejoin the army the h e  of 
occupation was too extensive for DaIliousie, rand Wel3ington 
ordered him to avoid the city and bold hia troops together; 
obderving that hia own projected aprntiong on the iippc~ 
Baronne would keep mibtters giiiet on the Iomer part of thnt 
river. But if thc mar hhn continued for e rnonth thah offiwr'rr 
situation wouId have lieen critical; for when mcrsi 
Napoleon lieard Borrleanx had fallen he sent .re.q~*denm 
E? geiieral Decaen by post Eo Libourne t o  form tbe ' m y  u,,,, 
o f t h  ~ i ~ m d d ?  general Despeaux, acting under Mss. 
Soult's oders, Iiad dready oollected a body of gens-$armes 
custom-liousa oficers oand national guads on tlre upper 
Giironnc, bctwcen Agen nnd Lit bo l lc ,  and it was ORO of his 
detacliments that surprisd Dalbousie'a men at SL Macaire. 
Eig11t guns were sent Jown from Narbonne, otter  htteries 
were despatched from Paria te arrive st Perigeaux on the 11th 
of Apfil, and three or fonr hnndred cavalry, coming from the 
side of Rochelle, joined L'HuiiLer, mbo with a thousand 
infantry was iTi position at St. Ana& de Chbsac beyond the 
Dordogne, Rehind these troops, al1 the nationa1 g u d s  m- 
tom-house oEcem and gcnsd'armes of five departments were 
ordered to aasemble, and march to  the Dordogrie; but tlie for- 
Ci midable part of tlie iuknded army was a body of L3ucliet'a 
veteranq s k  thousand in number, under general Beurman, 
d o  liad been turned from tlie road of 1;yons and directed 
upon T J 'h onrne. 
Docncn cntered Mucidan the 1st of hpril, Bmirmnn's troopfi 
bod not thm reachcd Perigcaux, D~lhousie'ri mvalry were in 
Liliourne between and L'Huillier ; the p m e r  of concen.. 
t;rpttion waa thne denied to tlie Frencli and meanmIiile admira1 
Penrose aecured mmmand of the Garonne. Wellinghon thouglit 
liim dilatory, but on the 27th he amired wjth ri seventy-four 
nnd t,wo frigatcs ; mhcrcupon tlic Rcp lu s  and other Prencli 
~ c ~ s e l q  tben at Royan, made mil iip tlie river, nnd though 
clitised to the shoaI of Talmont e s y i e d  tlirougli tlie narroiv 
diaiiilel on the north side and cast ancIior under some bat- 
teries. Pserious to tris event Mr Ogilvi~, a com- 
Omciul 
rnissay. heing on the river in a boat manned Rcl'ort bp 
wlth Fxenclimen, discovcrcrl the Requin sloop, 31.. Ogilvia 
BISS. Iinlf Frencli half Amerimn, pierced for tmentry- 
two gung, Iying at Anchor below Bordeaux, and seeing a sailor 
leap hnstily into n boat and row for the veseel seized him; he ' 
mas the armourer of tlie Requin? and said tliere were not 
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many men on board. Whereupon Ogilvie o b s e h g  liis dar 
tliought the crew would also be feari'ul, and resolutely bearii 
down upon the Requin, boarded and took ber without opp 
sition from ber crew, or his own, arthonpli slie had fourteen 
p n a  rnounted and eleven men with two ofñcers on board ! 
When tlie naval woperation was assuredJ Ddhousie crossed 
the Garonne above the city, arove the Fxench poses b~yonrl 
the Dordope, nntl sending his cnvnlry ovcr intercepted 
Demen's and L'Huillier's c?ommnnlcatians; tlie formcr hnd 
then to remrain at Mucidan with two huadred and fifty g e w  
ci'nrmes, rawsiting the arrivnl of Beurmm, md he found neitlier 
arms nor ammunition nor a wiiling spirit for organizing the 
nationa1 paras. The Engliah horsemen repatised the Dor- 
dope,  but Dalhousie mossd it agaiin lower domr nem SSt. 
Andr6 de Cubzac, with three tbousand men, and liearing 
Xr'IIuillier was at Ztauliera turned suddenly upon him. 
The French formed line on an open oommon, occupyying a 
w o d  in front with detachmentg; overmatchd in infantry, 
they had tliree hundred cavalry opposed t o  one weak squndron, 
pet non8 would stand tlie shock of battle. TIie mood w w  
clctl.red in IL moment, tho a r t i l l c ~  openctl, and t.l.lie main hody 
retired ie disorder, horaemcn nnd infiinty together, tlirougli 
&uuliers; le~ving beliind scat,tered nasses upon mhich the 
British cavalry galIoped and m d e  two or tbree hundred men 
and thirty officexs prkonem. U She aix thousand old troops 
under 33euman had, followhg Napleon'~ ordem, arrived at 
this time in Dallioiisiek rear, his poslbion ~vould Iiave been 
ernbarrassing, but tliey were delayed on the red until the 10th. 
. Dunng tliese ~perations admlral Penrose, ha-+-ing on the 
2nd obcened the French flotilla, consisting of fifteen armed 
vesseIs and pn-boak, coming down from Blaye to join the 
Replus at Talmont, sent bis borits to attack them; whereupoa 
&e French mssels nin an shore, and the mews fiitled by two 
hundrd soldierri from Blaye lhed the beach to prote& them; 
hut Lieutenfint Dnnlap landing the seamen and marines from 
tlie hoats, b e ~ t  he troopa and carried off or cleatroyed tllo 
whala flotilla with s los9 of onIy six men wounded and mi=- 
ing. This operation completcd, mcl tho action at Etaulicm 
knom, the dadmid, reinforced with e ~iecond &p of the 
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Iine, reñolred ta nftnck the ~qiiadron and the &oro batteries, 
but in tlic night ot'thc 6th the French E& firc t a  tlicir vcs~ida; 
whereupon esptain Barris of tho BelIr? Pode frig.3te lantled 
six liuntlred aeamen and mmines, autl destroyed the batberies 
rind forts on the rig-ht bank from Talmont t o  the Courhe point, 
Dlaye still held out, but at Pariri treason had done i t s  work, 
Napoleon, tbe man uf rnighbiest capacity kno~vn for good, was 
overthrown to make room for despota, who with minds enlar~ed 
only to cruclty, itvarice and dissolntcness, werE at tlic very 
moment of triumph intent to defraud the people, by whoso 
stiength and suílering they had conquered, of tbe only rewad 
they demmJed, jwt pvemmmt, The war m 3  virtu J ly  over, 
yet on tlie side of TouIouse, Bayonne, and Barcelona, the 
amies ignorant o£ th great e ~ e n t  were stiIl battling with 
unahted fury. 
CBAPTER IV. 
W ~ L E  Bcresford mas moving ~ipon Rordenux, Soiilt una ' 
Wcllington rcrnaincd in obscrvation, eacll thinking the othcr 
stro~gcr than hirnsdf. Tlie Iattcr, hcaring af Beurmm'a 
mmh, thought be ms ta reinforce hult .tnd dad actunlly 
joiaed, Thnt maml~al, bearing nothing af Bercsford'~ march 
until the 13th, conelded Wellington di11 h d  tlio twelve 
thousand men thus detached ko Bordeau~ The numbem on 
each side were liowever nearly equul. On tlie Fmch s i d ~  
were thirty-one thoustind infantry and cavalry, tbree tliousand 
being liowever atragglem dettGned by tlie generds of the 
militarg. disbricts; Iience, exclusive of conscripts without arme, 
onl y t~venty-aight. tlioumnd salires and Iiayonets with tbirty- 
ORicial eight pieces of artillery were in line. On tlle 
Rcprt, d i e s '  side twenty-seven thousrtnd sabrea and 
bayonets were umler ams, with forty-two pins; 
but this included detnchment~ sent to PRU on one side, 
Roquefert on the other, and the camIry pu~hed into 
the Landee md t o  the upper Garonne. 
Wellington, erípecting Soult would retreat upon hucll a 4  
designing to foIlow him, liad caused BcrcsEord t o  kcep the 
Ziullr of Es firoops townrda tho uppcr Ganronne tbat he might 
thc fiooncr rcjoin thc nrmy; bnt bdt, haviiig erarly fixd his 
lino of retreat by Et. Guadens, wanld have ~ehl ten the offen- 
sive on the 9th or IOtli, if tlie losg of his rnigwines ?id not 
conipelled liim first to organize a aystein 01 recluisition for 
snbsi&ence. E s  equdity of force aoon ceased, for on tha 
13 tli Preyre carne np with eight tliousand Spanish iiifantry, 
and the aext day Ponsonby's hexvy cavalry mived; Weiling- 
ton waa then the strongmt, pt he stI11 awaited Beresford, 
and mns irneasy about hi own situation. He dreaded ths 
junction of Suchet'a armsf; for it was at tliis time the .Sknish 
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regency .refemed the convention, propoaed by that marshd for 
tlie evacuation of tlie fortresses, to his decision. He gave a 
peremptory negative, obscming tliat it would furnish twenty 
tliousand veterans for EouIt, while the retention of Rosas and 
Fipem wodd bar the action of the Spanish m i e a  of 
Qtalonin In hia fnvour; yet his anxiety m 9  grerit, becanse he 
foresaw Fcrdinand'a return and his engngcmcnt Nith S~rclict, 
alrady related, together mi& the evident desire of Copon~ 
that tlle garrifiom sliould be aclmitted to a colivention, would 
fimliy render that measure inevitable. His own army wm 
iikcly t o  decrease. Tlie English cabinet, lesa considemh 
even than the Spanisli govcnment, had sent tlie militiq 
permittcd by tlie rcecnt nct of parlinmcnt t o  volunteer for 
foreign service, to  Hollmd;' rtnd with tliem the other re- 
inforcemenh orignally promised for the armp in France: 
two or tliree regimenta of militia oniy carne t u  the Gronne 
wlien the mar was over. To rnalce amenas tlre ministera 
proposed that Iord William Bentinck should gend faar thou- 
sand men from SiciIj to  I d  at Rosas, or some polnt in 
Fmce, and 80 join Wcllington; who waa thirs expcctcd t o  
extend bis wenkened forca h m  the &y of Biswty t o  the 
Meditemnean in order t o  cover the junction of thia uncertain 
reinforoementl Experienm had tauglit the Etigliali statesmen 
so little, that we find theic general thus addressing thern only 
one w e k  previott~ to the terrnination of the m. 
Ha-ving before declared that he should be, ccontray to his 
wiah~u, forcd to bring more S p a n i h  into France, ho 
B a p  :- 
' Tliere ara limits to the numbem witli di ich this aimy can 
contend, and I am convinced your lortlsliip would not wisli 
t o  Eiee tlie safetg sad honour of this Landful of brave men 
dcpend upon the doubtful exertiona and discipline of an 
undne proportion of Spanish trooys.-'Tiie service in HolIand 
iiiay doubtleas bo more importnnt to tlio nntienal intcrcst 
tlian that in tliis country, but 1 hope it will be considered 
that that whicb is moat irnport~nt of al1 is not lo l w  tlns 
have m j  wil&ic!h 7m stmqqled ~Jc~ouq?~ ii% diflultks fw 
mcw1y m k  yea~s: 
Soult'a infantry was now re-oganized In six Sliviaiom 
mder Daricau, D'hagnec, Tanpin, lfarnnsin, 
*lt* Yillatb and Harispe. Paris' troops liitlierto 
acting ns an unattached tiody mera *bus abmrbd, the cavnlry 
composd of  Bertoda and Viid's bripades waa under fierre 
goult, and there was a reserve of seven tliousnnd conscript 
inrantry under Travot. She division of wings nnd a ceritre, 
each under a lieutenant-general, continued, but wm i io t  heederl 
in tlie movementa; for Reille though commanding the rig!it 
wing was at Maukiourget on the lcft of tlie line of battle; 
D'Erlon, w m n d i n g  the centre, was at Marsiac oa the right 
covering the r o d  to Aucli; Clau~d was at JEabutens forming 
a reseme to botb. The advancetl gaards were towards Plilis- 
sance on tbe righk, l f d i r ~ n  in the centre, Leinhege on the 
left: h u l t  thus covered Tarbes, and ceuld move on a direct 
Iine by p o d  roarl~ either ta Auch or Parl. 
Wclliiigton, driven by n~cessit~y, now d d  Giron and 
AngIona from t h o  Bastan, although lireyr$s soldicrv hlrd by 
their outrage~i already created ri widelspread consternation. 
Hia lieud-quarters were fixed at Aire, his wniy was in posi- 
tion on euch sido of the Adour, he M repdred al1 the bridge~ 
Zieliind Lirn, restored that over the Lees in his front, iind 
disperscd some small bands upon his Ieft flank aiid mar: but 
a partisan sJstem waa organized on 31is riglit flank in tlie 
monntains, d onIy wankil rnoney. Tlie main brxliea of the 
tmo armies were a Iong day's march astder,  yet their 
dvancsd poes were nat very distant. The regular cavalry 
had freqitent enconnters* and in the night of t l ~ e  7th, Soult, 
tliiiiking Pau was weakIy protected sent a strong delachment 
to  arrest tlie nobles who had assernblerl to welcome the duke 
of Angoiilérne. Fme Lowwer got tliere before the Frencb 
with H bri,@e of infantrg antl two regimente of cn~alry, md 
fhe stmlrc fniletl. Tlie Frcnch in returning caliturerl an 
officcr and four or five Englisli drngoon~, nnd 8 sccontl d e k l i -  
ment penetrating betwecn Pan and Aire earried off a. post of 
correspondence, 50 days after, d ien  Fane hud quitted 
Pau, a French ofiicer accornpanied bg onIy four liu~surs 
captured there thirty-fuur Yortuguese, with their comniunder 
and ten loadcd mdes, By time excursioris Soult procurecI 
intelligence of Dcresfod's mar& to 13urdeiiux md resolved to 
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@nad the tablelmd above, aed chnrging the renr o£ tha 
retiring troops in a narrow WBJ lcading to the Aire rond killcd 
sevml and took Borne prianners, mongst tbem Bernardo de 84 
since known ns connt of Bandeim, 
TLis terminated Xodt'a operutions for the day, and WeI- 
lin,@on imrtgining the arrival of Suc1iet"s troops liad made Fiim 
thus bola, resolved t o  k e q ~  OR tlie defensive unt2 his reinforce- 
meuts and detwhments could come up. Eill however passed 
the greakr Les, partly to support his posts partly to malce 
out the force antl true dErection of the French rnovement: 3iut 
he recrossed tliat river during tlie night and findly occtipied 
the strong plntform fiet.ween Aire and Garlin w11icli Soult liod 
designd to seiae. TVeiliagton then brought tlie tliirtI and 
sixth cliviriion anti the heavy camlry over the Adour ta his 
aupprt, leaving tlre Iight diviriion witli tlie hnssnr bri"g.de 
still on the r i ~ h t  bank. !Clio bulk of tlie army thus occupicd 
a ahong position prdlel witli *he PRU rosd; the riglit rtt 
Gmlin, thc lcft at Aire, the front coverred by thc grenter Lces, 
a river diEcult to pass ; Faneas cacavafry mas extended oe the 
Pau road as far as Boelho, and on the left of the Adour the 
h n ~ a r x  pushed the French cavalry regiment left tliere Gack 
npon Plaisance. 
On the moming of the 14th Soult, iirtending to M1 on 
Hg1, d o s e  columns he h d  seen in the cvening before on 
the n'ght of the Lee% drove in the sdvnnced pos& co~ering tlie 
r~trogrnde movement, nnd exnmincd tlie new poaition; but 
tliese apemtio~s wostcd tbe day, and towmds evening lie dia- 
posed his army on tiie heights between the two Lea; pIacing 
Clausel and D'ErIon at Castle Fugan opposite Qarlin, Reille 
in  reseme rit Portet. At tiie same timo Pjerre Boult moved 
witli tbree caw~lry reyiments to CIttrnc on tlie Pau roarl, to  
intercept the cominui;icntions with tliat town and menace t l~e 
. al1ies' right flank, agninst mliicli the whole Frencb rarmy was 
now poiliting. Fane'c outposts retired with eome 10% at first, 
but tliey were soon supported and drove the French horsemen 
in diaorder clear off the Pau road b Carere. l%en Eonlt, 
seeing the stren$h of the p i t i o n  above Aire, and hearing 
from t l ~ c  pcnsanta that fortp ar tihy thonsnnd men wcrc con- 
centrated thcre, feared to attack, Changing hís plan he 
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resolved to hover abont the riglit flank of tbe allies in tlie hopes 
of enticing them from their vantapgrmind; but Wellington 
only drew his cavdry pocts d o m  the al ley  of the Adour, and 
massed lila forcer~ on the rigl~t in expectation of an ntt~ck.  
Ench general ncting upon false intelligence of the other's 
strength was afmid ta strike. TIie Eaglish error ns t o  tlie 
jilnction of Sucliet's troops was encouraged by Eoult, whu liad 
forrned Iiia battalions upon two rnnks instead of tliree to give 
Jiiniself zu appearance of strength; etnd In the same view had 
cansed t.he rBscwe o£ conscripts ta move in rear af hia line of 
hattle. Rut he also jutlgcd tho dlilieri' strcn$li. by wliat it 
rnight have been noi ml~at it was; for tholigh 
Fseyyre's Spnitlrds and Ponsonby's dragoons were fiirks, 
now up, tlie w M e  force did nof exceed thirty-six 3 I S S .  
tliousand men, including the light division and the bussars on 
the right bank of the Adour. This number WBS howmer 
increa~ing every lioiir by the arriv~l of detachments and 
reserves; aníl it beliovcd C-ioult, who mm entanglcd in a 
country extremcIy difficult if rain ~ihould foll, to wakh that 
Wellinghon, ~ v l ~ i l e  holding liim ju check with his riglit wiug, 
did not strike v-itli. liis left by Maubaurget and Tarlies, itnd 
thua cast t11em upon the rnountaina &out Loarde& 
This danger, and the intelligence now obtained of the fa11 of 
Bordeaux, inducerl him to retire before dny on the 16th to 
LemLiege and Simacourbe, where lie oecupied both sides of tlie 
two Srinches of tlie Lees and the heighta betwcen them; his 
outpsts remained at Conchez; and Pierrs SouIt xgaia gettmg 
iipon tlre Pan rontl detnched a hundred chosen troapers under 
enptain Dnnh ngninst the dlid communieation with Qrthcs. 
Tliey made a forced rnarch, remhed Hagetnnu at nightfall, 
surprised six oficers anrl eiglit m e d i d  men witli their 
hggnge, bok e number of otherprisonen and return~d oon the 
eveiiing of the lSt11. This enterprise ab such s distante from 
tlie army was suppmed to be execirted by the bands, annd 
swrned t o  inrlicate a disposition for insiirrection; whcreforc 
We:'elli~gtan seized tlie c i d  authoritiea at Hagetnau, urid 
declared he wodd hang al1 the peasanta caught in arms and 
buin their villagcs. But Soult's offensive movcment waa now 
exhausted, he sent hii conscripts to Toulouse and prepared for 
ra retreat w that place; he bd acfed tardily, he abould 
b a ~ e  been on the Lees the 70th or 11th d e n  only twenty 
thonxand infantry ~ n d  We thons~nd five hundred cavalry 
wuld oppose him between Aire. and Garlin. Weliington's 
pwsiva stratg h o  mnch proIongerl, was now dso at nn 
end; luEl reinforcernents and detachment~ were eitlier up OF 
clow at hmd; and he wuId put iu motion s i i  Anglo-Portu- 
p e s e  and three Spnkh ílivisions, furnisliing forty thousiind 
bayonets, with six t h o m d  clbdry, and from 6fty to sixty 
pieces af artillery. 
On the evening of the 17th the English husmr~ mre 
pnshed up the valley of the Adonr, towarda Plaissance; the 
1igI:lit division supported tliem, and ms foIlowed by the fourth 
division, coming from thc sido of Roquefort on its rcturn fram 
Zangon. Next morning the whole army wm izi movement. 
The hwsars with the Ziglit and fmtb divisioas forming toge- 
ther the left wing marclied upon Plaissance; Hiil commaniling 
the righh mancbed from Garlin t o  Canchez, kkeeping s detach- 
ment on the mad to Pan in ob9ewation of Pieme Sonlt'a 
avalry. The centre, nnder Wellingtñin in person, moved on 
Tiella by the high mad learling from Aire t o  Mxubourget. 
'The French right was thns turned by the valley of the Adour, 
whiIa Hill with a shnrp slcirmish, in mhich eighty British 
wcro killed and womded, drove bnck thcir outposta npon 
Lcmbege. 
Soult retired during the night to a hong ridge, h&ng a 
mal1 river with rugged h d a ,  caIled the Laiza, in liis front; 
ht his riglit under D'ErIon extended tomards Tic Bigorre 
RertonY on the p e w t  road of Tarbes. Berton's cavalv, 
arm&, one regiment o£ whicli, in retreating from Viella 
o'ss. the 1 Gth, disengaged itself with some difficulty md 
lws, reached Maubourget and took post in coltimn behind that 
place, the road heing confind on each alde by deep nnd wide 
ditches. In thk siturstion, Iieing pressed by Bacl's Germnn 
mvatry, wlliicli preceded the centre cuIumn of the allies, the 
h e n c h  horscmen suddenly charged and took an ofioer and 
Borne men, but were ultimately bmten and retrated thmugh 
Tic Bigorre, Boult, thinliing a flanking coliimn only wns in 
the valley of &e Adour, resolved to M1 upon it with b 
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Soult's mareh through tlie smdy plain of Ger was hmassing, 
and wmld have been dangerotu if weIlin$on hd sent Hill's 
can]., now reinforced by two regiments of h e a v  dragoons, 
in pnrauit; but the country was unfavourable for quick ohser- 
vation, and the French covered tlieir movementa with rear- 
p~ards whoae red numliers it was dificult to wcedain. One 
of theee bodies wm poated on a hill the end of which :hRbuttd 
on the high road, tbe slopa K ~ n g  clothed with trees nnd 
defended Ly skimishors ; it ms essential to h o w  whetlier a 
small or a hrge force tlius barred tlie way, but al1 who endea- 
voured t o  ascert~in tlie fact were stopped by the fire of tlie 
enemy. At hst captain William Light, distinpislied by the 
variety of bis attiainments, an artist, musicitin, mechmist, sea- 
man, nnd soldier, d e  the trial. He rode forwad as if he 
wonld foree his a y  through the French ukirmishers, hit in 
the wood dropt his reins and lerined back m if hadly mountled; 
his home ~ppeared tu wtcr wiIrlly dong tlie front o€ the 
enemy'g lighe troops, ond they, thinking him mortdly bu& 
cemd tlieir fire and took na furtlier notice, He thus passd 
uno"oservcl thmugb the u-ood tu the otlier side of the hill 
where tliere wemz no skirmishers, and ascending to the open 
summit a5ove gallopetl dong the French mnh iiie, counting 
their ~egimentr; as he passed. Ria sudden appeamnce, his 
blire undress, his daring confidenoe md hiri speed, n i d e  the 
French doubt if he wns an enemy, and a few shots ody \ver0 
discharged; but he, h E n g  down the cippotiite declivity, 
broke from the mar through the very skirmishers whose fim 
he hsd first essayed in front, and remlling the spot where 
'I~elliagton gtood told him there were but f i ~ e  battahons on 
tlie hi. 
Soult now felf that a mpid retrcat on Toulouse hy Sk Qan- 
dens was inevitable: yet lieing determined ta dispute erery 
position which offcrcd tho Imtrt ndvmtqe, his m y  mna on 
tlio morning of the 20th again in line of bnttle on the heighte 
of Oleac, two or three miles beliind Tarbm and coverin; 
Tournay on the rmd to St. Gaudens-LB however ski11 lield 
Tarbes with Clausel's corps, wLicL. was exteiided on tlie right 
towarda Tsie, as if to retain rt power of retreilt by that road t o  
Tonlousa. The plain of Tarhes, ~pparently open, mas hll of 
dcep ditchcs wliicli forbd the octioa of homemcn, wherefora 
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he sent his brother with five regimti;nta of cavalry t o  the Trie 
rod, with odem to wver tlie riglit flank and oherve the 
route to Aucli. He feared lest ITellinghon should intercept 
hj, retreat by that line, lrut at daybrealr the allies' r+t wing 
under Hill advanced by the !ni& road, whire the left d e r  
Wcllinghn movcd by thc road from Rnbrifitens. Vivian'a 
m d r y  folIowed from 13enumarchez and LR Deveze, ~end- 
ing detacicliments to zvatch Pieue Soult oti the side of Trie, 
and Cole ww bringing the fourth division np by forced 
marches. 
O'ombat of TaTbe~.-The Adour wprirnted Hill from WeE 
lington, and the latter appmrnching Tarbes made m, t, 
tlie liglit division and Iiusmrs fa11 on Hiarispe'a mm 115. 
centre, wliicIi occupied the Iieiglita of Odiex wivith two p n s  
loolcing domn the Rnhnstens roiitl. Under cover of tKs attack 
Clinton made a h n k  movement to  h% left tbrongli the +ii#ge 
of Douiw, mnnondcd Harispe's ríght; and endcavoured t o  geh 
between him and Soult's mnin position at OIeac, whiie Hill, 
rnoving hy tbe otlier h n k  of t he Adour, nsmiled the town and 
bridge of Tarbes, wliich was defended by ViUatte's division. 
These operations were desiped to crush Clausci'a b o  divi- 
sions, mliich seemed easy, because there appeared only a fine 
plain betneen Iiim stnd 8oult; tLe Iatteter Luwever, Liaving aent 
Ilis taggage ancl emunibrances ofF during tbe night, paw h e  
rnoverncnt witliout alarni, hing better acquainted witli. the 
nnturc of the plnin and hnving mndc roatls to fndlitate arctrmt 
upon the secoiid position without ptssing thruugh Tarbes. 
Nevert?tlieIcs9 Clausel was in some daiiger, for while Hil 
m e n d  his Ieft at Tnrlies, the 1igl;lit division supportetl with 
cav111ry and guns fe11 ulion Iiis centre at Orliex; and Clinton 
pnssing with a Iirklc cannonatle through Olrat nnd Boulin, 
penetrated htween Harispe nnd Fierro fSoult and cut tke 
Iatter off from the arinp. 
Almut tivelve o'clock khe fijht begau, Bill'g artiilery thun- 
dered on thc rigl~lit, Clinton'~ snweretl it on the left, and Alten 
thrcw the light division in masa upon the centre. Hurispe's 
leh brigde posted on a strong hill was suddenly aswiled by 
t1ie three rifle battalions, and the fight wm wonderfully fierce 
md riolent; for the FrencL, probably t h i g  their oppo- 
h a  
nents Porfagume on nccount of their p e n  draas, charged 
with gwt  liardiness; and lieing encountered by men not 
aocustomed to yielrl, they foug-ht. rnuzzle to mnszle, and it ws 
difticult to judge at 'first who would win. At 1 s t  the French 
gave my, mtl Harispe'a centre being thns mddenly over- 
throvm he retired rapidly thougb tlie fiel&, by tbe m a p  pre- 
viously opened, before Glinton could get into hia mar; Rill 
soon foreed the pwage of the Adorir nt Tarbes, then Villatte 
retreated along the Iiigh mad to Tournap, nnder n continued 
cannonade, and then the flat country ww eovered e t h  con- 
fnsed massea of pursuem rand pnrsued, al1 moving precipi- 
tateiy with an mger musketry. The FrenJi gane replied as 
they codd t o  tbe allies' artillery Iiut tlie situatioa of th 
reti- tmops seemed desperate; yet, as soult Iiad foreseen, 
the deep ditcheg, mclomes, the small copses villages aiid 
fm-houses prevented the Eritish m m l y  from acting. 
Clanse1 therefore, extricating his troops with great atility 
from their dangerous eitnation, finnlly pined the main posi- 
tion, w h m  four fresh dirisione were drawn up in order of 
liattle and immediately opened al1 €heir batteriea on the aliiea; 
the purauit wns thus checkcd, and before Wellington could 
or+e a new attack darkness carne on: he hdted on the 
bmks of the Larret and Larros riven. Theloss of the Frencl. 
is unknown, that o€ the alliea did not exceed one bundred snd 
twentg; tweIve officers sbnd eighty men being of the d e  bzk 
tnliona. 
Dnnng the nighi Boult retrcaid in two columrq one by 
the main rod, the other on the left of it, p i d e d  
Oñlelal 
, by fires lighted on different hills as points of 
Mbs. diredion. Next day he reached Bt. h n d e n s  mith 
D"Erlon2s md Wile's corps, whiIe Clansel, 
Maci-a. w h ~  had retreated acmm the M d s ,  halted at 
MYS. Xonrejean md was there rejoined by Fjerro 
Xodt's cavalry. This march of thirty miles was made mith 
a view to gah  Toulouse in the most raprd manner. For 
Soult had seen Wellington's infantryJ his five thwsand horse- 
men, md knew tha fourth division and Vivisn" avaIry were 
pointing towa~ds Mielan an his riglit ; hence he bed t o fear 
the allies wodd by Trie and Cmtlenau gain the phins of 
Muret and cnt Lim off from Todouse, the knot of his future 
combinations, the ody  position where he could hopo ta maka 
a successful stand. 
The allies piirsned in tbree colnmns by St. Gaudens, Galan, 
and Trie, but their marches were ~hort. On t,he 2lst Beres- 
ford having tho left column WBS at Captlenau; Hill in tlie 
Picinity ~ a f  hnnemezan ; VeUington at Tournay. The 22uJ 
Beresford waa at Cmtlenau, WellingtOn at Gdan, ni11 nt 
clcng whero fonr sqiiadrons of Frencli cavalry were dmwn up 
in front of the town, bnt. overthrown by two flquarlrons of 
the thirteenth dragoons st one shock, they gallopd in dis- 
arder througli St. Gaurlens j tliey rallied un tlie otlier  ido yet 
Tvere again broken and pursud for two miles, mmany being 
sabred and above a bundred tsken prisoners. In this aci5an 
the vc tem mnjor Dogherty of the thirteenth wnB seen chrrrg- 
ing between his two Bone at tlia hmd of thc Icding squadron. 
On the 23rd EIU was at SS Gauclens, Beresford at Puy- 
muren, Wellington at BouI~gne. The 24th Hill waa in St. 
Mnrtory, Beresfod in Iromhe, Wellington a t  ble en Dodon. 
The 25th HiEl enteretl Cacererr, Beresford rewhed St. Foy, md 
wellington wns at &11~&tnn. Thc 2 Gtfi BeresfortI entercd St. 
Lys snd marcliing in oder  of Einttle by his left, while his 
cavalry skirmished on tlie right, t o o l ~  post on the Auch r d  
behincl f l~e Aussonnelle stream facing the Frencli wmy, which 
waa on the Touch covering Toulonsc. The allics thus took 
seven days to mmch what Soult hnd done in four. 
This titrdiness, idly charackrized by French military writers 
u the sign of timidity and indecision of character, has bem by 
Engli~h mriters e~cused on tlie more of wet weatl~er and the 
encumbmce of a lnrgc h i n  of nrfillcry and, pontoons ; but 
the rain equítlly affected the Frencli; and tbe pontoons might 
hisve been as usefullp waited for on the Gmonne after tlie 
French amy harl been presserl in its retreat of ninety miles. 
It is more probable that, not exactIy informed of Soult'a 
nudbera, nor of hia tme lino of retrcat, nor pmfectly ncquainted 
with the county, FVeZlington ivtts cautious; because boing 
fhen in acrimonious dispute witli the duke of Angoulleme he 
waa also unensy as to the d t e  of the eountry behiad him and 
on his h k s .  The partimas were beginning to stir, the rein- 
forcements from England and Portugal were stopped, a d m i d  
Penrose liad not then entered the Garonne; on t11e otlier 
liand Fedinand had entered Epain and fomed hie engage- 
ment with Biichet rtbout tbe garrimns. in h e ,  he foiind 
Iiimself with forty-fivc thouñand men of diffcreat nationa, the 
Sllaniards almost ns dangcmus as useful t o  him, opposed to 
msri obstinat c enemy, on a lina of operatione rnnning a hun- 
rlred and fifty miles along the French frontier. B~B right 
ffank might be rexed by prtimns in Glie Pyrenees, his left by 
tliose befiind tlie Garonne, on the right b m k  of mhich a eon- 
siderable replar force r a s  &o collecting ; the gmerals com- 
rnanding t h e  militar7 diatrich beyond Toulonsc mere forming 
corps of volunteers, national par&,  rtnd oId aoldiers of tlle 
regular dEpAts-rtnd ep.w he expected Suchet to a r r i ~ e  on Ilis 
front rtnd overmatrh bim in numbers. He wes mrefd there- 
fore to keep his troopa well in liand, sparing them fatigue 
t h t  the hospital# miglit not incre~se. In liattle tlieir bravery 
~vonld bring tIirough aay crisis, but i f  he ware bhem 
down by forced rnasclie~ and covered the conntry with sinall 
posts and hospital stationg the Fiench people woi~ld be 
tempkl to rise agdnst him : so little tlierefore 1vBa liia cantion 
alIicd to timiclity that it -3 no slight indication of daring t o  
hava ahariced at 811. It does homever seem tbat with liis 
atmng cavalry and superior d i l l e ~  he sliould not b v e  let 
the Frencli so eiitirely slip from his liands. 
Soult proved hiinself an able commander. Eis hdting on 
the Adour, liis success in reviving the courage of ]lis army, 
and the front he sliomd to prevent his adversnry detacliing 
troops agair& Bordeaux, evinced rtn ?inyeldirig temper 
and a rmdy jntlgment, For though Wellington did gend 
Bcresford w i n ~ t  Boirfmux, it was not on m i l i t q  po~~ncls 
bu€ bcmuae tremou wtw there; and it compelIcd him to remain 
Sor fifteen d d p  pmive in fnce of an army he bad just de- 
featd. Ln that time his ad~ersary restored the discipline nnd 
coumge oT Lis troops, d i e d  the dispersed oonscripts, prepared 
B partisan tnrfwe, sent his encumbrmces to  Toulouse, and 
began fortifybg t h t  eitp as a final and secure retreat. Xoult 
was even t.he first to r-ke the offensiire afkr Ortlies, too late 
indeed, and he struck no impoitant blow, but twim placcd hia 
army iu dringerous situations; yet his delay was a matter of 
nemsity arising from tlie loas uf his magaines; and if he got 
into difficulties that were insepardile from his operations, Iie 
soon extricakd himself again. Tliat 116 gained no advantriges 
in fight iri rather argument for TVellington than against Saulb; 
the lattes aouglit but found no opportunity to ~itrilce; yet he 
insultecl the allied mmy with m inferior f o m ,  wliich, coupled 
n5th his energetic proclamatiun, encouragd the Napoleonists 
and alarmed the Bourboui~h : lastly, his retreat from Tarbes 
gained two d a p  for estribliahing his p d  position at Todouse. 
hnrl certninly Iie deceived his dvemary:  for so Iittle did Wel- 
Iington cxpcct him tu mnlte n determined s h d  them tbat in 
a letter writhn on tho 26th to Hope, he mys, '1 fear the 
&ronne is too Eull rsnd Iarge for our bridge, if not we shall be 
in Touiouse 1 bope immediately.' 
Soult cannot however be judged by merely considcring hi 
rnorements in tlie field. Hxving eltrly proved the power of 
Iiis nd~crflary, hc had nevm dcecivcd hiineelf about the uhirn~te 
course of the campaign, and tberefore ~truggled without hop, 
a h d  task; yet lie showed no fuintness, figliting continualLy, 
and always for delay, as tliinking Suchet mould finally ddiscd 
personal fedings to strike for hii countrg. Previous diaap- 
pointnients did not Iiinder Lis writing a,@ on tbe 9th oE 
Pebruary, uiging tlio immincnt dmprI tlia cehinty tlint the 
zllies' grentcst elliirts wotild be on the western fruntier, sud 
praping bim to abmdon Catalonia and come to Bearn: in the 
same ~train lie wrote 50 the lniniater of WHT, rind his letters 
renched thcir dectinatiom on tlie 13th. Suchet, having no 
onlers to the oontr-y, could tlerefom Irave. joined liim with 
thirteen tliousaud men before klie bnttle of Ortlies; but giving 
a cleceptive statement of his force Ui reply he coIdly obsei~ed, 
that if be marclierl anywlere It wonld be to join the emperor, 
not the duke of Dalmntin. The lattcr coiltinncd notwith- 
standing t u  inform hiin of al1 his httles md bis movements, 
and his itccumdating distresses, yet in min ; Suchet's apathy 
woulrl be incredible but for the unequivocal prtmfs of it fur- 
nished in the work of the Frencli ensneer Ciioumara. 
OLA WAI 
TAP, two amie9 being naw once more in presente, with reso- 
lution to fight, it is fitting to show apon what the gencrnra' 
combinations rcsted. Soult, born in the vicinity, knew t,' 
country, and chose !l!ouious~ as 8 atrategic post because t b  
mcient capital contnined fifty thoumnd inhabihnts, col 
manded the principal passage of tbe Garonne, was the centre 
of a great number nf rmds on both &des of t h t  river, and tlie 
chief military arsenal of the south of Franca Hcre he could 
easily feed hlei troopa, a m  and discipline the mns&pts, co 
trol and urge the civil authoritierr, counteract the discontente 
At Toulonfio alaa he wns rn~ster oof various lines of opsmtior 
He could retire upon Suchet by Carc~song or towards Llo 
b J Alby. He wuld h k e  a new position beliind the Tarn wnd pr 
long the mntest bydefending mcc~~sisively t iat river and tlie Lc 
He codd from thence retreat uponDecaen's armpof the Gironi 
and thnm draw the allies d o n  the right banlc of tlie Grrroni 
as he had before drawn them up the left limtnlr; well msun 
that Wellington must folIow hirn, aníi with weakeni 
forcea, m ít would be netesmry to leave troops in obsematih, 
of SncIiet. 
His fist a r e  was h place a considerable hody of troops, 
eollected from the dép6ta and otlier parte of the interior ttt 
Montauban, under the comrnand of general Loverdo, witli 
orden t o  comtmct a bridge-hed on the Ieft of tlre Tarm The 
pazsage of that river, mtl a strong point o!? retrest and assem- 
bly for a11 tlie detachments mnt t o  obseme tlie Garonnebelow 
Todome,were thus gecursll; and withal the mmmand of mnny 
great roada lending to tha interior of Prmce, consequently the 
pomer of making fresh cornMnations. To maintain Tonlouse 
wm however a great political objcct. It \vas t,he Imt point 
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while he held it, the latter gene?$ and ths partissns in the  
mountaine nbont Lourdes coizld act, emh on tlieir own side, 
apinst the long Iines of communicntions mttintnined by Wel- 
liugton with Eordeaux and Bayome, Suchet sho could do 
tlie same by marching with liis whole foroe, or sending a 
detachment tlirough the Arriege department t o  tlie upper 
Garonne, wliere general Lafitte having seven or eight hi~nclred 
men, netiorurl *ads rand other troopq, m? alrently in tietivity. 
These operations Soult nrged Suchet to adopt, Iiut tlie latter 
trented tlie proposition, m he liad done al1 tliose Iiefore mncle 
from the mrne qwrker, wltli contempt,. 
Toulouae ms not less vahable as a position of battle. Z l i e  
(Xaronne on the west presented to the allies s deep loop, at 
thc bottom of which mas tlie bridgey completely covcred by 
the suburb of SG. Cyprien, itself proteckd by an nncient brick 
wail three feet thick and ETaiiked by two massive towew : 
thesa defenoes Boult lid improved ~ n d  added a lime of exterior 
entrencliments, 13eyond the bridge was tlie city, surrounded 
by an old mal1 flanked witli towem, nnd so thick as to sdmit 
sixtcen and twenty-four pound p n s .  Thc gmat and cele- 
bmted cana1 of Languedoc, which johed the river h r o n n e  oi 
few miles below the town, wound for tlie most p ~ r t  mitliin 
point-blank ñihot of the walls, corering them on the north antE 
east as the Gamnne and St. CWyprien did on the west ; and tlie 
subuiba of St. Steplien nnd Quillemene, hetmeen wliicli the 
mnnl run, furnished outmorka on the east; for they WCrQ 
mtrenched artd oonnected with tlre fortified l i i l l~  uf hcarin 
and Gmbon, wliicli covered the suburbs and flanked the ap- 
proaches to the canal above and belom. 
Eight hmdred y d s  bepnd tliese Iillls n ~trong ridjie, 
mlled tha Mont Rave, mn paralle1 with the cnnnl, its oiiter 
slope, exceedingly ruggetl, overlooked a ma~sby plain tlirougli 
which the Ers river fl orved: 
On t.he soutl~ ihe  town opened on ns plriin, bilt the snburb 
af St. hiiche: lying tliere, batwen the Garonne anci tlis canal, 
furniahed anothcr admnced defence; nnd at some distnnce 
beyond the heiglits d l e d  the Pech David commenmd, trend- 
ing up tha Garonne. 
In thia position Xoult caIculated, that BS Wdhgton cmld 

l ia~.:~,  181 4.1 BOOK XX1V.-CHAP, 5. 189 
nffensive and could not resume the defcnsive with snfeQ, the 
iiivasion of France once Iiepn j t  was imperative to push it to  
a conclusion. Leading an rtrmy victorious and superior in 
numbers his business was to bring his adversary to battle aa 
soon as possible; and he could not force hia way tlirangh 
St Cprien, notliing remained but to pass the a r o n n e  ahve  
or below Toulonse. 
In n strategic view the passago should bo beIow the town, 
but, aeeing the south aide wns the most open to attnck, the 
Englisli general resolved to cast his bridge a6 Portet, eix miIw 
above Toulauae; designing to tlirow his xight ming 
Notes bp the 
suddenly into the opea country between the ~ , , k ,  ,f 
Garonne and tlie canal of Zanpedoc, while Wrth g$'jl** his centre antT left he assailed the suburb of St. 
Cyprien. Witli this ohject, at eight o'clack in the evening of 
thc 27tli, one of Hilrs bripdcs marched up fmm Xuret, somc 
men were ferried over a11d the bridge was commend,  tlie 
rernainder of that general's troops being tu pass at inidniglit. 
PJut d e n  the nver was measured the width wiln fonnd t o o  
,pat for the pontoons, and there werc no mems of  aubstitut-. 
iiig treatles, wfiereiore t h i9  plnn was abnndonerl, Bd it been 
cxccutcd sorno considcrahlo nilmntag; would probably havc 
been gained; Eor Soult did not know of the attemyt uiitii 
two driys hter md then on1y by his emissmies, not by his 
scouts. 
MeIlington, chnnsng his project, drove the enemy from the 
Toudi river the 3Stl1, colIected thc infnntry of his lcft anrl 
centre about Portet and masked the movement with his 
cavdry. In this opemtion a squadron of tlie eigliteentli 
liusssrs, under rnajor Huglies, teing inconsiderately puslid by 
Vivian across the bridge of Xt. Martyn de la Touch, sudddy  
carne iipon a whole regirnene of French cavrnlry, 
calpnd 
and the rashncss of thc act, tia ofkn happens in ~ ~ i i g ~ i e a ,  
war, proved the safety of the British; for thc 'lss' 
enemy, thinking n strong support mnst be ak hand, diacharged 
tlieir carbines sud retretited nt z cauter. Hugbes followed, 
the s p e d  o? both sides increased, and as tlle nature oE tlie 
~ a d  did not hdrnit of any egrecs to tlie @ides, this great body 
of Trench liersemen was pushed headlong by a few rnen d e r  

tlie cause why the bridge waa not fhrom, he concludd there 
was a design to cmss thcre Jso when Hiil shonld descend the 
Arriege. To meet this danger, he put four diPisiona nnder 
Clauscl, witli orders +a fa11 u p  the liead of the allicfi if thty 
nttcmpkd the passage bcfore HiIl carne down; resolving in 
the contrary ense t o  5ght in the suburbs of Toulouse and on 
tlie Mont h v e ,  because the positions an the right of the 
Arriege were a11 favourable t o  the assailants. B e  WAS soon 
relieved from anxiety. HiIl eíTe&d tbe passage of tbe 
Arriege at CintegabclIe and sent liia ~ T E L I ~  towards VilFs 
franche d Nailloux; but hia nrtilleg. were quite iinnhle to 
move in the deep muntry tliere; and as auccess nnd snfety 
alike depended on mpirlity he returnd dnring tlie niglit to 
Hnswel, recrwsed the Garonne, m d  taking np liis ponhns 
Icft only a fiying-bridge witli a srnall gusrbril o£ infantry and 
mvalry on tIie right banlc. Fíe wa4 followed by LnEtte's 
liorricmen who piclrcd up a few &raggIers and mules, but no 
0 t h  event oecurred, md Soult remnind me11 pleased that bis 
advemary hesd thus lost t h e e  or four important daga. 
He ww now sure tlie next attempt wouId be below Touiouae, 
~ e t  he reliiquished the desip of marching down the Garonne 
t o  fight between that river and tlic Tarn; because he woiild 
then lose hie communimtions with Montnuban, nnd linvjng 
now fortified the bridge8 ovw tlia canal nnd ebmpIeted Iirs 
works of defence for Toulouse and i t s  suburbs, concluded not 
to nbandon that city nnder any circiimstancm. In this 
~eaolution he sct his ívholc n m y  nnd al1 the working popula- 
tion t o  entrench t l ie  Mont &ve also, between tlio m a l  aand 
the Em river, tliinking he miglit tliua s e m l y  meet the 
sliock of battle let it; come on wliicli side it would. 3fean- 
wliile as the aronne  continued full, Wellington mas Eercsd 
t o  remain inactive before 8t. Cyprien until the evening of the 
3rd, whcn tha watcm fell. Then the pontaona bcing carricd 
in tlie night to Gsenarle fifteen miles below Todouse, the 
bridge was thromn tliere and tliity guns were plnced in 
Ziarttery on the left banllr t o  protect it. The third, fourth, and 
sixth divisions and three brigades of caval~,  the whole under 
Beresford, immetliakly paswrl, and tila mvniry being pushed 
out two leapea on the fmnt and fimks capturcd a large l i d  
of buIIocka destined for the Fmmh armp. But now the river 
wain gmelled so fast, that the Iighh dmsion. md the Spaniards 
were nnable to follow> the bridge got damagd and the 
pontoons rvere tiiken np. Thi~  p ~ q e  wns made known fo 
Seult immediately hy Iiis cavalry scoiits, yet; he knew not the 
exacb force which M crossed; and as Norillo's Spaniamls, 
whom he mistook for Frepe's, had relieved the outposta in 
front of Xt. Cyprien, he irnaghed Rill aleo had irioved to 
Gmnad~, and that the peatest parG of tbe allied iirmy wus 
ovw the Gamnne. In this error, mereIy observing Berwford 
mith Iiis cavalrlp, he continued to streqthen bis field of hattle 
about Toulouse; his resolution to keep that city being 
mnfirmed by hearing on the 7th tht the altied sovereigns had 
entered Pais. 
On the 8th the watera suhided, the bndg~ ww q a i n  Iaid 
down, Freyre'~ Spninrds and the Portupase artillery erossed, 
and Well ingh in peraon advanced t o  the heigl~ts of' Fenod- 
hiet witliin five milm of Toulouse. Marcm up both banh 
of tbe Era his columna were separated by tliat river, which 
WM impnsaabIe without pontoons, and it w a s  esgential to 
secure ras soon as possible one of the atone bridges; hence 
when hig Iefl appromlied tht? heights of Kirie KleXson, on the 
p a t  rond of Alby, Vivirtn's homcmen drove Berton's c~tvalry 
up the right of tlie Era towards the bridge of Borde~i, osd the 
eighteenth hussm descended tuwards that of Croix d'Odo. 
The latter was defended by Tial's dragoonn, and nftar aome 
akirmishing the eigliteenth waa audíieiiy menaced bp ra 
regiment ín front of tbe bridge, tlie opposite bank of the river 
beirrg lined wit11 dismounted caibineers; tlie two parties 
stood facing each other hesitating-ly unta the approwh of 
some Britkh infantry, when botli sides sounded a charga at 
tlie same moment; bhat t11e English horses were ao quick tlie 
French were in ran i n s t ~ n t  jnmrned up on tlie bridge, their 
front ranlrrc were snhrerl, antl tlic rcar went off in disorder, 
Ienving mnny kllld md wounded and a hnndr~d priaoners 
behind They were purmred tlirough tlis víllage of Croix 
d'Orade, yet rallied Leyond it on tlie rest of tlieir liripde 
snd atlvanced rtpin; &he hnscxra tlien re-crossed the bridgeP 
wliich was nos  defended by the British infantry, whose tire 
rtupped tbe Prench cavalry. The credit of this brilliant 
iction whicli aecured the communication of thc separated 
:oliimns was inoorrectly given te Vivian in the despPltch; that 
oficer was wonnded by ri, carhine shot pwvioug to the clisrge 
at tlie bridge, wliich wra conccived nnd executcd by major 
Huglies of the eighteenth. 
Wellington from the heights of Kirie EIeison carefnlly 
examineri Qie French position and r e s o l ~ d  to attack on tlie 
9th. He sliortend his comrnanic~titions with Bill, ha directed 
tlie pontoons to  be rcmoved fmrn Grenrtde and relsid higher 
up at Salli, 1vh-m the Iight division w~ t o  cross at dnylighf ; 
but tlie bridge was not formed uotil late in the day, to his 
greai dismntent, as it fmed him t o  defer Lis battle nntil 
tlie 10th. Boult's combinatione were now crowned with 
aucoess. He Iitad by rnennn of his fortreseicq his batilee, tha 
sucidden change of bis line of operationn after Ortliec, hia rspid 
rcttrwtt fram Tarha, rind hls dear jud,ment in king apon 
Toulou~e a3 k next point of resistancq reduced tlie ritrength 
of liis adversmy to m equality with his own He listE giued 
rreventeen days for preparation, h d  brougl~t the aIIies to  
deliver bnttle on ground naturally adapted for defence, well 
fortified, and wliera o n ~ t h i m l  of their force wm separated by 
a great riwr from tho red-thep could derive no advsntage 
from their numerous wvalr-y, and were o~ermatched in 
artillery notwitlstanding their previous mperiority in that 
arm, 
His poRition coveretI three' sidcs af Toulouse. Defmding 
6t. Cyprien on the west witli hXs left, Iie guarded the canal 
on the north with his centre, and with his riglit held the 
Mont &ve on tlie east; his conscript reserve uuder Travot 
manned the rrrmpnrts of Toulouse., and the urban gunrds, 
wliilc maintainfng tranquillit.y, aidcrl t o transport the ertillery 
and amrnunition to diferent posts. Hii~i left, me11 fortified at 
St. Cyprien, Iiad short and dired commuilication with tlio 
centre by the sea$ bridge of Toulouse; but Eill tflio 
remainetl in front of tbe former could only oommunicete witli 
Wellington hy tl>e pontoon-bridge at Silli, a cirmrit of tcn 
or twclvc milcs. 
T"ne dlies advmcd from the no& j e t  míth intent t o  
assaiI on tlie 8011th M weakwt of defenw; and the munty lefi 
of the Em had been es,refulEy examined, in tlie view of making 
mdm cover of tliat ri~er, a flank mar& ronnd the &em 
front to g i n  the opm gmund which had formerly been aimed 
at by pastiing at Portet and P'iapeL But ~gain the deq  
country itnpeded the mmch, and tlie Em cxiuld not be passed 
in force b c ~ w c  a11 the bridges with the cxoeption of that d 
, e o i x  d'Orade were míncd or destroycd by Soult, and tht 
pontoons were on the Gamnne. There vas then no choicc 
save to attack from the north and emt. The first, open snc 
Ant, and wi ly  approached by the great rods  of Montaubar 
and Alby, mas yet impregnable in defence, becauae the canal 
tlie bridge$ being protected by worka, m under the fire o. 
the ramgarts of Toulouse and for the most part withir: 
muaket-shot; here then, as at .t. Cyprien, R fortres~ not < 
position was opposed, and the Reld of battle was necessarilj 
confined to the Mont % ~ e  or emtern fmnt. . 
T l i i s  ridge, nntumlly strong and rugged nnd covered by tho 
Ers rirer, which m not fordnble, presented two distinct 
platforms, c~l led the Calwiet and Si. S~rpiere. On the latter 
t t e  extreme riglit of the French was posted, and Iietweer 
them, where the ground dipped a iittle, two roads led frorr 
lszvaur md Caraman to TouIouee, passing the canrtl behm 
the ndge at the mburbs of Guillemerie and St. Ft* renne. 
The Caldnet platfom wris fortified on its extreme lefi 
with a specim of Eiorn-work, conaisting oF a m r d  oper 
retrenchments and smnll worke mpported by two Iargc 
redoubts, orie of which flnnlced thc approachea t o  the canal on 
tlie nortli: a r a n p  oF alibatis was also formed there by fellilling 
the treea on the Alby r o d  Continuing tliis b e  to the 
rigbt, two other large forts, catied the Calvinet ttnd tbt 
Colombette redoubts, terminatcd the works on this platform 
On that of Bt. Xypiex'e there were also two redoubts, one 01 
the extreme right mlled St. Sgpiere, the otlier Tvithouf a 
nama nearer to r o d  of Caraman. 
Tho wllole occupation was aboat imo milcs long, and an 
amy attacking in hont wodd h8ve t o  cmes the Era under 
firs, ta advance tlirongh ground, steep marshy and redered 
almmt impassable by meam of artificial inundatiuna, t o  the 
~ l t  of the ridge and the works an the mrnmit; md if the 
sailmts sliould force betwecn tthe two platforms, they would, 
lile their flilnfrs wero b n t t e d  by the rdoiibts ~bove, come 
upon t.he worlrs of C m b n  ~ n d  Saccarin. If these fe& the 
sulinrbs of GdEemerie and Gt. Steven, th0 canal, nnd findly 
tLe rampa* of the town would stiIl $ave t a  be carried IR 
suooession. But it was not practicable to p s  the Ers except 
by the bridge of (?roix d'Orade, mhich h d  been 
seized so happiIy on the 8th; WeDington w a s  Dzzthe 
therefore reducerI t o  m&e a flank march under ~vcliinston, 
firc, bctween thc Ers and $he Mont &re, and 31SS. 
then to force the latter, mith ls 6 e w  of crossing the cana1 
above €he suburl, of Guiilemerie and establisliing h i ~  army 
on thc south ~ i d e  of Toulouse, where only the city oould be 
apsitiled with any hope of mccess. 
To impone this mach npon hirn al1 Soult's dispmitions had 
been directcd For this ha had mined al1 thc bedgcs on the 
Ers, mve only that of Cmix d.hade, thns facilitating a m o w  
ment b~Gween f ie  Era and the Xont Rave, whib ho impedsd 
one beyond t h t  river by sending half Es cavalry over to dis- 
pute the numerous streams on the right bank. Eis rirmy w~ 
disposed in the following arder. Reille defended the auburb 
of St. Q-prien with Tfiupin's and Mnransids diviaions, 
Daricau lined the md on the nortb from its junction with 
the Garonne to the mad of Albyj defending witli Lis left the 
bridge-head of Jumeaux, the conrent of the Mmirnes with him 
centre, and the Jfatnbim bridge with his right. Bnrispe was 
poctcd in the works on tlie Mont llave; his right wns at St. 
Bypiere Iooking toweds the bridge of Eordes; his centre was ut 
tlie Colombette rdoulit, aliout wJiichVial's horsernen were nlso 
collected; his left looked down the road af Albp towrds tLe 
bridge of h i x  d'Or~rle. On tliat side a detaehed eminence 
mithin cannon-shot, cnlled the Hill of Piigde, mm oceupied by 
St. Pol's brigdc, dmwn from Villatte's divisi~n; thc tmo 
mairiing divisions of infantry mere formed in columna at 
catain points lieliid the RZont Raye, ltnd Trxvot's reserve 
manned the walls o£ Toulouse. This line o t  battle presented 
Bn angie toward8 the CmK d'orade, each side about two mile8 
in lengtl~ nnd the apex covered by the bfigade on tlie Fugah. 
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Wellington having exmined the p u n d  on the 8th and 
9th made the fdlowing disposition of attack for tlie 10th. 
Hill to menace Et. Cyprien, a u p e n h g  or abating hia efmts 
to dmw the enemy's attention aceording t o  tbe pxopas of t 
battIe on the Sght of the h o n n e ,  which he codd easily d 
cern. The thid  and lig11t divisions and Freyds Spanim 
already on the Iefh of tlie Eq were to aclmnce against iba 
northern front of Toulouse; the two first mpported by Boc 
Geman cam1y to make demonstrationa against the mi 
defended by naricau That !S £o #ay, Picton wna ta  men2 
the Xdgo of Jumenux md tha conveut of the Ninimes WII 
Alten mnintained the communication between hirn and Frey 
who, reiaforced witli the Portupem artillery, wwas t o  carry f 
hill of Pupde and khen Iialt to cover Berdord's ooliima 
march. This laat, compseclof o the fourth and sixth divisic 
with three brttterics, WM, after p a ~ i n g  the bridge of CN 
&Orade, to move round tlie left of the F u g d e  and along 
the low gmund between the Freach heiglita and the Erri 
until tho rear ~hould poss the r o d  of Lnvnur, when thr! two 
divísione wem ta wheol into line md attack the platform of St. 
Sypiere. P r e p  m then to a s ~ n i I  CaIvinet, and Ponsonby's 
drqpons were to connect his Icft with Remford. Lord 
Edward hmenet's hussam mere t o  move np the left of the 
Em, while Vivian's can1i-y moved up the right of that river; 
both destined to observe Berton'g caralry,w%ich ha&g possm- 
sion of the bridgm of Bordes and Montaudran, hig-her up, 
mFd  pnsa from tho right banIr t o  thc Icft, destroy thc br idy  





BATTLE OF TOULOUSR 
[Plan 2, p g e  Y 58 ] 
On the 10th of April at two o'clcwk in the moroing the 
Iight divisiun ps~ied the C*8.~0nne 1)y the bridge at Xeilh, and 
at six o'elwlr tho whol~  m y  moved fomarrIs in thc oriler 
awigued for the diffcrent columriq. Picton 5nd Alten, on tha 
rigl~t, arove tlie Frcnch wlvanced posts beltind tlie works of 
tlie bridges on the canal. Frqre,  marcling along the Alhy 
road, maa caniionded by Bt. Po1 mitli two guna until he 






:n &e French general following bis instruchions retired fo 
horn-work on Calvinet. Frcyre woa thus estt~blished on 
Fugade, from whence major Arentschilct's Portuguwe 
1s opened a heavy cannonade. Beraford, preceded by the 
sars ,  marcLed from Croix d'0ratle iii tliree columns abreast; 
aing beliid the Pugade, thrnugh the village of Xontblanc, 
-- atered the rnamhy ground bet~veen the ET& r i ~ e r  and Mont 
Rnve, bat left bia &illery at Monthlane, Cewing t o  engage it 
iil that deep and di icu l t  countrg under the fire of the encmy. 
Beyond the Em on his lefb, Viviran's ubvalryp now (;lenwd 
nnder colonel drentscliild, drwe Berton's horse- Wrm,  
men with loas oper the bridge of Borde9, which 
the French destroyed with difimlty at tlie last moment. 
Womever tha hussnra gained the bridge of Montau- 
a,onei 
rlrm liigher np, though it was barricded and l i u ~ h e s .  
defended by a detacliment of cavaIry sent there '"'- 
by Rerton, who remained himself jn position near the bridge 
of Bordes, looking down the Ieft of the Ers. 
While t h e e  operation~1 were in propress, Freyre mho had 
nsked as a fitvour ta lcnd tlie battle a t  Calvinet, eitlicr from 
error or impatience amiIed the hom-work on that platform 
wliile Bwesford waa atill jn march, Ris Epanitlds, nine thon- 
sand strong, advanced ~ 5 t h  ggreat tesolution at first, tlirowing 
forwtards tlieir fbh BO as to embrace &e end of the Calvinet 
hill, and though the French musketry tlnd grmt p n s  thinned 
the ranks at evcry abp t h q  still nscendcd tha liill ; but tho 
fomidnlle fire they ware exposed to incrmsed in violonce; 
snd their rigltt wing, which wns raked from the bridge of 
hfatabiau, unabIe to endure tlic tomen& wavered, and the 
learling ranks rushing matlly onmards j i tmpd for ~ihelter into 
a hollow rod, twenw-five feet rleep in prts, which covered 
this fmnt af the French entrenchm~eta. Tlio Ieft iving rind 
tlie seconti liue run back in disorder, tlie Canhbrian fusiIiers 
uader colonel Leon de Sicilia d o n e  rnainhining their gro~~nd 
nnder cover of a bank wl~ich sheltered them Then tLe Preneh 
carne lmping out of their worku d t h  Ioad cries, and Iining 
the edgc of the hollow road ponied nn incessd strmm of 
shot upon the helpIess crowdu entangled in tlie gulpli below; 
while the krattery Gom Matabiau, constructed to rake this 
$I 2 
hollow, sent its bullets from flmk to  fld hirising tliroi 
the qilivering m s  of Aecili and bones. 
Rallying their fugítive troops, tlie Spnish genertils 
them back ap in  to tlia brinlr of the frita1 hollow, but the 
frightful carnage belom, and tlie unmitignt ed fire in froiit filled 
8hem with horror. Apin they fled, and agab the Frmch 
bounding from their trenches pursued, while aeaerd battalir - - 
mllying h m  the bridge of Matabiau and from beliind 
Calvinet fofollowed hax(1 Jong the m d  o€ hlby. Tlie coun 
was now covered mith fugitives whose hendlong flight ce 
not he restmined, and with pursucrs whose nnmbers nnd 
vehemente increased, nntil WelIington co~ered tlie panic- 
Btricken troops witli Ponsonby's cavaly md tlie reserve arta- 
lery, wliich opened with great vigour. MeanwliiIe 
Portugiiese gana on the Pugade nwcr cerned firing, anc 
brigde of t,he iight division, wheeling to ita Eeft, a 
m e n a d  the flanlr of the victorioua French who retired 
tlieir cntrcnchmcnts en b l r i nc t :  but more thnn fiftten h. 
dred Spnniards bacE been lrilled or wounded and their def 
wns not the onIy misfortune. 
Picton, regardlesrs of his ordem, which, big temper on si 
occfisiom being hown,  were given to him verbdly anrl 
writing, had turned hia false attack into a real one agai 
the bridge of Jumesux; but the enemy, Eghting from a 
too Kgh to be forced without ladders and appmachable o 
rrlong an open flltt, reprilsed him with e loss of nearly fi 
hundred men and officers: amongst the latter oolonel For . . 
of the forty-fifth ms killed, and general BrisTwme who com- 
manded the brigade WM wounded. Thna fram the hilI of the 
Pugade to  the Garonne tfie French had completely vindicated 
their position; tlie allies Lad suffered snormously; and hey( 
tIie Glironne, altliough HilI had now forced tbe first line 
nitrencliments crrvering St. Cyprien md was menacing . 
eecond line, the htter, more eontmded aud verg strongly foi h r  
fied, couId not be stormed The mirsketry battle thmfore sub 
sided for a time, yet a prodigious cannonade wm kept up 
along the whole o£ the Frencli line, and on the dlies' side 
fmni St. Cmrien ta Montblanc, where the artillery left 
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the Pnpde, poured ita shot inceeanntly winet the blrinet ; 
injndiciously however, becauee the ammunition thus used for 
a, secondary ohject m afterwartls ~aanted when a vitsil advan- 
tage miglit have been pined. 
It was now evident tliat the 6nct;ory muat he won or lost 
by Beresford, and yet from Picton's error Wellington h d  no 
reserves t o  enforce the decision; for the Iight division and 
the hcavy cavnlv only remained in hand, and tliese troops 
were necessarily retnined to mver the rdlying of the 
Gpaniards and protect the artillery. The crisis ther~fore 
approached with al1 happy promise to the Freileh general. 
For the repulse of Picton, the dispergion of the Spsniards, 
tlie strength of tbe eecond line at St. Cyprien, enabIed him 
to dmw, first Taupin'e whole clivisioa, and then one of Maran- 
riiii's b r i g a d ~  from tliat quarter to reinforce hifi bnttlo on the 
Moat h e .  Thus thee  divisions and his cayalry, nearly 
fifteen thougand combatantal wwere disposable for an offensive 
movenienk, vithout in any manner wealrening the defence of 
his worlu on Mont Rave or on the canril. Witli Mornrng 
thie mnss he miglit have falIcn upon.Beresfod, S t n t q  
who~e  foroe, ori~nally Iess than thirteen thou- 
sand bayonets, wris cruelly reduced as it made slow and diffi- 
cult way for tivo mil= tkrougli a d e g  marchg conntrg crossed 
anrl tangled witli water-cour~es. Sometimes moving in maas, 
somctimcs filing unclcr the French musketry, al\vriys uncler 
tlie fire of their mtillery from the Mont Rave withuut a s i n  
t o  reply, the length of the column had augmeated so miich 
at erery atep, from the dificulty of the way, tliat frequent halts 
were necessary t a  close np tha ranlrs. 
Betmeen fhe ri~er and the haghts the miry p n n d  b e m e  
nmomer and dceper as thc b o p s  advmcod, Bertonb scnvaly 
was aliead, an irnpassai.de river was on the Ieft, three French 
divisions aupported by artilIery and Iiorsemen overshadowed 
tlie riglit flmk ! But Fortune nzles in l Soult, alwfiys 
eyeing tlieir mawh, had, when the Spmiards were defeatetl, 
carricil Ttlupin'a division to St. tiypicrc, nnd supporting it ppith 
a brigadc of D'Amagnacb division disposed tkie whole about 
tlie sehubts; from tlience after a short hortative to act rigor- 
ously he ordersd Taupin to fa11 on aith the ntrnost fq, 
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at; the mme time direeting a regirnenk of Vid's c~valry t o  
de;icend the heighta by the Lanar rond and intercept the Iine 
af retreat, while Bedon's horuemen assniled the dher  flank 
from the side of the bridge of Bordes. T&s mas nat hdf c 
the Torce wliich he might have employed, and Taupin's wtilleq 
retarded in ita march, was stiii in the streets of Toulouse: the 
general also, instad of attncking at once took p n d  t o  hi 
right, giving Beresford fdl  time ta eomplet~ hia  flank mw' 
and wheel into linea at the foot of the helghb. 
Taupin's infantry, itnskilhlly amnged for action it la saib, 
at lmt poured down the hill; but nome roclrets diecbarged in 
good time ravaged tbe rankg and with their noise and terrible 
appcaranco, nnlcnom bcfore, dismged thc Fmnch soldiers; 
tlien the 13ritisli skirmisl~ere running fomards plied them vith 
a Iiiting fire; and Zarnhrt's higade of tlie sixtli division, aided 
hy Amm's and some provisioml battalions of tlie fourth divi- 
mion, for it is an error to say tha sixth division done rqinlse 
this nttzlclr, Lambert's brigade m h e d  forwards with a terribI 
sliout, and tlie French fled bwk to tlie upper ground. Vial 
boracmcn, trotting down the h v a n i  rond, now chnrgcd on th 
right flnnk, but the aemtp-ninth regimenf being thrown int 
square repnlsed them; oxi the otLer fld CoIe bad bee 
so mdden in hi adeance up the heights that Berton's c a d r  
had na opportnnity t o  clsarge. Lamberk, following hard apo 
the beaten infwntry in bis front, IriUed Taupin, wonnded 
general of brigxde, and witbout a check mon the summit ( 
the platfarm, his skmiahem even descended in pursuit oll 
tlie reversc slope. And at the St. Ssqiero redoubt a Frencli 
reffment, ~ec5ng its commanding officer killed by a soldicr of 
+,he sIXty-fjmt rcgiment, fled in a panic. Cole then eatnblished 
himself on the mmmit, and so great was the ront that the tw 
fork were abmdoned, and the French aought shelter at Saca 
rin and Cambon. 
Xoult, mtonished at this weslrness in troops from whom ha 
had expectd so mnch, and who had but just before given 
him ~sumncw of their reaolution and confidente, wati in fear 
thnt Beresford pushing Iiis success would seize thc bridge of 
the Demois~lles on ths  canal. Whemfm, covering the flight 
as he could with the remrtinder of Vi& oa~afry, hc hstily leti 
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8, but victory was still to  be contended for ; and with appa- 
rently inadequate mmns; for Picton, successfully oppoaed by 
Daticau, mas pralysed; tlie Xpaninrds rallying sIowly mere ncit 
tr, be depended upon for anotber' attack; tliere remained 
only the lieaqg mvalry mil the light division, which Vrellhg- 
ton dnred not thnist into mtion untler pain of being left witli- 
out nny reserre in the event of 8 nepulae. The final strolce 
~ ~ C T C ~ O ~ G  m-a8 ~ t i U  to bc made on tho left, and with a vcry 
smnll forec, sccing thnt Lambcrt nnd Colo hnd to kccp in 
check the Frencli at the bridge of the+Demoiacllcs, nt C~mhon 
artd Eacarin. Tliis Iieavy mass, comprising one brigade of 
Travot's reserve, Lalf oí' D'Annagnacs division, and al1 Trtupin's, 
together mit11 llarispe's regiment whicli bad abmdoned the 
fort of St. Sypiere-was undw Clauael, and he disposed the 
grcafer part in atiartnce of +,he entrenchments as if ta retalte 
thc oflcnfiX~e. 
Such was the state of affairs about haIf-pnst two o'clock 
when Beresford reliewed the action with Pack's hotch brigade 
rind tlie Portuguese of tlie sixtii division under Douglas. I'liew 
troops, ensconced in tlic kollow Lavaur road on Lambert's rjgbt, 
had heen hitherto well protected 6om the fire of the French 
morlrs; and now acr~mbling up the ~taep banka of that roarl, 
tliey wheeled to their Ieft by mings OS regiments as thcy coi~ld 
get out. Ascendiiig tho heights by thc slopo facing the EA 
undm a masting fire of cannon and musketry they cnrried a1 
tEie Frendl Iirenut-works, md the forty-secend and seventy 
ninth took tlie Colombette md Calvinet redoubtg; it was 
a surprising action d e n  the loose disorderly nttture of the 
attack imposed by the difficulty of the ground ie considered; 
biit tlie French, although they yielded at 5rst fo the thronging 
rush of  tlic Rritish hoops, soon mllied anri canie bnclr with a 
refl ux; tlicir cannonade wu3 inceesnnt, their reemea at,rong, 
and the struggle became terrible. Harjspe, who commandett 
in pemn st this part, and under him tbe French seemed 
a l ~ v ~ y s  to figlit ivitl~ redoutiled vigour, brougl~h iip fresh men, 
and surrounding tlie two redoubt s ~ 6 t h  a surging multitude, 
recovered the Calpinet by storm, with great daughter of 
fhe forty-second, mhieh fe11 back in disorder on thc saventy 
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Still the wE to the Grow of the won derfuI 
ohstinacy, t :y mere reduccd to e of &ir- 
misliers. E sh horsernen now rc m the lom 
ground to their n i 4  but merr! atopped by ra hollow md, rtnd 
some of tlie foremost tumbling in, perished. T he French had 
then the best of the ftght; liut when tvpo fresh British regi- 
mentq the eleventh and ninety-first, a m e  np, when t.wo 
generds, Harispe and Rxurot, ha11 been crirried off daningerously 
meunded, the battle tumed, and tbe F n c h  abnndoncd flie 
platform, fdling bnck on their right to Sacurin, and ou their 
left toivnd Xatatiiau m d  the houses on the cand. 
It was nom four o'clock, the Xpaniards hnd once more par- 
tially ritiwkerl, and werc again put to flight, and the French 
remaincd masters of their entrenchments in tllat qr~arter; for 
tho sixth divIcion hnd heen harclly handled, and BewgforrI 
hdterI to reform hk order of battle and remive his mtillery: 
it carne to bim indeed about thii time; yet witli g e a t  dificulty 
aiid ivit11 little ammunition, in consequence of the heavy can- 
nonadc it liad previously fumkhed from Montblmc. However 
fioult, seeing the S~inniards, wqqmrted by the Iighk division, 
had dl i ed  a foartlt time, that Picton atill mcnaccd the bridge 
of Jumenux and the Ninime oonvent, while Beresford, master 
of three-fonrtbs of Mont Itave, w s  now wdmcing along the 
summit, deemed farther rwistrance useless; he relinqriished 
the northarn entl of tha Cnlvinet platforrn also, and nboiit 
fivc o'clock withdrcw his wholc army b c h d  the cannl, still 
lioldirig Sacurin and C:lmbon : Weliiigton then estnblislied 
tlie Spaniards in the abiindoned worits, and so b e m e  master 
of tlie hlont Rave in a11 i t s  extent. The Frencli hwf f i~e 
gener~ls and perfiapg three thous~nd men kilFed or moiintled, 
and tlicy Iost onc piecs of artillery. Tlia ~ t E c a  Imt f o n ~  
geiiernls and four thousnnd six hundred md fifty-nine men 
and oilicers, of wliich two tliousitnd were Spaiiinrds. A 
lnmentnble spilliig of blood, nnd a uselesq for More this 
period Xapoleon had abdicated the throne of France and a 
provisional government WM constituted at Fnris. 
During tho night Soult, dcfcitted but undismayed, replnced 
the amminition expeuded in the action, re-organized and 
auymented bis field aitillery Emm the arsenal of Toulow, md 
made dispositions for fighting tlie next moming behind the 
r~nal. YeG looking to tlie fid neecessity of a retrerrt he wrote 
to Suchet t o  inform him of the result of the contat, and pro- 
posed a eombmed plan of opemtiana illnstrative af tlte fimnesa 
and perkinncity of hia ternper. March,' said he, 'with hhe 
whole of your forces hy Quillan upon Camssonne, 1 wiil meet 
you there with my amy;  me cm then retake the initiatory 
rnovernent, transfer the sent of war tu the upper Qaronne, and, 
IioIding on by the mountains, compel the enemy to recal his 
troops from Bordeaux, which will enable Decaen to  recover 
that city wnd make a diversion iu our favour.' 
On the morning of the 11th he mas again ready ta fight, 
but the Enghh general was not. The French position, 
within mitsket-shot of the walls wm stiU inexpugnable on the 
northern anrl mtern fronM. Tlie pseRRioli of Mont Ram 
wau oaty a prelirninq step ta the passage of the c11m1 at the 
bridp of tht? Dcmoiscllcs, md other pointa abvo the w o ~ k s  
of S a d n  md Cambon; for WelIBngbon stiIl meanetl to throw 
Eiis amy tns originally designed to tlie south of tlie town: but 
that was a great affair reqriEnng fiesh dispositioari, and a í r e ~ h  
supply of rammunition, ody £o be obtained from t.he parc r>n 
the other side of the hronne. Wherdore, to accelerate the 
preparations, ascertrtain Hill's st-nt.e, and g i ~ c  that gcneml 
farther instructions, Wcll in~oe  rcpired on the 1 lth t o  St. 
Cmricn; but thongh be had shortend bis communications by 
removing the pontoon-bridge from Gremde t o  Seiih, the dsy 
wm spmt before th0 m u n i t i o n  arrived and the final 
armngements for the passage of the canal could be com- 
pleted. The athck was therefore defened nntil dajlight on 
tlie 22th. 
Meanwhile al1 the Iiglit cavalrg were aent up tbe m a l ,  to 
in tempt  the COmmuriim$ion~ with Suchet and menace Sot11tls 
retrent by tlie mad Icding to Carcassonne. T h e  appmnce 
of tliess hoxsemen oa the heights of St. Martp, a h ~ e  h i e g e ,  
togetlier witli the preprtratious in bis front, taught Soillt that 
tie wuld no longer delay if he would not be ahnt up in 
Touleuse; wherefore, b8,vbg terminated al1 bis arrangements, 
he left eight piecm of lieitvg artillery, two generala, the gallaot 
Barigpe bcing one, and skirteen bundred meii whose wounda 
were rrevere, t o  t l ~ e  humranity o£ tbe conquerors; then firing 
out of  the city with srirpriaing order and ability, he made a 
foreed rn~rc11 of twenty-two miles, cut the brirlges over the 
cnnnl and the iipper Era, and the 12th establjsheil his amy 
itt ViIlefmcT~e. On the snme day Rili'a troops were pushed 
doce t e  Ba~iege in pursuit, and the light cavdry, acting on the 
siJe OS 3IontEaur, beat tha Pi~ncli wivitli tlie loss of twenty-five 
nien, and cut off a like numhr of gens-d'mw on the side of 
Itevel . 
IVellington entered Toulou~ie in trjumph, fhe white flag 
displnycd, and, ns at Bordcaux, a grmt crowd of pcrcona 
~ lo l i ted  the Bourlion coloum; but the mayor, fuithful t o  Iiia 
siivercign. liad rekired with the Frmch -y. me Biitish 
p e r a l ,  true to  his bon& b e  of poliq, did not fail t o  warn 
tlie Baurhonista that their revo~ubionisry movement mnst be 
at  tlicir own risk. Rut in the afternoon two officem, tha 
English colonel Cooke, and the Freneb oolonel Sk. Si ion ,  
:irrived from Paris, cfirarged to make known t o  the amies tlie 
rhdication oE Nripoleon. Tliey licd been detained near Bloiai 
by the oficiousness ef the porice attending the conit of the 
empreas Loui~a, and tIie bloorl of eight thonsnnd brave men 
Iinrl o.rerflower1 tho Mont Rave in consequence: nor did 
thcir ~rrival immedintely put an end to the wur. When St. 
Simon in pursuance oí' I i ia  mission reaclied Xoalt'a quartem on 
the 13t11, that rnarshnl, not witliont just cause, demurred to 
liis autlio&y, andpoposed to suspend hostilitk~ until authentic 
infomation could lie obtained from tho ministe.~ of  tlie 
empcror ; then sending al1 his encumbranc~a by tlie canal to 
Ciircassonne, he tmk a pcwition of obsemtion at Caatcl- 
naudary and awaited the propess of events. Wellington 
refuserl t o  accede to bis propwril, snd as general Loverdo, 
commanding ~t hlonftiiibnn hnd ncknowletlged the aiithority 
of the provisional government anrl r e d i  mncluded an armis- 
tice, he judged Boult designe11 to make a civiI s a r  and tbere- 
fow marched againrrt him. The 17th tha mtposts were on 
tlie point of engaging, d e n  the dulce of Dalmatia, who bad 
nriw received nñicial informatlon from the chief of the empe- 
rorb stnff, notifica his adhesion to the new state of affuirs in 
France,-and with t l ~  honouralile distinction thnt be k d  
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faithfully austdned the cause of his p a t  monarch nntil the 
very lmt moment. 
A conventiun ~vlich included Suchet's army m immediatdy 
agreed upon; but tliat marsha! had previously adopted tlie 
white colours of bis own motion, and Wel1ingt.m i n sk t ly  
tranmitted the intelligeince t o  Clinton in Gatalonia md to the 
troops ah Bayonne. Too late it carne fm both and uselesg 
battles were fooright; that at Rmelonna haa been aTrendy 
described, hnt at Rnyonne rnisfortnne md ~uffering l i d  fallen 
upon one of the Jirigbtest soldiers of the British army, 
During tbe propss of the maln army jn the interior, Hope 
conducted the investment of Eayonne with the unremitting 
vigilance and activity whfeh the operation reqnired. He had 
gntliered &ores of gnbions and fascines nnd plxtfonns, snd wiu 
reaciy to attack the c i t~del  when nimours of thc event8 at 
Pnris reached him; yet indirectly, aand without any official 
character to warrant a formal communicatioa to the garrison 
without Wellington's anthority. These rnmours were liowerer 
made h o w n  at tthe oiitposts, 8nd perhapa lulIed fhe vfgilmce 
of the besiegers; but to ~uch irreguIar comrnunications, mhich 
mig-ht be intended to demive, fhe governor natureilly paid 
little attention, 
Tha picluets and fortified posts at St. Etienne were & 
thia time furnished by a brjgade of tlie fifth division; from 
flience to the extreme right tlie guads had charg~ of the line, 
ttiid they had dso one company in SC Etienne itself. Binuber's 
Germrui brigtde wras encamped as a support to the lek, the 
wrnainder of the fimt division ms encamped in the rear, 
towards Boueaut. In tl~is &ate, about one o'clock in the 
morning o€ the I4th, a desater m i n g  over to general Erty 
who cornmnnded the outposts that night, p v e  fin exoct account 
of t%e projocted sdly; the gcneral, unnble to slienk French, 
sent him to Hiuber, who immediately intcrpreted t,he mansa 
story to Hay, assemliled bis own troops under sms, snd tma- 
mjtted the intelligence to Hope. It would appear tliat Hay# 
perhaps dlsbelieving the manf story, took no adclitional prtL 
cautiona: and it is probable that neither the German brigde 
nor the reserves of the guarda would have been put under ama  
biit for the activity of Winuber. However at three o'doclc 
the Freneh, wmrnencing with a fdse attack on t11e left of the 
Adour as bbnd, paured suddenly out of the citdel to tmhe 
number of three thoumnd combatants; thcy aurpriscd tha 
piquete, and witb Ioud shouta breaking through the chain of 
posts at vdous points, d e d  with one rush the churcb, and 
the whole o£ the village of Xt. Etienne, with exception of a 
fortified house which wu defended by mptain Forster of the 
tliirty-ciglith rcgiment. N.~a.gters of everg other part rind 
overthowing al1 wlio stood beforo them thcy drovc the 
piqueta and suppods in heaps dong the Pepehorado roa4 
killed General Hay, took mloneI Townsend o£ the p n r d s  
prisoner, dlvided the ming  of the investing troops, and pmsing 
in m of the rigrht fhrew tlie mhols line into confusion. 
Shen Hinuber, baving his Germans well jn hand moved up on 
the side of 8t. Etienne, rnllied some of thc fifth division, and 
being joined by a bathlion of Bmdford's Portupese from tlie 
side oE St. Esprit bravely gaw the counter-stroke to the enemy 
811d regnined tlie villnge and church. 
On tlie rigbt the mmbat was at first evw more disastrous 
t h m  in -&he centre, neitker the piqnets nor tlie reserves wcre 
able ta  mctain the furgr of the m~anlt, md the battle wm mofit 
confused and terrible; for on both sides the troops, hrokcn 
into small bodies by the encIosures and nnable to recover 
their order, came dasling together in the darknws, fighting 
often mith the bayonet, and sometimes friends enoounteretl, 
aometim~s foes: al1 mas tumult nnd horror. The gvns o€ khe 
citadel, vagucly guided by the flashca of the musketry, scnt 
their shot and shells booming a t  mndom througli the lines of 
figlit j and the gun-boats, dropping domi the river, opencd tlieir 
fire upon the flank of the supporting colnmnq which being 
put In motion by Rope on the fimt aIarm were nDw coming 
up from the side of Boucaut. Thus nearly onc hundred pieces 
of artillery were in full plny at once, and the shells having set 
$re to the faacine dbpfits ~ u r l  t o  several hliouses, tiw flames cast 
a liorrid glm over tlie striving masses. 
Amidst thk confusion Hope mddenly disappeard, none 
knew how m mherefore at the time; but it affermards appemed, 
that ha* brought up the resemes on the riglit to  ~ t e m  the 
torrent in tbat quarter, he pushed for Stm Etieme by a liollow 
road which led close behind the line of piquets, one of whieh 
had been irnproperly w i t h d m  by an offrcer of the guards, 
and tGe French tlius lined both ha&. A ~ h o t  atnick him in 
the arm, rtnd hifi horse, a lave me, as ww neces sq  t o  mñtxin 
thc giqiffantic icarrior, rcceived cight bnlleh and fe11 npon Iiis 
1%; his followem hrtd by thi time escapeJ. from the defile; 
yet two of  them, captain Eerries and Mr. IIoore, a nephew ot 
 ir John Moorq seeing liis hdplesa state turned back, and 
endeavonred amidst the heav fire of tlie enemy t o  draw him 
from beneath the horse. ~~e thus engaged they were both 
stnick down with dangerous wounds, the French can-ied them 
al1 off, and Hope was apin aeyerely hurt in tlic foot by an 
English bnll~t befora they gainerl the citadcl. 
Day now broke ~ n d  tlie alliee were cnabIed to wt acttli 
more unity and e h t .  Th &mam were in poswsion of 
St. Etienne, and the resewe brigades of the pards, beiug 
properly diqosed by Howmd, who liad ~ncceecled to the com- 
mand, suddenly raised ti loud shout and mning  in upon the 
French drove thcm back into the works with auch slnnghter 
that their oown wrikrs sdmit a Ioss of one gencral nnd more 
than nine bundred men : on the Britifih side gonerul Stopfoml 
WILH wounded, aud the whole loss was eiglit biindred ond 
tliidy men and officers. More than twq hundred were taken, 
besidea the commdcr-in-chief; and it is generdy wkno\v- 
Iedged that Forster's firm defence of the fortzed howe firsit, 
and next the re di es^ and g a b t r y  with which Rinuber 
retook st. Etienne, =ved the alBes from a very terrible 
diwter. 
A few dayri nfiar this pikona mmt the convention mcda 
Gth Sodt becrsme known and hostilities cea~ed, 
MI the French litropps in the south were now re-organized in 
one b d y  under tlie command of Suchet; but they were NO 
little indined to acquiesce in the rmolutlon, tliat prince 
Polignac, acting for $he duke of Ahgoul&ms, applied t o  the 
'Biitish commissaq-general Hennedy for a, aum of money f o 
qniet $h. The Portupe~e returncd ta Fortugd. Tlie 
Spsniards to  Spain: tho general8 being it is mid inclined at 
first to declrare for the Cortes qainst the king, but they were 
diverted from their purpose by the influence and authority of 
lord WellLngton, The Brikish infantry embarked at Borrlewx, 
snme for America, mme for England, and the mmly marching 
tiirough France took shipping at Boulope. 
Thus the war krininated, md vith it d rrme;nbrance of 
Ehe vetcran'm s w v i c a  
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CBAPTER VI, 
50wr land Thonvenot have been 'accnsed of fighting with I 
fuIl BnowIdge of Napoleon's abdimtion Thia cliarge, ccicu 
lnted originnlly by Bourbon partyt is uthrly tinfounded 
The extent oftlie infomtion oonveyed to Thouvenot tlirougl 
the dvanced posts has been already notieed; i t  was not sufi 
eiently amthentic to induce Hope t o  make a formal communl 
mtion; and tlie goveraar oould only treat it as an idle s t o y  tu 
insdt or t o  deceire bim, and baMe Bis defence by rdarding his 
counter-operations wliile tho works for the ~iege were advltnc- 
Uig. Por hom unlikdy, nay impossibIcJ mnsE it not have 
appeared, tht the emperor Napoleon, whose victories at Mont- 
3Iirnil nnd Champetubert were .lino& before ths clom infrest- 
ment of Bayoune, sliould have been deprivd of hiri mown in 
tlie space of s fm weeke, and the stupcndous erent be onll 
Iiinted at the outposta ~Gtlioiit any rehxation in the prepara 
t ions for tlie siege. 
As false and unsubst.antia1 is the cliarge against Sonlt. 
The amte remark of an English militay miter, that if thq 
W d .  iluuke of D~iilmatia, had knom of the peace befar, 
he fought, he would certainly hnve announced i 
after the battIe, were it only t o  maintain himself in that city 
aqd clxim a victoryI is unanmerable: but there me direct 
proofs of the falsehood of tlie accuwtion. How was the 
intelligence to reacli him? 1t w a s  not unti1 the 7th that the 
pro-&ionai government m o t e  t o  him from I'aris, and the 
bwer could not have mached Toulouse ttncler three days evcn 
by the most direct way, wbieh was tbmugh Montmhn.  Now 
the allies were in possession of that road on the 4th, and on 
the 9th tlie Frencli nrmy was actually Invested. The htelli- 
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gence from Paris must therefore have reacbed the aIiies first, 
as in fiict it did, and it was not Soult it was WeIlington wtio 
commenced the battle. Tbe charge would therefore bear 
more agxinst the English genera who would yet have been 
the most insane as me11 ss the wickedest of men to llave 
risked bis army and his f m e  in s battle wliere ao mnny 
obst~cles eemed to den J sucoecs. He al80 wiis the person of 
dl others mlled upon, hy honour, gratitud6 justice aiid 
patriotism, to avenge tlie useless slaughter of hís soldiers, 
t o  proclaim the infamy and seek tlie punishment of his inhuman 
adversary- 
Did hc mcr by word or decd connt~nanca tho ca'tnrnnyt 
Lord Aberdeen, dter the p s i n g  of the Englisli reform 
1ií11, repeated tlie accusation in tlie Eiouse of lords and revited 
the minicter for being on amicable political tmms with a mau 
cnpable of mch a crime. Tbe duke of Wellington rose on the 
instant nnnd enphntically declnrcd t h ~ t  rnarshnl Soult did not 
Irnoí~, and thnt it wns impossible he could know of thr 
eAperor's abdication wlien he fouglif, the liattle. The detes* 
tab1e dlstinction of sporting witli men's lives by wlmlesale 
attnchea to no geneml on the recorcls of history save the Orrtnge 
William, the rnurdercr ef Glencoe. And though Soult h d  
knom of thc emlmor'a abdicntion he conld not for that have 
been justly placed beside tLat wId-ilooded prince; wlio fonglit 
at St. DeUis d l i  the pace of Nimeguen in his pocket, bemiuse 
' he m u l d  nrit &y himsdf a safe lesson in IJLa trude: The 
French maralial wna at tlie liend of a bravo army, &nd it wa9 
impossilrrle to know wl~stlier NapoIeon liad abdicated volun- 
brily or been constmiiied. Tlie auiuthority ol sucli men sls 
Tzlleyrand> Fouclié, and other intriguen, forming a provi- 
sional government self-instituted nnd under tlie protection of 
foreign b~yonets, dcmanded no rcspect from SouIt. He hd 
even the right of denying the emperor's legal power to &di- 
cate. He lind the rigrit, if be tbought liimself stroiig enougl~, 
to declare, thnt he mould not suffer thc throne to liecome ths 
playtliing of foreign inwiders, rind t h t  lie would rescire 
France even tliougli Kapoleon yielded tlie crown. In fine it 
wns a quastion of pat,riotism and of calculation, a nntinnnl 
qriestion which the general of an army lid a right to decide 
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for himself, h d n g  reference always to the m1 will and desire 
of tlie people at lrirge. 
I t  wna in thiis light thht Sonlt vicwcd tfic matter evcn after 
the brnttle d when lie baid secn colonel St.  Bimon. l'riting 
omolal cor- to Talleyrnnd on tlie 33nd, he sayrr, ' The circum- 
wporidence, Gtance~ which precedcd my act of dliesion are so 
315s. extraordinary as tD crea& astonisliment. The 
7th the provisional go~ernment informed me of tbe eveiits 
' 
which liad happened since the 1s t  of ApriL The 6th and 
7th count Dupont m o t e  to me on the same subject. On tIie 
8th the duke of Feltre, in his qartlityof war minister, gafe me 
notice, that hnving left the militnry ciphcr at Paris hc wouId 
immediatcly forward to me mothcr. T h e  9th the ~irince 
Berthicr Gce-con~tribla and major-general, m o t e  t o  me fmni 
Fonhinbleau, transmittiilg the copy of a, convention anJ. 
armistice which bad been arrangeci at Paris with the rillied 
p w m ;  he demmded at the panle time la siate of tbe force 
and condition of my amy;  but neitlier the prince nor S 
dulce o£ Fdtre mentioned eventa we had then only knowletl~ 
of n prochmation of the empress, datecI the 3rd, whkh fwbnr 
t48 to wccylah a.nlytlti?Ag miagfmna P&. 
CThe 10th 1 *-as ~~tt,ttncbd near TouIonse by the whoIe 
dliecl army under the ordera of lord Weihgton. Thii 
vipraus action, wliere the Tmch army, the wcakest by halr 
shomd J I  i t a  ivorth, cost the alliea from eiglit to ten thoi 
sana men: lord Wellington rniglit perhapa hrsve dispense 
witIi it. Tlie 12th 1 received tlimug-11 the Englirih tlie fir! 
hint nf the cvenb n t  Friu. 1 proposed ~n mmistice, it was 
refused; I rencwed the dcmanrt, it waa ngain refused. At last 
1 sent count G a m  to Touloum, aand my reiterhted pxoposal 
for u, susperisioa of arms \vas ~ m p t e d  and signed the 18tl- 
the m i e s  being then in presence of ewh otlier. 19t 
1 ratified this mnvention aad gave mp dhcsion to the ri 
establishment of h u i s  XVIII. And upon tfiis suliject 
angl~t o declare tJint T sotiglit t o  obtain a a~icpension of nrms 
bcforc T manifcstcd mg aetitirncnh, in orclcr tlirit rny will and 
t.hat of tlie nrmy Jiould bo free. Tlmt 7zeitlw P ~ a ~ c e  m- 
p t d y  s l d  I m e  p m  to saj it eams twrn f r m  6 
fme of m. 2'0 follmo onh #le will of t 7 ~  wtim m 
Imll~~e 1 owed Co my mal& 
'In this Ictter, certnin assertions, relntive t a  the nimbm of 
the conteniling nrmies and the losa of tlie allies, are Iit vari- 
anca witli tlie atattteinenb in tLis Hisbry; and tliis loose but 
mmrnon mode of assuining the stnte of an adverse force hns 
been the ground-work for great exrrggeration by aomp; Freuch 
writera; who stmnrely enoiig11 cclnim a victory for the Frmcli 
army althougli thc Frcncli gcnerd liimaelf marlc no auch 
elaim at tlie time, and so für as ajipears Ilas  not done so 
silice. 
FidorZPs are &mimd 6y deeds c t d  tJ& m s e ~ e s .  
Ey tliis test we slrall knuw who mon the brittle of Ponlouse. 
Now al1 ~CEOIJS,  French nnd Eaglish, mho havc trmted thc 
suhjed, including the generals on both sides, are apced, that 
Soult fortified TouIouse tlie canal and tlte Mont &ve ns popi- 
tions of  battlc; that Iie was attaxlced, tliat T~upin's divinon 
was beaten, that tlie Mont Rave with al1 its redoulits and 
entreiicliments fe11 into the nlliea' pomer. FinnlIy that the' 
Frencli nbnndoned Tonlouse, leavbg there tlrrec womded 
gmerala, sixteen hundred men, se~errtl p n s  and a qnantity of 
stures at tlie discretian of their advcrswies : rrnd this witliuut 
any fresli forces having joined the allies, or any rem~rknlile 
ment ~fecting the opernti ons happening elsewhee. 
lTas Tonlousc warth prcservingl 1Vm tllc nlinndonmcnt 
of it forceri or voluntary ? Lek 8ouIt speuk! ' I Bwlt to 
llave entrenclied tlie siiliutli of St. C~yprien whicli sueiier, 
fo r rn~  n potl  bridge-lieñd ; thc enerny \vil1 not I mth "'*' 
tliinlr nttncli mc tlicrc unlws Iir) dcsiree t o  lose a pnrt of Itie 
arrny. Two niglit~ ago 1ie mzalla a denioristratioii of pwsiug 
tlie Garonne two leapefi alio~e tIie citj*; but be will prubably 
try ta pxsa it telow; in wliich case 1 miIl at tak  Lim datever 
Iiis force mRy be, ~ C C ~ I I R C  i t is of the utmod importmr~ ti) 
me not to ba eut off frorn Nontaiilinn whero 1 hnvo mnde a 
Zirid&~-.e-1ie11d'-' I tliiitk tlie enemy will not move on your side 
a ~ h  I mw:s tRat wwjjrst, and I rxm ddamined tu av&d 
tlmt m lmg aa J can.'-' Xf I could rcmain a, month on the 
Garonne I should be able to pit  six ar eidit tliousand eon- 
scri~ita into the mnks who now embarrnss me, niid ~ v h o  mnt 
a m s  whicli 5: expect witli great impntl~nce frorn Perpigoan.' 
-' 1 am molvcil to ddiver h~tt le  13etir TUU~OUSC 1+-11~tever 
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to "y be the superiority of tlie enemy. Tn thj 
h c h &  6 e w  1 have fortified a p&tim> whieh, 
7th ~pn? .  bgr tRs tmm amd t h  c a d ,  furnislies me with 
retreuched camp ~useeptihle of defence.'-' 1 lirive roccivcd the 
nnhappy n m  of thc cnemy's cntrnnco into Pnris; this misfor- 
tnne strengthens my determination to defend Tou~oi~m wliat- 
ever may happen. Tho preservation of the place which con- 
h h s  stablishments of al1 kindir is af the utmost imporkce 
to us ; but if unliappily 1 am Torced to qnit it my movements 
will natumlly bPing me nearer to you. In that case you can- 
not suskin youiwelf at Perpignan because the enemp will 
inevitabIy follow me.-' The enemy appears astonished at the 
detemination I hnve taken te defend Touloiise; four d a p  ago 
he pasrrecl fhe Ch~onne and hns done nathing fiince, perheps 
the M weather is the canse.' 
From thege exiracta it ia clear that Soult molved if pos- 
sible not t o  fa11 back upon Euehet, and wiia detemineil even to 
5ght for the preervation of his communications with hfont- 
d a n ;  pet be finialfy resigned tris important object for the 
more important one of defending Toulouse. And sa intent 
upon i t s  preaerwtion wm he, tliat having on &P. 25th of 
Mmch ordered al1 the atores and nrtillery not of immediate 
utility to be sent amy, he on tho 2nd of April forbade further 
progrees in that work and even had those tbings already 
removed brought back : moreover he very c1carIy 
Cboamsrs. 
marks that to abantndon tbe city and retreat towarda 
Snchet aill be the sips and consequences of defeat. 
These points behg fixed, we find him on the evening of tke 
10th writing again to fivchet thus: 
' The battle w h i ~ h  I announced t~ you took place to-day, 
the encmy haa becn horribly moltrcatcd, yct hc mccmded in 
eahbEisJ~'in~g hhrmlf 2 c p  a poritkm w&h 1 mmpkd 80 I!M 
%kt of T h e .  'She general of dirision Taupin has been 
killed, Earispe has lost his fuot by a camon-bnll, and three 
genm1s of brigde are wounded. -1 am prepared to re-com- 
m e m  to-morraiv if the enemy atttacks, but I rlo mf 6 s l h  1 
m &y ilo %c&md; ;E mght  men happm I h t  >slmR b 
f;rreea to open a pasBag8 to get out.' 
On the 11th of April he writeb apin : 
As 1 told you in my Ietter of yesterday 1 m in the n w -  
$ty of retlring from Toulouse, and I fear bcing ohliged ta 
tigfit my tvay at Bnziegc whithm tlie enemy is dirccting a 
mlumn to cut my eomrnunications, To-morrow 1 will take a 
position at Tlllsfranohe, because 1 have good hope that thia 
obstade will not prevent my pccsing.' 
TQ the minister of war he writes on the 10th: 
' Tc-day 1 rest in position Xf tlie eneiny a*cks me 1 
will rlcfcnd m yoclf. 1 liavc grmt nced to replcnkh my metanrr 
before 1 put the amy in march; y& 1 bclieve that in the 
comirig niglit I &Il be forcd to ahndon Toulome, and it is 
probalile I slmll direct my mo~ements so as to  rally upon khe 
troops of t11e rluke of  Albufera.." 
Soult lajs no claim hem to victory. He admits thnt aIf 
the eventg previously indicated by him ns the conaequencm of 
defeat were fulfiiled ta the letter; tliut is to aay, t2ie loss of 
tlie position o? liattle, tlie consequent cvscuation of tlie city, 
and ~Iie marcli to join Suchef. On the other hand Wellington 
cleerlgr obtnined al1 t b t  he souglit. He d e s i d  to p s s  the 
Glaronne rand he did pnm it; he desired ta win thc pmition 
and works of Nont Rave and he did win thm; lio desired to 
enter Toulouse aiid Le did enter it as a, conqueror at tlie h e d  
of his troops. 
Amongst tlre French writers who without denying these 
filctcl lg clnim t o  a Pictory, Choumaro is m s t  deserving of 
notim, Tliis geutlaman, línown as aii aLle engineer, with a 
praisewortliy desire to reiider jastice to tlie great capacity of 
Soult, sliows very clearly thnt lrjs genius would h ~ v e  shone in 
this campnip with fnr greatcr lustre if Suchct liad wlopted 
his phns and supporterl t im in a. cordial mannar. 13ut Mr. 
CEioumnrñ, lieated by Iiis suliject, completes the pieture witli a 
crowning victo7 at TouIouse which the marshd Lihself 
nppears not to recopise. Tlie worlr is a very vslunble hiato- 
rica! document wvitli rwpect t o  tlio disputes bctwecn SouIt and 
Ar~chet; Lut e t l l  rwpect to tlie battle of TouJouss it cuntaine 
grave errom as t o  Bcts, aud the iderences are wtenaliIe 
tliough the prerniscsi were admitted. 
The substirnce of the: argument is, thiaf the position of 
Toulouse w of the natnre of a fortress; t h t  the cuna1 
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wap, tlie res1 position of battIe, the Mont Rave an outmork, 
thc loss of mliich weighed littIe in the balance; because tlie 
French army was victoiious at EaIvinet aginst tlie Spaniarris, 
iat the convent uf the MBnimm ~dpins t  he liglit division, at 
tlia bridge of Jurnertux against Picton, at St. Cypricn agninst 
Hill. Finslly thut the French general certainly won tho  
victorg because he ofered battle the next day and did not 
retreat from Toulouse uiitil thc following night. 
Now admitting al1 tliese fact.s, tlie fortress was atill hken, 
Dut the facts are mirprisingly incorrect Por fimt Xault 
biinsslf tclla XucLet the Mont llave was his psi t iom of b&tle, 
and tlint the town and canal only 8upmtt.d <t. Nothing 
coiild bc more accurate than thie description; for mlicn ho 
Iod thc 3iont &ve, tlic t o m  and tlic canal enablcd him to 
mlly his aririy und bke mensureB for a retrcnt. But thc loss 
of tlie Moiit &ve renrlerell tlie canal untenalile : wliy else waa 
Toulouse abaiirluned? Tliat the linc of the canal was a more 
Fornidalile one to  xttaclr in fmnt tlmn the Mont Raye is h e ,  
y& that did ~ o t  cconstitute it a position; it ivas  not necescary 
to attaclc it, except pnrtially at fimrin nnd Cambon and t l ~ e  
bridge of tlie Demoisellcs; t l io~e poiiits fomcd, the c ~ n n l  
ñ-ould, ivith thc nEd of t8hc Mont Rnvc, liavc hclped te l i c~p  
tlie Frencli in Toiilonsc as it Iiiirl before Iielped to keep tlie 
all.llies out, Ilrellington once eutnblislied on tlie ~ o u t h  side OS 
tlie city nnd EioFding the Pech David muld haw removed the 
bridge from Seilh f a  Portet, above TonIonse, tlius slioeenlng 
snd securing Iiis conimunication nZth Hill; the French armg 
must then llave siirrendercd, or brolren out, no emy methr in 
snch a difficult and strnngled coirntry. The Mont Rave was 
tlierefore tlie po~ition of hat,tle, and dso  the Irey of thc posi- 
tion behind the canal, and &Ir. de Choumam is placed in a 
diIemnia, Re mugt adrnit the allies won the BgEt, ar confess 
tlie main position was so bdIy cLosen that a slight reverm at 
an oritivork mas sufficient to  mdce tlie French army abandon 
it at mry other point. 
Biit were the French victoriottn at wery other pointt 
Against the Bpaniarda thcg werc, and Picton also wrrs re- 
pulsed. The order af movementa for tlie battle 
A p ~ n d i x  PMVW indeed that this general's atta& rvas in- 
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2ed tn be a fdse one ; he disobeyed bis o d e r s  homever, and 
ne of his b6gades mas repulsed; yet to cl~eck one bripde 
,,itli a loss of three or four liundrcd men, i s  R smnl1 mfitter 
in n Finttlc where more thran eighty thoufuind oombntants wcre 
engagert The liglit divisien mnde a rlemonstration a ~ i n s t  
tlie conveni of tlie Minimes snd nothiilg more. 
Ita Iuss on the sliolc rlay was only fifty-six rnen :E,"& 
anri officms; and no Frencli veteran of tlie Penin- 
sula but woulri l aqh  at 6lie notion t l i ~ t  a red attack by that 
ni;ltdilcss division could be so ahpped. 
It iu enid the exterior line of entrencliments at St, Cyprien 
was only omqicd with a view to orensive rnovements, and to 
prevent t,he allim froin estnblishing Iiatteries to rake tlie lirhe 
of tlie canal from $hat side of tlie Glaronnc; whaterer may 
lixve heen tlie ohject Rill got possession of it anci wtls so far 
Pictorious. He was ordcred not to wfian the second line 
seriousIy and lie diil not, for 11is whole loss scarcely exceeded 
eigbty rnen cnd oíiicers; Lis corps covered tlie pnrc and the 
communicrttions, and it would liave been folly to endanger 
tliem by a serious attack upon such strong worlrs befori: the 
l l o n t  l h e  cmied. 
From tliese undeninble fmcts, it ia clear tIie French gained 
an advantge agaiiist Picton, and a rnarked guccess against 
tlic Spaniards; yet Beresford's attack was RO dccifiive as fo 
coiinterbalance thwe fiiilures and even t o  put the defeated 
Spnninrds in potiscssion of the lieight tliey hd originally con- 
teurlerl frir in vnin. 
Cliournam attributes Beresford's success to Taupin'a ermra 
and to a vast superioiity of numbers on tlie side of the dliw. 
'Fifty-tliree tlioiismd infilnty? more flixn eiglit tliousand 
cnvnlry, and a rcserve of eiglitecn tliousnnd mcn of al[ ams, 
opposed to twenty-five tliousand French infantry, tmo thou- 
saiid five hulidred cavalrj*, id a reserve'of seven tliousand 
conscripts tliree thousancl of whicli mere unarmed.' Such is 
the enormous dispropartion assumed on the authonty o£ pene- 
m1 V~udoncourt. Tlio crrors oC Ttiupin may Iinvc bcen grcat, 
~ n d  lijs covntrymea ore the best judges of his demerit; bnt 
the numbera Lere assurnd are inust iniiccurnte. The imperial 
muster-miis are no& of a later date than Deceniber, 1613, 
Emk8 yet aa officid table of the orpnization of Soult's 
Campaign ampI published by a French rnilitary historian, 
Koclc, givca thirty-six thonsand six hundred nnd 
thirty-five combatanta on the 10th of March. Of thcsc, in 
roud numbers, twenty-eight thoueand s k  hundred were 
infantry, two thousand seven bundred cavalry, md five thou- 
sand seven hundred mere artillerymen, eng,rrineers, miners, saap 
pers, gens-d'armes, and d i t a r y  workmen. Nothing is mid 
cif the rwerve division o!¿ conscripte commanded by Travot ; 
but Vaudonconrt's table of the same army on the 1st o€ 
April, adopted by Chonmam, suppties the defioimcy, The 
conscripts are there seh d o m  seven thousand two hundred and 
sixty-seven; and thig cipher being dded to KO&B @ves a 
total of ferty-tlirae thousand nine liundred fighting men. The 
Joss in eombats ,tsd marches from tlie 10th of Jlarch to the 
1st of April must he deducted ; buh on tbe other band we find 
Souk informhg the miniskr of mar, on tbe 7th o f  March, 
thitt threa thousnrid soIdiers dispersed by the bnttb of Orthes 
were atill wandering hehind tlie army-+,he g r e a t ~ t  part rnust 
hava joined before the battIe of Toulonse. There wns also 
flie regular garrison af tllat city, composed of the d 8 p h  oof 
severd regirnenh anci the urban paras) al1 under 
AppencKm 6. Trarot. Thus littIe less tlian fifty thousand men 
were at Boult'a disposal. 
Let twelve tliousand be dedncted for, Lo. the nrban gaard 
which was only empIoyed fo  maintain the palice of the town; 
2'. the unarmed conscriptFi; 3'. the milftary workmen not 
Simught into action : 4'. the detachments employed on tha. 
flanl~s ta communieata with LaFitt~ in the Atrieg~, snd to 
reinforce Loverdo nt MontBuban: thcm will rmmin thirty- 
eight t h o m d  fighting men of al1 wm. And with a rery 
powedd artillery ; for !ve hrl. h u l t  after tbe action direct- 
ing seven field-batterim of eight pieoes ewh t o  attend tlie 
army ; and tlie Prencli writers mention, besides khh fielrl-train, 
1". Wteen pieces which m m  t r a n s f d  during the battle 
from the exterior llne of Sh. Cyprien to tlie nortliem and 
eastern fronts. 29 Fonr twenty-fonr pounders and several 
8ixteen-poundcm mountcd on tlic! walls of the city. 39 'fhe 
nmment s  of the bridge-he&, the worh on Calvinet antI 
tha 
eig 
ae at Sacarin and Cambon. Wherefore aot lm t h n  
hty, or perhaps ninety, pieeea of Fsench artilIery were 
erigaged. 
An approsimation t o  the strengLh of the French amy being 
thns &e it remains to sbow tlie number of the allies, which 
for tlie Angla-Portuguese tmops can be done exactIy Gom 
Wellingtonk moi~ ing  siatetes. On the 10th of April thoae 
states ~ihowed forty-three tliouwnd m.\wn E~iindred and forty- 
four British and Germans in liuc and twentv tkonsand seven 
liundred and ninety-tliree Portuguese; in all, sixty-fonr thou- 
sand five hunJred and tlurby-seven soldiers and ofims prwent 
under atms, excliisive of artillerynen. Of tYia n~iniber nearIy 
ten thousand were cavalry, e h e n  Iiundred and eighty-eight 
belng Portugnese. 
Tlie Gpanish nuxilinricq exclusive of Xina's barids inwsting 
St, Jean Pied de Port, wcre 19 Giron's Andulusittns and 
the third army under OIDonnel, fifteen tliousthnd. So. The 
Ga2licians under Preyre, fonrteen tliousand. 3". Three thon- 
sand Ctallicians under Morillo ancl as many more nnder Longn; 
mnhing witli the Anglo-Portupese B total of ninety thousand 
combatantu with somewhnt more thnn a hundred pieces of 
EieldLartilIery. Of tLis force, U'Donnel's troops were in the 
Palley of tlie Biistan, Longaag on tbe upper ~ b r i ;  one &&ion 
of Freyre's GhIlicians mns under GarTos D'Eepaña in front of 
Bayonne; one Iialf of Rlorillo's division ww blncksciing Navhr- 
mns, the 0 t h  hl f ,  and the nine thousand Gdli~ians remnining 
iinder Freyre, were jn front of ToiiZouse. Of tlie Angllu- 
~ o r t u ~ i e s e ,  the firct and fifth divisions and three unattaci~ed 
brigades o€ infantry with one brigadc of cavnlry were with 
Bope nt Enyonne; thc sevcntli division wa9 nt Rodcaux; the 
Iiousehold brigade of heavy cavalry was on the rnarch from the 
Ebro, wllere it liad pnssetl the winter; tlie Portu,pee;e Iiorse- 
inen mere partly employd on the coinmunicat%ng in the 
rem; partly near Agen, ~vhere sir John Campbell with the 
fourth r e ~ m e n t  lin<l nn cngngcmcnt on the 11th with the 
cclcbmted partisan Florim. Tho sccond, third, 
fourth, sixtli, and liglit divisions of infantrg, and ** 
.Le Cor% Portugese, called the unattached divi- 
mon, were with Webgton ;  mlio had also W s ,  Pon- 
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sonby's, Fnne's, Vidun's> md lord E. Somersct.s brigndea of 
cnvalrg. 
Tlie~e troops on the morning of tho 10t11 mustered under 
arms, in round numbers, tliirt-g-one tliousa~cl infnntry, ot wliich 
four tliowand tliree Iiunrlred were oificem sergeants ltnd drum- 
mers, leaving twentysix tliuusarirl and six Iiundred kyonets. 
Add twelva thousand Spaniarda under Freyre and JIorillo, 
iind me bave a total of  forty-three tliousand five hundred 
infantry: the cavalry amounterl to semn thousand, and thcre 
were sixty-foiir pieces of artillcry. Henee aboiiG fifts-tmo 
tliousnnd of al1 rranks nntl arms were in line to fi ght tliirt,y- 
ei@ thousond Frcnch mith moro thnn eighty picccs of urtil- 
Ie'p, some being of the large~t calibre. 
But of tlie allies onIy twerity-four tlioueand men with Gfty- 
two guns can be said to bave been seriousIy engagd. Thirteen 
tlionsand salires and bayoneta +tli cigliteen guns were on thc 
left of the Crrironne nntter Hiii: neither the light ciivision nor 
Ponnonby's h e m ~  camlv, nor Bocli's Clermans were rcally 
engged. Wlicrefore twclve thoii~nnrl six h11n(lrer1 srihres anrl 
bnyonets under Beresford, nina t h o u w d  bnyonch undcr 
Frep,  and two thousaiid f i ~ e  huntlred under Pioton really 
fought the battl~. Tlius the eIiurmous disprriprirtion asnimed 
by the Frenc'h miters disappears entirely; for if the zllies 
hrtd tlie advantage of numbers it wns chiefly in c x v a l ~ ,  and 
Iiorsemen were of little avail apinst the entrencherl position 
and pfipondemting rrtillery of thc Prench. 
Soult's clifim to the admimtion of his connfpen  is well- 
foundcd and rcquires no eain msumption t e  prop it up. 
Vast combimtions, inclthnustihlo persond rcsourcea, a clenr 
judgrnent, unshnken firrnness and pntienoe under dificulties, 
unwavering fidclity t o  his sovereiga and his country, are 
~vliat no man can justly deny Ilim. In this aelelirahd 
aampaip of nine rnonthg altliougli oounteracted by the 
treaclierous hostility of many of liis couniq-men, he repired 
and enlnrged the worlrs of five strong plsces and entrenched 
five great camps with auch morks as Marius himeelf would 
not have disdained; once he changerl his line o€ operatEons 
and cither attaclcing or dcfending ddivered twenty-fonr battles 
and mmbats. Defented in all, he fought thc lnst 9s ficrccly 
&Y the first; remaining nncanquercd in mina, and atilI in tent 
upon renewing tL stmgg1e wlien peaee mine to  pnt a stop 
t o  liis prodigious eflwts. 'i'hose eITorts were hitleas bemuse 
Suchet renounwd lim, because the people of the south were 
apathetic and furtune wns adverse; because he ww apposed 
t o  one of the grentest genernls of the rvorld at tlie head of 
unconquerable troops. Foi what AIexxncler's Maoedoninns 
wcrc nt Arbcl4 IHnnnibd's Afieana at C a n n ~ ,  C~anr's 
lloirions at Phnmalia, Napulcun'a guinrds at Austerlitz, such 
uFere Wellington's Briticli soldiera at tliis period. The-same 
men who had foiiglit at Virniern and Talavera contended at 
Ortliea and TouToiise; and six yeam of unintemptcd success 
, had engmfted ori tlieir natural strength and fierceness a con- 
fidcnce wliich rendcscd tliem invinciblc. It is by tliis Soult's 
drmness and the constmq of Lis army are t o  bc vdued; and 
the eyuality to wLicir he retluced liix great adversnry at 
TouIouse is a proof of nliilit~ vkieh a judicious friend would 
put forwartrd ruther tiian snppress. 
Was 11e not a grmt piiemI, mho being origindly oppwied 
on the Adaur by nearly rloublc liis owti numliers,-fiuch >vas 
the proportion tnfter the detaciimentci wero withdrwwn by 
tlie einperor in Janunry-$id yet by Ihe aid of Iiis Eortrwses, 
by his msrchea nnd combinatiuns, compel his dversnry to  
emplg so many troop~ for blockndes sicpes md detoiched pos& 
tliat nt Toltlottfle tlic lntter wns scnrcelg more nurnemus than 
tlis FrenchB Wos it notliing Co lirt~e dram Welling.ton from 
sucli a rlistsnca ialong the froiitier, nnd force Iiim at lmt, 
eitlier to figlit a blittle under tlic most astunishing disadvan- 
tages or to mtrent witli disl~onous: wnd this not because the 
Eiiglkli geneml liad committed any fault, but by the force of 
coniliinations whieli mnbrticing $1 tlie ulvantages offererl by 
the country Icft liim na optien. 
That Soult madu soitw rnictukes is true, and perliaps tlie 
most importrtnt wnc tlint wliicli the emperor ivarned 1Jm 
against, tliough too late, tlie lea* so milny men in Bayome. 
He did RO he says, because tlie place could not hold out fifteen 
days mithout the entrenclid camp, and the lrttter rrquired 
men ; yet t,lie resuIt proved Nnpoleon'g mgacity; for tlia allies 
made no attempt t o  try the stmnghh of the cmp, and an the 
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18th of Maflh Wellington knew not the real force o€ t€ 
gnrrieon. L'p to thst pcriod Hopo was inclincd to blockax 
the placa only; nnd from the difieulty of giithering the ncce 
wry &res anrl smmunition on the righ bank of the Adou 
tlie siege though resolved upon, was not even comrneaced c 
tl~e 14th of April, when t t a t  bloody and most lamentab 
~ d l p  was rnade. Hence the citadel oould not even wifh a 
weaker garrison hzve been takm before the end of April; mtnd 
Soult might h m  hd Abbé's di6sion of aix tbousñnd good 
troops in the  battlcs of Orthes and Toulouse: liad SuchrL 
joincd him, hia army would havc bcen nummaa cnough i 
bar trVellington's progress dtogetlier. Here let the sa,wii 
of ths Englisii general be noticed; for from the fimt L wi 
averse to eritering France and only did so for a political 
object, nnder tlis promise of great reinforcementa and in the 
expedtion tliat be aliou2d be dIowed to organize a Bonrbon 
army : wliat cozrlrf lie have done if SouIt had rretained the 
twenty Qioitsnnd men dr&d in Jannrsry, or if Suchet bad 
joined, or thc people had fnkcn m s ?  
How weii Soult chose h i ~  gronad &t Toulonse~ how con& 
dently he trust& thut bis sdversary would eventually pass 
the Garonne bdom and not above the city, wihh w h t  foie- 
sight he construeted the bridge-hend at Montnnban, and pre- 
pared the dificultiea Wellington had to encounter, have been 
alreacty touclied upon. Rut Chonmam hns asmmcd thnt the 
EngIish genernl'a wagon for rclinquishing tho pasmge of tlie 
Garonne at Portet on the nigl~t of the 27tb, wns not the want 
of pontoons buh the fcar of boing attmlsed dnring the opera- 
tion; adducing in proof hult's orders to assail tlie Leads of 
bis wlunins. Those orders are however dakd the 31st, three 
days after the rattempt of wbich Soult appenrs to have known 
nothing at the time : they were given in the mpposition that 
Welington u<slieri to  ctht  n sccond paesnge at that point t o  
aid Hill mhile deeccnding tlio Arriege. And whnt xemon las 
anp man to EuppoRe that tlie gamo gcned  md troops mho 
pa~ged tlie Nive and defeated a like counter-attwk near 
Bayome, wodd be deberred by the fem of a battle from 
attempting it on the Qaionnel The passage of tlie Nive w~ 
elearIy more dangerous, beame the communication with the 
rest of tbe army was more difficult, Soult's disposable forw 
Iurger, hi counter-movementa more easily hidilen until the 
rnornent of execution. At Portet, t,lie pnssage being desiped 
for the niglit Eicrison would linve becn s surprise; nnd tha 
whole army, whicli wng drnwn crosc to  thnt $ide, could have ' 
becn thrawn over in three or four hours, mith the exc~ptiari. 
of tlie divkious destined to keep the Frencli in clieck itt Xt. 
Cyprien. Boult'a o d e m  did not emhrace sucli an opemtion; 
they directed Clausel to fa11 upon tbe l i e d  of the troops Iind 
m s h  them while in the dkordw of a Iater passage, which was 
expected and watched for. 
Clnmel having four divirrioncr in hand wm no doiibt a 
formidable enemy, and Soi~lt's notion of defending the riwr 
by a counter-attrick wtw escdlent in principie; but b con- 
ccive is one t h g ,  t o  execute ia anotlier. His orders were, as 
1 have said, oniy iiswed the Jlst, wliw HiIl was across lioth 
the Qaronne and the Arriege. Wellington's design waa aot  
then to force a passnge al: Portet, but to menace that poink 
and really attack SG. Cypricn whcn Hill should hnve de- 
scended the Arrjege. Nor did Sonlt him8elf mnch expect 
C?ausol would have any oppodunity to atta&; for in his 
letter to the minkter a£ war he mi& tha position between the 
Arriega and the canal were al1 dieadvantageons to thc 
French, aod bis intention wna t o  fight in Toulouse if the 
nlFFes aliproached from the south; yet he stirl believed RiIl'a 
rnovement to bo oniy a Tilid, and that Welliwon would 
finally tittempt the passage tielom Touluuae. 
Soult'n measures were profoundiy reasoned liut yet extremeIy 
simple. Bis first care on mriving ~t Toulouse was to secure 
tlie onlp bridge over tlie (Ttuonne by completiug thc murks o€ 
St. C-yprien, which bc had begun wliile the army was still at 
Tarties. He tlius gained tirnc, and ns ho felt sure the alliee 
could not itet In tlie Arriege district, he next directetl IUs ' 
attantion to the bridpbead of ~ f o n ~ u b n n  to secure a retreat 
behind the Tam and the power of establisliing a fresh line of 
operationrr. Memn.hile, coatrary to liis expectntion Welling- 
ton did nttemlit to  & on thc drricge, and thc Frcnch gcncrd, 
turning of neccssity in observntion to that side, entrenched a 
position on the aouth; moon however he liad proof that Kis 
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fimt notion WRF~ well-founded, that hia acivcrciary aftcr losing 
much timc must nt last p s  bcIow Tnnlonac; mhercfore lic 
p~ocecded with rrodigiaus nctivity to fortify tlie Mont Rnve 
as a fielll of bzttle on the northern and wstern fronts of the 
city. Shese workti advanced so rnpidly, wliiEe tlie wet werrther 
by keeping the rivers Rooded reduced Wellington ta inactivity, 
tliat Aoiilt became confident in tlieir strcngth, and h i n  
N influencetl also 1i;v the news from Pariq, relinqiiislied liis fin 
design of opposing tlie pnrrsxge of the Garonnc and prcservin 
tlie Iine of opmtions by Montrtuhnn. To hold TouIouse the, 
hecarne liis great object, nor was he diverteti from this by the 
accideut ivliich befel Wellingbn's bridge at Gmnade. Moeit 
&km, Frencli and Ei1glisl1, have bIamed liim for letting slip 
Geneial that opportuiiity of attaclring Beresford It i 
Iierhn, sairl Reille firat hformed Km of the mptiire c 
318s. tlic bridge, nnd stronky nrlvi~ed him to attw 
fhe troops on the right bank; but Clioumara hns weU defendea 
liim oa tliut point; tlie cli~tance na9 fifteen miles, tlia 
evr.nt nncertdn, t3ie worka on tlie llIont &ve wtiuld have 
s t o d  still, and tlie allies might perbaps llave stomed St. 
Cwypri en. 
We!lington wm under no nlam for Beresford, or rather 
for Iiimaelf, as cnch dny hc pasacíl the rivcr in a bozt and 
rcmaincd on tliat side. His force was not 1ci 
Morning 
Stntq than twenty tliousnnd, principallg British; hi 
4tI"ofhprg- pofiilion WBB on a geiille rrange, ttlie flanIcg covere 
3155. by tlie Em nnd tlie Garonne; he had eightee 
p n n  in I iat tel  on his front, whicli wami likewise flankal b 
tliirty otlier picws plaoed on the left of the Garonne. No 
w ; i ~  he ivitlnoiit retreat. Re cnulrl erosg the R q  anrl &oul 
cTartror1 not have followed to uny dlstrtnce Icst the river should 
subside nnrl tlie rcst of thc army pris~ on his renr; unless, 
re~erting to  his original des ip  of operating by Montaulian, be 
liglitly uli:~iidoned liis now mxttiretl 1iIali o i  defeurling SOL 
lousc. WjseEy tliei-efore Iie continued ta strengtl~cn liis pos. 
tion round that city, bis comliinntions being al1 directed t 
force tlie dlies to attmk him betseen tlie Ers and tlie $Ion. 
Bnve, u,licrc 3t ~ecmetl scureely possible to aucceerl. Xome 
Frcnch officcrs hold tlint hc should huvc cntlcuvourcd te crush 
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EIill, rand scixe the pare; hut thia wns rliffimilt; Hill bad 
tiiirtcen tliousand men in ordcr of bnttle upon a contractcd, 
Fiptice red7 to brcalr thc heds  of tlie French columns as thcy 
ernergd from St. Cyprjen; tlje Iight division was at hnnd 
untit riiid-dioy on tlie 9th; anti wlie~i the Croix ZOraJe liridge 
w s  taken it wria impossible to  have attwked Bill without 
losing tlie Nont Rzve and tlie IIne o€ re t reat  
He has k e n  also cliarged with this fault, that he did n d  
entrencli the Pugade. Cliuumam ~ a y s  that troops placed there 
would l i a ~ o  bccn cndangercd rvitlioiit dcqmatc ntlvantage : 
this docs not eeem conclusire. The liill was under tlie shot 
of tlie niain hcigl~t nnd migl~t liave been entrenclid lvitli 
warks open t o  tlie reiir; XG, Pol's brigriile would thus 3iave 
incurred no more danger thwn wlien placed tliere witliaut 
entxenclimenh. Bcresford could not liavc moved up the IeEt 
bank o€ tlie Ers until tIiese morlrs were can%, and this woiild 
huve cost mcn; it i~ thcrefore protinhle w ~ n t  of timc cnirserl 
Soult f o neglect this acl~nntage. He committed o grnver 
error d ~ ~ r i n g  tbe battIe by ffialliiig upon Eerosfurd with Ti~upin's 
diviaion only, when he couIrI have emplbyed D'Armagmack md 
Tillatte's lilrewiqe in that attack ; he sliould have fallen on 
liim Jso  while in the deep country beIowv, and befoie be hrrd 
formed Iiis lincs at, tlic foot af tlie hei~htt.  Wlixt hindered 
Iiiin? Picton m s  repulsed, Freyrc defentcd, tlie liglit diviriion 
employetl to protcct tho fugiti~es; and one of  Maransin'~ bri- 
gadcs witl~dra~vn from St. Cjprien liad reinforced tlie victorious 
troopri on the extreme left of the Calvinet plntform. Beres- 
ford's column, entnngled in fht? mnrshy ground, mitlioiit 
brtillcry, nnd rncnnccd Soth front and rcar by cnvnIryp could 
'not have resisted eucli an ovcrwlelming miss : l\relliugtoli 
can scarrely eccüpe criticism for ~ilucing Iiinl in tht pre- 
dicamcilt. 
k commnnrfer is not intleed to refrain from liigli attempts 
Iiccnuse aF tlicir pcrilottq nntiire, tlic g e n t a t  Iinvi: ever Iwrn 
tlie most dtiliiiq; tlic Eiigliali gccncrnl could not reliiaia inactivo 
Lidore Toulouse, aarl Iie m s  not to Se deterred by chnger or 
dillicnlty; twicc lie pnssed tlie brond and rapid h ronne  and 
worlred his way to a croming victorp: tliis ras  hardilioocl, g e a b  
ness. But in Ctresfud's particular attaclc Ile did not oversbep tlia 
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mles of art, he liurtled against thom; and that be was nc 
drmaged by tlie shock is owing to Iiis good fortune the 6era 
ness of his soldiers and the emw of his adversary" Wbat : 
Beresford bad been overthrom on the Era ? Wellington must 
have r e p ~ g e d  the G~ronne, Iiapp y if by rapidity he could reunite 
in time with Hill on thc lefh banlc : Beresfords faililure would 
have been absolute ruin, nnd that done refutes the Frencli 
daim t o  a victory. WIW there no other mode of attnck? Tliat 
can hmdly be said Eeresfod passed the Lmaur rmd to 
assail tthe platform of St. Sypiere, md lis N= probably ~io 
ordered to a ~ o i d  an athck in flailk by the Lavaur road; aind 
became ths platfom of Calvinet on the side of the Er:rs river 
wm more strongly entrcnched h a n  thñt of St. Sypiere. Rut 
for tliis g i n  it was too mucl; to throw his column inta th - 
deep ground withont p n s ;  nnd separntcd from the rest r 
tLe anny, seeing the ca~alry, intenrled to rnnintain the oot 
nexion, were nnabIe to act in that miry labyrinth of mte 
murses. If the Spaninrds mere judged capable of carryin 
the strongegt part af the C a l ~ n e t  platform, Beresford's fir 
AngI~lo-Portuguese dhisions weere ~urely cqiial to athckin 
t b  ssmo plntform on the immdate left of &Re E p n i d s ,  
snd an advanced guard n-ould hnve sufficed ~II protect the left 
Aaak. Tbe assault would then have teen mtide with unity, 
by a great mas,  and on tlie most important point ; for the 
mnquest of $t. sypiere m s  but a step towards tliat of GI- 
Pinet, but ths conquest of CaIvinet wouId have renderd St. 
Sypiere untennble. It is hhowever t o  Iie obserped that tlie 
Spaniards ~ttttaclred too saon, ~tnd  their dispewion exceded al1 
remonable cdculntíon : so panic-stricken t.hey mere as fo draw 
from 'lVeliiion ot  tbe time tlio bitter obsercation, thnt he 
liad wen many curious spectacics but nsver befere saw te 
tliouand men ruiinirig s race. 
Boult's retreat from Toulouse, a model of order and re@ 
Iarity, was made in the night, which provea the difficulty of ho- 
situation. Neverthdess it wa9 not desperate; nor was it 
o h g  t a  his atlversnl'fi gcncroua forliearance t h ~ t  he pmed 
unrndested undcr tlic nllies' p~;iins, as an Eiiglisli writcr lias erro- 
n.eoualy assumcd; for thoso g n s  Iid no ammunition, and that 
wiia one reason why Wlfellmgtciu, tliough e q e r  rtu M1 upon hhn 
the l lth cmld not do so. On the 1 Sth Sault waa gone, and 
his marel1 covered by the great anal could acarcely have been 
molestad, because the nearcst point occupicd by tha nlliea was 
more tIian a mile and a haif distmt; nor is it credibla thut 
Soult, as some otlier writers liave ima~ned, ever designed to 
hold Toulouae to the last. It would have been an avowaI of 
miliby insolvency to wliicli his proposal, that Suchet should 
join Lim at Carcassone and ret&e the offensive, d t t e n  on the ' 
night of the 11% is qnite oppopd. Neither maa it in the 
spirit; of French waffare ; the impetuous valonr antl suscepti- 
'iky of $hat people mc ill-auited for etern Nummtian deqpair. 
rico an attainalile object of war before the French soldicr 
d he will mako supernatural efP& to gain it, but failing he 
,domes propurtionately d i ~ c o u ~ d ;  Iet some new chanoe 
be opened, aome fresli stimulus ~ipplied to his ardent sensitive 
femper, and he wiIl msh fomrd ~gain 6 t h  nnbmded 
energy, the fertr of death never checks him, he will attempt 
anpthing : btrt the nnre!enting vigonr of the British infantry 
rn resistanco wcars his hry out. It ww so proved in the 
Penhula, where the  mdden denfcning shout, miiing over a 
ficld of battle with s more fnll and terrible sound thnn that of 
any other nation, and dwap follomed by tlie s t m q  wiwtwering 
c h q e ,  startled m2 appalled tllose mnch columns More 




apoleon'a af war wns admimbIy adapted to draw 
i and augment the military excelience and to strengthaian 
the weakness of the national charscter. His discipline, severe, 
but appealing t o  the feelings of hope nnd honour, wronght the 
q u i d  temperriment of the French soldiem t o patience under 
hordships, and ñtrong endumnce nndcr fire; he h ~ ~ g h t  the
g c n d a  to rely on their own talents, to look to the conntrp 
wberein they =de war for resourcss, and to dare everytIiing 
even wíth the smllest nnmbers, that the impetuous m1our of 
France migbt have full play: hence the violente of their 
attscks. But he also h g b t  them to combine al1 nms 
together, and to keep strong reamca tbat audden disodem 
migl~t be repaired and the diseomaged troopa hnve time to 
raiiy and recovzr their prktine [~pirit; cerEain tu they would 
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then renew the battie with the stime confidente as bef01.e. Re 
thu~ d e  his troops, iiot invincible indeed, nature had put a 
bar t o  tbat in the chramchr of the l3rit.ish soldier ; yet so 
temilda and wre in war that the nnmber and patness  of 
their exploits surpmd those of aU other nat lons, the %mms 
not excepted if regard be had to  the shortne~ o€ the periotl, 
nor the Mncedonians if thc quality of tlieir opponents l \ m  
cnnsidered. 
Look at their smaeing toiIs in the Peninsular w&r al( 
which tthougb 80 great snd important wm but an episodl 
their military histoy. ' 1% Spaifi Zwge mis wül stwreie a m  
d-I: m i e s  d Be 6&en,haa the saying of Henry 1%' of 
France, and it was  not the Iight phrase of an indolent king, 
but tlie profmnd concluaion oC a q i o w  general, Yet 
Napolcon's cnormous ~rmies wcra so wondcrfully organized 
t h t  they existed and fouglit in Spain for aix years, and witli- 
out ccssation; for to them wintera anri eiummem were alike : 
tliey endured incrdible toils and privations, yet ,were 
starved out, nor were their s m d  amies beaten by 
Spaniards. And for their daring and resoarce a sinde 
recoided by Wellington will sufñce. They captured more 
thm one strong place in Spain withwt any provision of 
bullets =ve tlrose fired at them by their enemies$ 11iaWig 
trust& to that ehance when they formed the aiege l Be+.- 
the British troop~ they fell; but haw terrible wsx tlie stmg 
how many defeatits they reoo~ered frorn, how manp brave I 
they silew; what changes rtnd interpositiona of fortune o c m  
before they muld be rolled back upon tlieir own frontiers! 
And this is the glory of Englantl, that hcr soldiera and licm 
onlj were mpabb of ovcrtlirowing them in equal bafítle. 1 
welr. not to defraud the Portuguese oT Iiis well-mrnd fa 
nor to deny the Spttniard tlie merit af Iiis conatancy; but w 
battle except J3,glen did the Penindnrs wiu P What fort 
djd they take by aieget What place defendB Sir Art- . 
WelIesley t&ce delivered PoFtupl. Sir Jobn Moore's march 
to Sahagun ~ a v d  Andalusia anrl Lisbon from invmion nt x 
critica1 moment. Sir Arthnr'a mnrch tu Talnvcra delivcrcd 
Gnllicia. G;rablam m~ed  Catlii. Smith mvd Tanfa. Wel- 
lington recaptured Ciudad and Badajoa, rmcued Andalusia 
L V l  U 
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Aave denominat;ed it the Fabian aystem. me* are mere 
phmee. Hia ~ t o m  wlls tho samc RA that of nll grent 
generala. He held Lia army in Iiand, keeping it with uu- 
rnitigatd labour always in a fit shte to mwcL or to fighb, 
and acted indifferently as occasian. offered on the otiendve or 
defemive, displayiag in both a, complete mastey of his art. 
Sometimes he was indebted to fortune, aometimw ta his 
natural gmiuq d w a p  to his untiring industry, for he was 
emphfiticnlly a painstaliing man. m 
That he wns Iess vant in his desigag, 1esa daring in exem 
tion, neither so rapid nor so original s commander as Napo- 
leon, must be dmitted; and hehg latm in the field of glury 
it is to be presumed be learned something of t1ie art from 
that geatest of ail masters. Yet something besides the 
difi'exence of genius must be allawed for the digerente of 
sitn~tion; Napolean was nevet, epen in his fimt c~rnpaign oi 
Italy, ao harnssed by tho Frcncii as Wcllinghn was by 
English Spanish and Portupese governmcnts: their syst 
of WQT were however rtlike in prhciple, their operations bd 
only modifid by their H e r e n t  politiml positions. G.,-. 
bodily exertion, unceasing mntchfulness, exact coml~jnations 
t o  pratect their flanksi and oommunieations mitbout acatterjng 
their forma; these were common to botb; in defenee firm, 
cool, enduring, in attnck fierce and obstinate; daring m 
dianng was plitic, yet alwaya operating. by the flankr 
prirefcrence ta the fronf ; in thcae things they wcro alfke 
following up a victory ths English general fe11 short o£ 
Prench emperor. The battIs of 1iPelliugton mas the atroks 
a battering-ram, down went tlie wall in ruins; the battl 
Napoleon was the awell and dmh o f  a mighty wave be 
which the banier ~ e l d e d  and the roaring b o d  p r e d  
onwards covering alL 
But there was nothing of timidity or natural mant of enter- 
@se t o  be discerned in thfi English generah campaigns. 
Neither was ho af thc l?ahia,n school. H e  recommwdeci thnt  
commander's syskm t o  the ;Spnninrda, Iie did not fuliom i t  
liimself; Iiia military poBcy more resembled t h t  o£ hipio 
Africanus. Fabius, d&g Hannibal's veterang res with 






r e f u d  brrttle, md t o  the nnmatched ski11 and valour of tlie 
grent Cartlinginirtn opposed the ithost inexhaustiblc rnilittwy 
resources of Romc. Wcllington ,n nevw 108th t o  fight 
wlien there was any equality of nurnfim; he lmded in 
Portugal witb only n k  thousmd men, wlth intent to stbck 
Jmot wko had twenty-four thoueand; at Rorica he \vas the 
assailant; at Timiera he was assailed, but he wouId have 
changed to the offensive during the battle if othera had not 
interfered. At Oporto he nas again the daring and successfuI 
msailant; in the Talavera campnigm he took the initiato~g. 
rementa, although in the battle ihelf he sustained the 
ck. II~B campaign o!¿ 1810 ie Portugal m s  entirely defen- 
: because tlie l'{irtuguese amy waa young and untried; 
Ilis pursuit of Mwsenn In 1811 was entirely agressive 
iough cautiously BQ, as weIl knowing that in mountain 
,fare those who attack Inbour at a disadvantage. The 
,,,mtiona of the following mmpaiga, including the battIw 
of Fuentes Onoro rtnd Albaera, tlie firat siege of Eadfijos sud 
tlie combat of Guinaldo, were o l  n mixed cbrtrncter; so waa 
tlie cebmp~igign of Salamancii; but the campaign of Vitoria 
and tliat in tha south of Franca were entirclp and emiiiently 
offensive. 
flight therefore .is the resemblance to the Fiibian warfare. 
"4 for the Englialimank hh~rrlines~ and enterpise, bear wit- 
3 the pnsmge of thc Donro at Oporto, thc capturc of Ciudad 
Irigo, tlie storming of Badajos, the surprisa ot the forts at 
de t e ,  the m m h  m Vitoria, tlie passage of t.he Didassoa, 
the victory of the hTivelle, +he passqe of the Adour below 
Rayonne, the figlit o£ ~rtltliei tlie cmwning battle of Toulouse ! 
To say that hc committed fmlts is only to sg tliat he made 
war; to  deny hii the qualities of a grent commatider is to 
rail agahst the ,clear mid-day sun for want o£ ligbt. How 
few of his combinations failed. Hov many battles he fonght, 
victorious in all! Iron hardihood of bocly, s qnick and sure 
vision, a grasping mind, untiring power of thought, and the 
Iinbit of Inborious minutcs invcst igation sin& arr~ngement ; a31 
tliw qualities he possessed, aand nith them that most rsra 
hculty of coming t o  prompt and sure concIusions on sudden 
emergencia. T b  is the cerhh mark of a mrister-spirit in 
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wrtr; mithont it a commander mmay be distinguished, he mnp be 
n grcnt man, ho cnnnot be a peat  captdn: whera troops 
uenrly nlilce in a m  and knowledge are opposed, ttb batittle 
generally tums upou tha decisiou uf the moment, 
rlt thc ISomosiwra, Napoleon aent the Polisli cltvalry mtc- 
cessfully charging up the monntain when more stiidied ar- 
rangernents with ten times fhat force might have &led. At 
Talavcm, if Joseph had not yielrled to the impnident heat of 
Tictor f8he fate of the allie~i would have been pealed. At the 
Coa, Monthnin'e refusol t o  charge wikh his cavnlry 
Cmuktrdl~l division, the loss of rrhich would have pnt 
towrds producing the evacuation of Portu,d, At Bu: 
hlnssena wonld not d e r  Ny t o  attack tlie fird day, 
thus logt the only favourable opportunity for assailing that 
formlIable position. At Fuenteir Unoro, the same Massena 
suddenly suspended bia attaek when a powerful effort would 
probably have been decisive. At Albuera, Soult" cooIurnn of 
attaek, inatcad of pushing forwxrd baltcd to firc from the first 
hcight they M gained an Beresfod's right, which ~iaved that 
general from an early and total defeat; sgniii al; a Iater period 
of tliat battle the unpremedihted attack of the fusiIeers decided 
tlie contest. At Barosa mith a wonderfd promptitude Gmharn 
anatehed the victo y at tne moment wnen a terrible dcfeat 
seemed inevitabIe. At Fabugal, not even the wstonishing 
fighting of the lipht division could have a a v d  it, ii Repier  
?id posessed tliis esseatial quaIi$ of a general. At El 
Bodon, Marmont failcd to seiee the most fnvoumble oppoi- 
tunity which oceumd during the whole war for croshin,~ tlie 
aIlics. At Orthcs, Soult lat sIiptwo opportunitiea of fnlling 
upon the d i a s  with a d ~ a n ~ e ,  and at Soulouae he faiIed to 
c m h  Beresford. 
At Vimiera, Wcllington was debmed by Burrsrd from 
&ing a sipal  iIlnstration of tliis intuitive generalship; bnt 
at Bnsaco and tke heights of San Christoval, near Balamanca, 
he snffered ;Idassena md Msrmont to mmmit glaring fnulb 
itnpunished. On the other hend be has fumislieil many 
examples of thrtt mccecsfuI improvisatinn in which Finpleon 
seema to havc mrpassed al1 rnmikind. His sudden ret.reat 












fiom Oropesa acrosa the Tagus by the bridge o!¿ Arzobispo; 
bis passage of the Douro in 1809, his halt at Guinddo in the 
face of Marmont'8 overwbelming numbers; the Battle of %la- 
manca, l i s  sudden rush with tbe th id  division to aeize the 
bill of Arinez a* Vikorim, his counter-utrolre with the rriñth 
divirrion at Snuroren; hin bnttle of the 30th two days nfter- 
ds; hia mddon passage of the Gave below dirtlies. Add 
thw l i s  wonderful battle of Asye ,  and tlie proofs are 
iplete that he possesses in rin eminent degree that intuitive 
reption which disthguishes tlie greatest generals. 
portune however always ssserts her anpremncy in war, and 
:n from R dight mistnke snch cliriastrous conaeqnencee flow, 
t in every nge and every nntion the uncerhinty of arms 
been proverbial. Napoleon's mmh upon Madrid in 1808 
ire he knew the exact situation of the British m y  is an 
mple. By that marcn lie lent tus i s d  to l i s  enemy, sir 
John Moore ~eized tlie advantage, and though fhe French 
emperor repaired the error for the moment by his mtonishing 
march from Madrid to Astorga, the fate of the Peninsula was 
thcn dccirled. If he had not been forced to turn apinFtt 
ore, Li~bon wouM have fallen, Portugal could not bave 
n organized for resiatance, and the iealousy of the Spaniards 
:Id never h m  snffered IveIllngton t o  establisli a solid bme 
at Cadiz : thrit geneda  after-mccesses wodd then have been 
a i th  tlie thing~ that me nnborn. It was not eio ordaincd, 
WelEington mas victorioue, the great conqueror waa over- 
tlirown, England stood tlis most triumphant nation of tlre 
worId. 33ut aith an enomoue debt, a dissatisfied people, 
pin ing  pace  without tranquillity, greatness without intrinaic 
, fitrength, tho prwent time unemy, the future dark and thrat- 
ening. Yet she rejaicea in the gloy of her m s !  And it is 
a stirring aound t War is the condition of this morld From . 
man to tke arnallest insect al1 are at atrife, and tlie glory 
of ama, which caanot be obtained without the exercise 
of hononr, fortitude, caurage, obedicnce, modesty, and temper- 
uncc, cxcitw tlic bmve mart'w pahriotism md is a chtening 
corrective for tlie rich mnn-8 pride. It itr yet no semirity for 
pwer. Napoleon, the greateat man of whom liistory maka 
mention-Napoleon, the most wonderful mmmander, t l e  most 
sqacious politician, tho most profound stahesman, iosb by 
armq Poland, G e r m q ,  Italy, Portugal, Rpain, and France. 
Fortane, that aame for tlie unknown cmbinations of infinih 
pwm, ms wanting t o  him, and without her aid the designa 
of man are as bubidea on a troubled o c m .  
NO TE.
A. :UYERJ':NCE to my text will show, that I disputed tho correct-
Dess of g-eneral VandoDcourt's return of the Frenc11 numbers at
the battle of Toulouse, as act don by the engineer Choumara
ill his elaborate aDd aLle lLCOOu.nt of that action. I had no
authentic documonta, but from n. comparison of sw.tcrncnl:8 in
several French authors and deductions from the authentic num-
bers of a prC\-iOU8 period, allowing for IO$lle6 during the inter-
mediate operations, I obtained what I thou~llt a neArer approxi.
JD&tion to accuracy than general VlUidoDCOUrt. Since thU
edition went to press, an authsntic documont has been placed in
my hlUlds, which proves that I did very nearly indeed attain the
true llgurCll in my approximate calculation. 'l'h.i8 document. viz.,
a return of the Fronch troops diSpOBllble hoforo the battle, ol
thoso actually engaged, find of the 108s sustamed, WIIS, when the
French army evacuated Toulouse, left by mar.ili&1 Soult's seCll'e·
tary in the house of Monsiour Courklis, 1I. banker of Toulouse,
who allowed RohertJ. Graves, lLD., F.R.S., the eminent Dublin
physician, to copy it, but with an injunction not to make it publio
fol' & certain number of )'elll'll.
The timo having olapscd, Dl'. Graves has placed it at my
disposal, and I give it below in juxtaposition with the numbeJ:'l!l
attained by myself.
In IM Do>cw.......,. I .. to<! H~,
)'o~ ..vant 1.. b4tllil.lo •.. M,OOO
De!Jqudlu 11 T I.valent ..ux I
hGpiLaWl: ••• ~.OOO
Rut.e ",,1,11 If,,,,. Soult 49,000 60,OOOdllIX"'oble
Desqu"l1U \10 etlient } I
Actuellement eng_gOOs. 39,168 3MOO Oght.lng m~Q,
Office... 1421. eoldlu I
Cllevauxde C8valerie '6U
Do:> de tn.wl.. .. nn





This statemenf; r e q n h  explanation. The French not U&@, 
qnently piit d o m  al1 their los8 as d.it&s, ruid it mnst have beon M 
hero; bccau,uee the bk~s48 e~den t l y  bear no proporticm to the 
killerl, if tukP be taken literally. Bnt taking bleas6~ to mean 
tilo mmdsd left to the generosiby of the vioeom in thc 
abandoned city, thc amomt taIIic8 m o ~ +  accnratoly with tbc 
number of 16iM which Iord Wellingh s a p ,  in hls despatch, h( 
fouad in the hmpitals when he entered Todouae, becanse aome 
No, 1, 
Nro. 1.-Rxh=adfrinn tL o$i&E sfn# fl tñs Q~&G? m y 3  com 
miallded by Igilietktenant-ymwal ser John Mway ,  at the Col da 
Bala W ,  lTfh JI~ 'A~,  1813. & C ! M ~ ~ V E  0f ~flceps, S W ~ . ~ W ~ S ,  
and r m n l e r s .  
NO. 9.-Xxhlact frma tfie uriqhal zowkly state qf the Anglo- 
SiciEian fww, cmma7aded by l imtmat -gmal  BgT 7TTI1tm 
Clinlun. Xead-parters, Iluragona, %Slh fhptember, 1813. 
Xxclzw've of <$%m, sergemts, and h w s .  
Cnvnlry 663 o1 ala s75 40 m 
Artillerg, en&*e&ndBt;ifP 
curps.. .. .. .. 'El7 61 SE 607 E96 1.152 
~nfaiitr~ .. .. .. 9,124 1390 1019 115 anli 11,533 
No. 3.-R&radfmn the o r i g h d  &te of bkt! Malhrqzcina di& 
& ( FY7~ittinyigmamds). Turagma, 151h of W ~ d e r ,  1813, 
APPENDIX.
. I.
o. l.-E.ztractl-rom he .fJirio.l $t<de qf Ae allied a7"11l!l, CQIIIo
an c lieute1lant-general n urra G ~
lJ lay-uel', 17t.4 une, . Exclu.sille of ojJkers, sergeantl,
. dl'1lmmers
P...-. a. rOt hI,. no. c_~•.
"-
.olfl,. TouJ ......





UI.I1 anlllcry ,. ••
'"
• .~ ~, ro. ..Hrll~h ~nglnOl<)'" ~. n~co,... ..
"
, ~ ...
BrillBh ""d Germ"" lnf...tl')' 7.~'.l6 .~ ~, 8,693
Whltti"fb.",".lnfaulrl •. 4,310 =
'"
b.I~9
Slclll.... n/on,q .. ~
'" "'
1,378
Genenl T.>I&1 •• 14,18\ 1479 t.r.G ... 'H 11.L:16
o. 2 -Ext 'al!t om ll o in 'U)uk~'I d t t.U lt "gIQ.
li orce romman crt t! ieut<:n nt'gener l sir Willia
( . H -quart , 1arugQll , 25th &plembcr, .
&cl Uitl6 fofficers, c all s, dru.mmers.
'rnoII' 8, fo, d• .,. !.,k. C.......... H..... Ihlo•. TouI_.
....lt')' •••• .. ..
'" '"
..
"rti .y glnee... &Dd stAfI'
C0ll"' 00'
"
M ro, .% ,1~2
tnfJ.r>trl 1. ,,~ .., ", 1,~;l.
Ge....... ToW. 10.'184 l~lS .m .•, ..~
..'"
.-E:ctr<ICtfi-01ll flu: riginal8Uztc t1l6 llor uinIJ illi-
IWIl JV7Iit illg!uJm's). aragt , /4 fDe,-emlJer, .
Inf&Illrl
UII'I"...... fi;<L c.......oI. 110..... Mol<.. T.tal .......
4014 400 U, 110 :n 11041
No. 4.-E&& frm t7w ori haz s t a k  of tfiaJ1rsf amy m- 
manded hy the cwnp.morrimrDon Xinmciam Copmu et Nmi.. 
~ e d q u a r t e r ~  V id ,  1st  of A?gd, 1813. 
Uider m. Siek. Commnuk Honeh Maleo. m a l  m t i .  
Ininnt dlqxsahle .. .. 10,219 1635 2201 686 . 13,961 
I n  Caxona .. .. .. 1,IR!J 115 308 , m 1,695 
B ~ O C P U ~ ~ ~ ~  .. .. .. 984 17a 144 ,, ,, I,:{~Iv 
drtillery, &c. .. .. .. 877 7 59 6 ,, 3,070 
erprid TOW .. 1 3 ~ 2  %a so2 ia,ooa 
Note.-ThIa &be incIude9 Vila Camps'a, M e l G q  Deren'a, t h ~  
Empecindc's, and k h e k  divisionq besides the h o p  immeditely 
under Eho b l f .  
No. ií. 
No. 1.-Forcs of the Anglo-Part~~ptese a m y  m& t h  m m p t  
qf WeZEiagtm's m r n a ~ d .  Exti.acid fvom d k ~  w i g k F  mom 
ing &aCjm IRe %t1~ of JWTy, 1183. 
omcsra, 'ratul. 
k r g u a i t q k  M k 1  Blm Xtn. norar. 
Brlenh adGermPnm*l 916 b8a4 6,760 . 5834 preaen t under acm . . 2 
Dittc infantry . . ... .. 4665 28,988 84,581 
Portupuesecadalrp .. ., 271 1,241 l ,d92 I& 
Ditta infantrv .. .. .. P 9 1  80 ,51  23.4i9 .. 
G m d  Total, excludre d sick Infrmtw 
andabsentmcornmand .. 573a66 6w8a m d  cavdq. 
Eo. 2,Baplo- P & ~ B B  fww- E x t r a c f d  fmm -& m'giml 
moming dafe, 15th of O c t o ~ ,  1813. 
O@--# 
B a g t i n 1 r . h .  RunL id & %Id. 
Brltlsh and Germsn c s d q  and 
in Pantry . . . . . . . . 6,&59 97,PSR 48,TM 





&rpenot& &Y. h k  r i d  fik Tolst 
&iitlah und &msn mvdrg and 
~nfuritry.. .. .. .. k s ( i  ~ , I Í R Y  43,1183 
~oonuguoae di* .. .. .. a990 2a;~~7 28,327 
Q m d  Total, exclmlve of uiek,l BSa6 absent on command. $c, , . 61.9?11 70.270 
Total .. 74,270 
-
No. t i , - B ~ ~ y E o - P ~ p s e  E&&& &m 7Bh m'ginai 
m m h g  date, 13th Wbrtuwy, 1Y14. 
IufatlttY 
I3rkiah md h - n I ~  idht rp .  .. , . AEgS 9 ab,306 
Portngueo infaritry .. .. .. 1 ! 8  
- 
Gmcrd Total. pre8cnt mder arms . . 66,204 
-
Ariüierymen. &e., a h n t  .. .. .. 4,000 
omctm 
8agFRUm, 'km &nk&5ln. ToinL 
B13Ush m d  Germen cbdq .. .. 1139 7,840 
Portugmcmcavdry .. .. .. 830 9;s 1:;) 
hfistq. 
Brltishand i3emaulnfantrg .. .. 4946 w,9iss 84,94s 
Fmwgawrnfanwy .. .. .. waa 16 .9~3  19,6051 54~550 
Qeaeral T o a  pmmt mder arms .. 648Z7 
-
T h s m m h , , 8 b o ~ t  m. a. I;wP 
10th 1814. 
omrq -1 
k~hntrp. p m t  ander ami. &ir?antaBto. and 61s. Ibtd. 
lecond divisiun, Britisli.. .. 715 4 121 
Uitm I'ortupiiw .. 238 I:t1(i71 
f M n l  dtvision. nrirlsli.. . . 599 Grana ToW, 
Infantrv, nficars 
Pourth divinimi. llriti7ft.. .. h31 i ~ % a ?  ..,, 1 and soidiers. ore- 
Note.-Thwe b no aeparate date for the cndry  on the 10th of April, 
but on tha 15th o€ May, 1814, they dood a follot~a :- 
Otfirrrq Rnnk 
Cmmlrg. prtmt nnder rmi~ Ilcrgrnnia. &c. aiid lile. 
h c k ' ~  hrlpdc of h m i n n q  . . . . 1 12 
Ponuonliy's brigde of IlrItish .. .. 1Xt l  
Faine'r bri~nde of Rritlsli .. .. .. 210 
\.ivinri'r hrignrlp nt H ~ i h s h  ' 128 6351 




Totnl of  AnpbPortngtiese cnsalrp sud Infantry, present unrier gims . . 37,917 
Add theYpaninrds undm Frcym md Morrlio, to&ethcr &d ta bc ,, ld,lMO , 
-
51.Yli 
~rtwergmm, dco. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ., ~ ~ r a  
Node.-Ny authority for fhe nnmber of p u s  empIoyed during thia 
campaign are q i e s  d the returns giwn to me by sir hlexmder Dickwn, 
who mrnmñnd%d that am. The number of artilleiymen i s  nnt borne on 
the moming stntes; ht in tho oripnal wnck1y ~ l t m t O  of the 15th of Mny, 
1814, 1 fiiid the artillerymen, etiginoers, drivera, nnd w p n - t r ~ i n ,  
amoiinted t o  four thou~imd ~ g h t  hundred and twenty-one, with five 
thousand m d  thirby horaes md mules. lliis m q b e  taken ris the averqo 
atrength during tlie mrnpsign; riiid aa more than hnlf wem wth sir Jolin 
I:ilPe w d  some with lord Udhmsic, tlie number d the bmttle VE 
TouIoirsie wnld not have exceded f iR~en  hundrd, m a k ~ n ~  a total of xll 
ranks and armr of fifty-thm tloua~nd combatanta. 
No. 111. 
lo. l.-GewvaE &a& of #lis F m i  amks m& Smlt and 
hcfiet. I E s A a c t ~ d f i m  t Ae Impm'a 2 1Uwtw+r~119, Jdy,  1813. 
T7te amies  of 11te n09,th, c&re ami md/1 Lnng h~ un inipmhl 
decree fi-wganized in m fiody, tah-hg i l ~  tiSk oJ' t h  army of 
S&%. 
m t  undmmma. Dcta&t4. HoapEtala. Total. 
m .  Horaaa. Ma8. Harmm. Mon. tronem. 
rmy of Spain .. 91,983 1!,6i'6 4110 as2 14,014 11 i.167 l3,P28 
Arapon .. 32.3C2 4,919 3Wi 531 3,731 39,384 5.470 
Catnlonia.. 25,9lO I.Xfi!) I G B  .. 1,879 2?.1?7 L.i.I.4 
-. - - 
General Totai.. 15425.5 19,464 681 945 18,634 1811,808 90,242 
No. 2.-15th o f  SmhAw. 11813. 
., a Total 
Mcn. Bonrn. Mea. Wcn. Mm, Jlorana. 
m p d l p l l n  .. 81.351 ll , lb9 4006 1438 22.494 107,843 11.272 
Arnpn .. 32,476 4,417 2723 320 s,Gt6 s,R:s 6,arr? 
U . .  2 ,  1,G7D i 20 ,, *, lar  u 2,4:)7 
~ m e r a ~  ~ ta l . .  ~37,ss3 17,t76 6915 17s 28,241 r : z , m  a0,or.i 
-- -  - - - -- . 
Note.-The garrisan of h Sebaatim thougli mptive iii borne on this 
%h. 
'I'hi~i s ths lnst g e n d  &%te of the French army in my p ~ s ~ i o n ,  hnt 
ie two foiiowing notes wwe inaerkd in the Imperial &lis 
No. 3.-DefaiEd &lak of f Ae army q f ~#paipa, Jdy, 1813, wRm 
8orll  took the rcimnsa~id. 
BGrcti~r nnd 
RIaht &t.-Lleutenant.uened Reille. mn-eT~crlvc. - - 
M*!?. Toinl. 
Flrat divldw, Pq. 9 bnttallons .. 6.!122 lb9  PrePEnt nnderms.  
leventh dllto, hlnucnne, 7 ditto . . i , i U B  
l i n t h  ditto. U l lnniniew. i i ditto ::; A8 ho"%. {$i\3'36 
- 
Centre.-Drouet, Count D'Erlon. 
Gecond dlrislomD' Arrnagnac, R hatt. 6,861 
Thrd dtto.  A ,  9 d i  8 20.957 694 j%} 23,9% 
8 i x t t i  ditto, l)nrirsi, Rol i lu i  5,96ii mcn. hrirw 1iiii2? 
Left win~-Liei i t . -gcnm Clniisd. 
Fourtii ~liiislori, Coniuius. 9 hattal~ 7,&56 : I ; i  
TiiTt) tmin. ~rmt~vr immen,  7 {iltto 4.161 !" 17.21g { m n l ) ~ , ~ w  
Lic!it~i  d ~ t t c ,  Tiuiprn. IW ditto Ü,YH 1.ii men. Iiorses. 
Kewve.-General Víllatta. 
Fmnch .. .. .. .. 14,959 2091 l'fm 
Fercigo . . . . 1 tmitalloiis of tlie fihine. rfrcnyh not dren. 
4 dliui lmlioiia, gcncrol St. Pul, rliftn. 
4 drtto Spuiiiiulu, ~ i i c r n l  C ~ b i n o c m ,  d*to. 
Eüectlrr 
wiceff*ctwe. 
mdrg.-I%m 6OUld. Ibm. Mcm Total. 
23 rqrinimns .. .. 4723 4116 Preannttinder m s .  (S17k3) 7,52t 
Ditth-Trielhard .. . . . . 2358 2275)7IiBl me", 6891 homs. 2313 
Toini aocorüiii~ tn.tbe organliktion, by-t) ,,,4W 
excli~qive af tlie foroign bnttalionn.. Q1,086 
Idci nndtram* 
Tmps mt in the orpnination .. 14,936 16,946 
Gsnerab ~ m i e o n o t s t  aebnstlan, i i t ~ n l y  
PPY { ror~~lntn~ p:wt of thts number.. a'151 apB6 
Caxnn,-nittn ol Pnnhp~liiiia+ l o t  .liily .. 2,Wl &i91 
Lmcth.-Uitto of Yniiwn& 1st May.. .. 1,465 1,674 
Secoiid ~ 8 e r v i :  nul a11 tlie u h v e  . . . . 5,595 6,iW 
No. &-Bdailed atate ofthe a m y  of &A, 16th #@Mtr, 
1813. 
i . .. b0' i i j  
. . Villatte .. .. 8236 
Prwlsionml t m p g  ot tñe r&ht The Itallan brlde,  nbmt 
wing. dectlncil tu reidoroe 2004 oidered Mllan. 
the gerrison of B w n e  . . 
Cav*.-Plwre Smlt .. .. 
Dilio Trielhard .. .. 
~ennd'arnien{ mountcd dlarnounbed .. .. 
Parc .. .. - -  .. .* 
Enginaers .. .. -. &k luna .. .. 
~ a n  Eh~tIan.. .. 
Santona .. .. 
St. Jcon Fied  de'^&' 
N~vairone .. 
U L I ~  of G .. 
APPENDIX. Z09 
No. IV. 
Ondtmfor bk mml d W I h  $ tlGB allkd umayfoP dfie d h k  
of tire e ~ m y ' 8  f i r lged  position i m  fimt of ~ b s l m e  jbpor to- 
ntnraw, 1st April, I 814. PuZl i s I~d  in t h  Wnited X m i m  
Jmml, October, 1838. 
m . 1  
S%. Jq, 9th Apik, 1814. 
' The h n t  attaek of the third division ia  to extend frem the 
river Garonne to tlie great road whfch leads hom the village of 
La Landa to Toulonrie (the road from Montaubanj inclusive of 
that road. 
T1ie light division will be immedütkly on the lefb of the third 
division, niid it  will e x h d  ita front of attack from the p e a t  rmd 
aliwe-montibned nntil it wnnccts ita left flmk with thc rjght of 
the iepankh troops. 
' The operntions of these two divisiom are meant, however, 
mom as divcraiona %han ns rcd a t t ~ k a  ; It not being expected 
Shat they wiU be able t o  force any of $he pnsae~ of tho canal 
mhich cove~s Toidouse. The line of the canal is to be threatened 
chiefly at tlie hndges and at; the looks or any other @nts where 
tlin &rm of th4 ground, or 0 t h  circnmstnnces nost  fmapour the 
ce of tlie txoopa. A considerable part both of tlm third 
rthe light rliaisiona munt be kept in reseme.' 
flote.-The analyxiiis of the dlllied armp on the 10th o f  Apd, 
@en in Appendix II., sections 6 and 7, hns bcen very carafi~lly 
made and fnithfdly set dawn; but as thc renl nurnber of  tlie 
d i e s  hQs lately bccomo a point of disputo htwcen Frcuch md 
English writers, I hcrc givo t h o  morning Stntu of tilo wboIo 
wcnrnbly printed from tho original document delivered 
the djutant-goncrd to lord Wellington en tho morning o f  
the 10th of Aprii, 1814. The reader d i  thun be enablod, 
with thc hoIp of my ted, t o  trace emh di~ion in ita c o m e  and 
Z Non deseited 2nd Lñie Bn. K.G.L. The Meu m M  are hdds sent m 
l Do. ,, 1st Line Do. 
I Uo. 47th F d  
1 DO 4th Da, 
- - 
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TO BER GMCE THE DUCBESS OF ABRANTEK 
'Tautefois, pourqnoi donc m'étonner de la conduite den 
Portugnisl K'ai-je pas w ici, en Prmm, un des f rhm 
dhrrncs de Junot souffrir qri'on imprimht, Jñns un orivrago 
traduit de l'bngldq de4 cboses revoItantes de fuussetlo Eiur liii 
et sur le rnargchd Neyt . . . . . Cet ouaage, fait par un 
colonel Napier, et qui a trouvE grhe  Jevrant le ministhre de 
lu guerre, parcequ'il dit du bien du ministre, m'n 6té donné 
B mi, it m4 la w m c  de J w t ,  comme renfcmant des docu- 
mentu mt7miipaq. J'ai <Iu y lire une intlAcentc nttqiie 
contre la vie priv6e d t n  homme dont on ne pouvait diro 
aucun. mal cumme militaire dam cette admirable ahire de ta 
Convention de Cintra, pui~lque lea Anglais ont h i t  passer 8. 
ine commission milihire ceux qui I'tlvaient sign6e pour 
'Angleterre; et les beaux vers de Cliilde Hnrold suffisent 
ieuls a la gIoire de Junot, qurtnd i'original de cette convention 
ie serriit ras 1h pour la prouver. Reureusernent que j e  le 
possede, moi, cet original, et m h e  &ns Ies deice l~ngues. ll 
n'mt pas daos 11. Kapier :- 
It iie not permitted t o  a mitn to discover i l l - h o u r  ttt the 
expressions of a lady; y& when thosa exprcssions are dis- 
bononring to him, and reputation mtl wjt joined t o  beauty 
give tliem s wide cirmilation, it would indicate irise~eilidity to 
leave them nnnoticed. 
To jiidge of the tdents of a general by liis conduct in the 
field has always been ths undispnted rigl.lit, of every military 
writer. I will not therefore enter upon that aubject, because 
1 am perauradad thah your gmce could not mean h apply the 
words ' rmIIing f&&oo& t~ n simple j n d p e n t  of the mili- 
. tary genius of the duke of Abrantes. Indeed you intimate 
th& tbe offensive passagee are: those directed against kis 
private life, aand toucfiirig the Convention of Cintra. 1 tliiuk, 
however, your grace lins not perused a y  work with mucl~ 
attention, or you mou~d scarcely have failed t o  pmeiw tliiit 
1 llave @ven the Convention of Cmtm at le@ in tlie 
Appendix. 
Eut in truth 1 have only alluded to general Junot'ri privñte 
qualitiw when they bore directlp npon his govcrnmcnt. of 
Portugal, and with a fresh reference to mp work you will find 
I hava affirmed nothing of my own knowldge. The character 
of fhe 1 ~ t e  dnke of Abranteg givea by me, is that ascriheri to  
him by the emperor Kapoleon, (aee 1;m Cases,) and the 
aiithority of that great man is expresaly quoted. It is against 
Napolcon therefore, md not rtgninst me, who but repeat l i i ~  
uncontradicted obsewationa, that your resentment sl~oiild he 
direcbd. 
If your graoe shodd deign to dispose of any furtber thouglit 
vpon me or ,my work, 1 would venture to suggest a perusril 
o€ the Portiigueae, and Englisli, and Spmish, and Gerwn 
histories of the invaaion of Portugal; or even s sliglit examin- 
wtion of only a swEl part of tlie innumerable, soine of tliem 
very oelebmted psriodiculs which trelit of that event. You 
wil1 be then convinced, that so fnr from hfiving wrantonly 
assailed the character uf general Junot I have made no alight 
eKort to stem the torrent of abuse with which Iie has been 
unju~itly overwhelmed; md helieve me, mdam, tlint t l i e  
estimntion in rvhich nn eminent mRn will be held by tlie 
world is more surely t o  be found in the literatuir: of different 
conntries than in tlia fond recollectiona of liis own family. 1 
admireci general Jiinot'a dariiig chnraeter, nnd having enoiigli 
of the solrlicr in me to like a brave enemy, 1 have, wherwer 
the tmth of  liistory would permit, expressed t h t  feeiing 
torva& him and towards other French generuls whose 
charactem itnd whose acts hnvo hecn alikc maligntvl by pnrty 
writm in thia country : such indeerl hm been my regnrd for 
justice on tliis point, that I h a 6  thereby incurred the cliarge 
of writing with a Prench r ~ t h e r  than a nnational bias, as yonr 
g r a ~ e w i l l  dism~er by refcrring to my lord Mahon's ' Hiatory 
of the War of the Buccession;' in which his lordship haa done 
me the honeur to observe that I have written ' by  fa^ the b& 
PREHUH mmnt yet published of the Penii~sula War.' 
Fos my o m  pnrt 1 stiU think that ta  refrain from wlpr 
hie 
use of a ga1Iant enemy wil1 no& be deemed m-Enghh, 
liongh lord Mahon cons id~a  it whol1y Prench; but hia 
.,,,&hip1s ohervation incontestibIy provea that 1 have dia- 
covered no iindue eagerness to malign any of the French 
generals. dnrl witli respect to tlie duks of Abranteq 1 muld 
show tliat al1 tlis offensive p m g e s  in my work rest upon tlio 
publiied autliority af his omn eountrymen, especially tlie 
emperor Napoleon; and t h t  they are milder in eapreasinn 
tlian tbose aiithorities mould bave warrantd It. iis l iowmr 
so uatural and so amialile in a 1dy to defend the reputation 
oE her dcccnscd iiurrhand, that rathsr than appear to dctmt  in 
any manner from the grace of such 8 proceeding 1 choose te 
be silent under the unmitigatea severity of yonr obaeiwt- 
tiona. 
Not EQ with r q e d  to thnt part of yonr remrtrks which 
reli~te tn marshitI Ney. Aftm wefully re-examining every 
sentence 1 llave written, 1 am quite unable to discover the 
slightest gmunds for yoiir grace's wcusations. In al1 parb ofmy 
work t l i a  name of Xey is ~nentioned with praise. 1 have nut, 
indeed made rnywlf a purtisan of rnarshd Ney in relating bis 
dispiites witli marslials Roult md Mssenm, bwuse I lionestly 
beiieved that be ma.3 mistnken; neitlier bave 1 attrilinted t o  
hiin uiiliouuded tnlents for the hipher parts of war; but this is 
only rnatter of  opinion wliicli tlie world ia quite  apable uf 
apprcciating a t  its trua vdue: upon oil other poiuts 1 bave 
cxpre~ctl - .  admiration o€ marshnl Ney's extraordinury qualities, 
i rnatchless valour, Iiiu heroic enerryl 
In tlie hope thnt your pace  mil1 now think it remnable to 
'ten tlie mlierjty ofpour fceIings tomrds my work, 1 tdce 
r leave, witli more of dmimtiuti for your ge'enerous warmth 
in defence of tb person so clear tu you, tlian of resentment for 
the harsh tcms mliich you Iiave employerl towards myself, 
1 remain, madam, your very obedient servnnt, 
TT an articlicle on the Dzcke of rdingtm'~ Dqdvs,  the 
&ti& m d  Fo~eign, @m?erlo, R&, after describing coionel 
Gurwoorl'u proceedings to procure the publication of zhe dcv 
pxtclics, says- 
"Ve Jme dis t id ly   tut te^ that no other person ei*er h d  
&wss to any documenta of Uie duke, by h p c e ' s  permisaion, 
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for any historicat or other purpose, and tht a11 inferential 
pretensiona to such privilege are not founded in fmt.' 
This assertion, wliich if not wholly directed agabinat mp his- 
tory oertainly inclndes it with otliers, 1 distimtly st& to be 
wmtmA9. 
Tlie duke rif Wellington grivc me the original morning states 
of bis army for the use of my Biatory. 
The duke of Wellington voliiiitarily directed me t o  apply to 
sir George Jfurray for tbe wch-8 yf ~mm&.' TStut ia to 
sav the orders of hattle i s u d  bv hirn to thc diffcrcnt penerala 
O 
previous to every p a t  action. Sir aeorge Xurray tliouglit 
proper, as the reader will see in tlie justiíicwtol pieces Lelolig- 
ing to this volume, to denp al1 knowledge o€ these 'wdm of 
m~mtg.' I lirrve 8ine.e oht~ined aomc of them from otliers; 
lirrt tbe permission to get al1 of thcm was given at St.rath 
fieldsxye in tlie presencti of lord Fiizroy Somerset, wlio wat 
direct~d to lend me thc morning s t a t ~  crcl~so, aud he did do NO. 
Lora Fitzroy Somerset, witli the consent of tbe duke 04 
TTellhg,rrten, put into my liands king Josepli's portfolio, talrcr 
st Yitoria and conbiaing th% mcnaich's corrospondence wit l  
tlie empcror, wit,h the Frendi rninister of wer, nnd with tEic 
maiwlials and genernls who at direrent periods were employei 
in tEie Peninmla Al1 these were documents of no slight 
irnportance for a history oE the mar. 
Refore 1 commenced this H i s t o ~ ,  1 applied verhaily to the 
dt~ke ot' W3Flington to $ve me papera in aid af my under- 
taliing. llis answer mas in substance, tliat he had arrrnngel 
al1 bis ppers with a viem to publication liimself-that he liri 
not decided in whrtt form they shwld he given to the morld 
31- when, pmbably not cZurifig his lifetime, but he tliought liir 
plan wonld be to (&fe m phimd&tielbbtory' to be publishec 
after bis detith-that he was resolved never to pulili~h anytliing 
uuless he could te11 the mhole truth; hiit at t h ~ t  time he coulc 
nof, tell the whole tnith without wonndhg the fedinp ofmang 
wortliy men-witliuut doing miscl~ief&addiiig in a laugliing 
nTay, " ~sFmld do m mucJ~ mJ¿&f  CM B u r n a p ~ ~ t ~ . '  Thcn he 
relatetl many anecdotes illustrative of errors committed by 
genexala and others arcting with hirn, or under him, especially 
at Waterloo ; errors so affectitig bis operations that lio could 
not da justice to  hunseIf if be suppressed them; yet by pulili- 
city he wotild ungrricioudy affect the fame of mnny rvort;'iy men 
whose only fmlt \m duhess. 
For these remns he wonld not gíve me his private papera, 
but Le did give me thr! documents I llave alrmdy noticed, rrnd 
t old mo he ivould then, and alwnys, answer nny quostions onr 

T m  foflowing controvemial pims are aU 1 think fit ta 
pbIish in replg to assdanh. Most of them have h n  pub 
k h e d  as pamphlets : one of them in the h d m  m d  W& 
m i a w  erR&. TEiey mill be found to sustain the ammcg 
of a aork, wwbich, written honestly from good matmhl~, oost 
sixteen yeara of unremitted hbour. Tlie arxount of the dw 
trian Pnissiitl~ and Rusdan secret policy in 18~5, gmen h one 
of the replies to the Qwdwb Rmim, waa drnwn fmm origi- 
nJ secret dipIomiLtic despatchea placd at DJ- & p o d  
w. N. 
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S O H ~  ext;raFts from Aliion's B a q  af the Jdw 
hion reflecting upon the conduct of sir Jolin hloore have 
been sliown to me by a úiend; in m0 of tliem 1 find, 
with referenw t o  khe magazinefi at Lugo, a alfa1 misqnohtion 
from rny work, ta mpport a consure on that gcneral; and nloo 
fhe following ñpecimen of disingenuoas writing which shll 
not p m  mith impunity. 
Speakmg of tbe prevalent opinion that Englsnd conld not 
succeed militarily on the contineiat, Mn Aliion pap :- 
' In sir John Moore's cme this universd nncl perhaps un- 
avoidable error wns greatlp enhanced by Iiis connexion mith 
tbe opposition parby, by whom the military strengtl~ of Eng- 
larid liad been almaya nnderrated, the aystem oI continent11.1 
opemtiona nnifomly decried, and the power and capacity of 
tlie Prench emperor, p t  as they were, mmortldy 
nifier1,' 
Mr. Aliaion here provas himself t o  be oee of tbme anemia, 
t o  sir John Noore d ~ o  dmw npon their imnffinatians for facts 
snd npon their malice for wnclusions. Sir Iohn Moore never 
had any conncxion with any political party, though during 
the aliort time he ~ w a s  in prliarnent in early life, he voted 
witb the T o q  gavemment. Re may in aocieb h3VB mef; 
witti some of  tlie leading men o£ opposition thus grossly 
a~sailed by Mr. Alison, yet it is doiihtfiil i f  be evcr conversed 
with any of them; unless perhaps &Ir. TVyndham, nith whom, 
wlien the latter waa semetary at war, he liad a dispute upon 
a military sabject. Re was however the intimate friend of 
NE. Pite and of hlr. Pitt's fnmily. It is untme tlmt he enter- 
tiiined ot even lmned tomards exaggemted notions of Frencli 
pmwesa; hin experienm and his natural spirit and greatness 
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of mind m y e d  him the other way. In hia jonrnal he thuil 
spesks of the relative merits of the French and Britisb trocpa 
after the battle uf Miida. 
' No action for t he  numbers engaged was ever more bril- 
liant, and when coupled with the Egyptisn campaip is za proof 
that if onr m i e s  were equally large, our mpcriority oyer thc 
French would be as apparent on slrore as it is at seea' How 
indeed could the man who stormed the forts of Fiorenza. and 
the brmh of Calvi in Corsim, he who led the disembarkation 
at Aboukir Bay, the advmce t o  Alexandria on tlie 13th, ilnd 
defended the mins of the camp of Cllesar on the 21st of 
March, he who h d  nmer been penonally foil& in any mili- 
hry exploitJ feel otherwi~e than confident in arms8 Xr. 
Alison may d&te  but he cannot hurt sir S o h  Moore. 
Iw the last volume of dr W d k r  Scott's by Mr. 
LockharC, page 144, the followhg passsge from sir walter's 
d i q  o m r s  :- 
' He (Napier) hm however given a bad sample of accuracy 
in the case of lord Strangford, w J m  bls pointed clmation 
has been as pohtedly repelld' 
Th peremptory deci~ion i~ Mse in reaped of grammar, of 
Iogic, and of f&, 
Of mmmar becaase wlwa an dverb of D&. has no O 1 I 
proper antecedent. Of logic, because a tmth may be pointedly 
re;iclled withotit ceasing to  be a truth. OP fact, became lord 
Strhngford did not repeI but admitted thlie essentisl park of 
my uffimttion; namely, tthat he had falsified t'ne date and 
place of writiug Lis dmpatch, and attrit~uted to  Lmself tlie 
cbicf merit uf musiing the v a l  emigration from Liubon. 
Lord Strangford, indeed, publislied two pamphleh to  prove 
thtrt thc merit really attached to liini; but tlicj hollownesa of 
Ibis pretensions are aposed in rny rcply t o  lfis f i ~ t  pamphlet, 
mdc amcg rrnd the nccuraq of my stntement wae aupprtc(1 
3toniini: by the testimony of disinterested persons ; more- 
. ":'mnicls owr maay iaiters,. professiiig to know the facts, 
SUII, &c. 
1828. did, at the time, in the newspapers, contrarlict 
lord Str~ngforrt'~ staternents. 
T 5 e  cbief point of his s d  pmphht  wras fhe reiteratd 
assertion thiit he wcompanied tlie prlnoe regent over the b s  
of Lisbon. 
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To this 1 mnld have replied, 19 That f had seen e letk, 
written at the time by hfr. Smith, tlie naral officer wmmand- 
ing tlie boat which conveyed lord Strangford from Lisbon to 
tlie princeYs ship; in which lettw it distinctiy stated, 
shat t im~  di($ mt v m h  timt m~al until ajer sb J d  pamd tle 
h. 2'. That 1 possessed let,tera from otber persons presenb 
at the emib~ation, of the aame tenor, and tliat between the 
tvriters of those Iettem nnd the &ter of the Bruton-street 
drñpntch, to dccidc ivhich mre the berter testimony offercd no 
diñiculty. 
Why did 1 not so repIy t For a reason twice before pub- 
lished, namely, that 31r. Justiee Bayley liad done it for me, 
Sir Wnlter takes no notice of the judge'e answer, neither dow 
)fr. hklimrt; rsnd yet it wati the moat important point of 
tlie case. Let the readw judge. 
The editor of the SUR nelvppaper, after qaoting ran artiele 
f o m  the ZYmw upon the subject of  the controversy with Iord 
ñtran$ord, remarlted, that liis lordship vruc Snn 
hcwclIy be lidieved wpon Ibis o ~ h ,  certahly mt 
wpm I& honour at t l ~ e  OEd Baihj.' 1828. 
Lord Btrangford olitaiiied a rule to ~how cauae wliy a cri- 
minal infurmotion ~hould nat be filed aguinst tho editor for a 
Iibcl. Tlie prcsent Iord Broughnrn appenred for thc defcnce, 
~ n d  jnstificd the offenaive passqe by refqrences to lord Strang- 
ford'rr own admisaiona in tlie controversy: and tlis judges 
tliinking the justification good, discharged the rulo by the 
mouth uf lord Tenterden l. 
During tho proceedinga in court the rrttorney-general, on 
the of lord Skrai~gfmcl, referring to that nobleman's  de^ 
patcli, which tlior~gli purporting to he mrittan on the 29th 
November from R.3I.S. Hibernia off the Zlws m 8  reiilly 
mittcn the 29th o€ Dwember in Bniton-&re&, said, 
' Everybody Icnew that in diplolomacy tliere were nepmt ;. 
Gn70 copies prcliared of al1 doci~ments, No. I for the Siin 
the ministcr's inspcctien, No. 2 for thc public.' namplipez 
Mr. Justice Bnylcy ~hook h i ~  head in disnpprohation. 
httorney-general-94, my lord, it is the prac4ice of tliese 
departments and may be justifid by necessity.' 
Mr. Justice 33a~ley-~ l Iike 1 m t y  in ?z placw, Master 
Attorney-genernl.' 
And so do 1, wheieforc I rccornmend tairi pointed rcpeller 
to Mr. ZXickhnrt when he publishta anather cdition of 1iis 
father-in-law's 13% 
IR the eighhh volnme of the M e  of iT&figtom'# Dm 
patclm,colonel Gurwood has inswted tlie following M a note:- 
' Lieuknant Gunrood, fiftp-second regiment, led Glie 'forlom 
hope' of tbe light division in the assault of tlic lesser breach. 
He af temrds  hok the Prench gol-ernor genera! Barrié in 
tha cihdel; and from the liands of lord Wellington on the 
brench by which he h d  cntorcd, ha rcccived thc smord of Iiis 
prisoner. Tlic pmission accorded by the dulce of Wellington 
to compi!e this morlr has doulitlew been one of the distin- 
guisIied consequenim resulting from this service, and Iieute- 
nant G m o o d  feels pride aa a soldier of fortune in here 
offering himself m an encouraging example to the pubalten 
in future mars.'-'The dehil of the asmult of Ciudad 1Wrigo 
by tlie lesser lireach is of too little importanoe excep* to tliose 
who served in it t o  hecome a matter of h t s to l  The onm- 
piIer however tdws this opportirnity of o b a e h g  that colonel 
William Napier has been misinformed respecting the conduct 
o€ tlie 'forlorn liope,' in the wcount @ven of it by him as 
is appmm ia the Appendix to thnt valume of his History 
o€ tlie Peninsular War. 9 oorrect statement and proofs of it 
llave been siuce furnished to colonel MrilIiam Mapier for any 
future edition of his book which will render any fmther notice 
of it Jm unneocssary.'-Pnge 531. 
My account is not to be disposed of lu ao sumrnq B 
rnaniier ; mr shall tliia note, tliougli put furtli as it were rvith 
tlia weight of the duka of WelIington'~ name, by being inserted 
amongst his Desphhea, remain witllout an ananswer. 
Colonel Gturaood sent me a letter, mntaining what he calls 
<a cowect & a l m t  d pro& uf d.' Uut 1 know of no 
poof8, and the oorrectneas of liis statement depends on his 
o m  recolIectionri, which the wound he reccived in the henil 
at the time swms to have rendered extremely confused; 
at lea.4t the following necolIecGions o£ otlier oílicers are rli- 
rectly at varinnce witb Colonel Gunvood. In his ' c m &  
g t a t m t '  Fie say$ '%%m I first went up the brcach there 
were still aorne of the enemy in it, it ww rery akep md ou 
my srrival at ttli tuup af it uiider the gun 1 was knocked down 
either by a shot or dona thrown at mc. 1 can nasuro you 
tliat not a lock m s  sn~pped m you desmih; Zint finding it 
impossible that tbe breach from ita ateepness and namowness 
wuld be carried by tlie bayonet, I ordereci tlie men to load, 
ccrtainly hfore tba &val of the stormlng prty; and having 
placed some of tlie men on each side of the Iireach I went up 
the rniddle with the remainder, rand mhen in the oct of climliing 
over the disabled. gun at  tlie top of the hreach wl~ich you 
demibe, 1 waa wouiided in tlie head l ~ y  a musket shot fired so 
close ta me that it blew mp cap to  pieceti, tiiic.1 I wrra tumblerl 
ovcr senselcss from tlie* top to tlie h t t o m  of tlie Iireacli. 
Wlien 1 recovered nig senstrs 1 found myself close to Gcorge,' 
who m 5  atting on a stone with liis ami broken. 1 askerl hiin 
liow tlie tliing wm goinq on, h. $c.' 
Now tn  the above b-tdternent 1 oppose the following lettm 
from the aiitriora of the mternent @ven in the Appendix 
relating to the atoming of Badajos. 
M~jor-genemt sir G ~ B Q E  NAPIGR to coIoneI 
WILLIAM NULPIER. 
1 am sorrg our gallant friend Gurwood i~i not satisfid 
wifh, and dispiitcs the acciirag of your aceonnt of the aaault 
of tlie leser breach at Ciudad Rodrigo as detailed in your 
mork. 1 can only sxy, tliat ac~ount wag prii~cipdly, iC 
not mholIy taken from colond Fergtisson'~ (he being one o€ 
my storming cnptaina) nnd m y own nnrrritive of t hn t  trnn~ac- 
tron up to the period dien we were each of us moitnded. r 
d h m  €o ?he cwrecims of m!% I sf&d b ym, and beg furtlier 
t o  say ilint my friend colonel Mitdiell, who was also one of 
my captains in tlre atorming party, tuld me the last time 1 saw 
him at the cornmandcr-in-cliief's Ievee, thnt rny etatement wae 
'perfid+/ corrwi.' And botli hc nnd colonel Ferguwon r ~ o l -  
IcctPri tlie circ~itnñtttnce of my no$ permitting the p r t y  ta 
load; and also, that upon belng clieclred wlien ncarly fwo-tliirds 
np the brencli by tbe enemy's fire, tlre men, forgetting tlleir 
piwes were not loadcd snaplied tLem o f ,  but X cidled to tliein 
aiid remindcd thein rrf my orders to force their wny mitli tlie 
bityonee alonc ! It mns at tliat moment I wac woundcd and 
fcll, nnd 1 ncvrr ritlier upokc to or satv Gurivood a f tcmrds  
during thxt night, as he i-iished on with the otlier oficers of 
Uie pnrty to thc top of tlie lireacli. Upan looking mer a s d  
maiiuscript of tlie various events of my life a8 a scldier, 
vvritten mnny yenrs ago, I Bnd al1 I statd to yau corrohorateci 
in evcry particular. OE coiiise ns colonel Girmood tells you 
he wa4 t d e  at tlie top of the breach before ang of the &orming 
* The prpsent mnjor-general Sir George h'apisr. 
YOL W. Q 
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prty entered it, I cannot hke upon myself to contra 
hinq but 1 certiiinly do not conceive how it wac possiWe 
Iie nnd mysdf jumped into tlie ditch together; 1 saw 
woundcd, and spolrc to  him a@ having moimtetl tlie fm 
braye with bim, a-ad hfoore we mshed up the hreach in tlie 
body of tlie place. 1 uever saw hirn or apuke to Lim after I 
mns stmclr down, the whole affair did nat lust aliovo twcnty- 
five or tliirty minntes; but ris 1 fell wlien about two-tliids iip 
the breach I can only anwer for the oorrectnesv of my account 
to tliat period; Boon itafter 1 wri assisteil to get dowu the 
breibch by tlie prince of Orange (who lriniliy #ave his shsh to 
tie up my shattered a m ,  and which E& i s  now in my pos- 
session) by the present dnke of Riclimond and lord Fitzroy 
Somemet, d tliree of whom 1 believe were actively engaged 
in thc nssault. Our friend Gurwtjod did his diity like a p l l an t  
and active soldier, but 1 cannot admit of his hitving been t*li;pa 
in th breuch tiefopg t l ~  ot?w ofimrs of tlte s t m i ~ g  p r t y  
Vt0,88If! 
I Iielieve yonrself and e v q  man in the anny with w" 
I bav6 the honour t o  be acquainted will acquit me of 
wiuh or intention t o  dgme a gallant comrde and brother- 
oñicer of the credit and honour due to his bravery; more y- 
ticitlarly one with whom 1 hfive lona béen on terma of inti- 
mate friendship, and whose abiiities 1 admire .as m ~ c h  as 
I respect and esteem 1;s conduct as a aoldier ; tliercfore 
this shtement can or ouglit onlg to be attributed to my 
sense of wlmt i8 dw to the other gallant ofiwrs anil soldiem 
who were under my commaud in tiie assault of the lesser 
b r e d  of Ciudad Bodripo, and not to any weBl~ or intBntwa 
an my part to cletract from tlie distinguishcd services of, OF 
the laurels gaind by colonel Glurwood on tbat occasiori. 
Of murse gou are at liberty to refer to me if necessary 
and to make w h t  UBB you plwe  of this letter privately 
or puhlicly either nnw or at any fu ture period. 1 ~kd$/ G1LJIm-a
ta al2 1 JWB m eihteci? to p m m y  olae e(w, ~ n d  I am, 
&c. $6, 
G ~ o n a a  NAPTE 
Extract of a letter from colonel Jnmd~s FERGUS~ON, i.,,,- 
secend rcgimcnt ,(fonncrly a captain of t h ~  forty-tliird 
md one of the storming party.) d d d ~ s s c d  to air 








' I send yon a mernorandum I made some time back from 
memory md in consequence of having seen vririoue accouuts 
4 
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respecting out arisaiilt, You are perfectly corre& to ter- 
wood, and you~ description of the W E L ~  we carried the breach 
ie accnrate; and now I h a ~ e  seen your memoraiidum I recollect 
ths circumstnnoe of the men's arms not beirig loded  and the 
mapping of tlie fiielocks,l-'1 ms uot certsin wlien you were 
woiinded, but your dcscription of the scene oii the  breach and 
the w g  in lvhich it was carried is perfectly nccueate.' 






1 think the accmnt you give in y o ~ ~ r  i istmy, of the 
attack of thc little breach at  Ciudad nodrigo is as favour- 
nble to Gurwood as he bas nny riglilit to expect, lrnd tagrees 
pcrfectly both with your brotlicr Gcorgc's rccolIectious of that 
nttack rtnd niti  mine. Oiir late friend Alcñandcr Skdc, who 
I one of rny oficcrs, declared he was with Gurwood tlie 
)le of tlie time, for a great part of the storming party of 
forty-tliird joinecl Gurivoort's liarty, wwl~o were placing tbe 
lcrs uguiu~t the work, nnd it wax th ensneer  officer 
illing orit tlint tliry wcrc wrong and pointing out tlic wny to 
le bremlr in tlie fausse-braye that direeted out ~ t t e i ~ t i o n  to it. 
onstlirm Wylrl' one of the forty-thirrl \vas tlie fiwt man thiat 
l u  up the fausse-bruye, and we mude directly for tlie little 
hreacli ivliicli ivas defcuded mwtly U-T y m  dawilie. We were 
on tlie breach some little time, and when we collected nbout 
tliirty mcii (somc of tlic thircl bnttalion rifle brigdc in tlte 
niirnher) we matle rt aimultaneoiis rusli, clieereíl, and rnn iii, 
ht positivcly no claim coiild be made ns tu tlie first wliu 
ered tlie hreacli. , I do not want to dispute wiriitli Gurwood, 
1 a p i n  say (in idiich p t i r  lirotlier x g e c s )  tliiat mome uf 
storiniiig party were E i r / i i 7 a  tlte forluru Iiopa. 1 do not 
dispute thnt Gurwood nud some cif Iiis purty n e r e  omong the 
numlicr tlrnt rud~cd ia at thc breacli, l)ut nn to  Iiis hnving 
twice m o u n ~ d  tlie breecli hcfore us, J cannot u&stwnd it, 
and Stede almys pmitiw!y h i e r E  d.' 
T a h g  thus justified mysdf froin the chnrge o€ writing upon 
--... information about tlle asslidt of tlie little brea&, I chal1 
add sometliing abvut tlist of tlie gmt breach. 
Colonel Gurwood oficra liimsclf as an encouraging example 
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for the anbalterns of the British arwy in fnture wam; but the 
following extract from a staterneat oP the late major Mulnckie, 
so well kriown for his bravery, worth and modesty) and who 
as a subalteni led the forlom hope at the great tireach of 
Ciudad Rodrigo, denies wloiiel Gwvood's cIaim to tlie ps 
ticulm mcrit upon mhich he seema inclinad Go found his got 
fortune in after lifa 
E x b k  fmm e memoir addreased by the Iate major MACKIE 
t o  mIonel BAPIER. October, 1838. 
' The troops being immediately ordered t o  advance mere 
tioon across tlie ditcli and npon the breach at the game insta 
witli the ninety-fourth who had advanced along the ditc 
To mount under the fim of the dcfcnders wns thc work of 
momelit, but when tliere diffimlt.iee o€ ri, formidah!e natu 
presented themselres; cin each flank a deep trench waa cl 
acrosa the ramparb isolating tha breach, mhicli was enfiladi 
wit,h cannon and muslcctry; whilc in front, from the rampa 
into the streetg of the town, mas a perpendicular fa11 of ten b. 
twelve f ~ e t ;  the wliole preventing the soldiers from malcing 
tliat bold aud rapid onset so efective in facilitating tho auc- 
cew oof 811th :han enterplis~ The grertt borly of tl ie fire of 
defence being from the housea and from an open space '- 
front of the breacl~, in tiie first impulse of the rnoment 
dropt Trom the rampurt into the town, Finding ntymlf he 
qnitc done and no one folrowing, 1 discovered thnt the tren( 
iipoa tlie right o€ the breach wm mt acrosa the whoIe lengi 
of tEie mmpnrt, tliereby opening a frse access to our t r o ~ ]  
and rcndcring what wm intended by the enemy ag a defenl 
cornpletely tlia rcverse. By thia opcning 1 a e i n  monnted 1 
t2ie top of tbs brench and led the rnen down into the town. 
Tlie e~iemy'a fire, which I have stltted liad been, after wc pined 
tlie surnmit of tlie wnll, confined to the liousea and open space 
alludci2 to, now begran to slacken, and dtirnattrly tliey aban- 
dunsd tlie defenoe. Being a$ this time in advrrnce of tl 
wlio'e of the khird clivision, 1 led wbut rnen 1 could colle 
along tlie atreet, leriding in a direct line from the grent breat 
into the centre of tlic town) by which &eet the p e a t  body m 
the enemy were precipitrdely retiring. Having advanced con- 
siderably and pnssed wmss a ~treet  rnnning ta tlie left, a body 
of the enemy carne auddenly from thnt street, msbed througti 
our rmks anrl escnperl. In pursuit of tliis body, d i c h  aftes 
passing us held tbeir course to the right, I urged the party 
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tbe governor and garri~on had taken ~ e f u g .  The outer g t  e 
of tlie enclosure heing open, I entered nt tlie hcad of tlie 
party mmposed of men of different reginients wlio by tliis 
time had joined the adwance. Immediately on entering 1 mas 
hniled by a French oficer ssking for an Enghsh general to 
wliom lie might mnitrenrfcx. Pointing ta rny cpaulcttcs in 
foken of their semirity, the door of the k e g  or strongliold of 
tlie place wras opened, and a sword presented te me iii token 
oC surrender, wliicli sword I accordirigly received. Tliis 1 I~a t i  
scarccly done whcn two of their officcrs leid hold of me for 
protection, onc on mli arm, and it was wI~ile 1 wm tlms situ- 
attd I&w GeaireooocE m m  wp antl o b t a i d  tJle szvord 
of I ~ M  govmw. 
'In this way, the pvernor, with lieutenailt Qurwood and 
the two officers 1 have mentioned still clinging to  my arms, 
tFic mhole pnrty moved tomrrls tlie ramyiarr,. Having found 
wlien there, tlirtt in the confusion incident to such a scene I 
bad lost ns it rere by accident tliat prize whidi wm actually 
witliin my reach, md ndllich 1 h d  justly wnsidered ag my 
o m ,  in tbe clragrin o f  tlia mament 1 turncd upon my heel 
nnd Ieft thc spot. il?ie following dny, iin comptbny mitli cap 
tain Lindsny of the e i ~ h t y - e i ~ l ~ t l i  reament I wnited upon 
ooIone1 Pakenliam, t h n  assistant-adjutant-general to the 
tliird division, to know if my name liad been mentioned Iiy 
generd Pictun ns iiaving led tlie advance of tlie riglit Zirigde. 
Me told me tliut it  lid, ranrl 1 therefore b o l r  no fiidher nvtice 
of tlic circurndnnce, fccling assured t h t  1 sliould be mentioned 
in tke ivily of ivliiell ni1 officcrs in nrnilnr circumstmes must hc 
so arnliiti~t~s. Jly cliagrin anri disappointment mas bo c ~ s i l y  
imagincd when lord Wellington's desyintches reachcd tlie army 
froni Englaiid t o  find my name nltogcther omitted, and 
tlie rigbt PIrigu~le deprived of tteir j u s l  irieed of praise.- 
Sir, it is erideiit tliut tF~e tendency of this note' (colonel 
Gunvood's note quotcd from tlic Despntches) 'is unnvoidnbly, 
tliougli I do hirn tlic juatiee to bcrlit?ve 11 no rneans Wention- 
ally iipon colonel Giirwoorlt part, to impress the liukilic with 
tlie belief that he waa himself +he f i~s t  Britisli officer tliat 
entered tlie citadel of CiudntI Rodrigo, consequently tlie one 
to mliom its garrison siirrciidered Tiiis impression the Inn- 
pagc he empleys is tlio more lilrely to convay, innsmucli as 
to liis excrtiona and good fortune in tliis pxrticulnr iiistrince 
1ic i.cferrr tlie mliole o€ 1ik professional auccess, to wliich he 
pointa the attention uf tlie future aspintnt as n pledge of the 
rewards to be expected from silnilar efiorts to deserve tliem. 
To obviate this impressian, m d  in bare ju~tice to the riglit 


curate and umpported by the duke of WeIIingtonss despatch, 
which diatinctly aays tho howitzcr was trakcn by thc forty-third 
regiment. 
IIere 1 must state, thst, treating of genera1 Ell's entei 
prise against t t e  Frmch fmts iit Almaraz, 1 quoted tL 
dulre of Wellington as complnining t n  the minishers that Iii 
generals were so Tcarfnl of respondility the sliglitest movc 
ments o f  the enemy deprived tliem of tlieir judgment. Trust- 
ing tliat tlie Desprttches tlwn in progress of publication mould 
beiir me out, I did not give my autbority at Iarge in the 
Appendix; since then, the 1ei;ter on wliich 1 relied hw been 
pulilished by oolonel Chrwood in tlie Despatches, but pnrp 
of the passage to which 1 allude, aníi witliuut any inclicatio 
of ita being so garbled Thig omission might hhereafter giv 
a h ~ n d l e  t o  accnae me of bad ffiifli, whereforc 1 now give th 
Ietter in full, the Italics marking the restored pamage :- 
- P U ~ ~ B  GaimtdO, ~ a ~ - 2 8 t i % ,  1812. 
MY DEAR XIORX),-YOU will be m well pIeased as 1 am a 
general HiIl'a sumes#, wliicli certainly wouId have been sti 
more satisfiictory if Iio hrid takcn thc prrison of Mirabctc, 
wliich lie mould bave done if general Chonme had gone on a 
little betkr in the night of tlie 16th; and if sir Wil)iam Erslriil 
liad not very iinrieoesstirily tilarrned him, by informing hinitha 
Soult's wlinle army were in movement, aiid in Estremadur: 
Sir Rowland thei~fore amording to his instriictions carne bnch 
on tlie SIst, whereas if he liad Btñyed a dity or tmo Le would 
have brought hii hwvy bowitxem to Ziear on the castle, and Iie 
would eitlicr havo stormed it uncler his fire or the gnrsison 
wonld Iiave surrendered. lhi mt&tlastadiq dl t h t  Jm 
p a s d  1 camzot p m a 2  ZLV ilne gmernl oficers to fml a Iittle 
mL+ in tikr situution. Y/"y tCkkB dwrn mt th hd 
moaenaent of t / ~  l a ~ y  amd tlm s p u d  tKe dwq amd i a k -  
wpt eumabbkg, a d  tJg e&r~~opo!im~/ &~mmtanoe &, t h ~  
iftlmj m laot in o o m d  thmj are ari stmt m amy p-wi 
soUk-8 im  Elta m y .  Tour lordsl~ip will observe that 1 Iiav 
inurlred some passages ia HilI's report not t o  be publial~a 
My opinion ia that the enemy muat evacuate the tower of 
Mirabete, and hdeed it is useless ta keep tliat post unIess t h e ~  
Iiave anotber bridge, which 1 doubt. Eut if tlley see that wa 
entertain a favouralile opinion of tlie stren@li of Nimbete, 
thcy wiIl keep thcir garrison t,hcre, which rnight lx inconvc 
nient t o  ns heredter, if we ~hotild w i ~ h  tn eetriblish ihhere w 
QWn bridgk 1 enclose a Madrid Gazette in which Ton wi 
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.e a curious daription of the state of king Joseph's antho- 
by and Ltis ff i irs  in general from the most authentio 
luroes. 
E ~ e r ,  my dear lord, &c. &o. 
WELLINGTON. 
VILLA MKRIEL. 
Tm fo?iowing ~tittement of the operations o€ the fifth divi- 
on nt the eombeb of Milriel, 23th Octobe~, lSZB, ia insertccl 
at khe desire of sir Johil Oswsld. It proves that I have erro- 
neously nttribukd to him the first and, ns it appeared to me, 
uaskilful disposition of the troops; Liut witli respecii to the 
other portio<g of hia stateinent, ~ h h o u t  denying or* admitting 
tlic nccumy of his rccollcctions, 1 shul1  ve thc auauthority 1 
On the rnorning 23th of Octobcr, 18121, mejor-geneni! 
Oswald joincd and ass~tmed tlie winmend of the fifth di~isiiion 
ak Villa hluriel on the Carrion. Major-general Pnngle had 
alrendy posted the troops, rtnd the greater portion of tlie 
division were admirably disposed of abuut the village, as dso 
in tlie dry bed of cuna1 rtmning in i ts rear in some places 
paralle1 to the Carrion. Certain of the corps wem formed in 
colnmns of  attaclr suppo~~cd by reserves, rcdy to fa11 upon 
tlie eiiemy if in conserliicncc of thc mine fniling he shniild 
rentiire to pus11 rt coliimn along the narrow brirlqe. Tlie 
Tiver Iind at some points been reported fordable, but these 
were said t o  be at al1 times difficult md in the then rise of 
water, as tbey proved, liadly practicable. As tlie enemy closed 
towards the bridge, Le opened tt hwvy Fire of hi l lery on the 
village, At tlilit momeut lord Wellington entered it and 
pmsrd the forrncd columns well trhelteretl hoth from fire md 
oliservation. His l o ~ l ~ l i i p  ripproved of the manner tlie post 
was occupied ~ n d  of tlie nclsantage talcen of tlie c m 2  and 
vil%@ to rnaslr the troops. The Fmncli mpported by a herrvy 
sud superior Eire ruslied gaIlantIp on the bridge, tlie mine not 
explodiizg snd destroying ttie nrch ttill tlie leiiding section liad 
almost reached tlie apot. 8liort.ly afkr, the maia body retired, 
Ieavlng only fem ligl.lit tmops. Immedintely previous tci thie 
an orclerly oficer ~nnounced to lord Ivellington thnt  Pdencia 
and ita bridge8 were gained by the foe. He ordered the rnain 
body of tlie division imtnediakly t o  ascend the lieiglts in its 
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iposite side of the river and pardel to it there was a broad 
ep drp m a l .  On our pnssing the brid~te a t  Villa Muriel 
i lzad that villngo on our left, from thc magin  of the canal 
tlie ground slopctl gradually up into hciglits, tlie ~ummit form- 
jng afine platean. Villa JIuriel waa occiipied liy the bri,oadier 
Pringle with a mkl detaclment of infantry, but at the time 
we considered tbnt it required a largei Eorce, aa its mainte 
nnncc appwlred of the utmost imporhance t o  the amy; we were 
rawnrc tliat thi, enemy lind passcd the Carrion with mvalry and 
also tliat Hill'g cacarlores h d  given wrry nit another pzrt of the 
river. Our enginwm liad partly destroyed the bridge of 
Villa Muriel, tlie eriemy attwked the viliage, (at tlie time the 
brigadier and liis stitff were there," pmsing the ruina of the 
bridge by mcans of lad(Iers, &c. h Le encrny in clnving the 
detnrhment from tlie village mmade aome prisoners. We 
retired to tha plateau of ttie I~eights, nnder a fire of munketry 
md artales, where we hl ted  in close column; the enemy 
strengttiened tlie viIlage. 
Lord Wclljngton arrird with his stfiff oon the platean, annd 
irnmcdi~tcly rceonnoitrd the cnemy whoso rcinfomemcnts liad 
arrived and were forniing etrong coliimiw on the other side of 
the river. Lord WelIington irumediritely ordered some artil- 
lery to be opened on tlie enemy. 1 happened to be close t o  
the Iiead-quartei a k f f  and lienrd lord Wellingtan say to an 
aidde-camp, ' Tell Os~vald 1 wantnt Lim.' On sir John Oswald 
mriving he said, 'Oswald, pou mil1 pt tlle division under 
arma and drivo the enemy from tlie villa@ and retain posaes- 
sion of it.' Hc rcplicd, 'RTy Inrd, if tlie Yillngc ~hould he 
taken I do not consider it a8 tenehlc.Tellington then mid, 
*It is my oders, general.' O s d d  replied, ' Aty lord, as it is 
yonr orders they sliull be obeyetl' Iellington tlien gave 
orders to liim tliat lie ahould Luke the second Iirigade of the 
diviaion and attuck in line, thut tlie first brigde sliould in 
criluinn first descend the iioiglits on tlie riglit of tlia aeconil, 
entcr t,Ilic a n a l  nnd wis t  in clcaring it of thc encmy,' and 
srnying, '1 1 ~ 1 1  te11 you mbnt 1 will (10, Oaanld. 1 ivill g v e  
ynu the Spaninrda and AInva into tlie bargain, herided by a 
company of the ninth regiment upon your left.' Tlie attack 
was made wcortling2y, tlie second bumalion of tlie fourth 
regiinent being left in wscrve in column on tlie aIope of tlia 
hilI eñposed t o  a severe cnnnonride wbich for a sliort tima 
caused tliem some confusion. Tlie cncmy were drii-en from 
* A fa[= stopping here misled me nbout the bridge. 1 m d e  the d i a c  
pasa by ladderri i d a d  of &e French. 
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the cana1 and villlage, and the prisonm which t b q  made in 
tire mornirig were retaken. The enemy lost some men in this 
affair, bub general AIava m woundcd, the officcr command- 
ing the company of Bn~nswickcm killcd, and several of tha 
division killed and sounded. Dwhg the atta& lord WeI- 
lington sent the prince of Oranp under a heavy 6se for the 
purpiie of proventing tha iroops exposing themselves at the 
m a l ,  two cornpaniw d&nded the bridge with a rletachment 
just arrivccl fmm Enghd.  The posseasion of the viIlage 
p v e d  of the utmost imporhance, as the retropade movement 
we m d e  that njgbt could not have been effected with saf@ 
hnd tlie enemy keen on our side of the river; it was wc 
were enabled +,o pase along the river wiih alI &mas in the most 
perfed rrecurity. 
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ford anived in Loniion tlle same day* thnt Iie a h e d  at 
Ealt Hi11, yet he wmte on thut day and in hfr. Canning7a 
hourre, tlie despatch dated 29th November, H,M.X, Hibemi% 
ofF the Tagus.' 
'Sir J a w ' t  Yeo.9 presence dur;ng the writing ah Xalt 
Hill is explicitly denied by lord Stmgford; but my words 
were ' mjiclenthy cksswteted,' mcaning thereby, confidentl y 
asserted by others, not by me. 1 repeaf, tlie fa& has been so 
asserted by many persons ; a writteu assertiion of it was befom 
me at  the time of penning the axpreesion. I knew  ir J a m a  
Yco mm the original mtliority, ancl fartlier information to the 
wme prirport ha# reached me since (aee Appendix A) ; never- 
theless I considered aa sir James Yeu was dead, some miscon- 
atructicn of hi6 words might have arisen, snd it would be 
more just t o  lenve thnt matter doubtful; hence the qualifying 
expression, ' i t  i3 confidently asserted.' 
Lord Xtrmgford's denial Es however silficimt. 1 believe 
sir James wss rnistakea 1 believe the Ietter written in bis 
prcsence, and scnt off by a king's meescngsr, rclatcd to pri- 
vate., not to public business: anrl if rny work ahoi~ld reacli a 
second edition, tlie text &al1 run thus: lord Strangfor<l's 
despatch, dated the 29th Novemher, H.hL.8. nibernia, off tlie 
Tqus, but redly writkn the 1Bth December at blr. Caming's 
hause, Rruton-st,reet, b n d o n ,  
Lord Strtlngford aaqiires me that, with the exception of 
'som pmsages t d i a g  to cmprornise tlie safety qf indi,vidunh, 
lo givc notice to I& cWaje8ty''s m w  qf i n t e d d  gierations, 
or t?& m@?&t prove qfemhe l o  €he gmemmmt to mhkh l¿e was 
about to he ~ e - m d i t ~ d , !  a reaaonalAe bill of exceptions truly ! 
no essentid fact contained in tlie original dapatclies was sirp- 
pressed in tlie revised one. Perhaps riot; Lut tbe queation in 
discussion ig mlietlim thnt dcspatch, or mirrativc, or mmposi- 
tion, or wl~atever it may be mlled, did or (lid not fnithfully 
relate the e\-ents whicli l i d  taken place l Wlietlier it gave n 
true or 8n erroneous inaprmhiola of lord IStrangford'a erertions 
upon the ocmion of the Portuguese eniigmtion? A few 
extmcts from thc despatch itself, placed. in juxtnposition with 
* h r d  StranSfod mys he arrived in hton-street on Saturday night. 
Cilphn Pco tliou~ht it wa3 Siindñy moming tliat lord Stmnglord and 
hiniself were toqctiisr xt %lt BilL C m  hiu lordship have m d e  a mis- 
L~ke  of a d g  in thía ingtancc, snch aa hc hns cvidcnily m d e  in hlri 
d ~ p a t c h  relntii-e to his arriv~l  in Lisbon the 5 t h  ot Novemher ? 
-t. Be yav then only Qptain Peo. Loid Stm+ud weiglis his worde 
very riiccly. 
LORD STRAFGPORD. 239 
';he statement now put fortii by hia lordship, wiii set thi 
&ter in a faiir light. 
Lord >9tranv@wd iw M 8traqfr"ord in OOlsm- 
De.vatch. watioa. 
* I accordingly requested m Pwe 82, parnpapb 46. ' I 
tudienea of tlie Prince Ekgent, arrived nt Llatiori on thc &gLt 
:oqether with due atisurnnees: gf €?E 'LBIB iwristanl, and slmost 
3f prOtection md security; and zmrnedicrte<y saw ATr. XArmjo, 
apon rre~ivingB.Jt.Higl~nc.ss's m110 r a s  nlr~arly an hoard ahip. 
ansírer X proccedod to LFsbon 1 tlm p~occoded to tho vesvcl 
m ~ I M  27fB, in Ls Majest 's In wLich tlic Prince Eegent 
ship Confiance. hewing a 2% rrar ernbarlced! and notrrith- 
if truce. 1 Had .Mnmedilat~/y standing tlie wrrertion to tlia 
nost interestína commiinica- c0ntra.y in colonel Napkr'n 
inns with tllc C O U ~  of Lishon, nok,  1 had a long and most 
ho particnlnm of whicb nliaii confidential interviea with Iiis 
,e fu& detailed in n fiiture Roya1 IEighmess. 1 liad theii, 
icapatch. It siifieea to mcri- as coloncl Yapicr truly stutcs, 
ion b thi pliicc tliat tlie ILO puwer eitlier to advanco or 
Prince L g e n t  nwlp directed r&rd ihe emipntian ; biit 
i11?¿;# up~rehensions io  aP~op11:R nliee did 1 crcr nssumo thn t  
amy. u d  all his kupcv [u un 1 Lad, or take anp credit tn 
27)iylishJeet; tbat he received mgerlf for anything that ~ H S R ~ I !  
the mDst cxplicit nssurnnces nt thnt I n t k i o w  with &Roya1 
f'rom me, Ilitit hia Jlajest lijghess. 
rouid ~merouslg avrilooc 
tlioso acta of  unR111ing and 
niornenlary lioetilil Lc. &c., 
snd that tbe ~ri<ing<a~uadion 
before the Tngu~ ahould bo 
emliloyed to p r o f e d  l ~ h  retveat 
f r m  fishon, and Lis voy iqw to 
tLo Braeil; 
To lord StrangSorSs question I reply, that 1 never wcused 
him o€ taking credit for bis exertiom at an inrerview Eind tlus 
migI~t of 2 1 ~  SSdh, with the Pi-ince h g e n t  on beard sJGp; but 
I did msert tlint his Ritibn-8treet despatcli conveyed an 
e- ina;m.ewim aa t o  his personal procectlings. 1 wsert 
it apin.  A despatcli, statiug t.hat lord Strangfard proceeded 
So LislJm tlce 27th, arjd immnedicstdy 111~41 niuat iiiteresting 
communications vitll tlie w t  rif Lisboii, (loes nut convey 
the iden thnt lord Strnngf~xl  ~rr ivct l  in thc nigIbt of l J ~ e  Zstl~, 
nntl saw the Prinee Rcgerit oii board ahip. Tiiiri goes to tlle 
pith of tlie qiiestion, because tlie t.niliarkut~on of the roya1 
furnily took plnce on tlie 27th; wiicli. coupled with tlie c m p p r ~  
Jm-m direcld lo a AWc m~np,' tlie ' h p s  to ala ~ ~ 1 ~ ~ 4  
&t,' unrl tlie explicit astiurance that the Brittsh sguudron 
' o d d  pw~ect ' the princea ' 9-st~mt fim X,kh,' inevitahly 
Id to the concliisinn, tliat his lordahip'~ ( kwnediate eommatfi 
m i c a h '  prorluced the resolntion to embark: than which 
not.hing coulrl be more erroneous. 
Eut it seems, notwithstandjng rnp asserti~n to the contrary, 
lorrl Stjrrnngforrl hnd Iong and moat cnnfidcntial jnterr,iew 
with tlie prince regent on board sliip on tlie night o€ the 38th. 
Tlie expresaion ' any oficial intervicm,' h k e n  singlp, may be 
construed to mean, tliiit lord Stmngford lid no iuterview 
wbatever with the Portuguesa prince; but talcen with ita 
context, plainly refers onIy to an intewieiv demrtnded for the 
purpose af urging the emigration, md in that sense lord 
Stt-angford adniits its tnitli. 
Compuring tlie rdnt i~e  merits of lord Stmng.ford md sir 
Sydney Smith, with referente to tlie emigrntinn, I aclmow- 
ledge that the words .L?qt  a naval force off Lisbon' do jmply 
grcater activity nnd zeaP by the Rnglish ministers tl~m tiie 
facts, ns stated by lord Xtrmgford, wiü ju~tjfy. I will sub- 
atitnte thc mard < & a naval force.' 
Lord Ekrangforil rests Iiia c l~ im on a Iong series of pre~iotrs 
negotiations. 1 do not denj his lordship's perseverante in 
tliese nwtiations; but 1 deriy tliat his Iieriseveraiice wiis mc- 
cessfd. Al1 that can be said is, tlirit in deepite of tlie con- 
fifimtion of Ennliah propcrq, nnnd the detxiner of Engliuh 
auhjects, and altliougli he nPaq himself driven, iit were 
ignominiously out of Lisbon and forced to join tIie fleet in an 
open Iioat; and altliough tlie~e insultswere pat f o i v ~ ~ d  by tlie 
Portug-ucac prinoc ns n pclicc-offcring to thc Prcneh monarch, 
Iortl Strringfhrd ~ti l l  Jind laqws! 
The prince regent was timid and iresolute, and there wns 
a powedul court faction opposed to tlie emigmtion; but lord 
Strangford tbought fenr wouId prevail over indolente, that 
t l ~ e  princc would finally mniyrntc, nnd he did e m i p t r !  ? lord 
fitmngftird g t ~ ~ d  UYII! In America t l i is  miglit be apositive 
merit, but t3iere tliey have not red ribands. Let us, Iimever, 
examine x IittEe rloser into tlie fncts, as given bp bis lordsliip. 
Early in August, the prince regent, spealiing through hia 
minister, ~olcmnly mgurcd lord Strnngford be woiil$ uot 
consent to the demand for confiscating British property in 
Portugal. 
Tlie 19tli of Aupst, the prince m o t a  an xutog~aph letter 
to the king of Engl~nd, in wliich he declared liis tixed resolu- 
fion to emipate, rnther thnn secrifiioe liis honour by conaenting 
to the Freiich and 6pani.sh darnands. 
The 2nd of Eepkmber, a m c i l  behg held at Jfafia, it 
overmlielt 
poss~xsion 
ww agreed the ernigrat . take place in eitlier of the 
following cnses. Igt, I :h shonId nttcmpt to compel 
tlie prince to vioIate the ngnta of BritiqEi subjecta in tlieir 
pewons or property. Snd, lf au aing French force 
Jtoull cross the hontiar anrl take . af the Portuguese 
forhesses. 
On tlic 2nd of November, h. de Lima, a Portugu~e 
courtier, returned from Paris; Be was sdverse to the emigrn- 
tion, and the 8 th oT November d BrettB?~ popwty wm cal+ 
Jvcahd, U& IITiELSh &jmk det&wd m p b ~ ~ e r ~ ,  Here 
then tLe first cuntingency on whicli tlie depmture oT the priuw 
mas t o  depcnd h d  talrcn place. Did thc e m i p t i o n  followl 
No! bnt tlie Britisli minister m s  diven Rom Wsbon. Nmer- 
theless the prinoe regent privately maured the la t te~  he would 
etiiffratc t7ie Prmh apmy aclvamed. 
llaaildiilc a state of war commenced, lord Strangfonl's 
functiona cerned, anti sir Sydney's carne into full activity. 
Lislion and Xt. Ubcs were blockadcd, md Portugucsc sliips 
detajncd for adjudimtion. The 20th of Novemlier Junot 
crosaed tlio frontier, the 24th, a, coiincil was 1ieId by the prime 
regcnt; tlie second case liad arrived, ttie ernigration, says lord 
Sh-augfortF, was resolved upou, tlie prince's promise redee~ned. 
Not so f st, rny lord. A resolution takeii in the couucil of Mafra, 
\vas to  emigrate rnther than sacrifice British subjects antf tlicir 
propcrky ; yet d e n  tha push carne, thc fint were detainerl, 
tlie second was confiamted. The prince regent also promised 
tIie lcing of England that he would emigrate ratlier tLaii 
accede ta tlie deniands o£ Fmce and Spain ; y& he drove the 
lcin;'~ representative from his murf confiamted British. pro- 
pcrty, aiid mnda British subjects priaonem to plcese tlie 
Frrnch. Tliu~,  ~coortling to lord Straqforrl, Iie brolce Iiis 
l>ublic, solemn, voluntary promise t o  the so~ereign of England, 
wlien he thouglit by so doing he conld mollify the FreiicJi 
muearch. Can it then be doubted that he wouId have brolren 
liis private promise to  lord Strangford, if there l id been only 
t l re advanoe of tlie Fmnch army to induce Iiim to  lreep it9 
Tliosc wusm were, 1'. Tbe reception of a J f w ~ i h r ,  in
whicli jt mas intimated by a man wlio rarely broke bis poIiti. 
cril promises, tiiat the I I m e  of &'.fagama d w l d  mt rdgn. 
So. Sbe 'aoli tayj  &$w' of sir Sydney SmitL, whicli oirered tlie 
msistunce of the English fleet to  formrd the emigratiun, anJ 
meilmced Lisbon with m attaok Et that mmure was dcluycd. 
Lord Stmngford mys,   ir Sydney's Ictter hatl no iiiflncnce 
on the prince regent's decision, but there is good gsound for 
lidieving the resolution of the 24th m not fin~l; the p&e 
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h r d  Strangford prwl mw~nimimana and splendid 
rneasure. So lord Lim tallrecl of a marcli to Paris, 
and i ~ i  due time it Iiap~,,~,.,. lielieve larll Liverpool riuea 
not mear a 'CtTrtterloo mcdnl, and 1 believe Iord Btrnngford's 
predictions ~voulíl Iiave f~ i l cd ,  if the J o r a i ~ ,  contriiiiing thc 
intirnation relative to tlie House of Brapnza had nnt been 
rcceivcd, a11d if sir Eydiiey Smith'a ' wlitamj Eettw' hxd not 
ai-rivcd to give fiill e0ect t u  tlie fear created by the dfmifacl.. 
If the prince liad rwlly resolved to emigrate previoiisly, 
wliy were his ships not prep~red for the vopnge'l wliy nll t he  
confiisioii nnd distrem to inrli\-irirliials from t h c m n t  of previoits 
amngement wlzen he did embarlrl w l o  wae the British pro- 
perty confescnted P why was t,be British mmiaister driven from 
tlle murtP ivliy, if the prime was so friendly Lo the Englisli, 
iii sncli confidential intercoum with tlio British minister, 
mhy, 1 ask, dirI tlmt mminister leave bim iii ignornnw of tlie 
ftict, tliat very v~iliial~le property mrl msny Britisk sut~jccta 
wew fitill in Portugal d i e n  he signed the decree of confisca- 
tion f 
It is dar  RS 8. Lisboa aun, and Iord Strang-fod says M 
much in para~aph forty-five, tliat this wealc priuce u~oulil, 
hetwmn powerful contending fmtions have vricillnted until 
diinnf renclicrl liis linlñce, hiu3 not the , T d m b ~  piit rin end to 
I~ is  Iinpea of mollifying the Prench, ancl sir Sydney's vigororis 
ncgoti:ition puf m end to his indolente. If therefore the xeerl 
riliaiid wns a remad for inducing tlie aplendid and maDmni- 
moiis mnning away of the princc regent, it sliauld Le eut intu 
tlircc pnrts, onc for lord Btrang-ford, ono for sir Sydncy, one 
for thc miter of tfie Nrmiteuí-. 
I de n ~ t  nsk lord Btrangford if the pnnce expreased his 
mqm-isq tlirtt tha Bmton-street despatch representetl him m 
iiiiliic~iccd h emigrate by lord Btrnngford'8 renionstrnnce; I 
do not nslr i f it be not a rniaMta ila Iik L inhn-akee l  dqak/d 
to say Iic nccomlianied the prince regent in his passagB: #m thc 
h. of L7.~hon; 1 <lo nnt usk if tlie captsin o f  tlie Hilimia 
wns liot tllr j í-xt K~yEZt71mm the prime mct from tlie time nt' 
k1i4 quitting Lisbon, until 8fkr he liad cleamd tlie inoutt o£ 
tlic rivcr. 1 knom the prinoe said al1 tkis, ivhen in the 
Crtfnls; hiit 1 sin content to establish the general acmracy of 
my owii liistorical note. 1 have m c h d  positively only 
tliree esscntial facts. 1st. Lord ~k~ngf0oi .d '8  Bruton-titrect 
~Irsp~tch (lid not do justice t o  sir Sydney Smith. 2nd. It. 
gnve ran erroneous imprecaion of his lor&l~ip's orm proceed- 
ing. 3rd. Lord 8trangford got a retl riband for it. 1 hitve 
d o w n  it did mi: do justice t o  the dmiral; lord Straagford's 
~2 
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own staternents prove that it d 2  give an emeona w u n t  af 
bis proceehga on the 27th; but it a p p m  he got tlie red 
xiband for hia predictim. 
Lord Xtrangford has pablished a s m n d  Psmpblet in 
dcfcnce of bimself. I would have onswered it, bad nok his 
Inrrlship mmed criminal procdinga to be tsken +nst 3Tr. 
Mudo Young, the editor of the Swn, for some pwliarly l i a d  
and insult,iing obsemkions upon lord. Stmngford in tIiiu mattec 
Lord Bmugham, oonnsel. for Yr. Young, mainhined the fusticc 
ol bis client'n obsemtion~, rtnd the r e d t  saved me the trouble 
of writing. For when hfr. T p d 4  attornepgened, defended 
lord Strdiigford'~ proceedings on the ground that it was usual 
t o  m k e  tha puhlic deqmtch fdsc, Mr. Juat,icc Bnyloy pithily 
obriemed, that ' /M Eiked hm.&$ &a al1 p l w ;  and the coiirt 
refuaing bis lordahip a remedy, &discbarged the n i l e  for a trial, 
LORD STRANGTORD. 24 5 
APPENDIX 
- - --3h, June 16, 1828, 
DRAP BIS,-In reply to our inqniq m d e  on tha part of  ~ O I F  
I<r~tli~r,  I ean snfolp s q ,  & he is not tha onlv poraon r h o  ha. 
Iicard Lhe rcport of a despatch Iiaving been wrttten at Sdt Hill; 
fcir I have hemd it too, and mvinformantwas cantain Yeo fafter- 
s n d s  s i r  damcfi ~ e o ) . '  
He told me that he saw lord Btraneford writa at S& Hillshat 
he conceivcd to be a, deapatch, and yhnt what w m  then mritten 
nva scnt off by a king'a moasonger. T h i ~  im rcs~ion (whether 
miitrkon or not) aas whal uiu on sL Jamea feo*.  mind ,  1 am 
rrfectly certain; hut 1 can myself speak only to the fa& of L a  
Garing communiontod it to me. 
1 =m&, very aincereIy onm, 6. D. SXITH. 
IRtter fronm ziice-iadmiml a+ G r a h m  Xm, KCB., to  
Zimt-rol. Wm. Xaph.  
Cobham, S-, Jane 4,1828. 
& f ~  DEAE KAPIEE,-1 have R perfc~t ~ ~ o l l e c t i ~ n  0f h v h g  been 
inforrncd by different Portug~ssa gentlcmsn a r n o n ~ t  thme who 
accornpz~ed tha lato kmg of Porhgnl (nt that time princo regmt) 
t o  tlie Urazii~, that liis embarking on tlie 87th d q  of November, 
1807, rrtis n msasrira not rcsolmd upon mtil the dny pravious to 
ik taking plncc; that the princo h d  al~nys entei.tained somo 
L o p ~ s  of being able to accommodate rnatkrs v-itli tho Frencli; 
tl int he nwer mould have ventured en tlie stap lio did, Pind tlie 
Uritish uqmdron not appeared; and tlilit a Ietter sent in Iiy sir 
S y d n q  Sinith tiinied tlic acale. LTe hnd long been wnvcring and 
rlinnging, accortling to tlic nem m d  rcports of thc dav, and 
~carccly auybody st Liibon thouglit thnt he w o d d  $ut hia 
dechred jntention i ~ t o  esc~ut~ion, which, in a great dcgree, 
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accounts for the un repmed &te the fleet was inwlienit rnnmt 
of tlie Tapa, ahicf for cnnfmion. dirt, nnd digordcr, eroocdcri 
anv ucene I ever belield. f i u m  dl tliat 1 letirned in the Urazila, 
aIiiJ fm lrrhat passed off Lishn and on the passage, my opitlion 
Iiaa ever been, tlt;liñt, the presenra of th~: Rrit,i;ih s riadron off 
Liabon, tho rnessaac aent io by sir Sydnay Srnitli, m3 thc cp id  
advmce of ILe Frcnch,trmy under Junot, thua placing Iiim, us 
one might say, htmeen tlie devil and t11e deep sea, rrere tlie real 
ratwea of thc cmipation of tlic princc rcgcnt nnd the ravd fnmily 
af P o ~ a l  to the  Uraeils. 1 have also a perfect rewhr~ction of 
tlie disgust which everpbod nt Xio (Fe Janciro fclC wlicn the 
d~spafct~ 8 i p . d  ~ t i n n ~ f o r k  nnd datad hi. Majrsty's sliip 
Hiliarnin, off the Tngui, Eov. 29, IW,' appemcr\ thcro. It 
SecrnP lo  me af very little importrtrince wlicther that despaich i r ' e r ~  
written ab Salt Hi or in Mr. Canning's apartments in London. 
1 m, h. &o. 
GBAW MOORX, 
A N o h ~ ~ o n s  periodical dticisms are liko wasps, they sting 
niid die; but eldioratc writinp, a~imentativc,  rtnd imputing 
inaccurircy, are rliferent, 1 speak only of Fnglidi works; to 
meet Spanisli witers would be endless labour. Sir Hew 
Dnlrymple's excellent Memoirs, published after my second 
volume l i d  appeared, sliow 1 have nuot strained rny autllori- 
tics; and if tliey are not suEcient, 1 have no other juhiifica 
t ion ns rc*p+rls Spin 
TEie Eiiglitih pziblicrttions which 1 propose t o  notice, lare- 
lo. ITotc.4 on tha Campnign of 1808-9 in tho North of Por- 
trtgtl. Ry Coloncl Xorrel. 
2'. Narrntive of the I'eeninsular War. By Major Leitli Hay. 
3". Annxls of the Peninsular Campaigns. By the Author of 
Cyril Shornton. 
4'* Etrictures upon Colonel Napier'a Hiatory of the Penin- 
~ultir Wer. Anonpous. 
59 Lifc of the h k e  of Wellington. By Major MoyIe 
Slierer. 
Co7oncl WmZs iVoh.-These were dictated by sir Davjd 
Baird in tiie notion tliat 1 and other wutbors, a i m d  to lower 
Iiis repuhtion; a d e s i p  not t o  be discovermi in w h ~ t  1 have 
snid of tlint bravc oficer. Bnt history wo~ild iiideed be an 
old almannc,' if, out of respact to pemons, errom influencing 
grent events mere srippressed: in tl~k view only have I 
censurerl sir D. EaiIíl, and I wilI now jnstify m y  censures, 
yet my own mistakes aclíltowldge, with a ~incers wisli tEiat 
tlicy were fci~cr. 
1". It is charged as a fault, that 1 saitl, ' the v m  of m? D. 
B&r& a o l m  &rked b q d  Layo m. the 26tA iVuvmder, 
1808.' 
The simple fnct coIonel Sorrel doea no$ dcny, but sny~ t,hnt 
' the column was well closed up to Astors by 
h'iirrative, the 29th of Nuvemlier.' Nevertlieless, sir D. 
p. T B .  Baird informed  ir John bfoore that hia troops 
c& mt &e ;econottlztrtated at Astwqa eyntil th 4th of 
Bemnber. 
2'. M y  work states, tlint, previously to hls lrnowing of the 
fatal liattle of Tudelu, ')Sir J.  Noove p~oposecl iw  cme hc cot!W 
d ~ a w  tAe mhwM wi~ags of Ski8 a m y  totyatim in good time, to 
EGbmdon all annrnunkdm mtI8 PMugd? t/&rou) F~imey into 
tb Jmrt Spain, ansd, c l~aw iy  ~ound J~im dakl L mulo! of 
d J i ~  iSpuni37~ /m, Afmd t 7 ~  s o u t l m  p r o r h m ,  trustiytg lo 
the w7~ich w h  om appd 10 the pat&ot&m and courup 
qt t!ie iSpmiurds w l d  pradum.' 
Coloriel Sorrel tliiiiks tliis "R1usi he meSt&.' But siir J. 
Afoore's letter to %fr. Frero proves tlia fact. 
Km's Rad thi8 amy been united anrl rently to act rit 
~,'*",~"' t l ie  time OE general Castaños' defeat, much as 1 
tliink it would have been risking it, yet it mas 
mg intention to  have .ve~~:l ied ou Madrid, and to Lave sliarerl 
in tlic fartunea of thc Spaniah nation. If 1 muld not hnve 
suhined myself there, 1 thouglit by plming myself bcliind 
the T a p q  1 miglit give the broken armiw and t21e people of 
SpSpain, if tliey l~id any piitriotism left, t,n opportunitg b 
sssemble round me md t o  march t o  the reliaf of ttie cupitiil, 
That this wa4 my intention is  knotvn to tlie officers xiih 
me wha are in my confiüence; it i s  known J s o  t o  lord 
Cnstlereagh, to whom 1 liad imparted it in one of my late 
letters." 
T. CoInneE Xorrel correcta me for saying sir D. Bnirrl 
M~mted do Tao P~untca u d h o p l ~  &S; and thab storw .lome 
abtroyed at A dorga. 
1 udmit the fiist to be an error. Nevertlieless, a retro- 
gratle rriorcment witliout orders from sir J, 3loore wm iwm- 
m m d =  Craufuds higade htid pwsd Astorgn Iicfore tl~e 
rctrcat m a  countcrrnnntlcd; and 1 can =ure colonel Sorrel, 
I did myself wdk snkle-deep in spirits lioured into the 
atreets, 
4'. It is l i in td  3 shonld not have censured sir D, Baird for 
sending an importuiit despatttcii by a private dragooi?, wlio 
got dni~k antl lost it. ' I t  b dmbtfil ah,' coloiicl Some1 
compluins, w7i.etlm ib mpe8+ ' h h e d b  iwegulwrity~ 28 
wlkd to th h a & &  of the g w d ,  or t b  c h m d k w t a  
of t l ~  d~aqom.' 
He intimrttes also thítt to a g  sir J. Moore personalIy 
directed the movemente of sir D. Bsird'fi diPlsion 1ii the battle, 
is dcruptory of the latter's reputittion. 1 cannot admh tliis. 
h gcnernl-in-chief muat he sommhere; where he is he muat 
diwct. Riit touching the mntter nf the dragoon, 1 imputed 
' lilnmerdile iwegdwity' to t he general ; and jnstify it by tlie 
fnllowing statement of sir J. Moore'a aide-decamp who mrled 
tlie desputcli. 
'On tlie night that tthe rear of the mny pa~wed fhrough 
Villn Friinc~q, rtnd hnlted a t  a mal1 village abotit two lesgnes 
and R half from that tomn, pir J. Moore sent mptriin George 
Kapicr, ene of his ae'des&-ccvnvp, about two o'clock in tlie 
iriorni~ig, ~vith despatelies for sir D. Baird, enclosing ordera 
to licut~nantrgeaerals Hope and F r ~ e r ,  tlie nature of which 
orrlcrs wns to prel-cnt 1icrit.-gencral Frnser's division procced- 
ing nn tlie road towpirds Vigo, and to make them halt at 
LII~O, as sir J. Moore bad, owing to many circumshncem, 
altered his intention of proceedin~ with t11e army t o  Vigo. 
IYlien sir Ju11ri delivered tliese despatclies to wptain Xapier, 
he snicl, 'Have you a good horse, Knpierl you must get t o  
Nofinle3 to sir D. Rnird before five o'clock this morning, iif 
pos~ilile, ns otherwise sir David will b v e  mtirched and then 
you must folloiv bim.' Sir Jahn also gave craptain N. par- 
ticuliw ordere to be very crareful of tlie des~ixtchea as tliey 
rvere of tlie grentcst conmqucnce; and t o  te11 sir David 'to 
foreamd tri~se 7~Aieh m m  mc20s~d tO g w d ~  H g e  md ETW 
ob8 qtricX: as pssible.' ' 
'iTben captain Nnpier timived at Nogales, which he did a 
few miriutes after five o'clock, he found sir David in lid, aand 
Jclivered Iiim albo despudxAes amd w d w ~ .  Sir David asked, 
' f f  Iie (cnptnin N.) wns to ge on 'Rith t h o ~ e  for generala 
Hope nnd l7ra~erl' 'No, sir, unle88 you have no otlier person 
to send; in tlrat case, of coiirse 1 wilZ proceed, but 1 must 
Iiibst get a fresh horse.' Sir David then said, ' lYme you 
iirrleretl liy sir J. Mime to prooeed with these lettem to 
gcneml Hope?' Captain N. rcplied, 'My ordars \vere to 
delivcr tlic clespakhes f o  you, anri you werc t o  forward thoso 
for lieut.-generds Rope and Fraser, d h  m e  a 4  
clespiei~. '  On tliis lie snirl, ' Yery ~ e l l ; '  and Zn d o u ~  hm 
I~oicrs @er, or pmlmp not p i t e  aio l q ,  he sent the despatclies 
r i f f  try au orderly drrigoon of tlie lifteentIl rw~inient. Sir 
Dnvid rnnrcbcd soon nftemrtls, with his rlivision, to some 
licights on tlie rond towards Lngo, about two or three short 
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leagues from Noyales; and towarde the wening he carne 
Iiimsclf bnck to  Kngnlcs, ancl snid t o  cnptain Niipicr, who \vas 
wniting there until. sir J. Aroore should &ve, '.By God, t h  
PCESMG! of CI, d~agom by w l ~ m  1 sent Z7~ose dquntc!les t / ~k  
mmifiy, ?m gut ~ J c ,  $rml hst €?m' Upon mliich captaiii 
N. imniediately rnounted Iiis home and ivent off to rcport tlia 
circtimstance to sir J. Moore. m l i m  he met on thc hill comino 
doivn into FopIes. ' HB p i t e  wtmisIied arrd dis; 
p W  with 8 2 ~  D. Baid Jor JL[L* sent d q m k h  by ala 
mrhly d r ~ ~ ~ o o m ,  ~ct'~clr.lch z w a  qf w,d c m e q ~ m c e  t h t  tAs 
mmnndw of t l ~ j a r c m  timqIat i t  ~ s m j  to m d  me I ~ i a  
own ai&-lle-m?y d~ t l m ' "  
Two forccd marclicrr wcre thns imposcd upm MXenzic 
Easer's division, which occasioned jireah distress and 10s~ .  
I lere  1 must observe that I never meaned, nor did atbribnte 
blaiiie t o  tIiat general, wliose conduct was strictly in univon 
witli Lis ordcrs; yct X Lnve hmrd t h k  his fricncls wcrc hiirt ; 
perliaps at tlie liglitness of tlie expresqion, ' Pilgrimage to St, 
Jago,' a trifling conceit, unsuitable to the occaaion. 
~i,~arratiae of tho Pmhmdw JVm-Mnjor Leith Hay ia 
~-Jcasetl so t a  tem a narr~tive of liis pemonal arlvent1tre.s 
during about half the perid that war lasted. IIe seems 
offerided tliiit I ahould have eupswl tlie foolish conduct af tlie 
militnry agents employed 3 tho eommencement of  tlie 
Snanish insurrcction : vet lie has not. and ooulcl not. disrirovc I d  I I 
my stntements, seeing they nre supported by the letters oE 
tlie a p t a  tliemaelv-; tlie pulilic volce has prwlirimed their 
ju~tice. He ~ays, indeed, tW to ZracluElB !he 
ñarraave, , 18. wltoEe of lJze agent.9, wit?~ exqntbn mt~j i f c o h t E  
C m  a& Zwd W-iUim Emtimk, i m  ma ~wqning 
m d  u.lkquali~$& cera8~m, appewra m Jtitle wcrrtihy of hiskmj u.s 
it proba bly &El be Imta$er m i d w e d  of maoticB;' and tliat to 
answer me he hna only to mentiontlie mmes of ' eobrmcb Paiahj, 
Joms, Llfwe, d 3ir~neh.~ Buk 1 have not inclrrdecl the 
ivhole in one sweeping censure; and tlie lastrnmed oficers, 
wliose hlents 1 acknomledge, and one of wEiom, colonel 
Birch, I especially quoted ss givjngr goad intelli, vence, were 
not ngents, but on the staff of an agent. Thcir just .i*ie~vs 
plnce in disarlvantageous light the errom of general Leith, 
under whom they actea. 
Major h i t h  Hay decries mJr mork, but says hia own . is 
founded on milientic documents, meaning, his own memw 
ninda, Tbey wiIl scaraely pide posterity. Por, treating uf Qe 
Tbia p. 281. bnttIe of Busaco, he saya, ' on the forenoon of the 26th Sept. 1 wm directed to ndvance in front 
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with a squadron of Po avalry, and report the rnove- 
ments of tIie snemy 01 3 olose to tlie riglit h n k  of 
t l i e  Nontlrgo, rlirectlp cornmrinicnting with t l ~ c  vsilley of 
Laran~irn.  Im tlba m m f h  of tlcis s m h  m promded two 
Tmpw 2uifluiut e n c o z c ' ~ a ~ ~  un enamy.'-'As w Tode fw 
m r d  a c w b n d e  and J i .  of mu.skeh-y w w  I ~ w d  in &?te 
diroctim of St. COdadao, z u h m  t l ~  d d e  o$ Eiclr~ing~n, m d  
p w n %  A'~?/n~a'w m  fieing amie Q ~ M  Be position t h  
a r h : m  qf t h  dki? amnp/.' Now St.. Cnmbdno is twenty 
miles froin 13usxco; the light division and l'ac!~" brigade 
funned the dvunce of tlie arniy;' tEie fornier never \vere 
witliin ten miles o£ Comb~lao, nnd Pack retired from thence, 
Tvithout an mtion, on the 22nd. Mornover, on tlie 26tIi of 
Scptemhcr, when najor Ray heard thirc w~vtinderful firing at 
Conibatlao, the duke of Elcliingen ~ n d  general 
Reynier were, and had been from one o'clock of U;,t'D$ 
t21e S5th, imrnediately in front of Busaco, and 
their light troops were cctuially skirmlstiing with the British 
jn thnt position which the rnnjor liad just lcft two lcapcs in 
his rear! Tt  would ibppear tliat mjor Rayliaa trnsted t a  Tery 
Iiad memoranda. 
Sb*ctZa*.es .pm C M  Nqier's Bktom~. -AItliougli 
anonynous, 1 notico this pamplilet, written in dcfence o€ lord 
32ereaforil, Iiecrtiise the d t c r  would llave it a~iderstood thnt 
lie is  lord Xeresford, o r  that lie mrita from Iiis lordsliip's 
dictntioe 1, homever, think, lord Jlieresford's knowleclge 
would reject the inaecurscy of this work, and liis modesty 
slirink from dictating such grnss praise of himself. 
It is not crediMe, lord Bercsford sliould describo ?&y;!. 
liimself ' As o w h  $m arad con&atm~j pason' 
-' A m n  wlrm punl$catim eminmdyfitcd h h  for 
impo~tanb trvsh'-' A n o f i w  of aml, &pw, dbmebion, and 
2nt~EFigend - ' 8 d i s l i f i p k I ~ d  rnmart* q d b  of t/te 
greatest t?~inga'-~ A pwson evinchq a, ?mmulkdge of mcmbincl, 
a ski11 in tha 'L'&M principia w7~;:B t?g I~umam hemt iB 
mtwctel, arad a f a d i $ ,  in infl&y and direck P a p l  L126. b y  thew,  raded mmpt tIw 83ccIu&a diara-+ 
ter igkim O f fJ~e higlmt c h a  of d n d '  
This snoiijnious nuthor g i v ~  mo credit for ' wy c m E e r -  
d i o  pn6ciea m am 1~iatwi.m; md believes ' mj m o r g  cm 
.iinintm.¿iona.f,' arising from ' 2wnumtB infmthn' nntl  
Iie mnswers my statements lest m m k  of W!L yure&mui 
to cm~dwatkticm s l W  bh pmtdy.'  h lw for 
posterity! He fears it wiU be biassed by ' w n  
~$ ,~ ;~  
adcpter and~rop,agatw of Jool.isl¿ and tmrnpmj 
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qwrd - ' A pwsm of m q  orduJity'-~ 0f exbrmdimry 
ignwama of fa& and of t o p o g r y I t y ~ '  W'Piting fim 
m pmte a& fda imf~mnatwa'-~ P v y m p ~ '  -' J v y w  
, ~ - i w d ' - '  A m21Ier'-' A mere soldw of bTmy, p r e m m t z y  
to dhcw #M ditities, $!M opinhwJ and t7t.9 cmducl O/ 80 idle 
and cli~tanguG/iecl an qfcm aa Imd An hbfo- 
whn ~ h t l w t  litGrawj in&g&ty or fnimmg' - ' A  y c i n l  
pZecac7~'- ' dn iUo&d T ~ M '  - ' Am intwjd wsertor' 
-' Exc&uely de&& in € 1 ~  most egmfial q d i t i d - o u e  
wliose ' Idlechd &ion & tirickty aBca ted  by t h  mbt of 
p a ~ t y  prejtdEw8.' 
As indications of 'gallecl withers' this m y  pass, but in 
the same t+ein 2: am told 1 %m ndf~irag of lmd Bmfwd 
w ? d m ' - h a d  ' g2vm r n y ~ e y  ao trmble to inqxir~ im% hu 
w,i!itnl/ mjm M. I L ~  persoad ci~&~m&'-'Ihkf lzot 7tfiwli 
w l h ,  or W ~ E ,  OY h ~ ,  h t  dhtIw&hd @CW had 
enylloyed;dnd with ' a rommwn and m s t  smseleBa p @ d i m  
eol~iclb h oftm fowrad Wa co& htl~ a el088 of 
poFdiml opinim, iooB it fw. gramtsd t7lat Íiemme Eord Bw* 
ford wm 1tigJtFy attiad, he mwir ~mxwarily be d&Xmt in 
pro fessiond s ? d ;  and I i ~ m e  IE psses~ad tld f m i l y  patvon- 
q e  wF~icIb migltt firing I L ~  w i t s  into wticq it mwt ju l lm LM 
m 2m'tnble cmsspce~aae, tlmt ha c d d  lzot be h poaswsimd. ot  
tb ~ ' 8  that I r ; i~Lt  &.*me it.' 
Being at least ns nobly connded ae lord BeresfoiT 
his ' high alliances' to those wlrorn tliey concern; Iii 
patronnge is more to the purpose, sncl for his military scrvices 
1 wiII give some tokens of inqiiiry &out them, TEiis pilmph- 
leteer cdls me a ' mere aolrlier of theory,' pt 1 haw tieen 
more and liarder eampaigns tban lord Berdord mw, before 
he iittained itlie commantl af tlie Portuguese army. 1 he@ 
mith hhb lord-liip's cxpedition to Buenos Ayrea, hiei first eesny 
us a general-inxl~ie~ Jíany curiwa debils o€ thn t  event 
Iiave been related to me by eye-witnesses, buk siiffice it t o  say, 
lord Reresford was there completely beaten and laid 
arms. 
His ncxt appewnnce ww as commnndant of tlie 
hiadeira, sewetly clelivered t o  England in trust by tlie pnnce 
of Portt~gal. The Portugt~ese declnre, that, in vio 
tliis trust, lord Beresford mxde tlie authoritiea smer 
ance tn George 111. 1 wiil not dweU en tkat. He 
the island well or ill for some montla. 
At Coruñn he commnnded thc brigde cowiring khe em- 
brtrkntion. Tlierp. was notliing to (lo, úitt if a coiivcrsation, 
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? did nat t 
v. 
not entire 
erninent staff-officer, his lordshi~ 6en mte the honour 
ao high :hs hi3 dcfender dow aov 
Thwe indication~ tiid 1 am ly ignorant of lord 
Reresfords scrvicea, befwe he wmmanded the Portupese 
forcea, are only giyen in answer to the writer of tliis pamlihlet; 
and for my knoivledge of his serviees a@ he attained tliat 
mmmnnd, let my work voiich, 1 may llave seen t l i~m with a 
jairrdiced eyc. I mag hnve been 'incapa6I~ fim the ci~mm- 
s f a w  o fmy  miJi£~ry life, to foma an ckdeqzmte meptim of 
tlm d7:fmlties ~ I ~ i c i b  t1t.e g e n d  of a h g e  c q m  ?m to cwntmd 
w i A Y  rnmay hnre lid my Lidd&unl &ion q h a t d  by 
t ? ) ~  W U G ~  of pcwiy prejudice) hut my opiuion still iq that 
mnmlinl Rerehrd wñs not ' a diqfinqubJm3 cmnamder,'-not 
an ' mfer~-uim~ gmmal+ot capdle of the things.' 
If 1 am wrongJ La deeds are bsfore tlie world to obvia& my 
inclusionsj great aactions cannot be smotliered with ink. 
he authoib of this pampblet; is liowever tinjustitiai.de in sging 
hnre ' Iiintcil at pofisBional b d m d w s . '  1 hnve strictly 
infined myñelf to mcmuring marslial &resforul$ military 
.pacity by tlie standard of Es exploits. Nos wil'l it serve to 
y out-liolitical prejutlice 1 1: kave nowliere attacked lord 
'ellinghn, lord Hill, lord &pedocli, lord S t~~ar t  de 12otlie- 
.y, eir EEdard Paget, ond otlien whosc political opinions 
ere the sBme RS lord Beresfordk. 1 proceed to examine my 
iponent" arpments. 
1. Treating of lord Eeresford's ~tppointmcnt, I =id :-' Tiie 
ortuguese regenq, wl~ether spontaneously, or brought 
iereto by pre~ious negotiation, ofi'ered the command of a!l 
ic nntive troop~ to  an English gcnernl, with power tn alter 
id arncnd the military discipline, to appoint British officers 
b the command of ~egimeiits, nnd t o  lict witliout centro! ia 
g measure Iie stlouid judge Etting to d i o r a t e  the con- 
tion of tlie Portupese amy.' 
' It is unid; sir J. Doyle, sir J. Mnrray, gcncral Bcrcsfortl, 
id even tlie maquis o£ Eastinp, tlicn earl of  Moira, songht 
tr the riypointrnent. Tlie 1st  wrts undonbteclly well fitted 
his courtly manners, his high rank, and his tale&, in tlie 
iliuet and tlie field, for sueh m offrce; Iint pawerful parlia- 
-ei~tiiry interest prevailing, major-general Beresforci was 
appointed, to tlie p t  discontent; nf niany nficers of superior 
mqk, who were displeased that a man without m y  visilde 
claim to sriperiority should be plstced over tlieir heads.' 
' Fhis dwrt mtract,' saya the pamplileteer, ' crmtains m 
awy fdf& as lines.' 'It wFd be di$&, jwrhaps? 10 
d in umy othr hGt& a p m y e  e q d y  S?&, 
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I will nom sliom that this writer has p t I y  eiraggernted 
the difloiilty of the ncgotiiit,icins; nnd when he dates that one 
of rnxmhd Reresford's qualifimtians for the command wag 
liis lieiiig ' jyfest lg  c m u m n t  ecitl~ tiw l-e Page S. 
uj'¿hepleopb, Iie stattes tlial; whicli a I-ietter autho- 
rity than he can be oontrac~icts. 
Extract o€ a letter frnm rnfirshd BRRESFORD tO 1 o ~ d  
TVELW~GTON, Chamusca, 4th Jan. 1811. 
O n  Ioml Cnstlereagh's commnnicating to me liia Bhjesty's 
pleasnre tliat 1 sLould prooecd to Portugnl to fill tEie situatjoa 
I now IioId, it wae rny rlnty to goint out to  h i ~  Iordsltip what 
my cxpericncc in tlio country hnxl mnde mc thinlr abso1utcly 
nccessary to fulfil, s i t h  nny prospcct of ~ d v a n t ~ ,  thc ~ e w s  
of liis JIajesty, anil af his roya1 liighness the prince regent, in 
giving to a Dritish general the conmand of the Portupeso 
nrmy; zncl, omongat otlier thinga, 1 represented it as neces- 
sary tlint in 811 tliings respecting the organkation and disci- 
pline of tlie amy, the canimnnder-in-chief &odd be perfectly 
intlepcndent of the go~ernrnen&~ and t hn t  it nias ab~ooliitely 
neccssnry rewards and punishments slkould be exclusively 
rritli liim. SIiese clainia lord Castlereagh told me Mr. CRU- 
uing npould give clirections to hia Miqjesty's envoy here tri 
stipulrste for, and t h ~ t  1need not nndcrtske t11e tasb until 
thcy wci-c granted. I cmerlncnntly, cin rny arrjvtll, dcclincd 
accelitiiig tlie command, on wvaitinq on the regency, ti11 Mr. 
Viliiers sliould bnve m ~ l e  these necessary Btipulations, and in 
consecluence of which, a@ !M Lad s o m  contrence ~ ' 1 1 1  the 
regency, 1 pput dmvn, at liis desire, in Etiglisli, sornetl~irig to 
tlic pui~ort (for it appears a very bad trmslation or iii-copied) (ir tlie propositiona in onc of the ppew enclosed, snd to 
whicfi tIie answer annexed ta it mas given, J wna not thm 
WJ match m t m  g' t ? ~  P-, but I recolIBct obseming 
to Afr. ViIliers tlint the answer appeared to  me ambipous, 
~ n d  ivisliing furtlier sxplsnation. He, liowever, assured ma 
tlint it ans qi&e propcr, and that the gmemvm& 2mtaadd 
f d l ~  to d e  l o  .no/ ~ P A T ~ R ,  and to ~upport me fiilly in eres- 
tliing, anrl 1 remiiined with the anderstanding tlint thoug11 
for the d ip i t y  of t I~e  government it miglit desire psrticular 
furms, tbnt rirtually tlie power iu everytliing respectlng tlie 
furiiintiun, oi*gauixatiuli, and JiscipIine oi tlie amy rem:tiiie~l 
ñitli nic; nnd on this pnnciplc I 1 1 m  eycr since uctetf, witli 
the full ncrluiescence iand sanction oE govemment.' 
Rcm I& find na mluctance, md no riiffieulQ, except thnt 
whieh tlie marshwl, from hia imperfect kuowledge oof the 
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language, qwienced in trying to rerad the ammer of th, 
regency. 
3". T?le pmphleteer g a p ,  17& dt?myi6 mmy o f i e r ~  ca 
a kdm @cE, munied hrd tdm~~ford'~ siihathn, n m  enw 
dbnamted at tfle t h ;  and mly  sir J. fl?¿rr/ objectd tu 
$14.3 locd P& of l ~ l t ~ g ~ d  zof i~ch acco~anied id. 
But t h i ~  local rank was a necessary adjunct to the com- 
mmd of tlie Portupae troops, mnrl any rlismntcnt oocnsianctl 
tl~ereby ww a discontent at Iord Beresforcl's appintment 
? Sir J. Mumay'a displeasure iei admjtted; and tlie folloning 
letter from genemi 8Lertiroke ho sir John Cradock speaks fc, 
ihelf :- 
"L.lsbQn, Marcm 1 2. 
' S&-Hearing, upon my landing bere this day, thni 
Sk John his Nrtjesty has Liesii pleased to confer upot 
cradwt8 mBjor-geneml Beresford tlie local rant of lieute 
Corresond- ntlnt-general in Portugal, 1 wiah to mbmit t r  
enma Tour excelleq that 1 am thiee 3eam a senioi 
major-general in the Britiah arrnp; and altliough 1 shall 
under the present circumstsnoea, perform with the p t e s i  
chmrfulnesa thc dutica wliich you mny require of me; yct 1 
think on reference to the wtomsi of the service you 611 set 
my p~esent situation in such a point of view as shall iuducr 
your excellency, to lny my humble request beforo his roya 
highness the commander-in+hief, that he mili be pciouslj 
ylensed to mave h i ~  lfajesty to confer on me the Ioml r d  o. 
1ieutenant.gened aIao while serving in thia oountry! 
Tlius it appears, the disconknt, even at the moment, mb 
not, as this ~uthor pdiwly M&#, eonfined to sir John 
M u m y ;  imd though he laboura hnrd to show lord Bcrwford's 
superior elaims were at the time Lveq~  d b  to any p w m  
whom ilatellwtd eye was mnot Blinded by prgjecdice.' I havr 
yet t o  leam that in the opirilon of the army, Ills lorhhip't 
merit s, though they should mcn be enhnnced by his shiire o. 
the glory of ~Ubucra, were greater than general shcrbroke's. 
11. The wnter ia angr-j at my saying, lord Beresfod coulc 
never have overcome tlie difficulties of I t i ~  situation if he liar 
not Iieen dimted, secsta*, anwl slckloki, ly th-e master spiri 
m d m  whom h eoorM 
WhetIier I am oorioct, or o t h e d ~ e ,  will be made rnanife~ 
in the courge of my work ; but this author discovers irritabli 
haste in commenting upon tbe expression; lie mpposes i. 
applied whoiiy to  the dificulties of discipline, wbereas ?. 
e~dcnt ly  refem to political ohRtaeIea Yet 1 will say, wen 
ths discipline of the t m o p  was not more indebted to lord 
n it was t 
him. 3 
,n  -4 
,o tho exs 
Inddcn, R 




B~:resfortl's thn 'B v+ho 
fit:~~cd undcr Elder, 
Olfuer, DougI~,, alitiii vuiicxa iiko uiiciii ,  ircio viro upiiita 
anirniiting tlie system tliat raineised the Portupese troops so 
11igEi in tlie scale of European arrniesi; those officers nere not 
instructetl by ~i~iar~liai Bercsford-sonie of tlieni were ctapsaiile 
o€ inst.rt~cting liim. 
JTT. The pnmphleteer denie~ the fmth o€ the following 
passnge in my Hist~ry.-~Im time d m s t  rnn t7lti rnilikmj 
situ:tuatk of emolunzent md <mpor¿a7acg m hId by Ey- 
li8h~@rnn' 
Tlic nord emolument is used in its simple senae. The 
nntion wns nt wnr fnr ite cxistenoo, the whole population iii 
arrns, the coiintry latcly ravngcd by an cnemy, thc treasury 
quite empty. I n  such a crisis al1 military situation~ were 
nini? or less places of enaolwmmt m d  imp~rtance,' England 
linyiilg tlie greatetest part of tbe army. Lord Wellington, 
ntiiiiirul hrkeley, snd Mr, Stirart -were membere of tlia 
regcricy. Tlie fimt WLW alfio c~pt.ain-genernl of tlie Portu- 
g ~ ( ~ 9 c  forccs, regular or irregular;-tliat is to =y, nf the 
wliole poptilation abIe to bear arme. The eecond was admira€ 
of tIle ffeet in tlle European waters. lktrshaii Bsredortl 
coiiiinüiided tlie regular land armies, Sir Tliomas Hiirdy ii.m 
conimtiiid3nt of tlie port and arsenal of Lisbon. TD all. these 
plnccri snlarjcs wcrc attnched. Lord Wellington, indecd, ga~o 
his Poxtii,gticse as he also did bis Spankh pny, to the military 
cliest; but this was a private act of disinterestedness. 1 
believe his example waa not followed. 
Let 11s proceed. 
Colonel Tmiit was governor of Oparto; colonel Cox, 
gcivrrnnr of Almeida; colonel husten, of Algame; general 
l<liint, of PenicliB. Sir Rohert Wilson commrtnded the 
Lusitanian Legion; Trant, John WiIson, and Miller were 
a l  tlie liead of different brigdm of militia and ordenanca; 
ccloncl Grxnt and major Fenwick comm~nded smalIer budies 
of tlio sltme species of troops; colonel P U r b n ,  cdonel 
doliii Campliell, and mIonel Mdden, hnd high commands in 
tlie mvnlry; genemls Hamilton, S p l ,  Earvey, Pitck, Aah- 
ivortli, and Collins, commanded divisions or brigacies of the 
r ~ n n l n r  infantry: othrs heId commands in tlie artilley; 
Hrirtlinge, Arbutlinot, Warre, &c., were w tlie staff; and 
ncurIy all tlic regirnenh of the line were commanded by 
Kngfislimen, or hmd Engli~h mnjom, mptains, nnd subaltenis: 
nor wcre these names, wwhich readiFy occur to me, thc whole. 
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trnm my aftcr-~cquird knowledge of the rcaI &tn of nffnin. 
Tlie paml~lileteer, chanaing thc propositiou, nsserts, 1 censureil 
Geresfwcd for proposing a ammh lo Lei~-im, when my observa- . 
tivns were expressly rlirected nyainst a nmwh to Opwto, 1 
will set domi what 1 did ~vr i to  nnd my autbority. 
Histnry.-< W l ~ i l ~  tliiis cngilgcd, intcll ipncc arrivcd thnt 
'S'ictor liad gudrleuly forcecl t.lie passage of tlie Taqirs at 
Aliriiirnx, aiid wris in pursuit of Cuesta o11 tlie roatl ta  Elcrida: 
tlirit Soitlt, l~aviltg C ~ U S S C ~  tlie Mitilio antl defeatea 1Loiiiana 
anrl Silvci~n, w:u witljiri u fem leltgries of Oporto; thmt 
Lnpissc Iinil rnntle n dcmonstration of assnulting Ciudntl 
Riirliigo. Thc jiinte of Oliorto now vchenicntly <Ictnnn{lcd 
aitI frum tlie rcgcncy; and the; Ltter, rtlttio~igh not mircli 
inclined to  the biñlio~i's p r t y ,  proposed that sir JoToLn Cindock 
sliiiulrl uriita a piirt, of Ilie 13titisli forces to tlie I'orlup~ess 
truops undcr marslal Eeresford, and marcli tu the succoevr af 
oiiiwto. 
- 1  - 
IIcresfortl mm mcme to trush the Fortuguem untler 3iis 
imniedinte wmmand among tlie mutinons multitudes; iii tliat 
city; liut he tliouglit the whole o€ the Eritish army should 
muve iii a t d y  to  Leiria, and frum theuce either pucih on 
t o  Oporto, or return, according to tlia mente that miglit 
occirr in tlie latter town, and he cndcavourcd to persriadc 
Cra<lorlr t o  folTow tIiis plan.' 
' lfa~.slid Gcresford'~ plan, f m d e d  on the ~iupposition thnt 
Cmtlocli coiild engage Boult d O ] m t o  and get quit liim annd 
retuiil ut liis ~ileliuure to Lisbon if Yictor dvanccd, was wr- 
t;ririly fnllncioiis: tlie advantapcs rcstetl on conjeetural, tlie diy- 
~Irailtngclcn on positive (lata; it wss conjectu~~al t l int  tlicy coiilrl 
wk~inie #porro, it ñ ñ s  positjve tliey worild endxiiger Lislion.' 
A~~thur i t i ~s . - 19  Extr~cts from niarshd Bcresford'a Jetter 
to sir Joliu Ciduek, 29th Xnrdi, 1809. 
' U I I U ~  tlie suliject of mrrrcliig a British force to Opwto 
undcr tlic nctziai circumtanccs, nnd untler the considcrntioii of 
tlrc.: vnriiiiis points from wliich thc encmy ~t prcscnt tlircnt~ii 
179, n9c Iiatl ~csterrlrry a Snll discnssiun, sud which renrlera it 
iiiiticccssnry for me nom to reca~iitulate the several rensons 
w1~ic:li Itidiiced me to sub~iiit to yous cxcelleucy's consiilcni- 
i i l l t i  tlic prupiicty of atlvaucimg tlie Uritisli Jorct: tu Leirizi, tc 
1)c tliencc puslid on tu Oporto, or otlicrn~isg n9 thc infornn- 
tiiin from diircrcnt prarts mar rcndcr cxpcdient. Giit iny 
principal rcrisnn ti7ms, tlixt ns thcre rilipearircrl an intention of 
ci ,-opcrntioil (qf eu?tic7~, /~lmmer, tliwe is no mtainty) Letween 
thc i~iariilwis Victur and Soult, it would be most desiralle, by 
B fC 
either drivieg back or overcoming ene, before the otli~r could 
give bis co-opernting aid, to defent their plnn, m1 if we 
should, or not, he ~ b l e  to do thjs, wonld he merely a matter of 
calcuIaCion of time; as, supposing on our a r r i d  at Leiria 
Oporto offered a prospect oi' Iioldiiig out ti11 we could reach 
jt, rand that Victor continued his southern pumit of Guest3, 
he would get so dishnt from us, m to  permit the army pugh- 
ing froni Leiria t u  Oporto without appreliemion from t l i ~  
army of Vietoi.' 'It is for ynur oxcelleny to judge, undcr 
the actual cirmimstances, of tbe propriety of tI&s m o z l m  
W w d s  Opon%.' 
29 Extracts fmm sir John Cradock's repIy to the abova 
29th Match, 1809. 
I h ~ e  th konour t o  acknowledge, at the earliest mommt, 
your exoellency's Jetter of this everiing, conveyiug a copy of 
the request from the regency, kc, that 1 ~hould move the 
British troopa ta the mcour of Oporto,' &c.-' To venture iipoii 
an advance to O ~ t o ,  two Bundred miles from Lislion, nrlicn 
t k e  very objeGt ir; perliap~ at thiv moment lost, ~eems  to  be B 
point only to firtitify the good fecling of evcry.aoldier, hut  
quite opposetl to the sober dictates of the undaatandiu~, If 
tlie Erikish army seta out wihh the dwlared object t o  miccrvwr 
O p w ,  or expel the enemy, tIie irnpression on tlie public miud 
is tbc , same. Rotliing but the acccimplishment wjll siiit the 
English character !' 
'Illiese evtracts contra&& the pamplileteer's assertions that  1 
~ o m p l e t e l y  misrinderstood the nnture of morshal Beredorrh 
views lznd intentions,' and ' strangely perverted liis m'eaning by 
making him aap it was doiibbful i f  Victor and SouFt in- 
tended t o  co-operate on a single plaa' It; is most disi- 
- jngenueu~, also, to essume thnt 1 obajected to a rnarch upon 
Jdriq riad then argue on thnt falas assumption in tha 
following rnanner :- 
' ThG XLm W A % ~ ? J  ~OVBWPZt cGPI?Wt be h0fh e h t  a& 
wmg, politk md $mpoEjt2F, cmect eppomow.'-' Xfll28 
pq.wsd of admnciwg t?te m,?/ to  Irica zam wbhtyi 
~~d w7m sqgmted by mmr8ILal Bmqfmd, t h  mm~t 
itse{f ought, '178 impmtial jwtice, b b e  b e  c & d  by 
tlte J ~ k t w r k m  m ut h . t  ~ a E l y  ummd wim pwt in mxxw 
h bg sir Jolm C~ackoelc.' 
Fíoiv waa it the same militav rnovement f Every cirmm- 
stance wss differenk-lo. It m a  a rnoremeut t o  hieirh-nd 
to Oporto. 2'. It took place ten or tmelve days Irter, rluriiig 
which time 5000 British irifautl, and 300 wtillerj Iiorsa, 
had reiaforeed &dock's armjr, and a regiment of draguom 
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ms hourly expectd. ' Xince t?se p e m f  accw&on ,:, Johm 
of s t ~ ~ @ ~ '  8aj-s sir J. C ~ I O C J K ,  ' i t  m y  6s acl, c d m k  
&db ~ri 'R: ~ h t  m u m &  in GGúIvmw UA WgeneraJ 
far as Le;&.' 3'. Victor, instad of thrmt ening 
Portugal, as the reports of tlie 2Gth Marcli repre- 5t11 A ~ ~ I I ,  
sented liirn, liad engaged mith Cuesta, and just ld09. 
Ewg-iit tlie linttle of  hledellin; mereover, 8 rnarch to  L&a 
only did not open Lisl-ion to t h t  marshal, 4". Lnpisse, 
instead of joinfng Soult, nas rnoving towards the Tngiis by 
tlie pasaes of the aredos; tlius, the Yrench were weakenecl by 
a divei~ity o€ plans wliile tlie allies were become strouges. 
And wliat more absiird thnn this miter's notion tliat tlie 
e same milibry movements must be equally good at oone time 
as nt antitlier 2 After 011, Cradock's march to Leiria wns madc 
enbirdy at the request o f  lord Re~e4ford: ' I  c o w l d d  ta 
g m w d  B e r ~ f o d s  a i s h  to a mm& Zn a d w m c e ,  
m he ssaZcl e2 w d  givs cmjdeiics to tJ14 h d y  of Pwtwpae 
t r c q s  assdfed at TI~w'I', and mbk him to wmdwlaiEe t l ~  
&j&e of tlie bridge wnd statim at dhmtw?-Sic John 
Crraducl; t r i  general Iiicliard Wemart, April 8, 1808. 
Tlie author having made this use of the march to  Leiria, 
cliangeg 11iu ground to inngnify lord BeresforSs military geniim 
in recommendii a naarcll EO &orto. 
Jt appea~s; lie says, ' f~om IL eviihnw cbflwrded by cohrwl 
1Vupkr I ~ i n z ~ e &  tJat lord Usr~8fwd I d  mactl?, diwinfid in- 
wt ion qf tJtc mmp-laay, tlaa¿ Iio flan! mticipated tlie uery 
o r r h ~ . ~  of R~I,OW~W-EP, in ~~uIt.ich t h  t A ~ e 8  c o v s  of X d t ,  Tdw, 
and Lapisse a ~ s  rdIr& to co-gwn-2 yet hk vmmiv, 
tiZe wi>&na of w J ~ ~ c ? L  M p r d  by fmts a& by ~ J M  &m& 
recwded in tice autlm's m pidum, is cmdeinwd.' ' C o l p ~ ~ l  
iVqim, for8ootl~, d b  ct v e q  mperjezal bzowldg8 af t1i.e &- 
cumsh1zces of t 3 ~  t i ~ ,  m d  scarcely any of t l t~  IOralitir?~, 
17~8 pe8umpth  ta ~ m d  tlmt time ei2ews me ~ ~ t ~ y  
wm7ad: 
IEard worda thwe, if foimded in reason; if otherwise, tliey 
are fooliah words. us test them Three invading curps 
were liangng au the rrontier: ' t l m e  appmed,' See hta lettLr 
cap lord Beresford, ' m i 7 b t B n t h  fl M - v a -  to sir ,roh,, 
t h . '  Here mae no grent divination; moreovar Crndock 
otlicr things wera divjncrl, ~ u c h  M tho taking of 'ppendk 
Ciridad httodrigo aiid Almeida which did not liappen. Let 
tliat pass. The presemtion of Eisbon m s  tlie prinirnry objject 
of tlie allies. Beresford proposed to combine a marelt apinst 
one of tlie three inveding corps, and he m8 bovnd to ~ihoiow,- 
14 Thut wliile thua operating agninat one enemy, another 
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codd noE take possession of Lishun. 29 That tliere shoaId 
be siome prrspcct of bcat,ing t I ~ t  bodp wliich the aIIies 
intendd to  figl~t. Vere eitlier of tliese things rreaonably 
aeciire 9 
VLtor, mtd  35,000 &oq, nnd Iifiving just defented 
cuesta, Wa8 n t  &ida snd Cwcrea, tlic h d  of his columna 
rcported to be pointing towards Porhigal. Wns tlie safety nf 
Lisbon eared far, iii ib lilm to uiarcli al1 tlie ~ l l i e d  f o i ~ e s  ngainst 
Soult, wlio wns two hundred milcs from tliat capital, when 
'ITictor, a more powmful enemy, was tlireatening it fmm a 
nearer point Z 
Tlie autlior oE thig pamlilrlet says, yes, because .< VictolP 
h d  no m n s  of woBgim~ tlec T w ;  he had ~ 6 t h  im m i t h  
pontooa nm Iiw'dye ywipayr: ~f cmy kend, and ths riwfim 
~ I L E  jontier of l'mhgd w ~ s  ~ c r l l i q  d m ,  as 4s dway9 tlie 
c m  at tlzk m m  of ~ J M  yew9 a ~ a p i d ,  A m y ,  pnighty, ztn&d- 
abk m w  ofw*.' 
lndeed ! Wlirit, tlien, Es the ineaning of the following extrnct 
from admira1 Derkeley's correspondence witli sir Jolin Cradoclc, 
April Gtll, 18097-'%here is a ~ircumstnnco upon wliich, if 
Lotli pouraelf and gcncrnl Bemsfford are rrhscnt from Lidien, it 
niay be neoessñry that some decisiva Gnowledge should be 
oht8inerl-I mean the boats and maft wpun t l ie  T a w ,  tlie 
di~ipogd of which Geem to be confided to thc commi~snry- . 
g e i i ~ r ~ l .  That gentleman, I suppnFe, will natnrñlly attentl 
tEic tliwy, m d  oof eoume, jf we s1ioiild midrlenly rquire fhem, 
or if the onemy made a rupid movement across tlie Alernteju, 
/MI &gI~t h ~ o m  mtm qq the ho~lts  hfore nn expresa conld 
rerpcli the commixsarygenrral to remove them.' IY l ia t  also ia 
tlie rneaning of tlie folluwing passages in sir dohn Cradock's 
deapahliea to  lord C~tlereayt,.li, i2tli Apri!, 1309 1-'Tliere is 
n f m j  at Anlvatierru, nenr Alcnntnra, anri anotlm up thc left 
b n k  of the l'a,..i~, in tlie Alemt~jo, ivbere tlrere is  also a fwd, 
md t l ~  &ver m c ~ ,  Be &y pms'ed*' 
It was soon fuund t h t  nuS &he comrnissary-general 'tiut tlie 
regcncy held the mft,-thut no regiñtry o f  the bonts wria 
inatlc, ancl notliing usefiil wis done or lilrely to be done in the 
niatter. Wlierefore, lTictor could baw passed the Sws, and 
Lislion was not secure during the march to Oporto. 
Now as to the chance of success agninst Soult, who liad 
ahore 90,000 men, his cwalry ntimeroiis and encellent. Coiild 
12,000 Eritkich inhntry, hhaving no mvnlry, fem p s ,  no 
trnnsport, and enibnrrasserl rnbber thsin assisted by an iI1- 
disciplined Portupese force, 1iam bruuglit Soult t u  LiattleP 
could they havc beaten him docisivelp and rcturned to cover 








. - . l .  
Li~bobon? Wm bpisse with his 12,000 men and thirty guiiii 
to  reniain pas~ive? Woiild he not have joined h u l t  or 
mnrclietI on Chimbrrt in icar of tfie allies? 
m Tlie. writer intiinates t h t  'CVeIlington did rnarch ta Oporto 
and defeated Soult. Yes! but five weeka later, wlien the 
1:iigIisli ministem' intentions were no longer doubtful-den, 
pmtly by Bcrcsforü~i vigour, pnrkly from tho stunning cffcct 
rif Sonlt's captitre of Oliorto-chieflg from the reputation cif 
WelIington-tlie Portupese h o p s  liad from a laivless mob 
Iiccomc an ordcrly forcc-wlien tlie army whs reinforced by 
7OC)O English Inhntry, four regiments of wviilry, artillery, 
liorses, moncy, and stores-more tmop  being on tlie voyage 
to Lislion. It hnp1)ened d e n  Crndock'cl eff orts, followed up 
by WeIlin,&on, hntl ~irocured coilntry supplies-when Lnpisse, 
by a false movement to Lower Estremadurn, Lnd marred tbe 
If'rcncli comlinationa, pliicing a wliole nation witli its fortresses 
uud al1 ita fwrces, regiilar and irregrular, l i e t w e e ~  Soult and 
Irictor, 1eaving tliem lio ponver of concert or cutumuriimtioa 
It Iiappened when Victor, whose troops wera suffering from 
tlic (izidinna fmr ,  was forming nn cntrcnclicrl cramp nt 
hiedclelIi\ in~tead of moving on Portugal-when Cuesta at the 
hend of more numerous forces than before, had promised t.a 
foIlow Yictor cIoseLy iin any rnarcli tuwai.ds Portugal-when 
intercepted lettem of king Joseplt's inrlicated Seville, not 
Portugal, QS Victor's objeet-wlien Venegns  vas threntening 
La Mancha witli a fresli army-wlien. Soiilt, liaving lost tima 
at  Rinarante md men at Chavea, h d  sprearl Iiis timops orer a 
: extent of cocountry and exhausted Iiis offensive strenpth- 
n there wna a compiracy in Lis cainp tlie leaders beiug in 
munication witL the EuglisL geuer:il, nnd wlien tlie r a l  
ilicrs of the Frencli were unlrno~vn and undcrmted. Nat- 
iatnntling 1111 tliis, $,he opeintioa mould ha;ve fuiled of any 
t resiilt: but for the astonisliing p;issnRe of flie Douro, an 
in not to be expcted from ordinnry generals. 
lifferent also mere tlie mensures hken to secure the Tags. 
isford wrinted Ckadock to m v e  at o m  witls t J ~ s  wJi& 
d f w w ,  depending only on somc mlculationa of time. 
:n lord Wellington moved, tlie fnlse rnarcli of Lapisse liad 
e l l ~ l l ~ ~ d  hirn to drnw d o m  the hiaitanian leson annd the 
tia of the U e k  frontier to defend tlie Iiridge of Alcantara, 
:h was inined. Tliree English betttilione drafted from the 
y ttt Leiria, were united kit11 two others and hvo regi- 
---ts of cavnlry just Iandcd at Uskton, and n-ith 8800 Portii- 
p e s e  regulam forming tngether an a m y  nnder one g e n e d  
to defend the h e  of the T q p  h m  dbrantes t o  Lisbon. Bn 
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additionnl corpfi of obssrvlltion m Aso fomd fiom t l ~ e  
g d s o n s  of Bdajoa and EIP~B, t o  watch the movements uf 
ViGtor on the Guadima; and finally, the seamen, marines and 
the civic legions of Lisbon fomed a reserve. Hence it wns 
tmIy sdd Wellin@on's plans were 'neitlier hafitily arlopted 
nor recMessly hurried forward.' De made, indeed, a daring 
mevement, bul it was the daring of a great general; whereas 
Reresford proposed ttmh rnarch of two hundred miles to 
sumour a place which had tictually fallen tha vcry rlny on 
trhich he mnde the proposd. Nor is this all. 51~~11al 
Beresford desired Cmloctr to march with the Fortiiguese 
nnd RriGish troops combined; and the pmplileteer s c i j ~ ~  ' tlie 
a l l id  foree would hitve heen iw ewy r v c t  8upesk to 
Smlt's w l d  m y . '  Now tliis rnmment naa proposed the 
29th af If.tnrcli, and the British liad tmo hundred milee to 
rnove; wherefore, dlowing tmo daya for preparations aiid 
unforeseen obstacles, tlie allies would have been in front af 
Boull; nbout the nint11 of April. At that period, howevert 
rnarshal Reresford thus descril~d the Portusese portion of 
tliis army, which, so 'mp& in m j  reyect' to the enemy, 
was t o  drive Soult's veternn infantry and powerful wvalry 
mt of the Iringdom. 
'1 tliis morninp met no lss than thtce exnrcsseg. commu- 
nicacngto me thelkbla stak of ~ i & - f o t  I 
~ ~ ; l ~ ~ d  can ea11 it no 3-in wliich tho trmp~ mmj- 
~ ~ ~ l ~ k .  707~m e,and t l ~  i&hitm,ts um {n imk 
' e a n b e ~  wdimt& and they mwuruge o h !  Anrl 
l 
wliat itgaid sir J. Cradock ?- 
'No rcliance whntever can he p lmd an the Portupese 
Bb John troops. If 1 s d  thd  ~ J M  wh& were rmIy to 
Cradock to 4Z&'Ut?k?J úT WUdf, 1 b t d k  X8plk g d  Beres- 
3 m - l  Cmtl* for$s m t i w m ~ s !  
resgli. 
~ p r j i  2, In fine, thnt Reresfod could not control tlie 
Portupese troops, nar Cradock procure q a i p  
menh or anpplics for the nritish, are proved by the Ietters of 
tIiose generals. But C d o c k s  dificulties, tlie pampl~leteer 
s ~ y ~ ,  could not have been Itnown to rnarslial Beresford at 
the rnoment of anggestiiig the plnn ; Iie it so; his proposition, 
tlien, m- founded in ntter ignorante of the real s b t e  of affairq 
and therefore ' d & E y  u m d , '  
V. Of the points wliich 1 have ennmerded above rts marlring 
thc differencc bctmecn marslial Eeredorcl's proposal and air 
Arthur Wcllesley's oper~kion, the following Iiave been eitlief 
dmied, doubted, or ridiculed, by the miter o£ tl~is pampblet. 
19 flussta'a pmhe to mi& m ~ ic tor 's  ~rwwmmts. 2'. Y'he 
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m m t  of Cuesta'8 fmm. 3'. TImt the mz.-$~acg, .in S o U g  
mm?y wm known b .fIx allien w l m  k v  il.drlJsur IVdEwky 
dece&d to  naarcIh ~ ~ ~ I D B C  tld g m d .  4'. Yhat a wliok 
n & h ,  &7¿ dl its fo~tresaw, $c. &. m*, by tJte f i a  naa~ch. 
of ppld  Iietween Vktm d $o?d&. 5' T l ~ d  
Abrantes mas a fw~ress. 69 3 7 d  SouEt's q f m w e  .iwm 
ex?mwled. 9'. Z'ld t l ~  identiwn of t l ~  XnglUIb to 
d $ d  PorfuqaG 1a.d been Wt$d. 
The following are however niy autliorities, , 
19 4%&d8 pmiw.-Mr. PRERE t o  sir Jom C~nocrc .  
Sm'Re, Apil31&, 11801). 
' IF gene& Victor should evocuate the counky which 
he now ooeupies, and unclertalre a mrarch to the relicf of 
mnmli~I Soiilt, generml Ciiesh woiild arlvanee in proportion, 
and endeavoiir ta  liarass and detain him, a3 fai as pnssihle, 
withaut riskiq a geneml actiou. This Iattw part 1 consider 
m agmed.' 
There was a direct communicntion hetliveen Seville and 
Lisboii, cnd this letter rcached air A. WellesIey either the 24th 
or 2Rtlt of April. 
2". A m m d  of Cmta's f m - T h i  m 4  rated by me at 
-5,000 in the gross, sud 25,000 actudy in Es camp, 
A d m d k Q i r  A. W ~ L E S L E P  to  lord CASTLEREAQU. 
Ap'124th, 1809. 
CUESTA is at LIerena collecting a force again! whicli it is 
said mill. soon be 25,000 infantrg and 6000 cavalry, a pnrt af 
fiem good troopa' 
>Ir, FBF~E t o  &ir A, WELLESLEY. 
~ % d k 8 ,  4fh  d f m ~ ,  
' WE hwe here 3000 mwIry, cansidered  tu part uf the 
-.my of Estremdura-' Generd Cuesta h a  with him 4000 
mvalry,' 
In addition to this, reemits wcro dai!y nrr%ng in Iiis eamp, 
and he I i ~ l  severa1 prtrtisnn detacliments. Tlics ii, s t ~ p ~ a r s  
1 Iiave nnderwted tlie actual force immedimi:ely in front of 
Victor. 
3'. The mn&raq 8wit18 a m y  wua hmm $0 #tí Selis, 
whm sir A~llaur IIJ&dq, &c. 4c. 
This is proved by tiic fo:lowicg faeta, dmwn from the 
riginal nnarrative of tlic Engli~h oficer cmp1,lnyetl. 
' Jolin TFiana, the agent of the uonspirators, reached Thomar 
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in tlie mi(ldle of April; and in consequeme of his infor- 
mntion, an English ticld-oficer wns Eient to Avciro to mect 
D'Argenton tlie principal coiis~iirator; Iie did so, and returned 
with the lettcr to Lislion, whither Deresford had meanwhile 
repaired to meet sir Arthur Wellcslcy.' It is e~vident, thercforg 
Rerwforcl kncw of tlic conqiir~y Iicfore siir ArtIiur Welleuley'~ 
amival at Lisbou, and consequently, the latter knew it when 
he plawed liis olierations. 
4". flmt a wlwb with aEE ik fmtrmses, 4c. &. 
mien Yictor wm on tlie uppr Owdirana, SouIt wiia on the 
Douro; their most direct line of conimuiiicntion wa8 by Ncan- 
tara, and coasting the Beim frontier, Aa long ES Lapisse 
protcctcd tliis line witli n strong corps, tlicir opcrations were 
cunnected; when that general joined Victor on the Gudiana, 
nearly a!l tlie central parts of Portu,@ and tlie allied armics 
werc bctmcen tlic lnttcr nnd Soult. T3ic frontier lino of 
Portugal, and tlie part of Xpñin djoining it, immediiitely 
became insurgent, and tlle partiaan c o r p  Jlefore employed to 
watch Lapisse, guarded tbe bridge af Alcnntura. M y  expres- 
sions are thcrcforc strictlg comcct. 
5 3  Abm.rantu.-Tlie pmphleteer rrays, Ftlme WCM mt th 
&ige of afwt$cafim,! rut thia place iii Nay, 1809. 
Auflmdy.-Mt~jor Pat ton, employed to  examine and 
hitrengtlien 12bmntea, reprted 22nd hliril, 1 RDI), tlie wqtle M 
commanding all around, and secure from escalade; the t o m  
as hvirig 4U00 wd requiring 6000 men as a garrison whea 
completdy fortificd. Tlic addltional forti ficnticiun were then 
being made, anrZ Iienee in May tlic ahte of tlic place waM as 1 
said, ' already cnplde o€ ri, short resistaate.' 
69 S d 8  ciJhi .oe wm tdtcazisted. Tliis tlie writer of the 
pnmphlct s a p  wns not moro visiblc in Miiy than in March, 
No~v, in Mnrcli, Soult WB, In one compaet mass, bearing down 
upon Oporto with t l i e  avowed intention of afterwasds march- 
iiig to Lisbon, hxving ausiirance from the empsror thaf Victor 
and Lapisse were co-operuting. l n  lfay, Lapisse bad abcn- 
d o n 4  nll co-opcration; so hnd TTktor;  botli were cut off 
from any direct mmmunimtion with Woult; t h e  latter bad 
remained five weeks inactive in Oporto; h i ~  troogs wcre 
scattered, and he bad shum, by feeling towartls Lis Iek 
iii force, tliat hin ~ e w s  were no longcr fixcd upon L i s b a ~  
It wris tlicrcfore mucli more vkilik. Finally, sir A. Wel- 
lesley judged it so, for in a lettcr to M .  Frere, 24th dpril, he 
mys, (they {the Frencli) have iiot passed tlie Touga to the 
south, nor htlve they extended tliemselves h t o  Tras os Montes 
amce the loss of Cheveq but theg h v e  mde some movetned 
townrds the Tnmega mhich divides Tras os Montes from 
Eiinlio; ilnd it i~ supponed theg intcnd to aquire for tlicm- 
srlt-es tlie optioii of retreating intn 8pain.'-' It is prolinMe, 
liowever, tliat Soult will not remain in Portugd when I ahall 
pas4 the Mondego.' 
54 Z k t  t l ~  infmfim of tls B~glish ea&& to ckfd 
~ ~ t ' L q a l  Jlacl b m  daecbtful. 
Autlm-it%ee.-Extract from di JORN Cwom's Compon- 
dencc, 1180. 
~an,uarnj lDt7~-l  T e  are iletermined t o  remnin to the 
last, propcr rnoment, in tlic hoyes of receivinp orrlers from 
Englantl.' 
I7eIirum-y 9tJ~-' The orders me di~ily expect r n q  be eitlier 
for immcdirate embarkation, or to  maintaiii PmLtiiga1.-' U'e 
Iiave liut t l l i ~  one wisli, to act for tlie credit of our cuiintry, wd 
eridea'~otir, under tlie snnt of nll information, to d~ccuvar whnt 
ma?y be the ohject of th govi;772mmt we 8mc. '  
Behmmm~ 26th.-' Sirice tlie 14th of January we are m2i 
old, imtnictionnfmm 3ngland' 
Extract of a despatch from Mr. C f i ~ m a  t o  Mr, Fmm 
A@ 11th.-'You wilI oliserve thnt iin tIie altcrnative 
for wliich it is ncassaary to provide (tliougli 1 trust. iicverthe- 
lcss jt is not likelg to txke place), nf tlie evaciinfion nf PortiigaI ' 
by Iik N~jesty 's  forces, sir A .  Wellesley is directed to proceed 
with the iirmy to  Cndix, to be landed tliere on tIie acccptance, 
by the Spanisli governinsnt, o£ the condition wlaielc yozb have 
a k d y  &m instmtod to propoBe, of $he drnisuioii of Britiuh 
troops,' &c. &c. 
Otlier proofs fslso cxist, bnt it ia idiciilmts %o dcny a fact 
wliicli ia continually complüined of in sir John Cradoek's cor- 
resyundeiice; nnd I liave neitlksr &pace iior iriclitiation to 
unravel al1 tlie tedious confusion oE tliis autlior's arg~ments. 
Ha~ing  ~ l i o ~ v n  t l tnt Iic ia inconsistent, nnd not very scrupuloua 
in misreprerienting my statemct~titq 1 proceetl to point out his 
errors as ito facts. 
Page 40.-IIe asserts tliat ' I J m e  is m o l l w  pmsihb ~oecld 
jhm Pwhyd  to  iVar¿rid 6Jmm by ~ J M  vaklry of ths T v s . '  
kmwm.-ln 181% lord WelZington moved from the Reim 
fronticr, throtigii tlie pn~s of Gun~laramn t o  Madrid, witJ& 
t m c l r i ~ i  ow the atd?q/ of  tí^ Tqw.  Jn tlle snme yrar Iord 
IIill inoved fromblcniti:jo, pawerl tliroi1~11 Lower Estremdura, 
entere(? La J f a n c h ~  anrl arrivcd at Nudrirl w i d d  mvi7ng 
dcmg C ~ M  xalaElty qf ll# l'ugus. 
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certhIp not thrs s q  7aeiqId of mmmm. Further on we 
~ h a i l  find wen tliis fa11 short of the fa&; there are fords at 
0 t h  periods also. 
Fage 4s.-The author, continuing his reprimnd, says, ' tbe 
Tagus cozcld no€ .?M forded bg Vzctor.' 
A m . - T h e  question is not whether he muld fwd, but 
whethcr lic coulrl pms; hut even m to fording, thc cstract 
from air Jolin Criarloclr's letkr t o  lord bastlercagh, diited 12th 
April, before quoted, proves tliis sriter'~ amor, 
Pagg 40.A t. i s  asked, ' Supposing ~lacvrsld Pi& h d ,  0.s 
colonel Bap'm point~ out, l r u c ~ c I ~  to Alnaaokcú, w/mt r d t  
e m i d  Imva m& a' 
A.raswor.-Tho allid advance to Opodo would haw bcen 
clianged to a retrcrat ; hut I h a ~ e  naalierc pohited out mcli a 
mñrcli for miirslial Yicbr. 
Paoes 60 nud 51.-< 2% hbt& m o m m d s  9~:- 
m d  Lmiw as d2iadagems mid popes. pos& fw t~i &fa8 
of fibm.' 
'Place. th BP%S!~ amg QE Smmvm md L m h ~  amd 
t7m m j  &, witJmt di$mlty, i.t by L m e a  d 
Bemfiu. ' 
Ans~uw.-lh is q a i n  air John Grado&, and not flie bis 
toriaii, who recominends those pusitions; neither are they, 
as tliis writcr would have it believed, spoken uf at al1 tis 
fieldq of battle, but as positions on whieh t o  wncentrtab the 
whole allied forocg, mith s view of covering Lisbon. JYhere 
ia  tlie position that may not be turnd1 Tlie thing to loolc to 
is, wlietlier an nrmy, in position, can by shorkr rouhes iuter- 
cept tlie march of tlie enemy, and affer battle qain. In this 
vieiv the French engineer, St. Vincent, after a careful exami- 
nntion, recornmenrled tliocie posts tu Junot, mcl in this viuw 
sir Jolin Cmlocl~ decided t o  ocmpy thern. '1 shall,' he wsit.es 
to lord Cnstlcmagh, Lcollect t,lie Hritish forcc on thc heights 
of hrniar, my ettvalry and li$t troop8 at the passes of Monte 
Cabecos ancl 131acellnr, and a supporting mrps at Bucellar. 
Prom ths; statiou at L~iimiar l c a n  m in any di~ectim w J ~ m  
tke m m y  can p ~ m t  Ir,imevy 
Papa 32.-The pamplilcteer says, ' Re Jlrss s h m ,  cMzck ?as 
trimts lo IIM sali$aclion of the ~mcEep, tlmt lJ~e poaifi'rn ao mwh 
rscomnaenrld ha t l ~  IIGtoq of tJte P m i d a r  JIrw, m s  
in~poper tn meq pmat of &m,*; that I o o k i ~  $o €h pktim 
0f fhe ~ I ~ ~ L o , ' s  C W P S ,  ~ ' t h f l  L28bsbo~ 7aW '&S @lmTm COUId k 
considered as uflvrding a eent~al~ but, on i%e ~ 0 d ~ a r s  a ugqr 
rdivA p o ~ f € h , '  
Amm-.-Tbe post8 alluded h, nnamdy kcuvem and 
Li~rnhr, were neither commended nor discommended by me ; 
nor are they anywbere expressly cdted rr central position. I 
=id, 'sir Jolin Cmdnck resolvcd to prcscmc his ccntrnl poai- 
tion; covering the capital. at sncli a distante ns to preclude tlie 
deiiger of being cut off by one army, while he was engged 
with motlict' Tliis refem, not to one, but to any place suiting 
tliat plan of mtion. Agdn, I remarked, ' i t  must not 1ic 
objected to sir John Cradoelr that hc disregarded the vnlne of 
a central poriitiun, ~vhicli miglit enlilile liim l o  be 1)eforeiand 
with thc! enany in ~ 0 ~ e r h g  Lisbon if th0 lritter shonld march 
on his flaiik.' 
Eut Crndock's position ~tt  Lumiar aas, in regara t e  Lisbon 
md die expected adwnce of tlie enemy, a w~itral position. 
Victor and Soult, rnarcliing dircct upon Lisbon, could not have 
formed a jiinction witliout ~ving Cíudock an opportiinity to 
pnsh lietveen and fight citlicr scpriratcly. Uere, as this 
writer ninkes liiniself merry with w h t  he d l s  my central 
positian, 1 mil1 tnkc thc troublc to inform him tlirtt, in a 
rnilitnry sense, rs central position is one from wliich a general 
can, when opposed by two adversaries, Rcting on diffeerent lines 
of opemtions, prevenG his opponents Erum liniting except by 
circuitous marchm ; whercforo 3 may bc ccntral, annd nt the 
a m e  time ratired. . h'mpoleon's position at; the siege of A'iantita 
waa central, yet so retired, thst his opponents were cloae upon 
Mantua erc lie could light them. 
Page 6 3 , i  Lord Jiierefi~d depwted f ~ u m  L2.m m t l ~  
8t7~ of Apnx h v i n y  siv Jolm C r d o &  a t a  oppoad to tob 
e k s  of mwc?~in$ to Leik.'  
Amum.-6 l coiisented to g e n e d  Beresford'g wish to make 
a movernent in adviincc.'-Lctter fm 8ir J o h  CrdocIc to 
gaaeral X. S t m r t ,  8th of Ap-il. 
Paxe TE.-'a& w h e  are tJlm mmfa ins  whkh c.dbd 
iVupiF1. Im p h e d  b k e m  @orto md LGbola' 
Bmm-Uct\veen Lisbon and Oporto l 
Thcy have vnrious nrsmcs-tllcrc is tlic lSicrm de Crnrrnmula, 
Sierra de R i i ~ n c ~ ,  Monte Junto, and thc moiintains of Torre6 
Vdras, Mafr-, Montocl~ique, &c., oa  w k l i  lord Wellington'~ 
iarnous lhes were eatalilislied in 1810. 
X'iigs 77, tlle pa~riplhleteer s g ~ ,  I llave mentioned many 
rcasons7 11iut not tlio real antl suhstnntinl ono why lord Wel- 
Iington moved a p ~ i n s t  Soiilt instead of  Victor, ntbmely- 
' Lisbm wodrll J~ave b e m  left v e n  to t l ~  fomw general." 
dwwer.-Tlie reasuns giveu by me were,- 
lo. Sir Xrtliur Wellesley ~ireferred atttacking Soult, I~ecanse 
7w Aeld a lZch pro$-i?zoe, a ~ d  U p w ~  t h  mond &y of Pwbp~gd. 
which Iioth repcnt md people desired t o  recover. 
So. To attaclr Victor, it waa set-@site to combine operritions 
$ti1 Cuesta, wLicli requird time, WJAGTL migh he m q y d  
ugaiPWtX4. o 
dutfboril%a.-Sir A. Wcllesley's compondence :- 
'1 sliould prefer ail attack upon Victor in concert with 
Cuesta, if SouI t wns not in possmsirin of afertile TO lora 
prwince u f t h  i:Gqdam, arxl of ths fa~rourite town Castlereagh, 
cf Oporto;'-' and if any aperiition qaiiist Yictur, hprl* '+ 
comected with Cuesta's rnovenienh, (lid nut rcqiiire time to 
concert it, wI~iclb mny w ~ d ¿  be mplo?jt~I .ili d&!urlqilzg Soult." 
hn operntion itgfiinst Victor is ~ttcnded by tliosc nxlvnn- 
@nI-if aurcessfti 1, it d h w  e ~ d I ? y  S&& 'j-O a, mie. 
a& L&rn>' $c. ~j c. 
Thus the 'swlistantkl m m '  hIls to  the gmund. Sir 
Arthur does not rnention it ; alid if he tliuuglit u rnovernent 
aguinst Tictor worilrl cflctzcdip r d h e  LUIim, he could hnve 
liad no. fear of Roirlt. 
Page 78.-The pumphleteer '& ab ca loss to see bw th& 
(Woult'a and Yictor's) operaticm mlc i  lava h cccrriBd m Iiy 
tb Xeerc' 
Anmm.-Mg exprcasion m not c c m y  m,' but cmklaact 
thir ~plwatbm: and the Zezere s a s  only mentioned a9 the 
line by wvliich Soult and Ticter, after reacliing tbe Mondego 
and tlie Tngus, coukl Iiest cotnmuiiic:i.te, or, if necemary, forrn 
a jmction,-and wliy not! If two amiea rnake ni flnnk 
rnarch to  cffect a jiinction, to covcr tliclr movcments hy a 
river will niit enly ~irotect heir marcli, but renrler tlieir junc- 
tion militwily sccure long Ficforc the troops nctually meet, 
tlie enemy cannot saiely pass the rivcr t.o prcvcnt it. 
Pqcs  13, 04, corrhin n Inboured reliul~e, for, that 1 11nve 
cnllctF rnnxll Iiotli~q oi tronpa ' wr)ls.' 
Amer . - I t  mny be t1ut C ~ p '  is a barbmisrn, hit it is 
found in JoLnsoii's Dictionary, and tliere defrned ' a body of 
aoldims. ' 
l%gc 101.-It is asacrted that on Sault's retrent from Oprto, 
Silvcira, in dimhcdicncc of tlic m o ~ t  positivc ordcrs, ' m m  
t 2 6 d  JLW t r ~ o p s  on rlre d f d i a  T O ~  o r  bwards Su!&: 
~ n d  thnt  early on the 15tli Jwd B e r ~ f w d ,  leavclag A marante 
m I& zoay fo Cl~aw~, oser!uo/c ymmal ,Silvira$ Ji&sa'm7 
ATWXW.-Tlicsr! assertiriiix Iiavc! Iittle referericc l o  anytliir~q 
I heve snicl, but tlieg arr: mcant to expliiin thc ' fa2me i m  
muzrdtIol E e r ~ f m g s  operat.im7 to wl~ich t,he French owed 
their safety. I mil! not contrndict tlicm ; yct SiIveira always 
aiñrmed tliat cdjyisim rlid rnwrcl on the 14th to  Nond.in. 
and I h m  thliniuqh Cuw Lo G k o ,  za?m-e ?M took t l ~ i ~ t y  pn- 
m w s  m t ? ~  16th md w I m  I~bjiYrtJm progreBs wm mw&d 
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'umqmted ordm fim w8haE Bwmfwd's ? & ~ t w . e .  
Hc dso afirmed that tho troops Bcresford ovcrtook, ns above 
stxted, -re not his, Iiut Racwllw's Beim di%+& which rat 
tliat time was d y  an auxilia~y. 1 have, therefore,in nowise 
misreprmented the inatter ia saying, ' thwa m a fvdqm {m 
BweRfo~cXa qwathm,' nnd ' time a& to he a m  m-
stmding Iietwem I ~ h  and Shei~a.' 
Page 104.-Adverting to my praise of Trant's sdvance to 
the Voup,  tlie writer says, ' t / ~  autlm-, for a nailda~ mcc~s, 
?!m m mti-awdinamj m t h d  of q w a t i r q  th dwdinat9 w 
e ~ ~ a ~ $ i w e  o* frmn g ~ a t  U& w h  d i ~ ~ ~ t b n  that 
qfiw a&.' 
Amw.-Generai Tmnt assured me that his admce to 
thc Ponga was his o m  audden nnd spontiinooua act. 
Page 110.-TLe following pasñage from my work is qnatd. 
EwIy in 7bm 2er87d Bermfad w w ,  8 , t r b  tJrm b r i g d e ,  
dimBrt mCa8t~noJ~m0,' upon wliiclit~ie writer ubserves,'lord 
Bmfwd eoaa m d m  d i m b d  m t h t  p l m ,  ?aw d a  he yo h e .  
A nww,-lord Londonrlem~; in his Narrative of tlie War; 
p. 305, says, <marshal Deragford, for exainpIe, iastead of 
retuning to the north, m8 o r b d  to pmcd mW1t?b m B.ra'tish 
aad Eioo PmEu$uese *a& 6y Guatdb J~amo to ti~e Tzetw,' 
As hls lordship \va4 ndjutnnbpnenil nt the time, and rnust, 
tlierefore, have imned the o d e r  hirnself, I adoptd his assertion 
without a suspicion oEita incorrectness, 
Page 115,-The pmphieteer m j ~ ,  'the duke del Parque 
would not g i ~ e  lord Bcresford some Brdiah b k a  h ~ f t  in 
a t m  cat C i W  IEod%o by th ~ ~ s m l y l U a b  of  si^ Johm 
M o m i s  m y , '  and he appends to tals the following note: 
' Colonel N a p k I  ~ J I  J& v d  %-ay, s a y ~  by 0l.ller of 
&p. A H I ~ T  IVdhky;-tlrat is, 1 mid, &re m fd 
by eM. Art7~ur TPdJealmJ~ wdm.' 
A-.-Extract from  ir iir delIesley'8 corres-pondence: 
'PO the (It i s  a curions cirmmstance respecting marshd 
mxqnis Beresford's corp, that the Cabildo of Ciudad 
Eurlrip ractuallq- refused to allow them tu llave 3lcricln, 
Feptcmber: 1, 30,000 lbs. of 100,000  lb^. ~f biacuit wliich 2 Jkad 
t a o ~ .  p~gmed t h m  in cme thc opcrntions of the army 
shonld be direeted to tliat quarter! 
1 now come to the last, not tlie lea& of this miter's mistakw. 
In my Histov it is said, marcha1 Beresfiirtl was EO crdulona 
of Frencll wexkness in the numher of tronpu, ae publicly t o  
annoance to the junta of Bndrojos, tliat ' ihtdt '8  fmm, wa?td&"g 
and I m a ~ d  by continaal attacka, W M  ducPd f.o YO00 or 
10,000 aoEdkrs;' upon which the pmphleker (p. 112) semarb 
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lord Bere~ford 611, I ~pprehend, be surprisd at thia Infor- 
nlation: although reading o€ events with which he had no 
' incuiisideralile cuncern, he must feel Iiimself indebted to 
lieutenant-colonel Napier for a p a t .  deal of very impurtant 
a intelligence relating both to them and to himself. The 
aliove relation will, 1 suspeet, be receivd by bis lordsliip as 
iiews of tlie very newest descriptiun. 1 doubt wvhether lord 
Beresfod, in tlie whole c o m e  of his life, ever comrnunicuted 
with tlie junta of Biulaj~x.'-~Of course t l ~ e  historian will 
give his authority for the fact?-' Tliis piihlic annotincement 
' to tbe juntra of Bxdnjo+tliis niimcriwl aceuracy mitli ivhich 
a lord Reresfordb estimate o€ Soult'~ force is set down-al1 
* t!icse particularities remind oiie vmtly uf tlie ver.acioua 
niiccdotes of the wortliies of the 'School for Bcandal,' and 1 
can only reply to tliern in tlie words of sir Renjnmin,-tha 
lieutenant-colonella account is more circumdantial, 1 confws, 
bnt I hlieve mine is the only true oue, for al1 tliat.' 
'AutJdy.-Letter from bis excellency uisislid Beresfod, 
to  Qie junta of Badajos; extractsd from £he Brit.iah Prtm of 
July 7, 1809. 
1 Lave alrmdy transmitted you an account of the forees I 
sent to Alcantara, and which \vere obIiged tir abandon that 
position to the enemy on ~ccount of his superior nnmhers. 
SIie resistance they made, however, was liiglily Ironourable to 
the small wrps wliich ultimatelyremained to  clefend tbt pnss, 
tlinu:h tlio los# and damnge su~tained by tlie t.own in con#+ 
qiience gaw me great concern, I have ngnin sent  t o  Alcnntnw 
four liattalions uncler tlie same b m  oficer, colonel hlnyne. 
1 flatkr inysell that in a short time ail tliat part of Spain will 
bc freed from itrt oppressors. I llave mueb plemure in trans- 
niitting to the junttt copies o€ the tettem received ye~terrlny 
from G~llicia, and cong-ratulnte it oii the frivourahle appearnnce 
of tliiugs in tliat province. Ton alreadg know that upon tlie 
defeut of tlie corps of inarshal Soult Ily general sir ArtFirir 
Wrllesley, tlie enerny were reduced t o  a most disgruceful fliglit, 
nlinndoning their ammunitian, &a, and the soldier~ thromi~ig 
rrway tlieir arms; after which, tliey made such forced marclics 
tliat It was impossible to come uli with €he main body of tlie 
a r q  before it liad passed tlie bridge of Breiiga. Oar troopa 
followed thmn with al1 expedition t u  that place between which 
aud Alnrie wc mnrlo some prisoners. 1 hnvc prcvioiislg com- 
rnunicated to d1 the juntas and gcnerals in Gdicia tiic pra 
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dout 8000 m 10,000 m, m't7mt any c a l a m  w. mmiini- 
tim, m d  ifi e v e y  ~espect in t h s  mort wretdd cuIackilim,jyiiq 
fmm w,r t ~ q e ,  would retire into that couutry, in ordcr t1i:it 
thcy might be prcpnrod in the best mamey to receivc ths 
and X entefirtain no doubt that the consequenoes of the capti 
of Lugo, md uf Eey having left Gallicia, wilE b fntd 
Soult. I have ths bonour to remain, with the most profou 
respec4 
Yonr most obedient servanh, 
' G;. C. B E ~ E S F O ~ '  
Cdmha, May 2 D. 
h that snficimt authoritjli or will it be called rn forge 
as some otlier letters have heen, hccause tlie initial of tlie fi 
Cliristian naine ia given according to the Sp~niah  spellii a: 
namely, Guilhelmo for william'l But liaving iiow track 
tlie pamplileteer tlirougl~ most of Es tortnoua stateinentg 
pray mp rcadcr~ to observe, that t h i ~  m n ~ s  of erfors anri EK 
rility is contxined in a pamphlet of less tlizn 230 pagee; it , 
tlie prodriction of a wrikr wlio acknowledges to hnve slient 
three montIis in ita preparntion, becauso he was ' d ~  t h t  
ml7~iny aE~rmld b~ pIdbJiBCI im wpb?y to  mj m&ddtt% which 
mxkl Sejk~tIy c&ed M ra m2shks of ?& m;' and mho, af+-• 
rougiily noticing even a false punctuahion, in wcL an exti 
sive mork aa mine, hyf down the folluwinx rulw for 1 
guidnnce of conternporary historians. Thd n;e?/ sbozcld r 
d h p t  k~ go f t c r~h  t 7 m  a b w e  rec/k&~ of f01ct.s.' Thrit tl 
must ' cmt mi& aU e v i k e  &id w d  be s&d in a coi 
of jmtice; and t h t  itliey must ' ~ G T  d h  th.8 m&, <i l  
smid,' to dkgrm ~lteir wcrlc.' In  fine, t h u t  the publit: m 
be content, by a species of eompmtire xndomy, tci jurige nr 
the size and form of the great tralissctions o €  the world fri 








i i s t  
+ 
Sincc mi ting the above, fim%.er Sh-ictur~ from the sama 
pen have aippemd. She author ia surpriwd tht bis forrner 
admonitions luve had no effcct npon me; perhaps lie will be 
more surpri~ed to find that his prescnt corrections are liiidy 
i'm Iinve tlie a m e  ftlte; for liaing written jn tlic same style, 
and as iilnccumk AS those 1 have just nnnlyseil, it wonld Iia 
waste of time tci notice thcm. Wir Eenjemiri D'Urbxu 1im 
Iiewever now mixed Limself up in this controversy, and 
obje~.tions shdl have au auriwer. 
his 
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Hig account of the battle of Albuera 1 hiid before me when 1 
wrote mine;-if I l i n ~ e  not quoted him, it is becnrise thatatwmthe 
condition on wliich w. copy nas placed in my 1i~ncis;-if I have 
not followd liim na guide exuctly, it is becuuso other infur- 
rnation justjfied mt: in guitting him nt certain points with 
respect to mattem of fa&, and l l ig opinions and conclt~sions I 
\vas in no manner bound to. 
1 ". 1 aclcnowledge an involuntary error in snping marshal 
l3eresfurtl's fuilure ut Badajos ltept lord Welliuy + for nearly 
tloo y m ~  on tlie fronticr of Porhigal. I sliould hnvo said 
more tllan one year; Iioiv the mistake crcpt in 1 cannot cap, 
l u t  1 h d  already cietected and corrected it in my cupy for 
blie seovnd edition. 
2'. I know tliat rnwrslial Eeresfod olieyed Iod Velliagton's 
instmetions by crossing khc Gundiana at Jerumenba, it is so 
sfated in my Histoiy; hut lord Wcllingtan liad dso given 
liim a discretiouary power of actingn and to  invest Badajos 
quicirly was the principal objeet. It is marslial Beresford's 
jurlgment in the use of tliat discretionary power tht 1 hay6 
eciiriurerl. 
39 In opposition to sir Benjamin, 1 dhe re  to rny assertion 
that mnrslial Dcresford fougbt an unnecessary bnttle, and 
jhyFLt i l  aywiwt I& o w n  & d y m d .  Nor wa.s it upun slight 
aiitliority tht  I said the irnpütient fceling uf tfie army waíi so 
strongly rcpresentcd to  hinr as to nffcct his dceision. 1 am 
not Liound to name t l~at  authoril bemuse sir Benjamin 
chooses to  ' regad the fact as imzgina$ kiut that lord Beres- 
Surd Euught. tlie bat tle q a i n s t  Li own j udgnient is undeninhle, 
ar there is no tmth in the following extract from gencm1 
Hawcy'a journal. 
24th Nay, 1811.-'Iiet general Beresford, and rode to 
Villalba, wvl~ere there is m old enstle,' &c. Bcc- ' 15s m r s h l  
wm ~ ~ n a r k ~ s l i l y  ~ u 1 z i e ~ t i z v  m to Ile pobiq ef JigJ~Einc~ t 
Alhera, wItic/~ Ia Irlmme~ ?~imsdfnaucl~ for, depkting tlhe erm 
S C Y U M M  01 d ~ f &  iK4 l t 8 f  &u8 C O ~ M B . '  
Here 1 mnst notiw the Seeond Strictures. I f  rnarshal 
Beresf'ord is content to have mich a defender, I hare no reason 
to regret his tmte; but sliould tlie psoduction readi a secnrid 
editirin, I would advise tlie writer noG to let liis autkorities 
eonfi.n{lict his text .  
P:igc 126, lle snyx, sir Alexander Dickson Iiaping 'furnb7d 
m wwith t l ~ s  aumber of guw, 1 arKbrcM7Ey &ded m te their 
c a l i h ~ '  But in page $1, Appendi, No. IV., genera1 D'Urban 
(irhom I followed) sets duwn, under the  l i e d  oT arhillery 
employed in the h t t l c  of hlbnc- six Gcrman, six Port~tgueac, 
- n 
and six British nine-pmndem; whcrefor$ if nine is nine, r 
three ~ixes make eigliteen, 1 did mt ' wbi trady  decide 
tfieip. caJih.' 
Page 35, it is s&d, ' m  t~ t ? ~  &P'S .ls~b~bl~'m tha.! tm 
T a p  rn2gI~b hama 6em f& affw a l a d s  d?y wmther, 
mtJ~im~ c m  be mefnaagimry, wIwSe &id ewmy, aid 
t7ae whob Pmdi mny, l m  the abmd k m e c t n e s ~  Df tAk 
~ t d m m 8 . l  But at p. 3, Appendix, sir Beqjnmin DUrbnn 
swp, ' flm Tagecs betwem Go'olegm a ~ d  Rio N&nRos mas b 
t~ a$er sama1 fap.& efler a fm days' dry watlwi-,' 
Pago 36, Sie sayfi, ' The whola army wns ahoiit 20,000 ;' but 
at page 13, Appendix, D'Uxban gires 20,000 jnfnntry nnd 
1400 cavalry, besides artilley. 
Page 75, it is affirmed that Beresfod muld f o m  his bridge 
and pass over hi~i truop~ in tLe siglit and in despite of t l ie 
Prench; and tlint it was Lpmf¿t ly  ~ m p s s i ! ~ b  fm t h m  to fm- 
trate th opmution;' hit x t  page 12, D'Urban's Appenrlix, it 
is ~ a i d ,  the French 'rnig?tt h e  opposed t h  .pwation wi t I1  a 
rrstiond proqect of ~ L ' C R Y S ;  
Pago 77,  'thc night wns so dnrk that tho cnemy neithcr wils 
r ~ y r  cnuM h mm;' but page 12 of D'UrbPan's Appcntlix, say~ ,  
the exremy ' o b d  &e IleigI1t.3 ocq ied ;  mil g m e  uli Iiis 
des@ 
Page 80, ' th m y  did mt ha18 at Ol*;' p g e  1 3 of 
the Appent%, nir Ecnjamin rinys, the nrmy bcing without pro- 
visions, ' eneampd &. t7w eoo& v m d  t h d  tmm.' 
Page 162, Wtl  &ift of w i d  whJL coW flq 'er  
has introdwed with somewliat of dramatic effect, ta clear 
away tlie ohcurity of mist snd smoke in which lio liad veiIed 
t l ie  scene, m w  ocm~~ecZ: pnge 31. of the Appendix, sir B. 
D'Urban my~, ' th mhd at this moment blew mide the mr',. 
and rsin.' 
Tiiis snfices to prove my opponent wlnerable. But 1 Ii 
&ted no fwt witbo~lt authoPity, and I sliail hercnfter sliow t 
rin nll irnportrrnt points thnt n a y  be contradicted. To ite 
exactly al1 the periods nnd circurnstances of  a bnttle ia nearly 
impossible, and I ~ l m i t  that on some minor yoints this writcr 
seems Letter infurmed tlian general D'Urbm or myself. 
IVhembre, in a second edition I wili nocept and uae his cor- 
rcctions; and also othcr rccwt information, ahowing thnt I 
Beresford'a ermrrt at Albuera, anrl Campo Mayor werc grer 
than 1 ha* sepresented them. 1 anno t  promiae to say a 
Dumouriez, wlio it. would seem is angler enough ta kno 
trout from a gudgeon, tliat marshal Bereaford at Albiiera ' 
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tise S th spi.re'I of th hqwbi i~;  and retain only the ' l i b d  
in my compositian ; meanwliiIe this d k r  who I being postered 
with a popinjay nnawers he knom no& what,' may rrecover 
temper, whidi, next to ' parmaceti, is the sovereipest thing on 
earth for an inward bruise.' S 
From the tedium of peraond justifimtion, I t.urn to the 
,re grrrteful task of replying ta some unfounded criticims 
Gr Jvhn Moore's mmpaiP 
It mi$t be j-ined, wl iw time hed Iilurit.ed the edge of 
political malice, Afoore's beroic d&h mnld h w e  arrmetl 
censrire whicli caalrl not be substtmtiated ; biit in this, as in 
other human affairs, al1 opinions are not to he boiind in one 
fetter, Yet will 1 show, tLat Lis censurers have anly opinions 
uiisupperteci by f ac t~  to  offer. To effect this, I must ap in  
i~rlvcrt to Coloololia~! S o d , q  $otee, classing thein with RmmiAT- 
ton's Anaals qf t 7 .  P m i w b  Cmpnipm,  and S/W'I Lifi 
V'tlie Dwka of WeILinytm, quoting and answenng al\ indiff e 
rently, as their mguments or rtssertions present tliemselves, 
'l'liq ib~cuse sir Jrihn Moore-lo. Of mcilliition and of 
loaing time at Salamanca. 3'. Of ta11ing counqel from others 
rather than from his o w n  jucl,went. 3". Of neglectinp &llkia 
as a defensive position. These are their words : 
' T/mi time WLW ht & Sal-- h a mtter  ef fmt, i d  a
g ~ z t  m5ject regr&. T ~ M  d u e  of o doy, or an Amr ia 
is p&. 1% & in vvin to a& anhat mig?bt 7tehp Z;m ll. 
pmm of a m e m m E  i d o  1Jw k t  of Spaia whiCJb m 
- mnalada, a d  &U?E&/& CGCCDT~~TLS to abk arad amte ntm, 
?d Idava Iicm mtena;n&ed; h t  B h m i %  that 
vwzuem t?mt m m r e  d a r&& m PortuJgal, 9ir John 
dfoore w a d  hnq im rtb &ig~.'-life of the Dake of 
lVellin$on, page 163. ' 
( Purb $ I b i s  d[fic&&s m& h admitfed to I m  p d  
from m arraqmts . ' - '  IVI~%B t l ~  i~fuatvy p& 
liy r l h d h ,  t l ~  cmalq and d E w y  aowe dircctecd to a d v m  
by ilferidfi a& F m i ! h ;  a& t h  c o y  m, tlmt tb 
c l i f i c u ~ ~  of coJCcivg hia wnay wm podzgwz~~ly d~ccmed, 
a~tk  #ir Jo?&n dfoore wlts compeíled to rernuin d o v e  a aml?~ 
inwtive at falamama. Prwjow i+ime zmrs # w e  Eost. T/w 
tlta?c&q of 1 m wwe bmt m a WtTeat. TRe a m y  did 
mt m u s  udil Ok d m ~ J b  hw~, m d  a c t h  ~m zmforEunateT?/ 
JnJaycd tF1' t l ~  ~ Y & Q  perwci whm u c t k  could no bngw 6s 
lilubk9-Annals of tlie Campaign, page 108. 
' B  ZS W W J ~  l o  Tw Zmld tJmt sir Jolm Xoom did nd fd 


artilley and cadry ahmld h v e  joined to retreat to Po 
tugai. 
The 4th of December Hope arrivetl; the bth, infomatic 
carne that Napoleon was resistedaak btMadDd, and by the 7t 
from every quarter mine news, which, wliether from nativl 
or Engliahmen, privaio or official, \\-M all of tlie Rame fenor- 
namely, tlmt the enkliusiasin of 8pnin was a g i n  awalrert~, 
Moreover, Napuleon's m c l i  from Urirgos to  tlie capitnl, ni 
unly perrnitkd a, junction witli Baird's division, but openerl 
point o f  athck to the now united Britisli -y. On the 7t 
therefore, sir Jolin, neieing the opport~inity thus widden' 
ofeit~d, resolved to advarice on Anhapn, tliereby meetiiig ne 
combinoitioas witli fresli digpositionu. Is thut waveringl . 
a general to shut b i ~  eyes to  wliitt is pwsing around hirn, ac 
ritiipidy folltiw a plnn pr~oonceivcd npun circumst,rances t o h l  
clifferent from the actual onesl 
' Uei slmld Jme j L U 4  ILG oum mcenmt &m#,' sa; 
the author o€ the Butea-'Ha s h d  Imvo ~ d i d  amo88 ti 
T'a,p~q to #te eio7da; saya the author of the Annnls. 
Be could not have done hoth. When Napoleon vas : 
Burgos, bfoore miglit have retired across the Tnps ; but tl 
author of the Annals speako of the period i.vE3ezi the advant 
to hliagun m s  commenced; at that time Naplcon wns I 
Mdr id  with 60,000 men, and tlie 4th corpa ans moving o 
Talavera; wherefore sny mwement towards tlte T a p s  moul 
llave been an ~lvmce,  and Moore'~ excellent jutiguient ce 
tninly would not hnve let Iiim cal1 an. a.rlvance a retreat. Br 
did he not fnllow h i ~  own judgmentl >fr. Frere nnd t.1 
Spaniards wanted him te move upon Madrid, and he wer 
towads Eurgos. 5ir David Baird wanted hirn to take a defer 
sive position in Gnllicia, nnd lie made a f o r w n d  movement 1 
Sahwn Others wanted him to r e t r ~ ~ t  to PortupI, an 
rnílittarilp speaking tliat waa most advisnhle: Moore said SI 
13ut the awakening enthuaiasm offered a hope for Spain, an 
he aclvanced on political gruunds, calciilating, :,S indeed ha! 
' poned, tliat he should al~vays be alile to retreat by Gallici 
which was not womo than a r e tmt  on Portugril. Thwe ar 
danger, yet mr is ncver s =fe @me; ancl when, as in tli 
case, al1 tbe diffrmilties are foreseen and bolJIy niet or skilfull 
evadd, a dangerous operatiun is not rash but qreat. 
Let m0 now prove, tliat he actetl upon such a calculrttion,- 
that he foresaw nnd judged al1 the 'difIlcnlties and result 
military and political-that he ndopted no mua'a recommet 
dntions, litit excciitcrl bis own plnn. 
Salamanca, December 13th.-' What is prrssing at hleidri 
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T lie deci4~e  o£ t l ~ e  fate of Spain, rnnd we must 
it hand to nid and to take advantage of wliat- ::f,$pmF 
r linppena. T l ~ e  wi~hea of our count?ry nnd ,~~n&.occ. 
our duty rlerntrnd tliis of 11% with whatever risk it 
rnay be &tended; yet; I mean to proceed bridle in hand, for, 19 
tlie bulilile bursts, ae sld1 have R rnn for it.' 
Salamanca, 8th December.-' Madrid stilI hold~ out, and I 
have aome reason to believc tliat efforts arE 
mid. 
rnaking to  collect a force at Soledo, and n still 
larger one on the otber side o£ the %erra Morena: as Iong 
there is a chance we must not abmdon this countiy.' 
Salamanca, 9th De~ernber.-~ Aher C~i~hi los '  defeat tbe 
Frencli mardied for Nuririd, the inhnbitants fleiv 
to nrms,' &c. 'This is tlie first instance of cnthii- 
~ ~ m J P ~  
siasm shomn; thcre is hope that the example may 
,T,,,,,l, 
be followed, and the people be roused, in which 
case tliere is still a cliance that this conntry may be sxved. 
Upon tliis chnce 1 have stopped Baird's retreat, and have 
tnlcen rnenswcfi to  form OUT junction, mhilst the French iim 
wholly oocupied wlth Mdr id  : we are borrnrl not to nhndon 
the cause as Tong ae there 5s hope; but the conrage of tlie 
populace of  Madrid rnay fail, or, at zany rate, they muy not be 
able to rcsist-in sho* in s moment tliings may be as bad 
ver,' 
I th December.-'1 shall msemble the nrmy nt Vallaclolid? 
By ttis rnovetncnt 1 shalI threrakn tlie Frencli ~ i , . ~ , h ,  
imunications, wbich will make some diveraion *ronre's Gr- 
in favour of the Spaniwds if they can take advan- resp5ndeuce. 
@e oI it; biit 1 much fcar t h g  mil1 not mow, but lmvo 
rnc to fiqht tlrc hnttle 1iy rnyrrelf, in whicli mse 1 mwt keep 
my cornmuni~tions open mith Astorgn. nnd Qullicia.' 
Saliapn, December 24.-' 1 gave up tlie march on Cm-ion, 
mhicl~ had never been underhken but witli tlie view of 
nttructing the enerny's attention from the armles nsembled in 
tlic R O I E ~ I I ,  and in the Iiopcs o€ hcing nble t ~ i  striFre ta tiFnlv 
nt a menk corps, while it wns still tliouglit tliat the Britisli 
were retrenting into Portugal.' 
' Tite mperimed fuihcl; s a p  tlie autlior of the. Annnls. ln 
nliat rnanuer2 'Tlie object of my mormsnt,' sgs sir Jolin 
JIooro, on t1io 12th of Deccmhcr, ' b  to timaha #te P4~encIb 
c o m m n ~ i m ,  and a t t m t  tlia'r a , t tmt iomjh  J4drid (~7kCk 
Xarqmn, mw.4 fmiaw an?/ movemm,.? wlkh m?/ Ira d e  h y  
t h  h$awb~i¿ arncim f m i n y  to tlw s 4 1  of t h  Z h p . '  NUII; 
ivliiat \vas tlie rcsiilt? Tlie 5th curps lefb Zaragoza; tlie 4th 
c u r p  wittidrew from &trcrnnJura; tlia 2nd oorlls mlne frum 
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Pjew Cnstille; tlio 8th corpe from Namne; Yal~oleon, wi 
50,000 men, rcturncc.1 from Mndiitl-thci mholc pltin of 1 
mrnpaign was overtiimerl! &esta mas tlien ennlilcd tn rno 
an army from tbe Morena t o  the Tngus, Infantndo to  obtaiu 
refuge at Cuenw, Palacios t o  descerid into La llancha; tlic 
aicgc of Znrnpza I ~ A  clclnycd, Portiignl wns snved, nntl the 
conquest of llnrl~llusia deferred, Tliis is to fail! And it is  
thus, turning from ths steady light of ffxts, tliis mriter 
entleairours by the feeble gIirnrner of Iiie own imaginaticm to 
trace Moore's mreer? 
These nutlrars spem bad gmernls in the plaine of Crstille; 
' let us see if t l iq  are betkr on the mountaiiis of Gallicia. 
<Had tl~e e'nfmution íf tJss gmmd,  &t7t ~ e y d  o th 
muntnj trnver~ed by h k  n m y ,  bm more accwra& and 
sim, 71.4 wm?d lave  h w m  t l~a t  tJws was m road ledy to 
Batanzox umd Coruña by ~oJ~k14 tJde wmy roda r~ m y  sewm 
havs advmed d k  rcqvidi~y mficimt lo h v e  &ngerd laia 
c o m u n i c a t i A t ~  fael, t l ~  red cm dhe right and Iefc omc- 
p2ed by! t l ~  Bridbh, most clifieu!t at m y  smm, mwtj at t l ~  
p&d im p m t h ,  when coverd  &tJb o ? ?  m and intw- 
mckd by muden lowwbts fim tlae mnhizs ,  h m  bem utkly 
i ~ a . c t i c d l e ~ - R n n a l s ,  pageB 1 12, ci sq. 
The lirigadcs of Alten nnd Crnufiircl, quitting hloorc's main 
body near Astorga, rnnrclied by Domingo Flores and tbc 
Puente de Bibey to Orense and Tuy; from Orease there is 
a cav~lry road to  Rt. Jago; frum Tiiy tliere is au aitilleiy mar1 
by Ponte Vcdrn to 8t. Jugo; from St. Jag-o there is n roysl 
mad to Coniñeb, Sault cl~~ired  Ney to mxreli tht! wtiole 
tlie 6th corps by this Iast route to Chruñt~, antl gened RI; 
chmrl's division did Rctually so move, reaching St. Jago so 
aftcr the battle of C o r u ñ ~  
From Villn Tmncq Fr~nceschi marcheil with his r~valry 
intci tlie Tal des Orrw, and then, remounting tlie Jlinlio, 
rejoined Soult hetween Villa Franca and Lugo. This rn~rch 
tuti!< pIace during Noore's mtreat; after thrtt event, Soult 
moved fiaom Coruiia by Ponte Vedrn and Tuy to Orense, send- 
irig La Hou~snye's rlmgoons tlirough 3lellid to  the snrne place: 
from Osense t.lier~ is algo a dircct route to St. Jxgo. 
From Zrigo tthere Is a caMage road to St. Jago, thrmrL 
' Eíellid. Tliis wm tlie rouh by ivtiicli sir Julin Moora iiitend 
to retrclat to Vigo, nnd dong wliich 3iaclc~nzie Frazer'~ di. 
sion (lid actuaIIy marcli anil then rcturn, mrl there wcre mq 
zines at al1 tliree placn. 
Prom Lugo tlicre is a road by Monforte to the Val i 
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wliicli Irnore retired. Soult marclied liis whnle corps by thia 
route d i e n  operatinp apiinst Roinang after tlie retreat from 
01irirto. 
From Benevente tliere i~l R higli roiicl by Mombuey and 
Piielila de Senal~ria lezrliiig to Orcnse. 8oult alvu traversecl 
tbis route in Sune, 1803. 
From thc AqL~irins thcre is a road by the Concejli d e  Ilsari 
to h q o .  Tliis ronte was followed by Ney, in Nay, 1800. 
Froin the hturins here is a bigh road though :hIondonedo 
to Uetanzoc and Coruíia, and tlicre is aEso tlie coast r o d  by 
Fbibideo t o  %'errola Tliese r m l  were rnarched by Ney, and 
t i j -  hrnnnrt, in llpril and JZny niorcovcr, Romnna moved 
from Mondonedo t o  tIie sources of tlie Kcyra, and thence into 
the Val des Orres, his route being by the line of the Asturian 
frontier, mrl consaqueirtly flanking tlie royal road o€ Lugo. 
So mucli for irlnprltctiatle md.' 
TIicsc writers thinlr AZooro ought t o  havo defended 
Gallicia. 
l b  /m b t m  &ter yf wgret lo m n y  Umt s i r  Jd4m M o m  
was m1 lec; ki regad WitA cc more jmmral,le ve th pujecl of 
d~femdiwg Gd¿icia, i\To p t  #'Spain o j k s  cpal  a.dvwntctgerr 
for a ckf&~e wmr: 
' 2% clommts $ven i rb tiza qpcIzdia: M c o h l  B&s 
IIistmj, dw&ntl?/ pi-av% that it m s  ¿o tldk qum~w that IIM 
anxklieB @' Napokim eua~ c/hf ly  dimid~'-Ann&, p 140, 
E t  seq* 
PmJmps i t  is io he ~eqretkd that th mgq&im t h ~ m m  out 
M'P Wa&d Bair8s let& of t h  8th U d w ,  f r m  Villa 
li'w1zcq was mt adrpted.' 
' V a d  t l ~ a  UritisF~ apmy b m a  collockd on t 7 ~  f m t b  of 
GaIZicia, abmt rRe mRd& of Decmaw, t i m e  m% be lltttle d&l: 
tAat D wmdd Jlnv~ bem idib to h m e  mmhhiimrd hw& a8 3 m t  
t h  &da; a& lonq bffbre 8 p . i ~  tlw fcm of ?fair8 
wrrs cmp!er~lu, cJmged &y t h  cig&?m of A T a p h .  of 
tliz forcs wl~ic/~jofollmed l ~ h ,  io ~ I M  dwirian ww.' 
J+'?i.cn ~ I L I  mgge~tion ofl?red, m skrmyfi, m zresniw- 
pil.iredi m v  qtiprnmf. m#&, a& th p a d  h d y  of 8 1 ~  F~emh 
WUJ ocmtgid eoit?~ l W ~ k d . '  
h g o  m d  ollter points naiyJd i m e  b fmt$d, pd&ord 
tctJwn alp m¿ shmrytI'md: d ~ 8 t s  w l d l w l d ,  and, by a jdi- 
cioz~s dispositbfi of mr fwce, t 7 ~  cla?zqw' of &y tumwd by 
thc rood thrmt$d~ ~ r m 8 ,  m d  by thom from €?&e ?zo~d¿ o/ Por- 
ttyal cxnd &e Astztl.ias, rmipJ~t hcws bm m+ficientyl gtmr& 
fijni-t.' 
' Th gimim OS ~ w ) l w ; n ~ ~ t e  m t7e i n j m e  w7~ic71 lfie oceih 
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paiion of GuüicWm, by m m y  to F Y ~ ~ M ,  m'ght h m  I d  E
b l ~  ww in Spah, k rmwded iw, ?a ?&m, whkh m & 
uder A& dktace'm do g m d  Xaeicvry.'-Xorrel'a h'otea, pag 
41, et sep. 
Ttie urpment of the autlior of tlie Ana& being but 
meiigre eopy of coionel Sorrci's f l o t ~ ,  t o  answer one is t 
angwer botli; but previons to  ercamining the qiiestion of th 
dcfence of Qdlicia, 1 will mark some sttunbIing-blocks in tlie 
WBJ- of botli. 
lo. On the 8th af December my the flotes, ' owr sfhngtIz. 
m s  u n h p i r d ,  m d  t,b Pwwh W Q  occupid with M d d . '  
!l%e streiigtli. of the Britisli army was tbe same on tlie 24th 
ns on the 8th of December; no las,  aave a few m m  h r t  i i i  
the cn~n l rg  slrirmishes, Izad been sirat~incd. hldrid capitii- 
lated the 3rd of December; on the 4th the Frencli toob 
possession; Napoleen was so little wcupied witli it on tli 
8th of Decemlicr, that he l i d ,  on the 4th, ddached Iiis cavaly 
in ptirsuit of Cnstnhos' fufftive amy, ~ e n t  lie Iat corps t, 
La Mnnclia to mensce Andaliiñia, and the fourtli corps to  tal:^ 
vera to form an admncecl guard for the march against Lisbou 
2", ' iTx amlzlneEk of N ~ t p o h  w e  dbk& direekd t o w d  
Galf&h.'-Annals. 
Tliis expressiori is not very intelfigible, but taken mith th, 
context, it means that Kapoleon fenred opposition in Galliciia 
incire t11m iri any otlier quarter ; yet two pages aBer wpe find 
tlre same autlior ~sc r t i i i g  thnt Mooie sliould hnve 'vetird 
neross lZle Trcym,' kiecsuse ' T b e  it wm ti& he was m' 
d r d d  b7J f l a p o h . '  
3'. V i e  Jocuments quofd from mp Appendix, instead o 
being fuvourable to, are directIy opposed t o  tlie views of tlies 
writ,em. 
Defore thp. bat tle of Rio Seco, Nfipoleon te118 Xavary tha 
' Bessiews hatt tofignt for th cmzmmfiicatbm of tlw M 
LCXJ tJat a mncl ~ e c e k d  by I ~ i m  w d d  $WB ct spaslln i% ¿IL 
el!l~ole m y . '  Nothing could be better eiipressed or more 
n~iplicable to the ~ t a k  o f  affairs. The French t1ien jn tlie 
Iliiinsulit werc rabout 135,000, of whicli 48,000 were in Por- 
ttignl and Catnlonin. Of the remaindm, 50,000 were acatttercd 
in Valencia, Andaiusila, and the borders of 3lurcia. E0,OOQ 
weie nt Zarqozq some at Madrid, and only 15,UQO u& 
h'm8idv~ were lef"t to protect tlie communicationc from Cuesta 
niLd I3lulze; whose unikd foreej cxccciIing 40,000, tlic best 
rgiilar troops in Spain, wae entering tlie plains of Lcon 
morenver tlie k i q  was then on Iiis joiir~i~y to tlic capital, an( 
bad Bessieres been defeiited wonIrl have been forced to fly. 1 
waii, therdore, the oompar~~,tive strength o€ the; Spaniarda 
on this peint, wmbined with the danger of tlie king and the 
scattered state of tbe 0 t h  French corps, especidly that of 
Dupaut'b, wliich drew Nttpoleon'~ attention, not the g e o g m  
pliicnl advnntages af Gnllicia. 
What a vnst dierence also, between the circumstances at 
the two periods brouglit into compririsen by these writers ! 
Wiicm the emperor wrote, the heads of the French ilimion 
were e n ~ d  in Valencia, Anrlalusiq and Ampn; tFte wliole 
country wsrs in insurrection. Bpanish srmies gatliering in 
cvcry qnnrter, Spilinuish courage untried, the Frencli commirni- 
cations protccted by a force oiily ene tliird 01 tliat opposed to 
it. IVhen lioore retreated, 90,000 men, that is, foirr times 
kis force, were united in pursuit of liim; al1 the Spanisli 
armies had been disperse& tlie inmrrections quelled ; Zaragoza 
m menaced by 35,000 Frencli, 30,000 were nt Tialn\-erq 
30,000 in Ln Manclia, 10,000 in Mdrid ,  Ei~rgos w~ iin a 
stnte oE defence, many thousand soIrliers were distributed on 
tIie lines of corsespondence, and 50,000 were marching under 
Napoleon upon Astorga. A11 thet gmnt rntin's comlinatioris 
mcre cempact, his comrnunic;ltions pratederl, and tlie head ol 
tlie principal opemtion hrned, not as i n  tlie fomrr m e  away 
from but against Wlicia; and tiifs, not because of its geogra- 
pliicnl advaiitages (whicl~ i t  is evident he disregarded when he 
want Trom Uurps to hladrid altliough he kneiv B a i d ~  divi- 
sion was at Aatorp), 11ut bcmuse tlic nnited British arrny WM 
on his communications. hrapolenn's dread,' mcl Napoleonh 
anxieties,' sound ,mndiy ; but laisi opinions nhould be under- 
stovrl berore tliey are quotd.  At that time Iie feared neitlier 
Britisli nor Spanish armies in Gullicita, nor any other part; his 
forcc wns ovcrpowring, nnd the hcad of his invasion mus 
~viiercver lia c1iose to  plnec it. Tf M o o w  had rctired on Lis- 
lion, Napoleon would have followed him to Lisbon, ka 
bloore wcnt to Gitllicig againat tliat point tlie emperor imme-. 
diiitely drove. 
' BCB&M & &-$ay at M d z k  Rio Ssco : hs mi!! o p a  cam- 
muw2aatim wfth Pwt-tqd, fm b h e  whds imto GalIzFEm, 4 
#& Lm.' 
' If Cuesta throzvs hi7i~seV GaEi& &t *l$ñting or 
~ u f c r i n g  a d~fmt, t l ~  pktzbn d' t k  amy will ba improvd 
If'h dow so a@ a &J& it d l  be eitiii betM.' 
' B y  dTiGnq C m t a  i d o  G d I G  m doprive Jtim of hb 
mnmunieatz'mas witlh M d i d ,  Andr~l* ~ ' s k m n a l a d ~ '  
' 2% tm importCL.12t poi*, and &e thcrJ can mde a T& 
W&!T warfare, a ~ e  Gallkia amd A&acsis, 6- ~ J M  t o o p n  
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O$ Sm Roque, # Cccdk, and A l g m e ,  a r a  m w I y  25,000 m! 
w h  hQve part mi& t h  a&tkla of Seni&; m d  a8 thse 
W?U) m r e  at O p t o  h . e  kdm pwt with $?M T&& of GaUkia.' 
'Xot a jwwant of IJM W&JS 621t sm tl& tl1~ afai-8 q 
Spda a# th& iww dqmd u p n  B ~ a e s .  foolidn, 
t7m, it Ls to hava i% ti& peat o f ¿ v  2i01untardly g {ven t-9 
cJ~mes  q&mb himl' 
A &j&t of Be6&e8 &lZ be o blm at IIM h t ;  Q d l  h 
fe22 d all tire &m poiniacti af t l ~  m y , '  
5% m y  of B a s h  q h t  fa h d t h  l& 8000 m 
9raol.s tu ohi& a&! chanca q a i k  Jnim.' 
' TIM grmt olj& of ih m J 5  c f d  s h d  be tu s m  
M&d. Xad&d c m  mly mmmd by tlte m y  of 
OaXlicin,' 
'If Be8Sihe8 & chcked, A& o6jset sJmld b~ to proM 
Bwgogg9 
S~ich were Napoleon's exprmsions ; not a word aboirt the  
geographical importance of CialIicia,-he only considers the  
dmgers fo rn  sucL a cwmparativcly large Xpanish force enter- 
ing the plnins of LBon: nnd in iijs oun eumprtiga he did not 
move agninst hEadrid until he helieved Moore w,w in full 
ret;reat upon Portugal. Tlie infitant he discovered liis mistakc, 
he returi i~l  with incredilile ~xpidity, not hemuse lie feared 
opposition in Gdlicia, but because it \ras necesmy to protect 
hiscommunicntions i i i  the pli~ins of Lcnn. Boiilt wna in tlie 
s m e  situation aa Eesikres I i d  heen; hut, its the Eritish were 
more fartnidatile opponeiits tlian tke Spmiards, Napoleon carne 
with tiis whole arrny to protect tlie cummuriicatioris. Thus it 
ia clcnr thnt #ir John lfnorc's mnrch against Soult wns in the 
veq spirit of Napoleonk w d a r e ;  they who would have liad 
him go to Gallick, undemtood neither l& views nor the empe 
ror'~ reasoniiig. 
Lt uti now examine mhether hliicia e o d  bc defended. 
T h e  arp~ments, or rnther lamentations of thcse wtiterrc, rest 
on a letter of sir David B a a :  it will be fitting therefore to 
see how fsr their foundation is secure. 
Sir Davjd Eaird coriimanded only a division, and Iiis know- 
ledge of tho real d a t e  of affairv was nece~sarily more con- 
Ened tlim tliat oof thc cornmandcr-in-chief. He ww ignorant. 
of the nurnben nntE position of tIie French armies, and not 
fully acquaintetl with tlie extreme inibecility and falseness of 
the aupreme junta Any proposition made by Lim on tLe 
spur of tlie moment, must tlisrefore be taken ns t l ~ e  sug- 
gestion of a man wha liad no meane of judging lnrgely; and 
tht liis p p o d  t o  defend Ctallicis bore thak impre~s is easily 
B ~ O W U  
' Ic has fiEpRtty,' he saya, < w d  tc m, tf& & 
evmt af ow A?iq ohl+d to rwlopt] ~ f k v s  w i . m ~ ~ e , ~ ,  it 
mi@ be w e  drantayeow fw 1?4e matbkd Bdb7b M Y I Z ~  
k m w  C=u.llkia a& p.~t of Lean, tdaa Ly p r d i n g  lo  
join you dt Sd-m to Lditlnh íY#se pm~'incm. 1 ' 1 ~  
A s h ~ ~ i m  i y ! ~ ~  he o o c w p a  6y t l ~  t m p s  q' tbe n~~rqww7 of 
I fo~mra;  and {f you 31Iclpd il popw by a m m ~ t  
#o join w in t / ~  wigILbm~I1ood of rliPIwq4 l mtertuim a 
wr&?mt be4i.f t l d  by o m p y h q  Ihe strmg grozvnd bd~ind 
it,' ux dodd ba aEib ta mvw tl~e eortntlrj in our m, md 
niiqld &t mtik tt i~ m mlmf efom the fijmvia7b mEim k 
disposed and de te rmid  to mde in dfmce of tlia wtional  
i d @ p d m v 3  
' !¿'/M ~ q t a l  road f r m  GmGu fo thix p h a  m d  Astwya 
is- rema~kahly goocl, aarltiun1qIb mmndajmm, arad w ~ i t h  tJ@ 
sm open to JM W G  ~ I t o u l d  be a 6 b  to receiceI m'¿& fafacelit?y, m h  
rnltS;rccemmts and szrpplies m t?ie BdiSIb gcnianmmt mi@ 
cEeerr, i t  pcpw to 8md. TYM eou*j aliuu.nds i~ catfb; 
bead h t d ~ d  would rep~ired, /na Cf lm~ r~a%?¿t Iie dtriiml 
f r m  Rnylmcl, arul in tiLe mntinae Qrdli& U I C I ? G ~ ~  JLaRve m 
opportunity of am&q u& our pmtectim, ancl OUT p w m m  
.$A Spain wwld fimi~Id a rallyiny pwimt, and act a$ a sti~& 
to tlte rSpffiniarrls.' 
Sir David piits tha cme h p t h t t i a i t l y .  He would criver part 
of Lean antl Gullicia, bmaiia miglit occulq tlic asturius,- 
al1 were to witit ros tlie Spaiiisl~ efiurts. Be WM but sliglitly 
nequnintwl with tlie sh te  of aihirs; for how cauld thc plai.ilw 
of Lwn bc covered Ily 25,000 mcn a ,g r ia t  200,OUril- 
how could Itomnna '~4 th  6000 ill-eqiripperl men defentl tlio 
Asturias agninst Kapolcon, &ter figiiig from thence at tlie 
~ i g h t  of Soult'ü f~mgers. Sir David t l ~ ~ u g l ~ t  it cnsy t o  get 
~irovisions, yet in a mrinifesto, pulilished a few days liefure, he 
writcs tliiis :- 
' Tlis kingdom of hllicia, strong from ths nature of ths ' 
country, will require no force to Jefcnrl it Iieynnd its olvn brave 
army r i u s  ascenibIiug tit Leon, uiider tlie iiirquess of Romana; 
tlwp~~emee o j  am ndditimal mumbw of troops ira its pmsea 
ancl on e'ta mm-nLa~mI w d d  h t  tend tu mlmmt ita mm~m 
aaitlwut adcling to its secilrify.' But tlie best cornitietit is, 
tliat sir John Noore. (lid not o n l  anthorize, but pressed 
FIaird, to prepare rirovisluns for tLe anny in G:dlicia, aud 
he waa unnble to procure more thnn B ~ B W  d a y ~  supply for 
each station. 
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6th Decmbw.-' f l t h  m n q a z i ~  at V 2 h  J r ' ~ m . q  
ami m cw two fartka back.' 
l ' i i l b  Dwder . - '  1 m d o6lGed to y m  for  yml 
opiniola vpm ~ I M  Galliim ME$ Yigo, and 3 is LJlat wltic 
p1'0bdly 1 8 i 1 d  nozu follm, 8Jddd a n w a m ~ d  hcm 
m .  1 m tlm-efow mmt -'m that moagueint, 
sl¿o~dd Bo f m d  m t?mt c~rnnaunic&~' 
lGtL Decembw.-'1 cmnot ?U+ agah pwsing upm yov. 
h € d e  mwy w m m r e  fOy t h  fming  # m g & m  aE 
Asbrga, Vi2L-t PwWmacI ami on t?bs mad to C o r u 6 ~ ~  for t?mgh 
we mcq do s m l l ~ i y  J w e ,  etie mwt alzaa+y look to a ~eh-eat 
wpm Gd!i&' 
2'0 lwd CmtlwmgA. 30th Dec. Ahi&ga-# 1 fmnd m 
prwkiom h e :  tJ& Xaelth wltich iSd bem cd&&d J M ~  bm
cmqv~md hj sir Bunid'~ COTJI~ {m &ir p u ~ ~ a g ~  f l w e  iq TM 
t w o  ck tp '  l u s d  to camj the m?! to  JrJb P ~ m a ~ - t h r  
m e  rao mmm of cam-age,-tf~ -le m away>-tlie v i i l q f  
are dmrled.' 
14th Jd%. 1809.-' Th umnt of p r r d h  w d d  nd p 
mi8 pne to e r d  lomyw (4t l ~ q o ) .  I m d ~ d  thd nlghtht' 
Zet us now examine the queetion by data. 
8ir Dxvirl's letter was d t t e n  tlie 8th Decembcr. The 
10th it wclied  ir Jolin &loore. TLe 12th St mm nnswered. 
Tlie 16tl1, orden might possibly have reacfied Coruña, t o  
f o m r d  storea and ammunition to t1ie Jin'ereiit positionm 
intended to be oceupied; on the 25th Moore mnimencel 
liis rctrcat before 90,000 men. Tliis gives ten dqvs fo 
' fort$/zq L q o  and 0 t h  ~&nts,--~ tcdn?ag up jw l i k  
pmiiiorw i% ssecu~e UN lalwd T& fm t h  mrth of POT- 
tqnl , ' -  ' eskddishiy a rqjwKw syarem of 8uppLy f ~ m  
E?~qI:ryn~E,'-~ cn1ilinif fi~t7B and m 2 n g  th pop~iZ(~tim ?f 
(;dk<&,'-' t?lLfo~&%J t h  PWY%BL??TJ ~ l / u & t k  J ~ Y  i!~a?as- 
port, a& persuadinq tha jumtct of tlw p~e>e~rm to giw veilk 
r q i & f e  aid.' Ten d q s  to do al1 tliis I witlr s junSa wliicl 
liad kept sir David's troops seventeea daye in harbour er 
it would suffer them even t o  land!-a junta tlint rnndr! m 
trnrling prnfit of his neccssities; and dter ciítracting nearly 
tidl' a million of dullars fmm him, bsd at  11ist so scantily 
fiirnislied liiin witli triinsport, that he mas obliged to Iewe 
Itk sliare ammunition Iieliind, and to  maich Lis troopa by 
7 ~ a ~ h n € t o ! h ~  to lc scn tiic burden of provisioning thum! 
Authn-itk.-Si~ J. Mma do lar-cl CwtteerqIh 13i~ 
AYuuerfiber.-'I m s m y  to  $ay, j h m  &T Davtd 3 h v  
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d i w y  ht cmplainti of the $do of Cmña, who t-t&d 
him m ags2stance. TItq p m h e  evqjtlting, but giva 
~alilJ¿in$? 
Do, 24& ~?Qv.-~ !Th 500,000 GTOITLWB ~ L N T  E8Pdd;p mmz- 
tima, B~T Da&d Baid co7~&claed m mat f o  laim; hs detuimd 
b/m, and m m ~ h ~  mpe?zd? um! 
Xir David Bmird to &Y J. Xm. 19th Xm.-' h e r g r  
p w d l  eJi>rf I~us hm d lo camptete th.3 equipa& of 
d J h  divkima: m'wg bo tke total wunt of aaektwm whkh 
we have €xp&oecE i?k GdicZa f r m  tlte local autlu)&, mr 
m e s e  Kas mt Iim g~mt.' 
Do. 21st ATov.-' r e  m ait th& l lwnae~at h t & D  of q~rn 
ammuna'th.' 
But Romana's amy wasi t o  defcnd thc Astnrias ! Rornana'a 
army, which is thua describerl by coIone1 Symeq by hlmself, 
and by Rloore. 
Colaad S p s  l o  & D. Baird. Dec. 14.-'XE i~ m d I y  
iwp882'bb dllat t?mj mn 8&& 6efm aa tim of l k m d b  
ilafffintry. 11 portfom, of a€ Imt omd~id ,  of tlu! Xpmt4 
mwk& m3 not  qh&: amd a Frmdh mfdk  d i  lom2 and 
$re J h  pke w i t l h  p'eckbn tlwee t i m  bejore a S p m k d  m 
$re IW.C&~ 
R m a  to & J. JIOOTB. f 4¿h Dec.-< 1 h a  b e p  to 
clothe rynd to oogan.i2ej h t  mm7h i s  w m f i y .  IETm are sti8 
al least twc-thi~& wJlo a r e  in want of clotlGng frm I d  t o
foot, A l m t   ti^ wlmle m y  am mill& I A C P ~ X ~ S ~ C ~ S ~  cm- 
tmch-bom, m d  8Jloee; a& 1~0Ezohh-8~t~adi~g l tlz mtwm 
1 hvt! d, 1 Iuve no$ lim a6k to succmI,-tlg m w t y  
ojaz'nq so fa0 1a02crm: 
N o o ~ e  to hrd CasthmgK 31st Bec.-' Poliody can 
& d e  X m n d s  tmgs to  be wwse tlm k clotx, a& b 
compJn,iw as mzac7b m m do a6 th i d i f e r m c  of t l ~  
idiabl:tants.' 
m-as ever so d a ,  so v j s i r i n a ~  a propotiition m d e  by a 
general, as tiiis o£ sir David Eaird's, iE we are to suppose 
he mde it aith s Irnowledge :ef the red ~stte ef aihirs, 
and with tb rcferencs t o  a pcrmanent defenecl Btit it is 
evident lic 8uggc:csted it wii,Ia referente t o  an enemy not mric'ti 
superior in iiumbcrs; it wns so considercd by sir J. Moerc; 
and tliose writers who lament its non-doption, uiideistood 
Bsird's view~l little a9 they did Moore's niid Napoleon's. 
Suppase CLu.qo fm$&i anrl ' t l ~  m n y  jdieioz~sly p ~ k d '  
by tlie 25th Deceniber. 
What system, what arrsngements, wuId have obliged the 
poor niountaincers d GtaUicin to bring in provision nnd 
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means of kmnsport for &ores? Was thig pwt of the plan to 
be eKected by tlie contemptible junta; or liy tlie pcople t h m -  
rielveul WM it to be eiiiited by furce or by inoneyl If by 
rnonev, wliere ans it to be Iiud? If Fiy force, where nos tlie 
forcel Woiild tbese writers have sir J. Yoore detac11 fmm 
hia 25,000 nen, to raise contributions in a frien& conntry, 
wlten Napoleon, mith 90,000 men wns in his front ? Finally 
what iti nlearit by ' a&diFkz dkh-ihdim o f f h  trmp~3' 
TIierc were two, onlg tm points, where a mnritime base of 
apertitions could h a ~ e  been estab.blislicd, namdy, Vigo, md 
Coruña nhicli includea Betanms and Ferrol. Non. Ed us 
examitie in succession the diferent positions oE defence which 
an army couPd take up witli referenco to tliose bases. 
Y, J I m m a b  w Rodrigatos. Tliis position is imme- 
~,, ,p,i ,  {IiateIy beliinrl Astorp. T t  is  strong to the 
C. Smitli,s front, but untvourable for a retreat to Tilla 
Reprt+ §l1> franca; it i6~ tnrned by tlle wliole road of Fonce- 
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h'np;erq"a badan, wliich comes into the now road at Cd- 
I~iatorp, wbello~ near Villa Franca, The Britisli must 
TOI. 1. therefore Iiave retirerl to Caltlcabellos, or occupied 
tliat place iii force. If the latter, 25,000 men wodd liave 
been spred over thirty miles of ground ; tbe enemy, 990,000 
strong, ceonld have thrown liis wliole force mpiust eitlirr 
extrcmity of the he, and Calcabellos oncc cmied, there was 
no retrent for the tmopa at Ilorlrigatos. 
2O,  Calcabellos or Villa Framcra. To hold this poaitim 
perrnanently, niagaiuines must b a ~ e  been establishd a t  Lugo, 
and strurig curps of oliservation placed, orie xt Orenso h 
rwver tlie erit~blishments of Vigo; one 81; Mondonede t~ 
mver tliose of Coriiña ; one at Lugo. The fird, becnum 
fmm nenevente the Frcncli muld move a force agaimt 
Orense snd Vigo by the Puebla de Senabria; the second, 
because they n~iglit do tlie stlme througl* tilo Asturiw to 
Behnxos and Coruña; tlie third, partly to connect these 
detnclimentq, hilt principdly to wtlfcli the r o d  of Goncijrn 
de Ibas, leding from tlie Astiirias direetly upon Lugo. 
From whence were these tliree detac1iments t o  be J m l -  
wauld Zliese w i h m  liave liad tlie Briti~li army depend upon 
tlie peaannts of tEie mountains for tlie protection of its h i ik  
its rnagkizines, and base of opcrntions-or upon Romani 
rimy, sricli as he dpscrilia(1 it-or wnulrl t h q  have hacl Moa 
to divide ttIie 25,000 Dritish into four parts on a liiie o€ o1 
Iiundred and fifty miles, when Napolcon had 90,000 mi 
masseil in liis front? 
3O. L q o .  Hcro wns the first position in whi& a sm 
army conld pret.end to mrilre a perrnnnent stand, Thc oom- 
miinictition mifh Ret:tanlrias is  gooiod, not abnve thirty miles; 
the army coidd Lave moved between those tmo points, and 
dclivererl baitle at eitlicr, with qood retreat to &da, or by 
H. Jago to Vigo; that is, if tho Frencli operakd onty from 
Astorgo, tand tlie Astwim. But tlie roads to Vigo were ~till  
oprn by the Vnl des Orreu and by Puebla Benrtbris, nnd the 
pacition of Lugo and Betanzos coulrl be kken in reverse. 
Wliat iwla to be tLe pin of al1 this? To preseme an un- 
stearlp Eooting in a barren corner of tlis Wiiiiisula, while tlie 
fiench rioted in the conquest of the south of Spain and 
Portugnl ! 
Referente to sir John Crdock's papers in my Appendis, 
second volume, will sliow tliat Lisiclion must have fallen the 
mumerit tlie 4th mrps arriyed tliere; from Lisbon tlie Vrencli 
woirlcl have riped to  Oporto nnd the Minho, thua opcning 
nnotlicr linc of opcmtion ngninst Vigo. aallicia Iina no 
geographicd dvantages for defence by an inferior force; it i.i, 
wlien an enemy posseeses the Asturias and Portugal, indefen- 
a i h ,  especially by ri rnaritime power. 1 O. lt oflers a slilient 
ande t o  tlie adrersq. 2". Tho Einrhonrs at its bnse ara 
witle apa* ssitnatd on a dangerous coilst, and the lines of 
commuuication from tkem to Trilla Franca are sepmted by 
dilGciilt mountains. 3'. TIie I i n e ~  of cominunication ruri 
alung the hontiers o£ Asturiaa and l'nrtugl; $he enemy, 
crnbrncing as it were t.he whole country, would be nearcr 
to tlie Iit~rbourri at the base nn botli sidw than the tumy t o  
wliom tliey belonged, rand could attack aay point he plensed. 
It would be impossilile, then, tu remiWn about Pilla Franca, 
niid tliis was provd in nfter-times; for tlie Gdlician arxny, 
iilthougli PortugaI wm in tlie poseession of the mliies, 
nlrvny~ broaght bnclr to Lugo by iylie slightecit demonstratioe 
of Eonnet's divicion f m  the Asturins. To cal1 sucli a 
district strong in any otber viem than whea tlie contenrling 
piirfies are equill Ln riumbers, or as i t  affords a fugitive native 
fume shelter in ita muuntaine, is to cIiscover a total igiiorunca 
af ivnii 
Shnll it be said Napoleun hd not troops enongh ta 
operate iii tliis extended manneri The 1st corps was left in 
La alancha, mc1 ~wvetl mvre tlitln suil icietit to bettt all tlie 
Spauisli forces tluit riillied In the soutfi, 10,000 rnen gar- 
risonetl M~rlrid. The 4th corp~ w w  on ita t o  PoTtltgaI. 
90,3,000 men were collected at Astorp the 30th of December, 
anrl G0,000 o€ thoce actually followed Moore to Corufia. 
Lpisse, with 12,000, nas sent t o  &lamanca, and could have 
u 2 
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marched upon Orense by the Puebla 8enabria road. Bonnet'ri 
rlivision was already in the eastern passes of tlie ksturias. 
The 5th corpa wns nctually drawn off from Zampoea, nnd 
could have been senf inta tlie hRturia~ also. The reserve of 
heavy cnvairy coi~ld baw occupied $1 the plains of Leon, and 
ths imperial guarda, the only t i ~ o p s  Napoleon withdrew when 
he retuned to  Fmnce, remnined for two months near Vitoria 
partling tlio lime of communicntion. Tbo withdrawd of the 
prtrrla and departure of the emperor hirnself were al1 the 
changes consequent upon tlie inno~tnwment of the Austrinn 
war. Nzrpoleon's abeence ms doubtless an immenae event, 
yct he did not know he m to dopart unti1 lie rwIied 
Astorp; sir John Moore thereIoro could not before that periad 
have foreseen both the event and its consequences. 
Colonel Sorre1 referu me t o  lord Wellington's mnipiaips, 
and dwelIe upon the population of Gdlicia, which he eati- 
mates at a million nnd a hdf, a8 if 3U the population had 
heen actually in arms md organined t o  give hnttle-or m if 
they coiild have been so arrnetl nnd argnnieed in ten days! 
L o r d  Wdlington'g cmpaigns! IWy, there it b I finci the 
iIlustration I want ! Portiipl liad t h e e  millions of inlia- 
bitank; Portugal h d  fin9 harbours; Port.ugd had a re@ar 
govcrnmcnt ; Portugal had an m y  organized anrl rlisci- 
plined; Portngal h d  an amd militira; PortugJ 1lad nn 
established vigorous systern for forcing the people to defend 
tlis country ; Portugal had gtrong mountaing dificult roatls, 
grwt rivurs; Portugal h d  aotrially in the field a regalar- 
fnrcc of 40,000 nien, B militie of 45,000, an anxiling 
PIritish army of 30,000 men; Portugal h d  more than a 
year to prepare-and yet when Portugal was invraded by 
70,000 Ii'rericli, lord WelIington retired &om the frontier, 
nnd woutd h a ~ e  retired from the country alaltogdher, if he 
Iind not hrtd time, snd money, antl mana, to fortify a pcwiition 
whicli coiild neither be tnrned by the flrtnks nor stormed in 
front. 'CVithout any of these advautagee either as to time, or 
system, or numtm, or local admntages, tliese mriters would 
Iimve had sir John Mmre defend Gallicie apinst mora tbnn 
doublc the nnmber of tmops mhich in~ndcd Portugnl! In 
defending Portugal, Iorr2 WelIinghon also defended the w11s.e 
of the ieeninsuls. gpain w a s  prostrate-he relinqnislied 
nothing. But w h  Moore retreated, the south of Spain and 
Yortugd were not evt3n invarted, and they offered a thoneand 
timcs tho advantagca of &dIicis! 
Having thus sliown how little thwe writers have considered 
their subject, 1 take tlie opliortunity of wrrect ing an involun- 
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tay error of niy own, and explaining Iiow it arme. When 
navating Chmllly's rnission at Ealamanca, I sairl sir Jolin 
IIoore ' tme t7w &ter im +es.' It mas not so. The story 
was first published by Cllarmilly to m a t e  a notion, wliidi 
l i a ~  bwn pmdily remired and propvterl by Moore's enemies, 
tlint, opprcsscd by tho difíicultica of Es situation, ho wes 
peevlgh snd irritable. Mr. Jamea Moore 'disclaining,' as he 
says, ' to  umwer Elte he,' not only JiJ. not in his N~rrative 
contrdict this misstatement., but rather eonfirilied it by his 
m~10 of treating tht: matter, Tlie story was repeated, rind I 
d o p t c d  it witliout furthr examinat,ioa Yet it i g  cprtnin 
that the original letter is at this moment in ehtenoe withoiit 
a rwit or injui~ ! Moore'a enemim foiled even on this trifling 
poink, must tlicrcfore continue to  draw upon tlieir imagina 
tions for fads, upon their prejudiccs for argurneuts, and thek 
rndicc for cnncliision~: fin11 wlicn t l ~ c ~  h r c  done so, there 
wi!l almaya be persona wdling snd able to dcfend bim. 

OF 
XAPIER'B BEPLY TO VARIOUS OPPONENTB, 
M)NT.iTNIRC 80ME 
NEW CURIOGS FACTB RELATIVE TO 
THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA. 
* Them was a man in Islingh, 
A?d he wns wondrous wie, 
E c  jurnliccl inb a quickset Ii~dge, 
And smtched out both hiu qca . '  
Tu my R ~ l y  h aarkwr O p p o n ~ ,  I plorlgcd mysclf to givo 
at~tliorities for certnin importan& facka diapiitcd by tlie anthor 
of the work entitled, F~iLrllier 8tricfure.s m wlonel , V a ~ ' i i  
IIidoy of ~YM l ' m i m ~ h ~  IVw. I now redeem tlmt pledge, 
whicli 1 pve ,  not as thinlGng ft necesssry to hke more notice 
of n mritcr whose ill-foundcd pretensions to uuthrity, and 
nlinw incorrectnesq 1 hart so thorou~lily exposed in m y  
hply ,  but te show that no weakness tlien witliheld me Trom 
dissecting Bis second. proriuction as complekely as 1 Id done 
Lis lirst; and also becwse í thoiiglit it rlue tu my readers to 
aubetnntintc the nccurncy of my tliird volurnc bcforc thc pub- 
licntion of a fourtli. l o  tliia view, I will now t ~ k e  tlie d i s -  
puterl fack in tlie order of events, and, placing my own state- 
meut fi~st, in m h  case support it 'by itutliority. 
dhzed~-Tlie lieiitenaribgovernor De Costa wm tried 81trl ' 
sliot. ' XIe om1/ evidenm q a h ~ t  ?&;m wm an expIan~ory 
b k r ,  mrittm b b r d  Liverpool by mbml Cox, w l ~ n  r n p k o m r  
at Pwdun.'-Ristory. 
dzrtAority,-Nr. Stuart to lord CastEerexplq Lisbon, Jnly 
25th 1812. 
' 3 1 ~  ~om,-It mnp not be irrelevant t a  rnention to your 
~ ~ ~ d d ~ i l i i ~  tline, vpm iib rn~?&nm of a Aqpat~7~ whkh qwd 
Coq r ? ~  Ia fe govarnor oJ A lrnsirJffi, m7bila m lithonfir in Pmnca 
d~lressed da lord Liverpool, rehtituig tlie circurnstibnceri mhich 
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led to tbe fa11 o€ thnt fortrese in E S 10, the person wha exercisc 
the functions nf lietitennnt-go-rernor at  tbe time o+' tbe captui 
tias been condemnerl to deatli by a court-marta.' 
3dl.h 0f ~ U S C ~ C P . - '  T?E + f d 6  P~Lgete~6 ~t@WBnt WiM 
brokm to  piecm-Hi&oy. 
Azcthwities.-lo. Extrnct from a memoir dram np by 
colonel Waller, st&-oficer of the second division and an eye- 
witness. ' htr tIle Frencli fornied on the plateau, they vere 
mnnoriadeci from our positíon, and a regiment of Portupese, 
either t lm Q h t  or &k&h infnnty, which were formerl in 
arlmnee of tlie swenty;fmwtf~, threw in aome volIeye but wm 
puiekly rlmkm into tJie psidhm.' 
2.. Extract of a letter froin an offrcer of the ninth British 
, regimen4 wlso rin eyc-witncsa, ' 2% GJ4th. Pw6uqw~8 rqC 
& k &o?JRd, w1~i.d~ I &u gme way #o o maG, smfi 1Jtkr 
m ~ d i n g  o$;cer a& ten ora d o m  m at t ? ~  outside; but 
he and they ñFerc? amonpt the re ry  foremost of the wnks of 
the nintli Critish! 
Bcfore q~i t t~ ing this point 1 wiIl notica an accusation m d e  
hy tlic autlior nf thc Fsrtl~ril. S t r i c h ~ ~ ~ a ~  namely, tlmt 1 hnve, 
from partid motire~, been silent irpon a . n lhn t  cliarge m d e  
by the nineteenth Portuguese regiment. ~vlvliich 1 aaswer, 
oil my own autliority as an eye-witneos, tliat m m 7 6  dmpe 
m ~IE&  Jm chcribed took place. The nineteenth Portu- 
gume werc not postd In fmnt of tlic convent, tliah ground 
mns occupied by the light division in fixt line and by the 
Germans in second line. There w a ~  indeed a Portuguess 
mgiment (possilily tlre nineteentli) whieli waa pusted oli tlre 
rnountain, nearly la mile to the riglit of the canrent and in 
fmnt of the hrigade of grrards. When tlie nkirrniFihers of 
Marchand's division pushed back tlieir opponents, this re$ 
ment mttíle an admnce in support of the covering liglit troops; 
IC wns a lmrlsorne demonstratittion, but it is exaggeratioii to 
m11 it R fine ciinrgc; the Iine never was ncarcr to the cnemy's 
akirmishem tlian tn bundred yarcls: fur tlie triith of this 1 
appeal to the liglit division, and especinlly to fhe artillery, who 
were at thc time firing upon tlie main body of tlie Frencli 
troopa said to have been cliarged. 
Operdons in h e  di lm&g'o.-Esre it Fs scrimly necessay 
to notioe tlis spciaf plentling in the Puvt7w 8trictw-e~ relh 
tive t o  captaln Squire and the batteries constmcted on the 
lefL of the Tpigus during Massena's stity at #m- 
Wde J~~~ tnrem. 30th that oficcr and colonel Sones say ITlsto~ 01 lhe 
,, p. 446, tlie Iiatteries wcrc mcant to c o d  t h  ~ a e h  
of t?te Zema It is ridiciilous to suppose caphin 
Bqnire who oon&nrci;ed them did not k n o ~  the object, or 
wriether they could effect it. Let tlwt d c e .  On other poink 
my ilnsmem sliall be full. 
lo. Bm~fmd amived d P & k p  uith 20,000 inf&j, 
2000 caeidqix and 1 8 gum.'-History. 
A &ty.-Lord TeIlington to lord Liverpool, Lonztmo, 
Marcli 16, 1811. 
' 1 Iiemd of tlie fa11 of hdprjm on the night of the 13hh mmd 
14th, and moj nr-genere1 a l e ' s  division waaa moved on Espinhal 
on the 14th, in ortler afterwtards t o  continue its route i n h  the 
Alemtejo, and it marclied in that direction yesterdny. Wa 
~Ikall have in Ilmt phnce 23,000 m.q of w h d  m l y  2200 
Wdl k ~ w a h ~ . '  
In sir B. DUrbunb memoir it iei dso stated that aftm th. 
p m q s  of $ 7 ~  Gwulkna the mny mas still 21,400 stsong, 
mith 18 $uns. 
29 Conabd of Campo Kayw.-27e F m h  m d  i ? ~  t78iv-
km& d ~ a g m  c?mrgd t l ~ ~ o q h  &Q otlm tu?&-Hiabry. 
hIy anthority ww an cye-mitnem, mhofia tcstimony is c o -  
firmed in the following memoir, tha prodnction of m officer 
of the thirteenth dmgoons mho was one of tlose e n w d .  1 
@ve it entire, Iiemuse it conf im my aocount of the arair in 
0 t h  importmt poinh al~o.  
On tlie morning o€ the 25tIi Murch, 1821, the amymoved 
fiom its bivouac position tomarda Campo Mayor, the tliirteenth 
liglit draguons in its proper pIace in tlie column of march, 
uritil tlie ground in fmnt was Eound sufficiently open for tlie 
upcmtions o!? envnls; d e n  khe wliolc mem ordcrcd to tho 
front. Tiie cavaIry con~isted of thc third dmgoon giiards, 
and fourhh dragoons, nnder the command of colonel De Grey; 
tlie first and seventli regiments of Portuguese avnlry, nnder 
the command of col.one1 Otwnyj and ths thirbenth dragoons, 
under the command of lieutenant-colonel Head md brigadier- 
general Long. 
'On gainiug the fmnt contipom mlnmna of half aquadrons 
were forined, and the wliole moved forwad aE a brisk trot, 
uniler the guidxnce of genera1 Long wLo directed t1ie rnove- 
ments of thc cavalry on thrtt morning. A ttroop from the 
tliirtcentli dragaons, and detncliments from the other regiments, 
were sent to act 8s skiriniñliers on tlie rising grounrl on tha 
riglit, snd t o  proteet the riglit flank of the column. At tliis 
p r i d  the strerigtli of the thirteenth Jragoons was reduced to 
tivo squadrons, liaving one squndron dehched 4 t h  the liglit 
division untler t,hc commllntl of coloncl Colborne, a troop mitli 
a Portuguese infantry Lrigade nnder tlie commnnd of colonel 
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The pursnit now continued a rapid rate, it being the 
ohject t o  gain tbeir fmnt ~ n d  capture the whole, m well m 
the enormous qiiantity of baggape on tlie r o d ,  with their 
artiIle7; it was tal~en for p ~ n t e d  a proper suppost would 
linve been sent ufter the regirnent, and thut tliere was not 
nriything to bc apprehcnded from tlrc cncmy's infimtry which 
wns behind; we supposcd a good ~ccount would Iic given of 
tliem, when we considered tlie force of Eritkh and Portupese 
that was Id t  on tlie ground. The pursuit did not cease ti11 
stopped at tlio bridge of Bridqjos, when, on cunsultatiuri Pieing 
hclcl, it wns jedgcd prndent to fnll bacl~ on tho mpport nnd 
scciire iill priaoiicrs rniid captiires. Sixtcen picees o€ nrtilleq 
each dram liy eight. mules, numbers of waggons, immense 
quantities of baggage of al1 descriptions, provisionq stores, 
borses and mules; in ~hort ,  the wliole of the stores whicli tlie 
enemy liad col ledd in Campo Illnyor, nnd wliich on that 
morning wcre rcmoved from tlience to bc plnocd at BarEajoa, 
were, owing to the rapidity of the ptirsriit, capttird. 
On nearing Rndajos, somc of the drivera, svpposing them- 
selves safe nlion witliin tlie fire oE the guns on the Sortificti- 
tions, refused to surmder, anrl kept nhipping on their mules: 
tliose were sabred nncl tlie miilrs rnoiint~l by men of the 
tliuteenth. Ttie retreat it7w continuerl for some milcs in tbe 
most oderly manncr, the men in Ligh spirits, until infom% 
tion not to he doulited was receivecl, ktlint iIie Frene6 inirintry 
wliich ww left on the ground were corning forwnríl, supported 
by a consider~blble horfy o€ tlixt cripalry wliidi herl oiirrendered, 
but whicfi, ou seeing their infantry coming on, recovered their 
horses md m s .  To attack tlii~ force \vas considered so 
i m p d e n t ,  that it was decided (as there appeared nti liopes of 
suppart) to aliandon al1 the. cupturee, malrc a rletour to  the 
rigiit of  6hc roscl, and cndercvotir to join the mny+ IIt m 
oiily Tic felt by those in similar sittiatioiis, wwhat thc feelings 
of nll were, when this decision mas f o u d  t o  be absoIutely 
necessarg.' 
To t h i ~  antllentic stntement, 1 nitd the following observa- 
tions by cnptain Artliiir Gregory and coFoncl William Light, 
both aerving Itt the time :u tlie fourth drripons. 
'The mmprise of the French troopri at Cmpo zE1. Mayos wa~i su complete, tliat wIien tbe cavalry 
liad got talimast of tho fortress tlie anemy'u infilntrg wtire onIy 
just turning out on thcir nlarrn post outside, arriving by t w o ~  
and threea. The hmvy briprdes nrcre Iiringing np tltair riglit 
ahonlrlcn to chrge, ~ u h m  tlte wm~IaE JzimaeY PO.& up m d  
thesla, The artillery mliich liad opeiied its fire rin the 
retiring rolumn, were ordered to cease after a very Eew rounda, 
m d  thc encmy nllowed to retire, unfoIowed and nnmolested, to 
Earlzjos, over a perfcctly opcn antI flat countrp.' 
AS they (the PrencL intantry) wcm retreating in close 
column a very shurt distance in advanoe and on 
our Idt, I hnd a b d k r  opprtonity of seeing them 
tlmn tliose i? the centre or right of our Iirigadc, 
as X was on the left of $he left half squdron of  the wliole 
brigde; comeq~~cntly, nearer to them tlian any onc else. V e  
were so near tliat the wEivEe near1y uf tlie renr ranlc anti some 
ofücers of the flanlc tul-iied round, -de a sudden stop, and It 
a~peared t o  me thcy were p i n g  to lay dorvn their arms. I 
rccolbct saying t o  the serjeant next te me, ' If we go on a few 
yards furtler they will throw down tlieir a m ,  for, look, tl~lieg 
are ready to rle so now.' dt bl~b w y  wmmt we w 4  Idled, 
t l ~  P ~ m h  sA&ed tJ& m ugaita, gave a ai~out of joy, 
f ihcd  a h c t  awl rnwch.d of.' 
Tiis testimon~~ Joinetl to the acknowledged fact that the 
Frcticli 'did triumpl~imiitly cai-ry oK tkeir rccuvered guna to 
BwEajos, verifies tlio inain points in my account of the ~ffair 
o€ C~bmpe h lqor ;  and witls respect t o  the presente o€ culond 
Colborne, nliich the author of bhe Stnctuw so Rippantly y 
denies, 1 reaffirm it npon tlie authority oE colonel Colborne. 
Thc autlior of tlie Xtriciwea, altliuug1;li equivocaily, dsnim 
that th tliirteenth dragoons were repríliuuided by mrsml~nl 
Ucresford Eor purming the Frcnch; thc fncb ww notorioiis, 
and tlie actud reprimand, a very severe one, has been pub 
lislicd by &fr. C. E. Long iii reply to this writer'a aspercions 
on the late lieutenant-gerieml Zoiig. In inywork it is said tliey 
were, perhq~s,pi%y reprimaiideil. 1: retract that smertion. 
More full information leads me to tliink thcy mere umju.aily 
reprimandecl ; they deserved praise, and the ' 'u.mpa.I-ing a h i -  
aation of t l ~  eul~ok m y '  was neil founded. 
5". ' Y/LU breach of 3adajm was laot c l o d ;  %c. $c. 
4'. ' Ber~s f id  shuU Ibave ~ n a r c l ~ d  upm M&&.' 
5". ' Rm~forck hdieued 8mlt d d  o d j  ad ori, th 
&fensiva7-History. 
Tliese assertions invelve matter of opiaion and matt er of 
fact. Tlie opiiiione I leave to ot.hs,  Ths m t k m  o€ fa& 
arc as follows :- 
lo. U Reresfod had moved by Merida or been Eess slow 
in liis after operations, Badqbs WM in lz m M l h  66 
iwi8l. 
2". The r o d  t o  Mcr ih  wa~pra&&le for mop 
3". T L e  f a r  created by tlie auddcn nppipearnncc af 80 Isrgri 
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a force, and tho vnlnur of the thirtccntli drngoons nt Campo 
Mqor, dd tlae m o v ~  6?y Uerida a m¿ra operatim. 
4". Deresford, unable to judpe riglttly of the real state of 
afairs, t7wzqId Ratkcbjw w l d  be mmded, 211Jmme~ flilss aUie~ 
pwed th W h m .  
6". Up to the Slst of ApriI nt Icaat, lord W d i v d m  did 
mt thidc well of tlhe rnnraitd's qwdm. 
Tbe fint of thesa facts smrccly rcquires authority, seeing 
tha* Badajo# must necessrarily h v e  Leen ill-prepared for a 
siege, yet I have abundant proof. 
Colonel Jones in his Siqes, pnge 3, writw thus:-'At tbis 
time (26th Mrarcli) the E'sencli had been jn pnmcssion of 
Badajos onb a fortniglit, and tlie works and bztterie~ of their 
recent aiege still aff'orrled considerütle cover. 1IJg h c 7 ~  WGGS 
q m  and the gnrrison ifl-supplied Mth proviaiclns, mmuni- 
tion, stoic9; thc re-captiirc, t!icrcfore, not only secmed incri- 
hble biit eaqy if specdily invrstted; bnt  the river Guadiana 
interfered, and there mas neitlier a pontoon-train nor other 
merins witli tlis nrmy for crossing the river! 
The lwt pssage of tliis quotation proves that Menda w a ~  
thc true linc, Eiccause tlicre wns a bridgc thcrc. It is foolish 
to p l a d  in liar lord WeTlington's instructions to pass at Jeru- 
menha. Tliey were given in the notion tliat al1 tbinqa for an 
immediab passqe  were in realiiness; but it was not 80, and 
Bere~ford, following the letter, neglected tIie spiiit of I i i ~  
instluction, mliicli wm to  rocovcr Phd\joa a4 ripecdily m potr- 
sihle. Slie deniiderl stnte of Rarl?jos does not rcat on colonel 
dones's single testimony. Coloncl Lamarre, tlie oornmandw 
of tlie Prencli engineers in t h t  t ~ w n ,  E B ~ +  ( Tlie E~igliJi cuin- 
mitted a grcat fmlt in wasting eight Jays M o r e  Oliveriza 
siiicb must havc fallen aftcr tho tnlíiiig of Badajos, and ?AL 
a little more boIdms  amdpmtraticm Badajos migh  lime b e  
dlachd willd m m s  i m  Ilie hgimning of A p i h  Prom tlie 
12111 of Bhrch the Erencli had liecn workirig &o iill up tlie 
trenches, to repnir tlie breach, and ta mnlíe otlicr restorations, 
sspecialZy the Purdalcrns wliich was a henp of ruins. Eut 
material9 were rwe, and mmons scarce. It was nat iintil tlie 
2 1st of A@ that hlLB bemh e t w  closed, and tbe atate of the 
said breacli liad been a source nf great unemiiless, tecauae if 
&e or s-ix flwwand rnm Imd o p p d  bejbr~ Raclcjw at tb 
en$ of illarch, Ilmt p h e ,  in a fiad  tu& and feebly gu&md, 
mtst Imv~ fallm in a slmt time." 
TLis last parngrapli also proves that Meridrn ~ a u l d  have 
beea tlie best line. Rut to proceed witli Lamarre. 
' Tlie armment of tlie plwe was hugmented by t e  pma 
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h h t  Campo Xaytw: (Those very guns wliich the 
thirteentli dragoons took and miirshd Beresfurd lont agnin). 
' Tlic formcr siegc and the prcparations for dcfcnce liad, how 
ever, exhausted al1 the resources of tlie town, and the neigh- 
bouring muntry, anrE yet so pressed were the engineers fór 
wood, tlid so late as tlie 22nrl of  A p c  (fourteen d q s  after 
13eresford h d  crossed tlis Guadinna,) 'a strong detacliment 
was sent out to fcteh timbcr.' Tliis dctaclimcnt, as may bc 
seen in the body of my work, wns nearly cut off by Iord ITd- 
lington, mho lost no time after Iie arrived in ascertaiiling the 
real da te  of tlie prrison. Tliere is, bowever, other and even 
bettcr proof of tlie denuded da to  of Badajos, namely, the 
original ~cgistedmok of the French pvernor's ordciui and cor- 
responden~~, from wliich I eatract tlie following passrqcs :- 
lo. To IJM rqd commaS8~~ o ~ '  tFw pwuince, 10th A pd, 
1811.-' Tlie place of Badajos lieing unfurnistied of timber, 
it is proper to fix upon some plnce to cut it,' Bc. &c. '1 prby 
you t o  ~nake al1 diligente on tliia mibject, anii to ernpiy al1 
meBnsi in yoiir power.' 
X2tJh Ap~il. Fo 'o* smna-' 1 send you tmo &ates of the 
articles wmting in Badajoa to  completo us for three months' 
consumption of 4630 rations of food, und 300 of forqc pcr 
dar, be3ideq the objects neceasrtry for tlic siclr! '1 p r q  gou, 
in oonzequence, t o  make immdiak rep%tiarw m the v2kqm 
of Gice prnvhce for the quick supply of the ssme.' 'Tbe 
paymaster-general lm m funda to p q  fm #Re wwk# of t l ~  
p k '  
Order of t7ee &y, 10th Ape%E.-C From to-morm the troops 
of tlie garrkon n i11  receive only i!?b~m q~~~ P& of b d  
daily.' 
14th A@-< Ow h l k e  c m  mke m rno~e* for w& 
of e l~umoal , 'd  fa+e bcattr~ les- m~ecirlea. ' Tlie eiiginccrs aiao 
are much embarrnssed for wnnt of tbia articIe, which is, how- 
ever, iiidispmslible.' 
Z6t16 dprzi. Zb the ~ o y d  m m h w ,  $c.-< NO bmndy 
cnn bc givcn to the worlrmcn ; tlierc is none in tlic rnap ines ,  
exccpt tliat whick 1 have rcscrved for the gunners in cuse of a 
"e*.' 
These extracts sliow the state of Eadnjos to the end of 
April. Rut 1 Iinve ~ a i d  ' geneml Imas, wlim lie surrmlereil 
to Boult, l d  pl&j qfprouisim; nnd it is aslíed how t.hat 
agrecs ivith tlic Frciicli &&y 2% $~;ant.. 
Lord Wellington miting to loid Liveqmol proves the fact 
as to Imas. 'Louzao, Iilarch l6tli. r ' l ~  g h o n  (that is 
tlia Spnisli) wanted witlber ammuw.itition luvr provlsiw.' 


SEQWEC, ETC. 306 
sntirely m th d e f m * ~ ;  and that no doubt may exist on thaf 
head, 1 will give an cxtmt from nnother of his own lettera, 
stipporting it by one fron lord Wellington, which 1 tmspose 
from my Appendix to this place. 
Marshal Beresfod to Mr. C. 8tuart, 27th April, 1811. 
his mmFw ;a, b ~ w ,  1 $hi& w q d ,  bit I can- 
not speak certain about it! 
Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool, Elvas, May 2, 1811. 
the niglit of the 16th instant, X received from marshal 
sir ViIliam Bcresford lettcr~i of tlia 12th wd 13th instant, 
wliich rcportc.d thnt mnrsliol Bo~ilt had hrokc up from Seville 
ahoiit the 1 Otli, and had d ~ a n c e d  towards Estremadurra, m.& 
witJuhrl+ ths rqwri% whi& 7 d  bsm p e u i m I y  ~eceiwed~ 
tJmt 7 ~ e  wwa bU82Zy ocmpkd i m  stmgt?~mivag 8suillB .m& tlia 
c tproacf~s  l o  t7mt city by m k s ,  and thnf dl hia tcwcwuw.~ 
i?ldiccc&d m Zntffitbn to  rmain m $TIA &fm$ve in Amhlwk; 
I tllercfm tvt & m t h  folhoing mming t '  
Tlie last pmgmph indicaks tliat WelIiiigton had not mucli 
confidente in Beresfortl when opposed to  Soult; bunt the fol- 
lowiiig estmct from another letter more fully disdosea tlie 
c0usc of liia rcprairing in pcrrion te  1i:stremiirlura. 
Elvas, April 21st, lord ITellington to Mr. C. Stirnrt. 
' J m afiaid tlmt m ha,m lmt som vdwble time Jm, m d  
I una cmm lo p,,t mttm m tJg &qId road; and to carne to an 
understantiing witli CastaIios and if possiiile with Blake, 
rcspecting our fatiire aperationa.' 
6'. Tant of .pm, stores, pm&hw, a& pmtooszs.-Xfy 
cbarge against the Portuguese government was perhaps put 
too  broadly: yet it ts untrue to say, as tliis m r i h  has done, 
that the government hnd not to do with tlicse matters; they 
hnd a grcat denl to do witli tllem, and nlao Mth the staring of 
the fortressq tlie food of tlie Portupese troops, and tlie nieans 
of transport for everytliing, I f  tlie writer of tlie S~cCECves 
has really received nny jiif~rmakiori from the marslial upuii 
this suli,ject, Iie mzist h o w  that un a11 tliose points t1ie negii- 
gencc of tlio goverrirnent, nnd of tlicir ' JWO de Vhmes,' nnd 
thc ftlIsc rcports nnd aascrtions by which tliey enr!cnvotired t r i  
cover thnt negligente, were sources of continua1 and most 
serious distress t o  Iord TVellington, who could no+ u ~ t i l  tlie 
end of tlie yew procure even a deeree for the abolition of tlie 
'Junta de Viveres;' and could at no time get delinquenta 
punialiad. Rc must ir no^ nlso, thnt a f t ~ ~  t l ~ e  buttle ot Fucntcs, 
tEie Portupese troops werc witliout nny amrnunition becnuñe 
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of tiie negligente of the go~ernment ; that one of tho principal 
reforras in tlie drniniatmtion soiight for by lord Wdlingtnn 
was the consolidation of the hranclies of the amenal under one 
head; and that it was not till Februerg, 1812, one yenr sfter 
this period, that Xr. D. Lemos returned from the Brazils with 
full antliority for Beresford to control the rtdministrntion in 
al1 thak rerejiarded fhe Portuguese wny. Thia writer shonld 
aIso have lrnown tliat the engineer'a seores ordered up to Elvas 
for DeredorSs siege were no& lui colonel Jones in his journal 
supposes, Irept back because t ? ~  exhauskd of tlu m n t q  
wodd m t  oJwd c&ge$, but because gov-t wtncld nnt 
m f m  t7lerq*m fk I h .  
Lord Wellington's operations depended mnch npon the 
Poduguese govcrnrnent, and that governnient almost almp 
failed to do i t g  duty. 1 am unwilling tlierefore, on this 
pmphlctcer'~ ai~tharity, t o  diminish the ccnsiire. I nrn 
unwilling to mppose lord WeIlington relied not npon the 
government brit upon Beresford; bacause if t,he guns and 
ammunitiun were under t.he control of the marshal, he done 
would be angmcrable for deficiencies of tliat kiad, mhich would 
lie n most scrious clirtrge. Let uci now hear colonc1 Jonesi~pon 
tlie extent of thse  ileficiencies. 
'The atrength of Badajos liad not been duly appmiated, 
Joma, sud tlie meitns prepard for its rsductiwn in artil- 
,e aeps, lcrg, ammunition, rsnd ñtoras, werc nltagcthcr too 
ay colonel inconsidemb1e.'-' It. m g  be considered fortunate 
J. Jones. that tlie a p p r o d  of marsbal kultH army caused 
the siege tu be raised, as otlierwise, dter a Ewther sacrifice of 
men in other feehlile attempts, it would have brought itself to 
n mncludon ftom &wdiltiy lo pd.' 
I might here leave mamad Bwesford to t.he a r e  of his 
kind friend; but as 1 am desiroua of clearing myself from the 
charge of unjn~tly blaming the Portugueoe govemment, I mil1 
insert Borne extmcts from lord Vcllington's ctirwpondence 
whicli benr inom directly an the question; and wliich sllow 
tliat i£ Eeresford bad nominally the control of the arsenals, 
ttie government, tlirougli tlie junta of t l ie  arsenal, liad in 
redity the cliarge of supplying th p n a ,  ammuiiition, and 
provisions. 
Wellington to &fr. Stuad, Celorico, Mar& 31, 181 l. 
'1 also iieg yon to draw the attention of tho govern- 
mmt to the operation~ on tlle frontiers of Alemtejo; tliese sre 
becoming of tlic utmovt importante not onIy to I'ortugal, Lut 
1~ tiir! aliicri in gcncsal. It is obvions tliey cnnnot be csr- 
ried on without rt constwnt communication with the m a p  
I 
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Bnee, as wen nt Abmtes aa with those &t. Liabon; f o ~  the 
inhabiMts of Alemtejo mpply notliing fo the troopa. 1 
now request you will give notice to the government that fhy 
muat eillw mfww tlwir m law strnctly, d oIiIige th Wm 
Ziitnntd ofdhntgo to  gwe dh mpia íkswi~  of t 7 ~  a m y  t7i.42 w 
of tMr cam'qea fw  ti^ p a p m t  of I&, m h hejmatim 
qyon &frolat& muut bs discontind, am? 1 me& dmw ths 
auny t a k  to its qtwgaxlaxlmt. X k t  &mm Im bem un.i%wllr?d 
h~ tlw memy, IIM &ea mwt be in. it, and ye! 1 k m  h 
lb P O W B  O ~ Y  l ! ¿ b t ~ - f ~ ,  ,O 1106VWM tlk3 ~ t k - k &  WCM8mJ 
mt&bil m Iw.@aE f ¿  ~ s h l  Bweioford's -P a.t 
Xstrenaos. If $ 1 ~  gowmm& me ti& of t h  war, and do not 
&ose to  ex& tJk7??lmlves lb oliliys Ihe pgnb ta bri.lag fd 
~ F M  mmm wJ&Ib are rqwiwd bo mdb t l ~  a m y  to c m  m
ita cperalwns ad ffi dzstancefim { ts  r m ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  i t  GI m w q  
that R ? ~ J H  68 hímm to th R&h ymermnmt, h t  lhey 
my adqt  mF, mmes m they w y  think poper.' 
Elvas, Yay 2 4  1811. 
' 1 mlwe tIw cm af a d J  whkJ1 ?m &en pd into 
mg ?m& & m j o ~  1EeJm cf t l ~  arliTlq~, r < q d i m g  t l i ~  
m a d  o j ' m t a b  pm dmamdd for the mke a j  ~Iak gwrkm 
fim Lubm. 1 tmst that t!ie mtwmd of th p n s  ha8 mt 
kn swpdd, m  as'^ ewly amival ia m? hpwtmd; and 
1 filudl bo oliiigd to y m  .if y m  d e  +iry upa t ? ~  
djd 
' fi & prfcthj tm t?mt mjw Armkchild ley7 th remw of 
11is ar!iIlmj, lJut k, 8,ik q~cm amn~~nitkn, at Xm-ogma 
Le- Celorico m d  Pmk HwmIIa. WAy l Bmwe I b i s  
mules u d  male M bm s t w c d  m tlte Jiia Afmjw, m d  
crncM mt &m i t  any fdm; m d  b e e m e  t l ~ e  nzagbtrm of 
th.3 W J  wmld q p 1 y  M mmm of ~~t to draw 
d 0%' 
Elras, May 27. 
' I hmfm coM &a M m ' m  M, m~thstmdiq tJw 
brm wJ~e'ch O O ! ~  R0.m haB & aBmt Amtacl~Zld, t9me i~ 
m anam~*~~PtewZ fol. llg Pm&qtme troops m d  mtillerpj, men iat 
Cdrnball' 
Let me now close this p r t  oE the subject by a conclnsi~e 
extmet from .marcliul Bercs ford's own wrrespondenco. In a 
lettcr tu lord Wdlingbil, d a t d  January 25, 1811, hc says :- 
Tl~eit- di$kdties ~ ~ r e  i n d n g  fast; m t t ~ s ,  i72 bis 
vikm, eoere conbing to a mi.&; Ite was  ir^ tltl ggrmtest a l m  
a h t  t h m ,  and quas ufr&d to look at 1 7 ~  stak af things, aa fw 
m an!y Pmtzrpe a u t l s d y  was conmmd. 
S'iege ofBadajos.-0n tlds h e d ,  tlie mnin fact &ispuhd b 
x 2 
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tJaB m# of dw c& im  th dmbb atta&. Tn my Riritoy 
1 @ve a q l e  aut11arit.y~ and this wrikr's cavils merelg prove 
that he is angry, and does not Irsiow the meaning of the w r d  
~once r t~  which he thiukx to  be riynonpoua with airnultiineoua, 
I nm also noeuscd of having, from iiidtdvertenw, m~irked the 
investment on the bth insted of the 4th of Lfay* So nice a 
critic should hiniself have il~oided marking the Campo Mayor 
arair on tlie 26th inatearl of the 25th. Yet I did not commit 
the error, if error it be, from ' imdvm&ce:' I find my xutho- 
ri tyl as IISI\~I,  in the rauthor's own Appendix. Colonel D'Urhn 
sap, ' On the moming of the 4th, general Stemart was put 
in movement,' $c., and 'm 1íia mminy af t l ~  5th i m t e ú  
Rdyioa." 
En like manner this writer, curiously exacR, assertu that tFie 
armp 'm nd o v e ~  the Ghadiam the 8tlb.l By his 
Appendix, however, it appmrr, that on the 7th onIy one bri- 
gde  of p n s  was left on tlia otlier sirle. Be say4 also? 'm 
S1jnmiw& j o h d  IIM mrarri7t.d from i?fov$iJc); md two of the 
teii assignd to his operations by nie are t o  b0 deducted; 
yet in €he next p g e  he himseIf eisyips the same term of ten 
d a p  I: and with rea~on, because it w:w not ti11 tlie 18th Latour 
Maubourg retired to GuadalcnnaI, find ten wd cight mdre 
~ighteen. Moreover, the operations were h q i n  the Ith, for 
011 that day tiie piqnet of cavalrp ww surprjsed. 
As to tlie Spai~ixds from Rloritijo, 1 Jid not aay t7yj&d 
f.h mm~Iia2,I  said Iie coinrnttuded 55,000 rnen includiiig thm,  
for which I adduce D'Crhnii's mmoii, gvcn in this writcrla 
own Appenrlix-viz., the 10tliJ geiieral Cwtafioe (nr  si^ 
TVi l? im Bm.apfwd's d e a i ~ e }  M cawed Cmnt P m s  P&ur 
vit  J¿ tlle Spawidb mcruvalryfm 11ie &de of NmkjC)1 foIbwd by 
g m d  JfmilFo m'tl~ 1~ia diwhim of infmtry, to ocmpy 
d fe rbh ,  f i m n  which th FrenrJh g n h  A& withdrawnz, and 
t?e cwlmt p R 4 d  m h& adwaficed p s t s  to  d M d 4 0 . '  
The~e  rnen, acting in concert witli tlie marshal, and by his 
rlesire, were certainly nnder his command. Let thesa trifls 
pss .  1 ~ 1 1  nom glve another extrnct from eiiptilin Squire, 
wlie, notffithstanding tllis writer'a displeatiure, is gcal autli* 
rity for whnt fe11 unrler his own observation ; anrI not the l e s  
w tbat he supports my opinion a8 t o  the marcl19s want of 
skill at tth ~iege, oorrnburatea the account of his Mundcr nt 
Campo Mnyor, nud n.ttcsts S e  fwt, that tlic arrny dirl gencrally 
holrl Eiis tñlenb in scorn, ancl were tlred of his cíimmand. 
' 17th alay, 1611. Thank aod! tbey fiar lord Welhgtoo 
or general Hill may be soon expccled in tlie neighbourbood; 
thP8 eGrilE be a revwal to ow tpij<#, for we lime laat uw cba- 
mter on this part of tlie frontier. On tlie night of the 12th 
the red attack on the east side of the town waa lwgun, lu t  
enspended by the marslini after one liour's work; t h ~  soil wsa 
c?xecllent. Hud ea8 bqm t1~w.3 wa 1Jw Dth, Badajos d d  
7m7e han o w  o m  m m i n g  of tlie 15th Rut a* t1t-e 
afaiv of Campo Mayor, $c. $c. ! I I wImt cun he txprntad2' 
Bdtb  of A&uera.-lo. ' Fl¿w tlia pungest o&cer m- 
m&.'-History. 
This is tmc. BTnke's appointment as cnphin-generel of 
Vslcnein and Murcia took plaoe indeed nfter the battle of 
Allriic~a, birt lis I d  heen created cnptain-general of tlic Coro- 
nilla in March, 18U9, and as one of tlic Spankli regeuts wari of 
a liigher rank than Beresford. 
2". ' 2% p o d  im m aliout fowr mih~ EoplgR1-Hish y. 
Xt w a s  BO, frum thc extreme Eeft wlicrc thc Portu,"nae 
mvalry lvere plnc~l, to the extrenle right mhere the liattle 
ceasd. bfy plan is carped at by this aiithor; it was only 
given as an explanatory sketch, but i t  was taken from the 
srimo source as hia, and doss not, as Iie asserts, extend the 
wood ovcr thr! t o n p e  o€ Iand to the h a n b  of the Albuera, 
' al'choogh eeme plan# of the position t h t  1 hxve seen do so. 
Moreorei, in desmibing the ground, tliis mriter, as usual, foqetst 
to nsake his Appendix agree witli liis text. At pago 113 he 
sys, ' t h  Tmr of tlae po&tim zul&s only p a c t k d l ~  for h- 
fmtg;' but D'Urtian's niarnoir ~ i t y ~ ,  ' it w m  e w j  for mvdy  
t / t r o u ~ ~ ~ ~ . '  Which ia riglltf 
3*. ' Th posiEion wa.s asoaczcpkd 5y 34000 infanbry, &m 
2000 cavrsl~, and 38 guns&History. 
Thi8 autliior'a disingenuous mamar of boletering up a bad 
cnnae is hcfc evidcnt. ETaving printsrl a running commcn- 
tnty upon my pílges, ~vritten by somebody who is not named, 
he makes this anonpous &tic state t ha t  the allies hati only 
34 pieces of artillery, thrm leaving out four Spanish guns; antl 
at t11c end oE WUrban's memoir there is alvo tl ie same false 
debil ;  und yet tlicsc pemons, who cannot, in so small a 
mrttier rittafn any corre~t~ness, m brouglit forward to cenRure 
my iiiaccuracy ! The offitial retums of sir AIexander Dickson, 
the cominanding oíñcer of artitilleigr in the httle, make the 
nurnhrs amonnt, as 1 liave stated, to 3&riz., 
British Iiorse artillery . . . . . . . 4 
Ditto foot ditto . . . . . . . . 6 
Ring'a Cterman jkgion rlitto . . . . . 12 
Portuguese ditto . . . . . . 12 
Spanishartillcry . . . 1 4 1 . . 4 
- 
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D s t d  of ap.mp. 
Bew&PLI'i cwpa. 
i British . 7,500 4th fnfanty, Germans 1,500 I)orfuguese 10,000 Britirili , 7'00 Portuguese 300 - 14,600 
Totd . . 20,000 Dedud for s b ~ g -  
- glera and de- 
sertere from the 
4th army . . 
- 
Total . . 13,500 
Berednfd'a . . . . 20,000 , 
Spaniards . . . . >3,500 
-
Grand total . . 33,500 
A&th.-1 O. Lord LondonderryI who m 8  adjn- 
hnt-general, rates the British at . . . . . . . 7,500 
ZS battalions of Germms I estimate at , . II,5OD 
39 Genera1 U'Url~an, who mtes the Portupese at 10,000 
4". General Harvey's joumd, in wriich Uie British 
mdry nrc rated at . . . . . . . . . . . 700 
And the Portngnem c8mIy at . . . . . 300 
- 
1 find, also, in it very amurate jonrnal kept by Colonel 
Thorne, a stnff ofñcer, that the heavy British camEy on tho 
20th of Narch, only h e n t y  days prwious to the battle, 
amonnted tu 762 men nnder ams-viz., 
Sddragoon par& . . , . 379 
4th ditia . , . . 373 
C _  
Wherefore, taking tha 13th dwms at a Iow M@ the 
Brititish cavalry done bad a thousand tmopers in the field, 
13ut the rmder will observe lime, a peater number of r n ~ n  
tLan 1 dlowed in my work The fact is, that being in doubt 
whcthm lord Londondcrry incIuded Alttn'g Gemm under 
the geu~~a.1 h d  of British, I íIedircter1 the Idter from the 
gmw number. 1 h e  never been able h procure gn official 
rehrn of khe whole a m y  in the ficld; pmliabIy none waa 
made, and rny hclief iis, tliat 1 hnve undcratated tlie number 
by nearly tmo tl~onsnnd men. 
Since writing tlie above, I have obtained the mekly d a t e s  
of general Long's division of cavalry for the 8th and for the 
29th of Tiiay, ttiat is, one week before and a Iittle more thaa 
a wcck after tlic bnttle ofAlbucm, and unlma it can hc ~hown 
tiiat in the fid~t l~ere were fewer men in the rrtnks tlian at 
other periods, tliep wilI be foud  conclusiae as to tlic numticrs 
of ca~alry. 
On the 8th of May, the preaent uiider a m  at Villa Fmnca, 
Tu front of Alhueru, were, excluaive of 230 officers and ser- 
ReantA, 1429 I'orhipieae and 13ri tisli troopers, the lntter h~ving 
1 109 men and 1076 horses. 
On the 29th of May, tliere were 1587 men and 225 officem 
and serprnts and 1489 lior6es, tlie increase arising from the 
ju~ictiori. of men whe h d  been dctaclied. The ullied cavalry, 
inclutling tho 1 3tli dmgoor.~, and the Portiiguese nnd Spanish 
- 
semen, was therefore nearly three tbousaud strong. 
K-J mode of estimating tlie nuinliers oT the 5th Spmiah 
y \vas as EoIlows :- 
:n D'Wrlran's memoir, Norillo's dividon of the 5th Spnni~h 
army ia said to consist o€ a few weak battalions, and C d o s  
LEspaíia'~ brigarle of five battalions, i s  called 3000 strong. 
One httailiuu oí' tha latter was aent to Olivcnza, t11e remaining 
four batta!ions 1 tlierefore took to be 1600 men; to tliese 
1 ddcd  400, sirpposing that Cnstaiíos must bave brwglit 
up AOme of Morilla's pmple to the action; Pennc Villemur's 
caralrp 1 know, from sereral murces, to have been at. least 
500 strong. 
Tlie nuruber OS the 4th a m y  I found in a letter of Iord 
TPe!lington, d~ted Niesa, April 28, 1811 :- 
'Frarn a lettcr frcm Mr. Weilesley, of tlie I l th,  1 lcarn 
that general Hlnke was himself Jiout  to oome into tlie Con- 
dado de Niebla, to take tlie command of general l3decteros' 
division, and of the troops \vhich Iid been unrler tlie command 
of gerieral Z q w ,  mtl wliich \vere to retiirn to tliat quart~r. 
TIM mlmb carpe wü1 amant to 12,000 m, ofeuhidb 1100 are 
malry.' 
I aubfracted 1100 mw, as stragglers or deserters during 
the long marcb frorn Ayamante, mhich 1 believe waa too 
riiany, b w ~ i s e  lord Welliugton, in a letter dated tlie 4th JuIy, 
181 1, six weelts after the battle, snys Blnke's corps !vas still 
from 10 to 12,000 strong; nnrl in an iibatract of the hcad-quarters 
retums, made llat July, Quiiita St, Joa, Blake's corps iJ agah 
set down a t  12,000. My etirnate is thns borne out; and 
what does a thousancl or two, more or lec%, signifg-, when it is 
phin tliere were alrendy more tlian nimliai Eeresroi-d wag 
ablo to  hndie, seeing that in so bloody and critica1 a battle 
one.third of his t roop~ never fired a rilirit, 
4'. 5% Prmclb Id ' abm 4000 ~eteram cumahyI d y  
19,000 c lww imfmt? y.'- fistory. 
The imperial muster-rollti of the Jst of Xay, the present 
untler nrms of tlie 5th eoqs,  Pnduding t,hc gnrrison o€ Rntliijn% 
1~111 3500 minforcenients in marcli to join, were 15,855, oi 
which 752 were mvalry and 590 artillery, 
leaving . .  .l4,543 infantry. 
Dccluct garrison 2,887 
Total . . .  11,656 
So& drew from the 1st c o p  one batttalion 
of pnadiers  . . . . . . . . .  500 
Dit.to from 4th oorp, two regimenkci of in- 
fantrg foming Werle's br igde  . . . .  4,000 
Frum Dessolles' reserve at Cordova, Qotli- 
not's brigarle . . . . . . . . . .  4,000 
20 158 
For officers and norrcombatants, wlio are 
dways inclutled in fiencki returns, 1 de- 
duckd . . . . . . . . . . .  1,156 
Total infantry . . 19,000 
Tiie divisíon of heavy dmpuns wxs . . .  3,000 
Tlielightcuvd~oftlie5tFrcorps . . .  763 
Drnwn from the 4th corps two regimenh . 600 
- 
lncluding oficers, totd cavdry, 4,252 
Gmnd total, includiug a dctuchent lcft - 
at ViIIal ha . . . . . . . . .  2 3,238 
Having thus workd out my estimate from authentic dom- 
ments, I turned to the French autl~ors wlio Iinve treatetl of 
t,his battlc-viz,, Jomini, Vk de iVqwboq-Liirnai~e, Il& 
lirm du SGge de BacIn$s,-&pene, G m p $ i e  d'A n&lu&,- 
Jlory St. J'i~icent, one of Soult's s h f f ,  Guide  de^ I.'oya~faws m 
&~pagm Tliey make tbe Freiich trventy .two tliousalid rneu 
of all. arms, while the Vic¿&í-m et C o ~ * t a p  P~aqaiai 
rediices tliem mucli 101wr. T hxve, tl~erefore~ most probublp 
orer-stated he foroe of tlie French. 
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P. ' N w 7 y  7000 of tJs~ diea,' and ' dove  8000 af tJm 
-m& v~we stridc douna.'-Bistory. 
Ab?mi&.-Tha oficial returns meke the Ioss of the 
Anglo-Portupese . . . . . . . . . . . .  4547 
The loss of the Spaniards 1 estimated from common 
report at tlie time, from the nut1iority of Colonel 
Jones's History, and from tlie Apanish account~ of the 
day . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . .  -2200 
Total . . .  6743 
- 
T%e Rritislr official return does not include a nnmher of 
men, wha l~aving been mnde prisonem maped ancl rejoind 
their segimentbi in a few days after the action. The miter of 
tlie Strictuve8 reduces the Britisl~ loss, and estiinates the 
Slinnisli af only 1700; but to efect tlie first, he drilies out 
tlic ofioem nnd sergmnta, and witli re~pcct to tlia lnst, bo 
knoms well tliat it is untler-rated; indeed in Iiis own t e x t  
there ia  proof of the iuaocuracy o£ his statement, for he says 
tliah before the Biitisli catne inta action, tlie Spnninrds had 
lost 1500; yet he mould bnve us belicve thut in all tile after- 
fight, tliough tlicy were constuntly exposci~ to the firc, they 
oiily To~t 200 more! 
As to tlie French los., geneml Gazan, in an iinerrccpted 
letter, sliys Le liad, a few days after klie batth, more than 
4000 wounded under his cliuixe, ttnd sorne liad died on tlia 
murl. By marslid Bcrcsfortl's dcspntcIies, I forinrl 350 
woiinded discov~.i.etl rrt Alrneiitlrnl, ~nr l  3000 lyiiig killed or 
morhIly ivouncletE on the tield. Tliis Iooqe estimntion, tnken 
at the IiigI~est, accoulits fos nbout SOQO; hkeu ah the Iowesq 
about 9000. Tliia I:iut nurnlier is xvliat Freucli writers admit, 
nnd it ia crinfirmed iii t1ie oficial nbst,~nct, of lord JVcIliiigton'~ 
analy~iis of tlie tiiirnbers oppoacd to him in Jlily, 1 SI  1. He 
tliere twice estimiites t l i e  Frencli los3 ai 7000 men ; but with 
t h ~ t  liberdity wliicli is uuiidly pmctised toivartls enmies on 
siicli cicct~sions, niurshnl BcrestUrd uddd 2000, sir Benjamín 
U'Urban d d s  3000, antl tlie nutlior o€ tlie Wrz'dwm adds 
4000 to tliis numlier. Row fnr will futirre mriters of this 
scliooI g01 
GO. ' Already D&'s am-ogmna~ em s7Bccrcilag Bwtvfi6a 
azslIborEyl.'-Bistory. 
TIiis is veritie~l i ~ i  D'Urban's mem oir. 
<Altliougli Rluke's corps hnd littlc more thnn a leogue to 
marcli from hlinendn~l, liy a gmd roarl, guidetl by an oficer 
nent for the pwpose, and wliich tlie ge'eueral hiid siipaged 
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11". (Ar &tical vnmmt g m m E  iStkuwt a&vd ai th 
fmt o f t h  hAIht ~ I L  Colhm'a Iin$nde,' $c.-Hjstoy. 
me author of the S-m says, time was nu 1~211, ' mly 
a g r a d d  shpe,' t f ~ t  t7e troops orid aot mozcnt it, thep 'cam 
up i t  i* tl~vqulrar mmum-1' Tlio rcgrilar mmnnner of corning 
up a slope nithout mcending is, no clotibt, verp rnodeat and 
uiiassuming, but; until 1 lrnow what it is I cannot describe 
it. Howcver, tliere wa4 a J~eiqIkt  if tliere Iras not a I Q ~ X  
Extract from D'Urbnn'~ memoir. ' Tliis height ms of 
peat  imprttanoe, inasmuch ns it commandeil the right oF 
t he  position; and the semnd division, under the honeurable 
major-general William S tewart, wliicli was now rapidly ad- 
vancing t o  sapport tba fipnninds, md wlvicI4 arpived jwt CM 
t i q  hud bem j h c d  to al)andm it, mas immcdiateIy ordered 
by sir JVjlliam Eeresford to c t d d  aacl ~ ~ o u w  it.' T he miter 
of t l ~ e  fihklwres Ilmj m e r  lost 21 / 
12". ' T/M 31 at etill m i n t a i d  t lstr  heigld.'-History. 
Ad1~)rZty.-D't'rl~n's memoir. Extract. ' Favoured by 
this (~lwl~nws fiom smoks annd rain} the first Iirigarle 
under colonel Colbonie fe11 npon the enemy mith tlie bayonet, 
and were driving liim bcfore thein, some quadrons uE Politih 
lancers, &c., cherged.' ' TI14 5 1st repimcnt, eulhk!~ w c ~ s  m th 
hjl of t h  FIbde, +c. iq-c., &!.iated itsdf fiom th c o a f h l ,  
and confin& tJx attmk &nw' The mord should be defence. 
13". ' lJutcgIdon', reij?n&s E O O ~  got foding on t l ~  m m i t .  
-4 D&ksom plaoed t l ~  mtillwy ha h. Thra 2nd dipmSion 
cam up m ~ J E  leJ, m d  tzoo Sprni~I~ cmp at Imt m& fe 
wmd.'-Hist 0r.y. 
AdIswity.-D'Urhan'a memoir. Extracts. ' The 3rd bri- 
gsde of tLe 2nd dicision, nnder major-generrtl Houghton, fol- 
lowing the fimt wiwith eqanl intrepiditg and better fortnne, 
deployed very judiciously, nnd witli admirable preMsion, 
under cover of tlie lower falls of the Iieiglits, mal-ea on 
in line to  the ~tiack, and supported and ~7tlZEmd by tl& 
2nd L-r&p&, u d e r  tkB h. coloml A bwromhy, csd t ? ~  8pw 
nPmdq ztndev general Bdhteros and XLMJ~L~, ccnmkd dl64m 
a, gaámd th con?&& ground cund took post upm it.' Tlie 
~ r i t e r  of the St~icturea s q s  1 cannot name tlie Spanisb 
coryia, hecause none moved furward! 
I wiI1 now give the ver~ion of thcso nttnclrs d i c h  1 adopte4 
copid from a note rnatle by mir Hcnry Rnirlinge iin the margin 
of tlie onginal impression of DUrban's memoir. 
Tbe 1st tirigde, ~vlvlien thep liad pi i ied the crest of t 7 ~  
haJ found it so Iiot tliat Stewart ordered a cliarge, wlfich the 
Buffs snd 48th done d e  In h e  q,rrainst tho enemy's column 
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of at Imst 10,000 mea Fortnnatelp tlw 31st, &ng th IBft 
vegimmt, hacl .not hotd E& lo dyloy  wium ths m 0 t h  
m& c?wged; 8 th~refore M t11e p m n d  w?& N o q I ~ t o n ' ~  
bigade deployed in da vemr> mtd mdw cm~r, m d  moved up 
to t1t.e wort ofth 3186, holding tlie position and keeping iip 
B liot fire in litle agrtinst t l ~ e  clase coIumn of tlle enemy wliich 
attempted to advailee, and sorndirnes to deliloy; keeping 
horvevcr wit11iu aliort rnusket-sl~ot, both 8idm firing p p e :  
the destruction being infinitely grenkr in tbe dense order of 
the enernp tlian in oui tliin erder! 
In conjunction witli tlie above, may be talren the following 
extract rif a, letkr from majur Elliot, ol  tke 29th regiment, m 
actor in what lia describes. 
' The attnck of the 16tmh Mfiy commcnced on thc right; d 
mst uimay & it d a d &  by cdolzel d7ct23k. The fak 
of the 1st bifgade, except tlie 31st regim~nt, wm very aoon 
decided; our Lirignde moved to the righlit in olien column of 
companies under a very liemy cannonde, by wliicli we hiid B 
mptnin rand n p o d  many men killed. The 29th lcd tbo 
bngde; tlie deploymenh wris mlide very atedily under this 
firc, anrl we became botly engaged. At this time a body of 
Polkla Imms iypm-ed o s  w Y(&, cl~wged, artd attmpted 
£?M nllnch 0% us wJiic?~ icaclpov~d so auce~ssfx¿ againat the 
h@&; hüt v ' a r  Fa?! (now a i ~  &egoy) jbaidd t l ~ m  hy 
tlmwing b d  tJbe fpmadiws m d  1st M i o n  mnapmp, who 
ev i t lb  un o b l i p f i s  seni t?wn O$ d w,: saw wo m r e  Of 
tliem. Tire kept ak it wlib o u ~  amn~ur~ikion h k J :  tiien the 
fourth diviaion carne u~).' 
This Iast pacsagc vcrifies the fnct thnt ammunitim faiI+d; 
n cirmmstnncc which is also menitionetl in thc Anmla of tlia 
.?'mi& Cawpaign, It shoas also t1ieri.c mere more clwrges 
of czvalry m d e  tlian the writer of tlie StTe'ctmw l rnom o€ : 
anrl lime 1 mzy niention a curions example of tke hpudent  
falsehood of tlis Spxnisli ~ccounts  of tliis ~mr. 
That Pcnne Villemur's cnvnlry fled in a shameful manner, 
ths following Ptritement by colonel Liktt proves. 
' After aur brigndes of infiintry first c3ngng.cd merc repulsed, 
1 was desired liy general D'Urhrin to te11 the eount de Penne 
Villemur to cliage the lancers, and we al1 startd, as 1 thouglit, 
to do the thing n-el]; hui when rvithin ti few paces of tlie 
encmy, thc wholc pulEerl up, tlierc was no ,actting tlicm ftir- 
tlier, sníl in a few momeiits afteter 1 IB Icft aloiic to xun the 
puauiitlet M me11 as 1 could.' 
The comment o f  Ghe Spanish govemment in tlicir oficial 
gaeette at C d i x  upon tliiE: pnrt ul tlie action wag, tbat Penne 
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ViIlemur, seeing three Engligh regiments broken by the 
French cavalry, withstooci the latter, prote&d the fomer 
and waa firerl upon by tbe my rcfiirnents he Iiud saverl : 
finally, that tiw SpanirvrIs done defeated the whole French 
army! ! 
Having thus eskblished most of the importan& disputed 
lscts related in my Eistov, trut.h being my object, I will 
notice tlie errors I have reatly made. 
1'. I aupposed the sewnd charge o!? tha lancen (that against 
the 29th) took place ah a lateir perid, and was that in ivhich 
the gnn8 were captured; it appears %he guns were taken in 
thi: cliarge ngain~t Colborne's higade. Rere be it noticed that 
Reresfods despatch mppesses tlie fact of more than one gun 
being taken, although six pieces af a r t i l l e ~  and other tropliies 
feI1 irito the lsiicers' hndndu. Five of tlle p n s  m-ere, indeed, 
a f h m d s  recorcred; but in the first i m t m c e  fhcy wcrc 
captured and might bave been mrried ofK 
2". 1 supposed the mutual firing betwen a Xt i sh  and 
Xpaiiish regiment liappened wlieli the fusiieers were mounting 
the b l l .  1 lind undemtmtl colonel R o b e ~ t  Arbntliiiot so, o,nd 
tliat 11a rodc betwmn hotli prkies; the writer nf tlie Stric- 
tzcw says he Iias sic bbert 'a letter contmclicting the fact. 
Neverthcless, tlmt such an event did take plnce at one period 
of this battle, is proved by tlie contmdietory evidence as to  
which pnrty fircd upon thc other. Mnny circumstnnccs my 
be satishctorily verified to a historian by conversation xnd 
other means, nnd lie may not be allowed to give tlie chain of 
evidence in print, but Eie may cEaim wnfidence if he show~ 
be has been dili~ent in oenreliing for truth. 1 bave, 1 
thinlc, shown, 1". 'Slint mp inqnirics wcre extcnsive; 2'. T h n t  
my autliorities, evw for trifling point~i, were sound tind 
nurnemus; 3". TIiat the writer of the S!rictues, b e i q  a 
person of no knowledge and very unscrupuluus, cannot b 
morsbal B~eresfod, but is prohbly s m e  cxpectant mdy to  
voncli for ~ n y t l i i n ~ ,  ' if thrift migl~t foIIow fxwninq.' I leave 
unnoticed his ~currilitg liecause I despise it. And 1 have not 
exposed above oiie-lialf of !lis misrcpmsentstions tliinking 
it wnsto of time; anri tliat his arguments nre upon a par with 
liis facts, one os two exnmplm wiIl auñice to pyove. 
la. He pays Xoult toolc an Iioui to evecute his rnovement 
across the Albuera against tlie right; and tliat the Spa- 
niards rcsisted oRcrir,arda for 311 liour and a Imlf! T h t  i~ 
to sny, thc Frcncli gcncral wns pcrmittcd, for two houn and a 
hdf, freely to mt againct a point of the position on tha pos- 
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msion of wbich depended the mfety of the army, to act there 
unopposed, save by a few thousand. Spaniaidh who were con- 
fmed and disordered by a miden chango of frunt and by thii 
uncxpcchd attnclr; and yct tli~ aceond divísion wns mitliin a 
mile o€ them, anrl the rest of the army not two miles dishnt!  
And tbi9 is meant to prove the ski11 of marshal Beresford! 
Portiinately for the latter the story of tbe Gpanirih resistance 
Spanish romance. 
O. This mikr would bave it beIimd Beresford d i s n ] ~  
ved and does still Mame the rarl~ance of  t l ~ e  fusilccr brigadq 
iuw the enemy's c~dmlry might, be says, llave penetrated 
by the gap thus mde,  and becxuse he wss in no danger 
oE being. beaten, and never thoongli of retreatiiigl Narshal 
Beresford, then, by Jirioging up general Collins's Portuguese 
and the Spnnish resewes to the aid of Eo~igliton'a brigrle, 
nnd joining tliem to Abercromby's trooprr, ~spected to have 
defeated t l~e  enemy ; in otber words, t o  have m n ,  without 
the asnistance of the fusiieers, tliat httle which was se.hardly 
gained with their iissistmce I Trruly 1ie expeded mucli l The 
regiments of Houghton'~ bripde, hnving lost tmo-thirds of 
thcir number, being mitlioirt nrnmuiiition, and hming  a Frcncli 
column upon their right f iad,  were t o  hnve maintnined the  
height nntil al1 the troopa nbwe mentioned could be brought 
iiito line I and then Epaniards andl'ortuguese were to do what 
ths fusileers did ! 
Tlicre was iia denge~ of the French ~~ pu~hing tilmqh 
iGe gqn macle by the advance of the fusileers. Grneral Cole 
had providea qrtinst that by plwing Harvefs Portuguese 
l ir ipde in tJie gwp, and tl~at brigade ddid actunlly repulse an 
attempt m d e  by Latour Mauliourg to push Lis liglit 3vaIrg 
thmugh. But i l Bcresford waa so certaiu of  victo^, ao com- 
poaed and confident, so little thinklng of a retreat, why did he, 
wlien tFie batfle lvas gained, mite ta lord Wellington t,hhnt he 
anticipated defeaf if uttaclced the next dap, rand was deter- 
niined not to  suhive itP But the whole ~trgment is noughh, 
seeing tlmt Beresfod* in Zii despnatch, praisd tlie attaclr of th 
4th division, saying, <it mns jndieioue and opportune." 
Tlicrc is cven a more ceditin proof tliat niardlnl Beresford 
did contemplate a retreat, namely, that he gave tlie order ; it 
ms in part obeyed t 2% I>P.i@e ami vilhjs afdlbuwa w m  
0 1 ~ 1 ~ y  d m d m e d  in ohdienolt to J L ~  W~LTII, ly AZtds 
G m m m  md Ey t l ~  &&jl and Bercsford irr pereon rebukcd 
colonel BxlIíet of t he  Gerinans for bcinp slow t o  obey. This 
facf, often mentioned, 1 have a40crtalued to be tnie since tlie 
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foregoiag pages were written; llence, far from being mowd 
by common reports, or by prejndice, I m eyen too careful t o  
mjcct doubtfd mntters, 
Thc annexcd extmct ia fiom a narrative of the campnign of 
1821, written by  ir Julina Hartman, who commanderl tlie 
British a r t i i l e ~  in tlie action. It placea the fact bgond con- 
tradiction, unlesa sir J u l i u ~  be the most imagiaalive of men ; 
nnd ccrtninly mamlial Bcrcsfod had good renson to cal1 tha 
arrivd of the fusileers ~ppwtulaq for like Bunpan's Pilgrim, 
he was then jn the ' Slough of Despond.' 
' The enemy made repelited md very serions attacka on the 
bridge, which were umucccssful mtii tha troops received 
an order te assemlife l o  c m  th wtmt q m  P a M ,  
The general-inxchief had given this odw at a moment, 
when tlie result of tlie struggle for the possecsion of the 
lieiglita hd appeared to him duuhtful Ln pursuance of tbis 
oidcr, gcncral Ton Altcn and tho commnnder of the Portu- 
p e s e  artillery, mtjor I)iclrson, dn&d &e & L ~ J Q  md 
meJ w7~icFd zcm immdtutely ompied by t l ~  m y .  Directly 
zfter, the retaking of this wm most urgently ordered, wliich 
by the vdour of the tmops, with great sacrifice and spilling 
of hlood mas aocompfished; but, notwitlistanding, the poe 
session of tlie bridge mmta neper complctely obtaineci.' 
1 can n m  also upon another point show t h a k  marsM 
Beresford'a error8 were ftu greater Shan I haJ. supposed them 
to be. 
shtement of captain Arthnr Gregoty. 
'A deserter ame in, about one o'clock a.x. on the 16th; 
he a ~ i d  that aa order wapae issued for an aathck at eight A.M.; 
he m e  immedrtltely sent in to hd-qnartem, and I siippose 
rin-ived,' 
"etween scven and eigbt, orders carne for the mvdry, and 
I believe for the horse-artillery, t o  go to the rcar t o  fow and 
innks tliemselveei comfortable. As bliere w a  a diffintlty about 
watering, one regiment mcnt down to the river at n t ima 
Tlic first mas tlir! 4th drngoons, which, aftcr w~tering, went to 
flie rear; tlie 3rd dragoon guatds mere going to water and the  , 
horses (I bdieve) mere tal~en off the guna of the horse-tirtillery 
for tlie mme purpose, when su ortlerIy of the 13th drngoons 
carnc in from a piquet on tlie r i ~ h t  ívith intclligencc that 
the enemy m% crosxing tlie rivei! Generd Long imediately 
gal;loped off anti fmnd I d {  tlleir army ac~oss ,  nntler cover of 
n hollow, whidi Lad ccimliletely mnskeri tlie operation. 1 was 
despatclierl to rcport it to tlrs rnarstial, whose head-qriartBra 
were in the villngc ol r'dbucrn; aftcr bcing dctríined a few 
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minutes at the door he ame out, and after questioning me 
stiarply upon my intelligence, was going in, when 1 took the 
liberty of mentioning t l i i~t he cavdry bnd been ordered to t he  
Terir, and thnt  one regiincnt had almdy gone; and 1. mked 
hirn if it. sE~ould be brought up ~gain, antl ta wherel Ris 
orders were, Let them go more to the right t h ~ n  they were 
hefore.' I galluped oil'to the ~ p o t  wliere tlie cavalry had been 
ordered, and found the 4tli dragoons with tlieir homes un- 
bridled and IlnlcM1 with thc adlnr cheins; the men h d  tnken 
tlieir mcoutrements and jacket8 06 and were going in al1 
directions to cut forage. A few minuks brought them toge- 
tlier. Xefore 1 could get bnck, tlie mnnonade had begun, 
LTad X d  dehyed i& a t t d  hdf m I ~ T ,  d t l t~  B?.$skh 
cmahj woztld I~five boca, in th w d&pr$ed wiw dao m t v y .  
1 do not know if the I i r igdes of foot artillery lid the  s m e  
orrlera.' 
Extract of s letter to capbin Gregory from lieutenant- 
colonel Wildman, a lieuten~nt in tlie 4th dragoons &t. 
Alln~em. 
' 1 perfeetly recollect. the 4 th dragoons being ordcred to the 
rear on the morning of tlie 16th Xxy, 1811, to cut forage for 
our horses, and I tliink jt wris you who carne t o  order us up 
agnin, but wl~ether we lid b e p  cutting it or not before you 
nr.n'~cd, 1 rnnnot rcmeml~er.' 
Extract of a letter ta mptain Artbur Grepry from colonel 
Lei~hton, wbo commanded tlie 4th dmgoons at the battle o€ 
All&a, 
' In regnrd t o  tlie morning of the 16ti1, me h d ,  as usual, 
hetn ~ inder  nims for nn Iionr hefort! dnylireak, and to the he& 
of my recollection bctween xeven s n i  eiglit-ddock received 
cirders to proceed for forage.' 
Tllua it is proved Ilint if Soult had delayd bis nttack .for 
h ~ l i  an liour, rlot a s2ngle BvS8I1 mv&y soldiw d d  k v e  
hm in t?djcld!I How wns it, theli, t h u t  mnmhnl Beresford, 
witfi tlie consciousncsti of this in 11is heñrt, did not sptirii the 
ill-timed sarcasm of DumouriezT Wliy did he not reply, Tbis 
is not F'hmdia, bat Albuera. Here were not Ronians, biit 
Englislimen. The Roman soldiers eould not mve Pompey, 
bnt tlie English soldier, lie who 'comes on w+th mch a con- 
quering bmvery,' mved me! 1 arn not Chhiar, but Beresford! 
Nm.-The emrg acknowledged will not lm found in this Edition af  
the XIistov 
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GEN ERAL LORD VLSCOUNT BERESFOEIS, 
m - G  
Am dmep CP hi-s ~ w d s / ~ i p ' s  Aammd &y%h&?n 
m 
COL. NAPIEEQ JUSTlFICATION OP ME! TIIIIlD VOLUNT,. 
J 
hiy LORD,-You have a6 liist appenred in p~in t  mithout ang 
disguise. Rad you done so at tirst it might have spared ua 
both aome trouble; I should have pnid more deference to 
your argumenrit and would willingly bave corrected any error 
fuirly pointed out. Now, having Grtudly wltnawledgcd 
ynurself the autlior of the tmo publimt!ons entitletl Stric- 
tures anrl Pwtlw Xtr ic tmw,  &c., 1 will not suRer you to 
enjoy the ndvantage of using two kinds oI weapons, withouh 
inaking you alsa fcd tlieir incrinvenicnce. I wil1 treat your 
present publimt!on as a mere continuntion o£ your fomcr 
two, and then, my lord, I~ow will you stand in this contro- 
vemy t 
Starting anonymously, p u  m o t e  witb al1 the scurrility thnt 
W taste and rncrtified vanity could suggest to  damltge an 
opponent, because in tiie friir exercise of iiis judgment hc had 
vetihred to deny your chim to the dtle of a pea t  com- 
mander : m d  you coupIerl tiiis with such fulsome adulation 
of yourself tliat even in a depended's mouB it would liave 
h e n  sickeniiig. Now whm you have sufered defeut, whcn 
al1 the emrfi, misquotntions, and miarepresentations of  your 
anonymons pnblictltiona havc been detected and cxposed, you 
m come forwnrd in your a m  name as if a new d unexcep- 
tionable party brad appeared; ancl you expect to be alloived 
dl tlie arlvari%e of fresh litatementa alid arguments, nld 
fresh mertions, withoiit the least refereuce to  your former 
damaged evidente. Pon e q e c t  that I should bzvc thnt 
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deferenee for Ton, which goiir ag, yOnF mnk, your services, 
and your auuthority nnrier other circiimstanoes might have 
fdirly claimetl at my hnnds ; t h ~ t  1 slioulrl acknowledge by 
rny ~ilence Iiow much T wn,s in error, or tliat 1 sliouIrl ilefmrl 
myaelf by nnotl~er tedioua di~section and expsition of your 
production. You will be disqgointed. 1 haw neithcr time 
uor iiicliiiation to enter for tlre third time upon sucb a task, 
and yet I wiIl not s d e r  you to clnim a victorg wliich yo~i 
Iinve not gniiied. 1 ilcny tlie abrngth of yoiir arpment,?, 
1 wifl expose some prominent inconsiñtencies, and in snsmec 
t o  those whiclr 1 da not notice refw to  your former pub- 
licationa to ~howv, thtlt in this euntrove.y, 1 Inow entitlcd 
to diircprd any-tliing you may choosc to advance, and &m in 
justice exonerated from the neccssity o€ producing sny more 
proofs. 
Pou tave publislid above six hunrld pagea at three 
diflerent pcrioda, and you liave taken aliuve s yeur tu rligest 
and arrange t l ~ c  arpnicnts and evidence containcd in your 
present woi-Ir : a few lines d l  m%ce for tlie mswer. Tlie 
oliject of your literary Iabours is to convince tlie world tliat 
at Csinpo Mayor yon proved yourself au excellent general, 
and tliat at Albacm you were supcrlatively pcntl Grcntrr 
emn thnn Cresnr! hly lord, the duke of Wellington drd not 
take a much longer time to establiqh his Europeati reputation 
Iiy driviug tlie French from tlie Peninsiila; and methiiiks if 
your exploits vouch not for tliemeelves your writiugs 
scarcely do it for them. At 2112 events, s pIdn sirnpli: stnte- 
nicnt, hnving your name pb%xed, wmld liave been more 
eflectual wi lh  the public, and wauld certainIy 1 1 a ~  been more 
dignified tban the rtnongnious publicatioiis with which gou 
riirlcrivonred to fecl your wny. lVIij+ sliciuld not dl tlie main 
poiiits contained in tlic lahaurecl pleadings of youc FecrtIi~ 
a%~icdzrrrs, and the still more lriboured pIeaJings of your prc- 
aeut wnrk, liiiva bean condeiised and published at once with 
p u r  nainc? if inrlced it wns necesanry to publid at al1 ! T1'~s 
i t  tlint Iiy nnonynolis abuae of yani. opponeiit and monymoua 
prnisc of yourself you Iiril~d to meate a favonrable impressiou 
oii tlie public hfore you appeared iii personl TliiB, iny Iuri.rl, 
seems very lilío a conficiousness of mealrneae. And tlien 
Iinw- iis it bhat so fcw of tlie iqurnenh nnd evidenms now 
~(Iduced siiould have been thought of before 7 It is a strrange 
tliing that In the fimt defcnce of your generalsliip, for one 
ijliort m p a i p ,  you ~huuld Iiave neglected proofs and argu- 
mcnts sufticic~t to form a eiccond dcfence of two liundred 
la,m?s. 
You tell na, tbat yon disdained to notice my Beply to 
wOZLS 0ppamfa)  bccause y a  knew t.he good s m e  of the 
public woiild never be rnisled by ti pduction containing 
~ u c h  nnmerons ooutrrsdictions and pnlpnlslo inconsistcneies, 
aiicl tliat your frieníici d e c c  confirmed you in this vicw of 
tlie matter. Tliere were nevcLtliel~a some thiw in tliat 
work ivhich requimd aa answer even fhough fhe g r e ~ t e s t  p& 
ol it had been ~veak; auc1 it is a pity your tiieiids did iiot te11 
you tliat m afeded contemp? fur an advermry who lias Iiit 
Iinrd only makes the byshuclei-s lai~gh. Having condcacendetl 
t o  an nnonvymous ~ t t ~ c k  jt woiild Iittve been wiser to refute 
tlie proofs offered of your own iuaccuracy than t a  shrink rvith 
mock grrandeur hom a contest whiclr yun liad yourself pro- 
voked. My friends p v e  me the saine advice with rwpect to 
p u r  anonymons publicatiolis, and with moro reoson, because 
tliey were Rnonynlous; but  h i n g  proofs of their wenkness in 
niy h d s  1 prderred writing an answer, and if you hall been 
provided in the same manncr you would like me have 
iirglected your friends' advice. 
31s' lord, I shll ROW proceed with my tnsk in tlie manner 
hcfore alluded h. You have indccd lcft mc no room for any 
refined courtesy iyth which t o  &en tlie nsperitiee of this 
contro~crsy; but be asmred, m1 it is said in prll sincerity, 
thnt  the errom to wliich 1 must revert, me not attributed to 
any wilhl pmmion or ~uppres~iun of facts, I~ut entirely to  a 
riaturtil wcnkness of memor, and tlie irritation uf a mind 
confuscd by tlie working of waundcd vanity: it is a hard 
trial t o  hme long-settled liabitu of self-satisfaction S U ~ C I C I I ~  
&turbed,- 
Cilraed be mp harp and bmke be evev chord, 
IfI forget thy wortl~, rkt& Damjwrl.' 
It was thus the flattering mam of poetry lulled you with her 
Rweet fitr~ins into a linppy drcnm of glory, and none can 
wonder nt yonr irritation when the mime of  Iiigtory a~vakened 
pou with tbe solsrnn clmgour of ber truinpat to tlic pninful 
re&ty that gou werc onIy an ordinary lierson, It woultl 
liowever have been !viser to bavo lireserved your equanimi ty, 
tlicre ~vonld ha-a bccn i;ome gmtiiaes in tiiliG. 
In yonr first S~ktures you llegan hy asserting t ha t  1 knmv 
nothhp whatever o€ you or your scmices; and tliah 1 was 
actuated entirely Ijy vulgar political rrncour wlien I denied 
p u r  talents as a general. 1 replied tlixt I uras not i g o r ~ n t  
of your exploits. Sometliinp of your liroceediiigs at Buenos 
Ayres, at Mdcira, and at Coruña were known LO mc, nnd ia 
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pmoF thereof I offwd to enter into the details of the fira 
if p u  desired it, To tliiq you have given no nnmer. 
Yon affirmed thnt your perfect Irnuwledge of tlie Porti 
guese Innpage wiis one of your principal claims to be con 
mtinder of thc Portupeac nrmy. I n  rcpEy 1 quoted from 701 
orm letter to  Iord ?Vcllington, yo~i i  confession, tliat, ~liich WI 
your iporance of that language 3 tlie time, you could nt 
even rwl Uie comrnunimtion from the regeucy, relati\-e f 
your own nppointment. 
Yo11 mksaerted tIi3 no officer, save sir John Ifui~ay, nhjeek 
at tlte first moment to your sudden elevation of rank. l. 
answer I publislied sir John Slierbroke's Ietter t e  sir J. Cr: 
dock comilaining of it. 
Ynu snjrl the wt,ores {wliich the cabildo of Ciudad Rndrig 
refused tn let you have in 1 809) had not been fomed bp lot 
Wellington. Ia reply 1 published lord Welliington's declai: 
tiori tliat tEiey hnd been formd by him. 
YOU denied thnt  you bad ever mritten a letter to the jui~i 
o€ Rnrlnjon, and this nrit doiibtfully or hwtily, biit positivP' 
and accompanied witli mricl~ smrn rtnd ridicule of mg asse 
tion to tlint eFect You harpd upn  the nem and surprisir 
information obtained re1ntir.e to your actions, and were, i 
tnith, verp facetious upon t he  suhjecl. In nnsmcr 1 pul 
lifilied Tour letter te tliat junta ? So much for your fir, 
Strictw&- 
Iti your second puMication (pv0  42)  you asserted thi 
coloneY Golborne was no$ near the sceno of act.ion nt Caml 
Mayor ; and now in your thirtl publication (pngc 448) .ynu 
siiow very claarly that he took an active part in those 
operations. 
'ou callen tlie distance from Campo Mu~iryor to Neridn ib 
mrelm, md now you sry  it iu  Jbw w c h .  
Tn Tour ffrst S t r l c t w ~ ,  y011 declurcd tliat thc extent of 
thc i i i t r i ~ ~ e s  rrgninst you in Portugal were exaggcrated by 
nie; sud you were very indipant that I ~houltl lmve sup 
posed you ~ i t h e r  needetl, or harl the su~iport mcl prutectioii of 
tlie dulce of  .Wellingbon while in comrnund oC tlic Fortuyucse 
amy. In tlie voliimea of my Eistory publishd aince, 1 
hnve shown wh& the extent oF those intrig~lcs maq : and I 
llave still sometliing in reserve to add d e n  time slisI1 be 
fitting. Meanwhile 1 wiil shy your lodsl~ip'a appetite by 
tmo extmts bearing upon this subject, and upon tlie aujiport 
ivhicli pou dcrived from the dirkc ot' WelIington. 
1'. Mi-. Stiiart, mrit,ing te lord Wellesley, in 1810, raft( 
noticing the violence of the Souza faction relative to tt 
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fal! of Almeida, gap,-'1 couId have borne d thEs with 
petknm, iif not wbccompaniod by a direct proposal that the 
fleet and trin~porhq should quit the Ta,guii, and tIint the 
regency ~ h o d d  send an order to mawhal Beresford t o  dimiss 
bis quar ter -mas ter -e  and militsiry secretary ; followed 
by reflections on the persona composing the family of thnb 
officer, and by hiits to tlie same purport respecting the 
Portugirwe who &m attnchsd to lord Wdlingtoa' 
29 Extract from a letter written at Moimenta de Beim 
by marshal Beresford, and drated 6th Xepteinber, 1810.- 
Eowever, rts I mentioned, I have no great desire to hold my 
situation hyond the perid lord Weliington retains his situa- 
tion, or &ter activs opsmiions have c ~ e d  in this country, 
even ahoulrl things tnrn out favourably, of which 1 really a$ 
thls Enstant have better hopea than 1 ever h d  though 1 llave 
been usudly e m g h e .  But in mprd to myself, though I do 
not pretend t o  say the situation 1 hold is not at a11 times 
desirabie to hola, yet 1 am fully perswded that if tranquillity 
iu ever restored to this county undcr its legal govemmcnt, 
that 1 shonld be too miich rexed and thwtrted by intriguee 
of all aorts to  reconcile either my temper or my consciente t o  
what would then be my situation.' 
For tlie Eurtlier expositian of the other numeroas errora 
and friilures of yoac two drat publicatiow, 1 mnst refer thc 
reder to my R& and Jí~tafiCCbtha, 6ut the p i n t a  
above noticed It is necessary t o  fix attention upon, because 
they @ve me the right t o  dl npon tlie puMic t o  disregaril 
your present mrk, aand this right cannot be relinguisled. I 
hppened fortunately to hava tlie m e .  of ~ p i l i n g  yonr 
rcckless W A B U ~ ~ S  h tho instnnws abovo mentioncd, but m y  
not wlways be provided with yous own lettcra to disprove 
your own assertions: the oombat is not equal, the odds 
would be too much, md I must therefore, dthougli reluw 
tantly, use the advmhges whieli the detection of suclr errors 
hlrs a l r d y  furnished, They ara strong proofs of an unsound 
memory upon esaential poinh, and deprivc your present 
work of al1 weight as an anthoritgr in this controvemy. Yet 
She atrangest part of your new booii (see page 135) is, thnt 
you avow an admimtion for wkat you cal1 tlie gm0us prin- 
ciph wliich lea& French authors ta m&t& f(w& for t h  
hnm~ of th í v  m w y ;  and not only you do this but sneer 
st me vcry openly for not doing the aame! yon sneer rit me 
for not frtlsifying faeta to pander to the morbid vaaity of my 
countrymen, and at khe same time, with a preposterous incon- 
sistency, wndemn me for be& an irraccurate historian 1 1 
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;,ave indeed yet t o  Iearn fhat the hmww of my counb 
either requires to be er can be supported by deliberate 11ir 
torical falsehonds ; your personal etxperience in tlie field ma 
perhups linve led you t o  a different conclitsion, Iiut 1 wi 
not be your historian : and coupling tFiis, yoiir exprese 
sentiment, mith your forgetf'ulness on the points befor 
noticecl, 1 am undotibtedy entilled to lihugh at your m d e  r 
attacking o t l i e~ .  \Vhnt, my lortl? like Eanquo's gliost yo 
rise, 'with twenty ntirtd murt,bers on yo~ir cromn to pusli u 
from our atools.' You have indeed a most awful and ghosi 
lilre m y  of arguing: al1 yeur oraciilar senteacea are to b 
iiriplicilly belieu-MI, and al1 my witnesses to fach sound tiii 
substmtid, are te be diacnrded for your airy notliing. 
Gpbin huire! hmd Iiim not, he $vas a dissatinfied, txlE 
ing, self-suficie. ignorrant officer. The oíñcer of dragooii 
wlio cliarged at firnpo Mayorl Be is namele8s, llls nmr 
tive teems with misrepreseritations, he mnnot te11 ivlietlter h 
drargorl rir not. CoIonel Ziglk! spunge him oilt, he wns onl 
a subaltern. C~ptnin Cregory! beIieve Iiim not, his statt 
ment cannot be comct, he is h o  minute, and lias no difidence. 
8ir Julius Ilartmm, colonel Wildman, eolonel Leigliton l 
01i! very hanouraeile men, but they know notbing of tho 
fnct they spenk of, rsll tkcir evidenee ptit tfigcthcr i i ~  worth 
nothlq-! But it is vmy exactly corroliorated by additiond 
evidence contained in fi. Leng's pul>lication. Ay l ay! J1 
are wrong; their eyes, their eam, ttieir secollections, aU 
deceived thcm. They wre not competent t a  judge. But 
they ~ p e d r  to  single fmts ! no mntter! 
Well, then, my lord, 1 push to you your own despatch! 
Away with it! It is worthless, Iiad evidence, not to  be 
trusted! Nothing more fkely, iiut wLat then, and who is to 
be trusted2 Nohdg  wvho contrndicts you: evcrybody ahe 
coincides mith you, nay, the mme person is to be believed 
nr disbelieved emctly as he supports or opposes your nsser- 
tion~, even t ime  French authurs ivliose genero- principies 
lend them to write. falseiiooda for the h x r  of t 21 .  mntry .  
Sucli, my lord, nftcr n ycar's Eabour of cogitation, is nearly tlie 
mtent o€ your Ii'ej%ation. 
In your first publicahion yon said aii heamy evidence 
~houltl have been excludd and notliing related but what 
couId be proved in a court of justice; now when tmtimony ia 
ofcrcd wliich no eourt of juatico mnld refusc, ívith n I t a ~ c r ' ~  
coulness yoti te11 t he  jury that norte of it i s  worthy o€ credit; 
thnt tlie ivitnwsa, being ~enernlly of a low rnnk in the -y, 
me iiot t o  be regardc;l,-thb they were not competent to 
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judp. Tbjs ia a little too mnch. There wmld be Borne 
shom of reason if these subalterns' opinions had heen @ven 
itpon the general dispositians of ths canipaip, but they are 
a!l witnw~us t o  fncts ivhicli carne under tlieir pcr~orial observa 
tion. TVhat! hntli not a sulidtcrn eyes ! Hath lic not msl 
Rnth hc nnt nndcrstantlingl I'ou were once a ~ulialtcrn 
yourself, and yon cannot blind the world by guch arrogwit 
- liriie of station, such mr-iveming contmpt for menk capa- 
city because they liappen to be of lower rarik than yourself. 
Long habits. of irnperioue cominand may have so vitiated your 
mind tlmt gou cnnnot dispoasess yonmelf of such iqjurious 
feellngs, yet, helicve me it woiild be much more dignified to 
avoid this indeoent display of tliem. 
Let me now remark upon sucb parts of yonr nem publica- 
tion irs may be necessasy for tho further supporE of my 
History, that js, wliere new proofs, or apprent pmofs, nre 
Iiromght forwaml. Tour forrner inacciimciea Iiaye exonerrited 
me from noticing nny part of Tour Hefiddt im save mliere 
new evidencs is brought forward, and then onlg in deference 
t u  tliose gentlemrn whu, beiug unmixed wit,li your furmer 
worlrs, ha176 a right to rny rensons for deolining thair testi- 
mony. 1 have liowcver on my liands a much more importnnt 
lnliour than contending iFPith yonr lordship, and mmt there- 
fore Imve the grentest part of your book to those who will 
trrlce tlie t.rouble to compare your pretended Refutation with 
my original Justificatiuti, iu ccimbinution with tb letter, 
I i e inm sntistiod tliiit in 80 doing you will uot gain. 
l'! Witli rcspcct to the dcnt,li of thc liciitcnnnt-p~ernor 
of Almeida, you still harp upon tlie phmse that it TVW the 
d y  ~ Y ~ ~ c H c F .  Tke expression is cornmon amongst persons 
~vlien speakiiig oT triuls; it is said tlie prisoner was con- 
derniied by auch or siich a person's svidencc, never menning 
tliiit tficre w r ~  no otlier twtirririny, hut tliat. in defnult of tlint 
~>nrticular evidence he woiild nok hnve b e n  condemnerl. 
'I'ou sny there was other evidenoc, yet you do not venturc to 
xfirin tliat Cox's letter IWS not tlae teskinamy upon which tlie 
lii?utenariLg-governor wm condemned, wiiiie tLe extract fro~n 
lord Stiinrt's letter, quotd by me, say~ it ww. And his Iord- 
aliip's letter to  you, in answer t o  your iiiq~iiry, ncither contra- 
dicta nor is inteniled to  eontrdiet rny s t ~ t e r n ~ n t  ; nor yet 
does it in rrny msnner deny the authenticity of my extracts, 
~i.Iiich indeed mere copied verbatim fiom his Ietter to lord 
L!as tlereagli. 
Lortl S t u a ~  says, that extiact is the only thingr benring un 
tlie qucstion wl~idb Jg m $d. Werc tliere not liing more it 
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wouId be quite sufficiont, but hEe ppers aro very voIuminous, 
more tlinn. dfty Inrgc volumcs, and Iic mould naturally nnly 
hare looked for his letter of the 25th July, 181.2, t o  which 
you drew his atkntion, Bowever, in my notes and exhcfs 
taken froin his documenta, I find, nniidsr hlie date of August, 
1812, tho following pussW:- 
' The lieutenant-governor of Almeida was execiited hy 
' Bemforrl's order, he, Beiesford, Laving full powers and the 
'government none to  intdere.  Greot interest wlts made to 
'save him, but ia min. The sentenca and trial were pnb- 
' liqlied before bcing carried into cxecution and wcro much 
' criticisd ; botli Glie evidence md the choice of officers were 
blamed, and moreover tlie time chosen aas one of triumph 
'just after the Iiattle of Snlamnnctt, and the place Lisbon,' 
This passage I llave not marked in my book of notes as 
being lord Stiitirt's actual words, it must therefore be only 
taken as an abstract of the contents of one of his naners: but 
I I  I 
comparing it wihh t l ~ e  former ppassrige, and witli the facta thah 
your lordship's wods are still verp v a p o  antl uncertain as to  
flie mnEn pint in qiiestion, namely, the evidence on wliicli 
thia mnn waq really condcrnned, there i g  no reaaon ta doulit 
the substmtial accumcy of the ~tatement in my fint edition, 
nor the p e r f d  accuraey of it as ltmended in t3ie second 
edition of rny kbird volume, published mnny monthe agn. 
"E'ou will find that I have fhere expunged the word 'onll/: 
snd m d e  the sentence exmtly to accord with the extra& 
, from lord Rturtrt'~ letter. You will also observe, that I neve-er 
did do moro than mcntion thc simple fnct, foi wliieh 1 had 
such gowI auutnrity; and so far from iaputing blame to  you 
for tlie execution of the sentence 1 expressly stated that the: 
man richly desemed dezth. 
Passing now to the subject; of tbe eighth Portupese red- 
ment, 1 wi11 first observe, that in uaying the cighth Por- 
tuguese regiment was liroksn to pieces no blame m 3  irnpnted; 
no regiment in the worlcl muld bave stemmed the first fury 
of that Frencli column which attacked tlie mountain vliere 
the eighth was posted. If the eiglith was not broken by it, 
m sir J ~ m e s  Dorigl~s's lett~r woiilcl seem t o  imply, mhat was 
it doing while the enemp by their flank mo~ernent gairied 
the cresG o! the poaitioii in sucli nuinlen m t o  make it a 
most daring expluit of the nirtth Rritisli regiment to  attack 
them tlicrc'l I t  is a atrangc tliing tliat t, hhcay column o€ 
French, resoliite to grrin tlie crest of auch rs position, shonld 
have w d e  'a Jardc wiwemmt,' to avoid one wing of .a r e -  
ment of Portupese conscripts. Xt may mther be imagined, 
k LETTER, ETC. 531 
wifh al1 deferente, that iit was the conacripts who mnde tlie 
flank rnovement, and that some optical deception h d  taken 
place, Iike that which induces children while trnvclling in a 
cmbrriage to tliink the trees and rocks are rnoving instearl of 
thernadvea Howe~er rny authority ie given, namely, &he 
statenicni of major Wnllcr, a staff officer prcscnt, nnd the 
hatement of colonel Taylor (for he is the nameTess eye- 
witness) of the nintb, the v e q  regiment t o  wbich sir James 
Doiiglas appeds for support of his iiccount. Tliese are good 
authorities, m d  if tlieir recollections are irrecoricileable witli 
that of sir Jumes Douglns it only show haw vnin it is t,o 
e,xpect perfeet ~cciimcy of  detail. Sir a n m ~  Do~ig-lm'a n e p  
tive teatimony was unknown t o  me, but thexe were two pasi- 
tive testimonies to my statement, and thmfore it is within 
tlie rules of those courta of justice to wkicli p u r  lordsliip 
would refer all matter of Iiiskory: moreover, some pnins of 
allowance must he mde for the natuml partiality of every 
ofiecr for bis own regiment. The following extra& from 
sir James Leith's repwt on the w i o n  is slso p o r l  circum- 
atantial evidence in favour of my side of the question. 
' Tlie face of afi:~ira in this q. r te r  now wora a difemt 
sñpcct, f o ~  the enemy who had been the wmilmEnt, AaRnny 
di-p-i-ad M. driwm mqlJI tJwe cppmd to  him, wm in 
possesgioa of the roclcy erniaence o€ the sierra nt t l ~ i s  part of 
rnajor-genera1 Ecbn's position d7wt o shd bkrag $red d 
him Not a moment waa to be loat. Major-general Leitli 
reaolved instantly to atttlck tho enemy witIi thc liayonct. 
He therefore ordered the ninth Rrit i~h regiment., wtiich hrid 
been hitlierto moving mpidly by igta Ieft in columns in order . 
to gain tlie most adaanhageous gtound for elieclring tlie 
enemy, to f o m  the line, whicli they did dwith tlie greatest 
promptitude amurng and oooiness undor tho firc of thc 
encmy, u,ho hacl just appeared formed on Biat pxrt o€ tlie 
Ay erninenoe wliicli ovcrlooka the h c k  of tlie ridge, and 
wno bad then for the fimt time also perceivett the British 
brigds nnder liim. Mrrjor-geneid hit11 hnd intendd t1i:tf 
the tliirty-eightfi, ~econd battalion, should have moved on ira ' 
the rcar and to thc Icft ftf tho ninth regirncnt, t e  havc turncd 
thc enemy beyond the rocky eminente, wliicti wlis quite inac- 
cecsible towarcls the rear of the sierra, wlde the ninth slioiild 
have gnind the ridge on the right of tlie rocky heiglit, tlio 
royals te have bwn pposted (as they were) in reserve; but tlie 
enemy Ju&vity &m werything hfme t h  in t h t  pu~~m, 
nflorded liim t.he sdmntqe of g-aining tlie top of tlie roeky 
ridge, mhich is accessible in front, before Pt was possible for 
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the Britbh brigde to have reaclied that position, alttongh 
not a moment liad been lost in rnarching to support tlie poiut 
attwked, and for that purpose it liad mude a rt~pid movement 
of more than two miles without h~l t ing  iind frequently in 
do~bIc  quick timc! 
Ifere we ltave nothing of ffank morements to  avoid a wing 
of Portupese comcriptu, but the p1,lain aud distirict asserbioii 
twice over, t hu t  mrytl~afig in fin6 dlTgmsed or drima 
awuy-and tliat not C V L : ~  a ahot wnri fired at tthe cncmy. 
FVliere tlien ws the cjglith P o ~ n p e s e ' i  Did tlie French 
coIumn turn &de merely at ttthe menacing looks of these can- 
scriptsl If so, wliat rt pity tlie latter liad not been p l a d  to 
lrecp the crest of the position. There is also anotlier d5culty. 
Sir Jmes Boug1~11b4 mys Eie maa with thc royals in the attark, 
and sir James Lcith saya that the roynls were lielrl in reserve 
wl~ilc the ninth drove amy the enemy; besides mhich, tlie 
eighth l?ortugiiese might have been broke by tth e n e q  when 
tlic Iattei were inounting tbe hill, nnd yct hnvc rallied nnd 
joined in the pumuit i h e n  the ninth liad broken tlie Frk.ench. 
Noteover, my lord, as yoa a%rm that botli yourself and the 
duke of Q'elliugtoii mw al1 the operations of tlie eigttli Portu- 
gime on this occasion, the former extract from colonel Taylor's 
I~ttcr aliall he enlaved whercby you will pmceive sometlung 
wllicii may lead you to  doubt the accuracy of your recollection 
. oii that hhead. 
' No doubt gemid Leith's letter t o  khe duke was intended 
to descilbc thc aepect of aff'aim in so critica1 a, situation, and 
wIiei*e the duke Iiimself oouM not poa&l.pj Iiave made his 
obsemtionri; and also Leitith mishecl to linvc due mdit given 
to hia brigade, wl~icli mas nut done in the deqatcles. On tha 
rontrq ,  tlieir exertions wer8 m d e  liglit of, anci tbe eiglith 
Portuguesc rcgiment m= cxtollerl, ~vhich I know @ve wny to 
a nian, save tlicir comrnanding offioer anctrti ten or a dozeu men 
a* the outside; but be md they were ainongst the very fore- 
most ranh of tlie nhtli Uritiuli.'-'General Leith's corres- 
pundence would be an interesting dacumtínt to colonel Napier, 
ns tlirowing considcriihlc Eiglit upon tbc operutio?i~ sat Biicm, 
lretween Picton and HiIi's ccirps, a ve1.y coiisiderrihle extent of 
position wJ&h cMdd mt of postiMi2y Be mw~ookdfrom my 
ather pmJ of hHd' 
ch~g8 of Ihe aimtmth. P ~ ~ - Y o ~ ~  lordship hss 
here g~ined nn advantagc; some of generd h l ~ I 3 c ~ n ' ~  expreR- 
sions are to me obscure, but it i s  impossiblc te doubt his posi- 
tive statement tliat he .zwe in front of the convcnt wall and 
tliat he cliargd some body of the enemy. It is however 
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necessnry ¡'% restore the question at iissuo hetween YQUr lord- 
sliip antl mysclf to i t ~  true bearing. You accuscd mc of a 
desire to damW the reputation of tlie Portugese m y ,  and 
J'OU ask why no mention wns made of a particular charge 
eirected by the nineteentt Pwtugneae regiineut at Busacu. 
Tllis cliarge you describerl m lieing ttgiain~t one oE xmy's alta& 
i y  colurn?~, whirk h ~ d ,  y011 ~n id ,  y r u i d  € 1 ~  mccnt of IÉa& 
position awI t h m  famimg ~ P ! I M Z &  O ~ O  t 1 ~  phin u l im  brrfore 
i t  was chaged by t h e  nineteenth segiment, As thla descrip- 
tion war certniilly wroiig, it was treated as a rnagniloquei~t~ 
allusion to an ~ l v a n c e  mxde by a Portupese regimerit posted 
w t1ie mountain to the rfglit. General Ii'Beaii is mistdcen 
mhen be quotm me UR snyirig 7 b i 9  line wne nevw nenrer tn the 
eriemy's Iiiies t l i ~ n  a hiindred partle. 1 ~poke of a Portupese 
regrnent, which might posríibly he tlie niaeteenth. 1 never 
dciiied thn t  tlny clixrge liad beeii m d e ,  Iiut only a charge szlcl~ 
as d . M  by ym; and in fact general M'Bean1tn's letter wliile 
it oontirmv tlic truth of your general ilescription, by implirxa- 
$ion alenies the accuracy of thi: particulars. Cerhainly Ney'a 
columns iiever prrssed t he  front of the light division nor ad- 
vanced on tllie plriiu Iiehind it, + 
Tlie dificulty of rccoiiciling general MLBem% atatement 
witli my own rrcoIlections nnd witli tlie grnund tand porrition 
of the Iigh:lit clivision, m j  perh~ps anse fmm the genertrl's 
meaning to use certain terms iu a lcss precise sense tlran 1 
take them. Thus he saya lie \vas posted in frant of tIie con- 
veiit ~ i t l l ,  and also on ilie riglit of Ilie liglit division; liut tlie 
light cdivision wns Iinlf a mile in front of t he  convont mll, and 
Iici~oe 1 i ~  pinbably clow not mcaii, as Ris words seem t o  imply, 
iinmerliately under tlie wdl. Re qw&s also of tlie light 
division being to hiq left, but unless he rneans the line of 
bnttle wifli wierelice tu tlie shuositiw oi' tlie grountl, tlie IigIit 
divieion m e ,  witli respect; tu  tlie euemy and the convent, in 
i i is  hont ;  anti if lic does spenlr. with regad tc thosc sinuo- 
vitieíl, Iiis front would Iiave been nearly nt right anglles to tlie 
front of the fiRy-8econd and forty-tliird, which most lilrely was 
tlie cnse. Again he aays he cliarged and drove the FrencIt 
frum t b & ~  pwhim clown to the bottoin of the raviue; but tiie 
eiiemy'a position, prtipcrly so d l e d ,  wns on tIie opposite sirle 
of hlii: pet~t m~iiie; aiid nrt nll liis nrtillery and cavrtl~, al1 tlie 
eiglith corps antl tlie reseww of the sixth corps, were in order 
of tiattle tliere, not ten regiments, much less one, dared hsre 
crussed the ravine, ~vhich >vas of sudi depth it was difficnlt to 
distinpish troopa at the bottom: general lVLBean probably 
rncans by the word position somc accidental ground on wbkli. 
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volume ahould ever come t o  a thirrl edition, hia Ietter ~haii hs 
taken as groiind for noticing tbis cliarge, withont homever 
mnking it 80 prorninent as your Ionlsliip desires. 
Your lordship closes this subjcct by tlisfollawing ohcrvation. 
colanel Napier repmnts  liimself as linving beeii an eye- 
witness of a gallant movement made by a certain Port.ugricse 
regiment,-whicli regiment lie does not profess to know,- 
but which movement toolr place a rnile distont from tlie posi- 
tion @ven to tlie ninetecnth mgirnent, it is evident he muld 
not also liave been an ese-witness of what was psssing a mile 
t o  the lek. Nor can lie tlierefore negative what i s  said to bnve 
occumd there. It is extraordiuary tliat the liishrian shouId 
not llave perc~ired the predictiment in wliich lie has yiaced 
himsdf.' Now you do not say that the two events oociirred 
ak thc m time, wherefore pmr conclusion ia what the 
renowned Partrirlge d l s  a nvn mjwitw;' md as general 
M'Renir exprca~lp nfñms liiu chnrge to liavr: tn1rti.n place on 
the m$At of the Eight division, it wxs not absolutely neccsaary 
tliat I should look to t l ie  left in order to see tlre said charge: 
hence the pwdicament iu wliicli I arn placed, is that of beiug 
obliged to remrtrk your lordsbip" inabiliy ?.o rezbson upon your 
own matcrids. 
Tour next ~ubject is captain Squire, but tlmt matter has 
been sufficiently diacussed Lefore, aiid tlie memory of tliat very 
gallaut arid table oficer wjll riever eunEr from your lordaliip'a 
angry opithcta. Crimpo Mayor follows. I n  your PurtIm 
StGhres rou mid. colonel Col borne was not near the sccnc o€ 
action; you now ñhmv in detail that lie wm actively engaged 
in it. You denied nbo t h t  he was in su~ipo~t  OS the xdranced 
gunrd, and pet quute his own report ~xplainiiig how be hap- 
pened to  be aepnrnted from tlic arlvanc~l guerd just Iiefow the 
rrction, thris proving tliat he .Ras marcliing in siipport of it. 
Yon refuse any crdit to the statemeiits nf captain Gregory 
arid colunel Lght, and you endeuvour to  trarnple on t l i e  evi- 
deiice of ti16 officer of tlie thirteenth dmgoons who wa6 isn 
actor in tlic chnrgt? of tliat r~~giment, but with recpect to him 
a few rernnrks are neoeaery. 
- 
Lo. Tlie accurncy of llis narrative concerns my Jwti$&rm 
veg little, ezcept In one part. It vas publislid whole as he 
gtlve it to me, hecause it tlirew liglit upon the suhject, and 
thcre is notliing in your lodship's ohservtttionq to m k e  me 
doubt its general. coriectness. But i t mas only tLe part printed 
in itdics t l i ~ t  concerned me. I had describd a remarlrable 
oomht  of cnvalry wherein the 11ostiIe squadrana I d  f& 
pwsed 11irqh m h  othw, md tlsen the Britisk put thc: Frencri 
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to flight. Pon ridicuIed tbb ns a nnrsay tale; gran called the 
description of it a ' c m t r y  &wq' m d  yeu still cal1 it a 
'scmic e#&.' Did tlie Iiostile mttsses m& twice, and did the 
ñritish then put their opponents to flightl Tliese wcre the 
ieal qiiestions. me irnn~unl fact o f  two cnvnlrg borliet~ c h q -  
ing tlirough each other, was the point in dispute; jt is scenic, 
but is it trueP Nnw my firet authoEiy dcsipratd aa m '*e ' 
~ih?8¿?; was colonel Colborne; my second colonel Dogherty 
d the thirteenth drwons, an ac&; and wl~en you so coolly 
sny the lnttcr's statcmcnt does not nfford ' thc sligl~tcst snpport 
t o  tlre gcenic descn'lition,' 1 must take t he  liberty of taugliing 
at you NIy, my Iord, you really s e e m  disposed to treat 
common aense as if ik were s mbaltern. Colonel Dogherty 
benrs me out even to the letter; for as tlre sscond cliarge took 
place with the a m e  violcncc thnt tlie third did, if tlie hostile 
Iiorlies had not p ~ s ~ e d  through tto tlieir original position, the 
French rnust hxve fled towartls the aIlied army : hnt tliey fled 
towards Badajos. The English must therefore lime pogseci 
Glirougli uiJ. Lurnetl, m d  it \vas ín tliat personal confict with 
tlie a:iLre wliich fullowed the seoond chasge the tbirteentli 
drvong defeated the Frcnch. 
lify lord, yori will nevcr by such special pleading, there is 
no other term by wliich yonr argument can be properly desig- 
nahl, you wiU never by mich special plmding liirle your 6ad 
generalsliip at Campo Nsyor. Tlie prook of your error@ -0 
too many ibnd too clear, tlie errors themselves too glaring, too 
grasa to lenve p u  tlie lmst hope; the name mnfiisinn of hend 
wliicli prevented you from seizing tlie dvantagw tlicn offered 
to yon seems to premiI in your writiiig; and yet d i l e  im- 
peacliing every person's creciit where their shkiilents niilitate 
agninst your object, you dernand the most implicit confidente 
i i i  your own contrndletory nsscrtinns and prcpsterous argu- 
nienhq. lvou only fhtigie yourself nnd your r~nrlers by yynur 
rinwieldy floundering, you are hewy and throm rnucli mud 
obout, and Iike one of tliose fine Andalusian lior~es o much 
admirsd in the Peiiinsula, you prance and curvet and Eoam and 
bbour in your pces but never gct on. At Gnrnpo Mayor you 
Iind on enormous superionty of troops, the enctny wcre tdren 
by snrprine, they mere in a lilnin, their cnmlry mas benten, 
tiieir artillery-drivers cut dom,  t h i r  infantry, hemmed in by 
your horsemw and under tlie play of your pns,  were rcady 
to  surrentler; yuu surered tliern t o  escape and carry oE tlieir 
captured nrtiilery and tlien blaamed your gdlant troops. The 
enemy escriped from you, my 1 nrd, but you cannot escape from 
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the opinion of the world by denying the truth o€ al1 shtemenfs 
mhich militate agninst yo~t. 
1 7 ~  mwh by M&.-If you had said at onm tliat tlie 
duke o€ Wellin$u.tuii forlinda you to go by Rlerid~, there would 
hnve been an end oT itI1 mp arguments against your skill; y ~ t  
i t  d o a  not follom t h ~ t  liese arpmenta would be liitile in 
themselves, though not applimlile te you personnlly : new 
comliinations wem prcpcntcd, and tlie duke of 11Telfington 
miglit very prolmbly bave clianpd his inbtructions listl be 
hecn prcscnt on the spot. Ruf why wnri t.Iiis Tour justificai 
tion withheld until nowP why wm so plnin, so clenr, so deci- 
sive s defence of yourscIf ilever tliougliii of before? and w i y  
i s  it now smothcrerl mitli sucli a Iieup of arguments w you 
liave rtddctl, tn prove tliiit yon ought not to havc gonc 1iy 
Meridat Bave you found out that 1 am not sudi a bnd 
reasoner upon militrtry aEairs as you were plexsed t o  style me 
in your forrnw pulilicaiion? Have you fouutl out tlirit p l ed -  
ing high runlr is not s sufficient answw to plain and wcll 
mppnrted atatementst It i s  goad tiomever tlint you b n ~ e  nt 
last condescended to 'dopt a different mode of proceeding. 1 
apldand JOU Sor it, sntl with tiie exception of twu poiiit" 1 cave 
you in tlie full enjoyment of nny triumpli which thc force oE 
your nrgurncnts mny procore yon; alway~, ~~omcver, rctnining 
my rigl~t o assmne, tliat pour lorctsliip's mernory with resliect 
to the duke of Wcllin$oii'a negative mny hare bcen as 
treacherous as it was abotit your uwn letter to  the juuta of 
Bndajos, Tlicre is tl~ercfurc nutliing to ~ d d  to the ag1- 
mentq uqed in my J~~lut$icafb?a ancl Ristov, in f~vour of 
tlie marcli t o  Metida; if 1 am wrong tlic world nill so judge m 
me. Hul tlie two points reserved are, 1'. Tliat you assefi  
now, in direct coutradiction to your former r~vow~l ,  tbat tiie 
march t.o Meridn aoiild h w e  been one (if fmm daye instmd O€ 
two; 8nd thnt tlio rond by Albuq~terq~ia ims tiie ~ n j y  one 
ivhich you could use. In answer to this 1 s t  prirt be it knom, 
that tlie Prencli liefure, tlia Syimiartis tlian, niarclied 113 tlie 
road nf Idontibio; iind Jiat a ycoir ufter, when lord Hill's 
expeditioii ae~irirrt Almnrnx took plncc, tlie wliolc of Iiil I i a t  
tering antl pontoon-train, with al1 tlie nrnrnunition Iielringing 
to ibJ mo~ed  mitli great fncili ty iii tliree days frorn Elvas, by 
this very r o ~ d  of Montijo, t o  RferiJri; w d  Elvns, hs your 
lordship lcnoas i s  rndier furthcr than Ci~mpo 11nyor hwn~ 
Xerida. 
The second point is tbnt mode of conducting a controver~ 
vlaich l i s  bwn bcfore exposed in your former puMicntiona, 
viz ,  misstatiiig my ugiiiiients to suit your owii rmsuuiug. 
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Spnniarda ta have hd seven hundred and frftg; but for clew 
ness let tb be pIaeed in a tabular Eom: 
Scrjennts, tmmpeters, and troopm. 
. . . . . . . .  Pmqent under m. 1576 
. . . . . . . . . .  Onconimnnd. 733 




. . . . . . . . . . . .  Present. 1730 
. . . . . . . . . . .  Comrnmd. 532 




Xedium eatimate for the 16th of %y. 
. . . .  Present 8th May 1576 
. . . .  Ditb, 29th Jfq 1739 
- 
2804 
Deduct prisoners on tlie 8th . 115 
- 
Total , . . .  8680 
- 
To which are ta he adderl the ki1le.d and wounded of the Anglo- 
l'ortuguese, anrl the men rejoined frorn commnntl. 
Thus, the atntements in the History and Jmh3&ion are 
botli borne out ; for bhe numbers are above two thousand as 
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lion, and because it was the then interest of the &ter rather 
£o exaggemtc thm to  Ic~acn his own numbcrs, ir1 order to give 
bis aovereign an idera of his activity and zenl. 
E x M  of a letter from M A ~ A L  SOULT to the ~ C F :  
of WAGM. 
IsdtZe, 92nd Apri!, 181 1. 
'UeneraI Jattoui Niubourg nnnouncea to me that generd 
Eeresford commanding the Angjo-Portnyie~e ~ m y ,  bnrl the 
Spanish generals Castaños ancnd Enllesteros with the remains of 
tlie c o r p  of tlieir nation are iunitod at Zafra, and 1 am assurwl 
tliat tthe w1~ole of tlieir foroes is twenty-iive thousund men, oE 
which thme tliousancl arc mvalry." 
' Colonel Quennot of the ninth regimenf of dmgoone, who 
commands npon the Lines: of the Tinto md observes tlie move- 
ments on that Bide fm AS Ayamonte, inform~ me that on 
tlie 18th antl 19tl1, genernl Rlake disembarkcd ten t,honnsand 
infantry anrl seven hundred mvalry between tlie moutha of the 
Piedra md tlie Guadiana, Tliese troops come fram Ctidiz, 
tliey h a ~ e  cannan, aud Blake mn unite in t h t  part fifteen 
tllou~rmd men.' 
Ditto to ditto. 
'Hay  4% 1811. 
L C ~ r d ~ w  is mmced by a c q s  of Eriglish I 'ortupe~e and 
Spaniards, many troops are concentrater1 in Estremadura, 
Badajos is investd, Blake hm united on the Odie1 an amy oE 
fifteen to  sixteen tliousrind m e n S r  1 depnrt in foiir days wit,h 
huenty thwmcl maert, t l w ~  tlwmand Iwrm, a& thi~ty pkces 
of camm lo drive across the Quadianx the encmy'ri corps 
which are spred in Btremurlura, t o  diseng- Majos aud 
t o  fzcilitato the arrival of count D'Erlon. If the troopa whicl~ 
that general brings c .  unite with mine, nnd iC the troops 
coming from the armies of tlie north m d  centre, and ~ l i c l ~  I 
have alredy in p d  arranged, arrive in time, I ~ l i a l l  brnve in 
Estrcmatlrim, thirty-Eva thownnd mcn Evc thownud horsm 
and forty ~iiwes of artillery.' 
Now, my lord, 1 find by ths imperial returns that connt 
D'Erlon miarched towads Andalusia 14th bVel~e thousand 
men present nnder m, and that he clid not arrive until the 
14th Snne. Tliwe reinain thrw t l i o u ~ n d  men as coming Erom 
the armies of the north mrl centre, to malee np tlie tIiircj4ve 
tliaasand men mentioned by Soult, and 1 fiiid the following 
passage in bis letter to the prince of NTagram, dated the 19th 
of Hay. 
Tlie 12th, 1 shaU be at Fuente Cantos, general Bmn com- 
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mnnands thw, ha bringcl with him the first reinforcemcnt 
coming from the armies o€ the north ~ n d  centre, ~ n d  1 shall 
employ him in the expcdition.' 
Ilenee, if w0 take tlie first reinforcement at haIf of tlie 
whole number expected, we add one tliousand five hundred 
men and RVB guns to the tmenty thonsand, malring a total for 
the battle of Albuera of twentyanne tliousnnd five liundrcd 
men of al1 arms, antl thirty-five p n s .  From tliese mitst bo 
cteducted the detachments left at 'CTillalba, stragglers on tlie 
march, and aome hussnrs scnt to scout on the ilailks, for 1 find. 
in general Mdden's n m t i v e  of bis isservices, tEiat Le Jvau 
mtched by pmt of the enemyL mvdrg on t&e dq of tho 
hrtttJa. . .. .
Y ou h a ~ e  now, my lord, positive B Q ~  nndeninble testimony 
that &e French numbers were over-rnted instead of being 
under-ratea by me, and you llave comborative evidente, that  
tha namlier of  tIie dlies wap as great m shted by me; for íve 
find in tho nbovc extractn Sonlt giving Blake fifhcn thousand 
mcn, of whieh, at lea& amen hundred are riivalalry, befm~ the 
liattle, and twenb-fiive thoupand, o€ which three thousantl are 
cavalry, t o  p u r  lordship, Castaiios, kc, We fintl the Frendi 
general's inforrnation, talfing i n h  wnaideratiiou tlie truope 
which joined Blalro in tlie Nichln, not diffcring csscntiolly 
from Mr. Hcnry Wellmley'~ report of the numbers o£ BIake's 
army, narnely twelve fhonsand, of wliich one t,I>orisan one 
htindred were cavvalsy; and we find both in some manner con- 
iirined by Ion1 W'elligtoil's repcatd ~taterneiiks of tlie forces 
of Blnke's amy after tIie hnttle, th t  is to say, mking a res- 
sonable allownnce for the numliers lo& in tlio action. Soult 
and Nr. WellesTey also ngee in making out tlie Spanidi 
cavalry more numcms thxn your Ierrlrrliip wiII dniit  af. 
Blake done h d  from seven to eleven liundred cavalry, follo~v- 
ing tlie st~tement o€ tliese pemons, and Chere was in dditiun 
the corps of Penne Villcmur, whicl~, a9 mid in my JeGat1Ifi.c~ 
tim, wns not les9 thm five liundwl. 
In closing yonr mleiil~tion of numbem you exultingly 
observe that it is the firat time you ever Eieard.of a. generdl's 
being censured for keeping one-tliird of his foroe in reseme 
and W i n g  t l s~  m y  wlth ti& ot?m tzoo. Ay-Lut thi8 
involves the vcry pitli of tho question. At Albuera the gane- 
~d did not beat tlie enemy. ?iiy lord, you have hstomed 
g ~ e a t  pains on your argument aboiit the bnttIe of Albuem, an-4 
f ~ r  be it from me t o  endeavour to deprive you of aiiy addjtioii 
to yonr reputatian which you may titus obthin, tliere is iiu 
desire t o  roli jou of well-eanied laurels, my observutiona w r e  
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rlirected against w h t  appenretl t o  me your bnd generalship; 
i f  t h n t  hns not been pointecl oiit to tlre satisfaction of tlie 
piiblic 1 llave notliing fiirtlier to offer in fairness, ttnd certainly 
will not by my vilc sopliistiy endeavour to daiiiapc your tine. 
But do not think tlia foree of your prescnt nrgumcnts is 
~dmi t t ed ;  if tlie~r are not Iiere c-wefully clissectcd it is not from 
any wmt of points to  fasten upon; iudeetl, rny lord, your 
book is very wenlr, tlrere are many failures in it, und a few 
more shdl bc noticed that you muy cstimntc my forbearance 
at its proper vallie. We \vil1 hegin witli yotir obscrvatians on 
captain Eregoq'a teitimony, not in dcfeiice of  that gentle- 
man'~ crerlit, for in trittli, as Lis arid tlie otlier oiricers' evidence 
is given to fncts of mhich t h g  were pwsonally cognizant, not 
the slightest regara can be paid to yoiir cwfunerl srgiiments 
in oppositien t o  t8heir honour. You da not indced mean t u  
impeacli auytliiug but tlicirmeinory; Iiiit t o  attempt to defend 
them from your observations wouId mnke it appezr as if I 
thoitglit otherwiae. hfy Inrtl, yo11 Iinw misscd ciiptnin Gre- 
gory, but you have hit yourself Tery hard. 
Beliold t ie proof. 
At pv 167 yon say, '1 mil1 now point out the poss  and 
pnlpal~le ermrs of captnin Gregory'~ narrative.-He s q s ,  
tl:nt on rec~iving the inteIligence from fin ootvlerly of tlie tliir- 
teenth dragoons mho carne iu from a piquet on tlie riglit with 
intelIigence tlmt the enemg TIR crossing the river, general 
Long gtlloped off-1 conclude to the riglit,---rnd fouiid hdf 
tlie 8rn1 J acrosq-~nd to tlie right, J j r / y ,  eeimj 0 t h  autho- 
rity Jm st&d t7mt the enmy's j r s t  m m m t  wasfiorn #M 
wood d o n g  t l ~  rigM bamk af €he AElnswu. wpon w/r left; antl 
tlint wc wcrc nirt nt al1 nware of tlicir intcntion to crosc nbovc 
oiir right and tbere make nn nthck, ti11 ailer their fird MOV4 
ment was considernbly adva~iced and the action h d  actualIy 
c o m m e n d  Fntli Godinot's wrps on the opposjte side of tlre 
river to our lert. It ia quite srrrprising thst colonel Napier 
diniild llave avcrlooked a hEnnder m pos9 HB to deshoy the 
vahe of tha wliole of his frienrlk testirnonv.' 
Now, my lord, compara the p w a p  marked by italim 
(pnrJon me tlie italicti) in tlie abovc, wwittl tlie following extrad 
from your own despatch. 
Tlie enerny on the 16th did not long delay his attack: at 
eight dclock' (the very time mentioned by eaptain GrcgoryS 
'he ww observerl t o  be in movement, and Lis cwalry were 
secn pming tho rivulct of Alhncra considcrnbly d o u ~  m 
P&~A€, d 8Jmrt7y a@ he marclied out of thc wood oppchsite 
to m, a, strong force of camlry and twe hmvg wlumns of 
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infantry, poeting them to oiar front, m if to &€m& I?M villagB 
md Iiridgrc of dlbuwa. D~nringr this time he waa filing tha 
principnl bod y of Iiis infai~try owr  thi: i-i~cr 6 q j o d  mm &y!t, 
and it was not Eong before ltis intention aplicarerl to he to 
turn us by tlmt flank.' Your lortlship Iins, indeed, in oinothcr 
parc discurdcd the autliority of your despatcli, as splieers most 
necessary in treating of tliis Iixttle, but it is rntlier Iiard nrsa- 
sure to attaclr me so ficrcely for liaving had somc fnith in it. 
With mspect ta  air Wm. Lumlq'~  letter 1 c~nno t  but 
admire Iiia remembmnce of tIie exact numbers of tlie Britisli 
cavalry; a precise recollcction after tweuty-tliree yenrs, of a 
fciv hrt~ty words spolten o11 a fieltl of httlg ia c~rkzinly a raro 
tliing; yet siicli precisian did not talce me quite by fisulyiriñe, for 
if I do not g ~ t l y  rnistnkc, sir Willinm WIL~ t hc  geiiesal, who 
at Santarem edified bhe liead-quarters by a report, t h ~ t  ' ths 
ensiny wwre cwtainly gmng to w.moei~ &t!w €o diteir e h t  or 
IltIsa*~ le), ío thk f imz t  & Ilkv rw: One would suppwe 
tbat so exact a person could never LB in. error; and yet th 
folloming extmct from gcncral Harvcy's jnurml would lend 
me to aiippose his rncrnory wna not qiiitc ña clmr ~ n d  powerfiil 
as he imagines. Xir William Lnmley s y ,  that to t1ie beat of 
Lis recollection he was not awwm o l  t,he axlvaiiee oP tlic fuzi- 
leers snd I-lwvey's brigde until they 1d littssed liia left flank; 
that t h g  then crimc undex bis cyc, m1 a5 tlie rain and cmolro 
clenred r swg  he ~ t t w  tliern in ane horIy moving to engage; nnd 
altliough tliey hail become so oliliqitc relative to tlie point 
wliere he stood tllrat he could not well spsak as t o  tlieir sictuaI 
distanee from one nnotler, tliere did not appear sny improper 
iiitciwl Lict\r.caii tlicrn. 
Knw hcar genrrnl Harvcy ! 
' Tlie twenty-tliird aiid one brtttnlion of the seven th fnz i lee~  
were in line. Tlie otlicr battrilien at guarter distaiiee, forming 
quare, at every lialt to co\*er the riglit ivIiicli tlie cavalry con- 
tiiiried to menace. Mnjw-gmwd Lunaley> IIm Uritidb 
cavdry, w m  &o im ccokzcrnn of hdf spzcnd~ons in r m  of aur 
RgJit m d  nmwcd with m, b&ng tuo w d  t~ ayuirast 
IIE m p 5 s  m d y .  
Tliere, my lord, you see that generdils ns well aq doctors 
$ differ* Sir W. Lumley, tweiity-tliree years after tlie evenb, 
recollects seeiug tlte fuxileem ~iud Harvey's lirigado at s~icli a 
distnnce nnd so obliqucly, tliat he could not speak to tlieir 
sctu~d diishnce from one anotIier. Gcncriil Haiccy raiting 
Qie dngr after tlie event, sys, sir Viltiani I;iiinley hnd his 
mwlry in IialE squatlrons closo in renr o€ therre Tery brigactcs, 
and \vas muviog mitli tliem? TIlis shodd coiivince your lord- 
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ship t h d  it is no$ Gw. ta rrg out nnd c a d  at everg &p in 
the detail of a battIe. 
As to the term gy, the word wa.~ med without the mark of 
quotation, bemuse it wa8 my own and it expressed mine md 
your meaning vcry weii. You fcnred tho cavalry of tho 
French wonld overpower ours and break in on your rertr and 
flank mhm tlie snpport of the fuzileew \pas taken away ; I hld 
you general Cole had placed Rwey's brigade in ttbe gap, that 
is, in wcli a situ~tion thmt the French could not break h 1 
knem verg well F i a r v ~ ' ~  bripclc f o l l o ~ e d  in sripport of the 
attack of the fnziieers because he ~ a y s  so ifl hiS jotrnal; but 
he also sayg tht  ht l i  ours au4 the enemy'~ mvah-y m d e  a 
corresponding rnovement. Tlius the far of the lstter bre~k- 
ing in m cliirncrid, cspeeinlly as during the rnnrch Harrcy , 
lialted, formed, received and Leat off a cl~arge of the Frencli 
horsemen. 
But we have not yet done with sir W. Lumley's numbm. 
How curions it is that brigade-mrtjor BoImes"s verbal q o r t  
on the fielrE of brittle, ras recollected by sir Willia~n, ~ilioiild 
@ve the tliird diñgoon-pards and the fourtli h g o o n s ,  form- 
ing the heayl brifiade, tlie exact nnrnber of five liundred md 
sixty men, wben the mme brigade-major Bolmes in Lis written 
morning &te of the 8th of Mny, nnnne wcclr hcfore the hattle, 
mves to those rePiinents rieven hundrlred rtnd fiftv-two troonem 
0 
present under ;m, and me hundred and erghty-threeL oa 
command. What h c m e  of tlie others in tlie intervalt 
Apin, on thc 29th of May, thirtecn days after the bnttle, ho 
mrites down these regimcnts ~ i x  IiunclrerF nnrl ninety-fivc 
troopeis present under ams> one hundred and eighky-two on 
comrnand, and thirty-two prisouers of war. In  hotb cases also 
the sergennts, tnirnpeters, $c., are to be added; mnd t h i g  cir- 
cumstancc must be marker?, bacause in tlie French rctlirns nll 
pcrsons fmm tlie hkhest officw t o  the conductors of cadges 
are indurled in tlie stren@h of mm: it. is probable neitlicr of 
tlie distinguislied regimeiits Jlurled to wjll be ivllling to h i t  
that their ranks mero full bdiire aiid after, but ernpty on the 
day of hattlc, it is contrary to  the English cuustom. Tour 
lordsliip, nlso, ia a parentbesis (page 126) says the thirteenth 
dragoons iliad not tliree liundred men at this time to prod~~ce; 
but thi6 pemerse brigade-maj nr Flolmes writes that regbent  
clown aIso on tlie 8th of May, at tlircc hundrcd and fiity-seven 
troopers present under arms, snd sixty-three on commnnd; 
and on the 29tli of May, three bundred and forty-one present, 
seventy-iiine oii command, eighty-two prifionen of war. SW- 
o & m ~  me notoriously tmuhleseme peo~ila 
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have been abont tbe time tlie fourtl~ divisiun moved t o  athck, 
1 remived a verbal ordw in Rm~liri7~ fm Don J m  h k  
de 8- (now Conde de Villa Rcal, an aicl-íle-camp of lord 
Eeresford) to  retire by th JTdvwdi rod,  ur y o n  UIE F d  
zerdB rond, I am raot mre wJ~icl6; to tliiu I. strorrgly expressed 
words of doubt, and he then rodo off to~~ards  blbuerfi; as, 
however, I could aee no rerison for fnll ing linck, and tlie infnn- 
try my pns  belonged t o  being at hband, I eontinnd in aclion, 
aiid thoiigh 1 believe I limliercd rip oiice or twice prcvioua to 
tbe  receipt of tliis messrage; and moved a littlc t o  improre ~ n y  
posikiiin, I ncver di$ so to rctire. Soon aftcr Don J o s ~  Icft 
me, seeing lord Beresford and come of his ~ t a f f  to  my right, 1 
mde across to satisfy myself tliat 1 wvas ncting correctly; but 
percei~ing thnt the Prencl~ wcre giving way 1 did uot rnenkion 
tlie arder 1 11~111 received, nnd nrt $non as lorr! Reresford FnW me, 
he asked what date mv mas were in. and then ordercrl me t o  
* O 
proceed as qiiiclíly as 1 could ~ 4 t h  my nine-pounders to the 
right; wLicli 1 did in time to Iiring tliem into action agak t  
thc retiring rnasscs of the cncrny. Tlre fnregoing is tlic sub- 
atance of nn explanation given to lord Beresford which be 
htely requested. " 
T h  you Lave tlie \&ole of wlist &ir Alexander Dickson (w 
he tclls me) irnote to  you. Here thcrcforc 1 miglit stop, 
rny lord, t o  enjoy yoiir confuqion, and biirp upon tliis fact, 
wlUcli is so foriliklab1e a bar to your lorttcliip's nrgument, that 
ratlier tlim give it publicity, you prT>led your owa corre- 
~ipnnd~nt's Ictter. But my objcct is not to gnin r~ triumph 
over you, it is to ednbli~h the tnith, and I wifl noh follow 
yonr exarnple in suppressing aliat may tend te serve your 
arpnene or wmkcn mine. It is of no consequerice to me 
wlietlier -u gave orrlers for a retmt or not, it ivas said 
in my History thnt you did not do so, the weight of tes- 
timony heing en Biat itide; it was oiilp wlien your anclnymolia 
puhlications called fortli nBv evidence Uiat doulit as to the 
correchiess of tlie first staternent enterd uiy rriiuri." But if 
tlia following oliuei.vaticin in sir Alcxandcr Diclrson's letter 
wn serve p i i r  tnrpnicnt, you nre welcome to it, altliorrgh it is 
not contained In the substance of wlmt 1ie mrotc t o  yoii; 
and lrere alsn be it remembered tliat sir Alesandeis letter 
* Since the fmt pnhlimtion d this Tf ihter  1 have I~imrned Rorn e x d -  
lent arithority thmt mwolid tleredod did actuslIy in penan oder  eneral 
air h l i n  Slolket to wtrent fmrn tlie bridge, md relulred him for beiiig 
iIorrA t o  obey. 
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'1 had never memtioned the matter ta any me, cxcept to 
Harfman, with whom I wns on tlie greztest hnbits o£ intimacy, 
and indeed X was fi-orn the fii.st inrlriced to attribute Souza's 
message to some mistakike, as neitlier in my convorsation with 
lord Eeresfoi'd warr there rtny xllusion to it, nor did anythinp 
m u r  to indicnte to me tliat ho wes awarc of my liaving 
received B U C ~  an order.' 
Tour, lordship will, no donbt deny that fhei count of Villa 
Real had autliority frem y ~ u  to order this reheat, so be it; 
biit then you can upou me and otheig b accept tliis aount of 
Villa h a l b  evidenoe npon other points, aaiid yon attemp* to  
di~eredit some of my witiieñseri, hcxuse tileir testimony is 
oppoged to the testimuny of  flie oount of Villa Real ; if yoii 
deiiy Iiim a t  Albiiam, you canlid Iiave Iiim at Campo Mayor. 
And kIinld sntither di5culty you tlius fa11 into. Your piibli- 
cations are iiitended t o  prove your talent as a geneml, alid yet 
wc h d  you ~ h o w l a d g i n g ~  tliat in tho most criticnl poiiod of 
this p z t  and awfiil lizttie of Albuera, your own staff hnd 80 
Iittle confidente in your liliilit~; t1iti.t rrir Henry Ikrdinge ttook 
ripon himself to wiii j l  fur you wliile the conde de Tilil:a Ikal 
took iipon himsclf to  Iosc it, thc oiic ordcring an ndvnncc, 
wliich giiined tllc day, tlic other ortlering z retreat wliicll woiild 
have rnined al1 : be assured such liberties are never t ~ k e n  by 
f t e  Btaff 01 great commantle~-s. 
In niicierit times it was reckoned e worthy nction to hold 
tbe mrrror of truth up to mcn plnced in liigli stt~tions, ~vlien 
tlie pnrtin1it.y oT frientlcr, the flratter~ of dep-pciidente, niid tlieir 
own Iiumxn vanity liad givm them too exriltctl notions of their 
imporknnce. Yo14 my lord, are a man in a Iiiph station, and 
yo11 Iiave evictenlly r~iaile a fditlse estilirate of j-our Iinjiurtritice, 
or you would not treut meii of inferior mrili ~ n t h  so mucll 
disilain as gou Iinvc cxprcsscd iii tlieso your puiul-ilications; 
whereforc it may he uscful, antl ccrtxinly wi!l be jiist, to let 
you knom tlie j u d p e n t  wliicii otliers Iiave famiecl of poiw 
talents. The folIoiviiig cliarxcter wns slrctclied about tivo 
iiio~tlis xfher tlie bnttle uf Alliuem TTIie ritiitiior sns a man of 
great iitlility, nsed to pulilic araira, experienced ia the stutlp of 
inaulritid, oy~poscrl to you hy no pcr.sonn1 intermt, nnd witlin1 
liad excclleiit opportunitiea rif obaerviiig yoirr disposition; and 
fiurely liis xc¿itciir.ss wlll not Be denietl hy tliocc wlio linve rend 
your tlirce pull!icationa iu tliis contro~~essy. 
'BIaid~al Eeresford apliears to liassecs a grent (leal of infor- 
mation upon a11 subjects connecterl witli tEie niilitary esi~blish- 
meuts of thc liing[lum, tlie d~partments uttaclicd to tlic nrmy, 
and the resourccs of tlic country. Ru t  n o t l i ~ g  ap1ieal.s ~o Iio 
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well m n g e d  and digested in hi head; he leever fixes upon 8 
p i n t ,  but deviates from hi~i subject, and overwhclms a very 
slender t l ire~l  of argnrnent hy a profusion of illustrations, 
stories, and mecrlotes, most of which relate to himelf. He is  
captious and obstinate, and diíEcult to be plmed He appears 
to g m p  at eveq4hiag for his orrn party, withonk cen~iderhg 
whnt jb mould bc fnir, nnd rcnsonnble, nnd dcccnt t o  exirpect 
from the other party.' 
1 now take leave of you, my lord, and notvfithdanding al1 
tlint has piissed, with iespect, tiecuuse I tliink you a bmve sol- 
dier, and eren an ahIe or,wixer o€ an nmy. Yon have a e w d  
your cnuntr~r long and to the utmonh of yonr ahility, and I 
admit that ability to have beea very mnsiderabje; but History, 
rny lord, dexls with rey great men and you sink in the com- 
parison. Bhe will speak af you m a general far above medio- 
crity, as onc who has done mnch md ta great detal of it well; 
get when she looks nt Campo Mayor and hllinera she will not 
rank yo* amongst great cornmanders; and iE she shauld ever 
cast hw pcnetrating v e s  upon t h i s  youi present publiwtion, 
sne wiU not class you amongst great ~riters. 

deacriptjon wati general, being. intended merely to ~how that 
Madrid could not be apprortched from the eastward or riorth- 
wmd, except over one of +e rnonntain mges, a fact not to 
be dipputeri. 
3". It is binted by the reviewer that lord MelvilIe'e degrad- 
ing ohcmtion, nameIy, that ' tha worst men made thc kst 
soldiers,' was picked by me out of general Foy's historid 
frapent. Bow, that passage jn my Hiatory waai wrjtten 
rnariy montbe before g e n 4  Foy'~ wwrk iw publidiedi and 
my aothority wm n very cImr reeallcction of lord Nelvilleh 
epeech, as reported in tlie papcm o€ the day.' 
Qeneral Foy's work seems a favourite authority with the 
reviewer, and he tr&s general TliiebaulEs work with dis- 
dain; yet both wem Prenchmen of ~rninenm~ and the 
ennohling 'pntriotism of vitupcration migl~t havc been iin- 
pnrtirtlly exercised, the weakness of dirimimination moided. 
Ilowever general Thiebault's work, 6 t h  some apparent inac- 
curacies ae to  numbers, is wntten with great ability and 
eleggce, and is genuine; whereas general Foy's history i+ not 
even general Foy'a writing; colnnct D'Esmenmd, in his rcomt 
translation of the E n t e  af Peace's memoirs, has the following 
conclusiva passage vpon that head. 
Tlw 211wlGs gmwd liby &¿mk a of IJH m 
im lapa& kis pemaEwo deacJt pmeratad hinz fmna m'82q 
m d  pcvy@q $-SE ~ke$c$,, he d a  rns the hmmr to peak 04 it several t i w ,  m d  mm nltucked m valiua to my b w  
tiapls; tJke i m p f k t  man.uam)ts of WJimt mtor h w  
lim r ~ J d I e J  and r& h~ ot/m Iimh. In Il~is pd- 
J- I ~ b b r p ,  J ~ l e  ?m bm p r a w l y  pmidd witle 
immmte m d  d i g n m t  08sertbw.' 
While upon tliis subjed, it is right t a  do justice t o  Manuel 
&doy* h ince  of the Peitce. A sensual and wrrnpt man he 
was generally atiid t o  be, and 1 caIIed hirn so, without suffi- 
3Tempi:ri cimt cowiderat ion for the extreme mggern- 
~f M R ~ ~ U ~ I  tion8 whicli the Spani~rds a l ~ f I y 8  di~pl~y iii  their 
Ealuy, lrm- hatred. The prinee has now defended himself ; 
Q I ~ ~ W . !  by 
colonel D'Esmennd and other persons well ac- 
~ i . : s m w i d  quainted with tlie dissolute nianners of GIie 
Spanish ml>ital, nand liaMng percionul eñperience l m d o n  nnd 
lvc~tminster of Gorloy's cliamcter nnd rli~poaition, have tcati- 
i:eriew, fietl tliat I~ iu  social dcrneanour wns dccolt astl 
:<u. 1. reserved, aud Lia diripusitioil generous; wliercfora 
* 6ae n& at the end of my RpFy KÚ &e tLivd articie ipi f i e  Qua~lerly~ 
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I mpms m y regcet iat having ignorantIy and nnintentiomlly 
dumniated him. 
To rttnrn to tle peviower. Eh iti mntlnndlp obaerving 
tbat he doeci not knam my mthority for mch and mch a h t ,  
nnd therelore he insinuatee that no mch fact hd place, thw 
making Eiis igorance the rnenaure of my acmacy. Tliis 
Iogic seems t o  be akin to that of the wild-beast showman, 
mho dcelare~ thnt thc Iittle negro boys tie thc ostrich birtl'a 
1eg to rt tree, which fdly accounta for the milk in the COCOIL. 
nub.' 1 might reply generalIy as the late aldernran Coombe 
did to a certain baronet, who, in a dispute, was constantly 
exdaiming, '1 don't know that, 15r. Alderman ? X don% know 
that ! ' Ah, gir Georgc ! al1 that you o h ' 6  hww would m&e 
a large hook ?' However it will be, though Iess niitty, more 
mnclusive to furnisli at least some of my authorities. 
1'. Tn opposition t o  tIie aupliosititious general Foy's mcorint 
of hlano's miirder, and in support of my omn Hbtory, 1 
@ve tlie anthority of sir Hew Ddrp~p le ,  from whom the 
iiiformation mas obtained; much better autliority than 
Foy, because he was in close conespondence with the insur- 
genh of SevilIe at tlfe h e ,  and Iid an active intelligent 
qcnt  thera 
2'. Against thc supposititious Foy"s tsathority as to the 
numbere of the Frencli amy in June, 1808, the anthority o£ 
Napoleonb imprial returns is pleaded. f i om these returna 
my estimabe of tlie French Sorcea in Spdn during 31ay* 1808, 
w:is taken, nnd it is so stated in my Appendix. Tlio incon- 
sistenv of tlie reviewer himself may drro be noticcd, for he 
marks my nnmber as mlusifie of Jiinot's emy, xnd yet 
incMs that army in what he caIls Foy's estimate ! Eut 
dunuFs a m y  was more tli-an 39,000 and not 24,000 as tlie 
siipposititlous Foy has it; and that number talcm from 
11 6,000 which, though wrong is F o y ' ~  eRtimate of thc whole, 
lenvea less tlmn 88,000. 1 said 80,000. The diference is 
not p t ,  yet my ai~thority is the bet, and the xwiewer feels 
tliat it is so, or he would a1so have adopted general Foy's 
nutnbers of the Fr~nch nt the comht of Rorip. In Foy's 
Iiiatory t h c ~  are s& rlown ss Ims than 2604 in mine tliey are 
ciilled 5000. He may be right, but it wouIR no8 siiit tlie 
reriever to adopt a t ~ I b  from a FrencL writer. 
3'. On tlie ueptive proofs atTorded 19 by the absence of 
~y quoted voucller in my work, 2". by the absence of my 
~choiv1edpcnt of such a fact in g c n d  Anstrutlier'ti mlinu- 
s d p t  jouranl, which joumd may or may not he garbled, 
tlie reviewer asfierts that the English nainieters never contem- 
A A 2 
ylated the appointing of a müitary governor for Cad 
Against this, let the duke of Vellington's sauthofity 
pleaded, for iri my note-book of conversations held witli I 
gmcc npon the suhject o f  my H i s t o ~ ,  the following pasa 
nr.ilm :- . .  . . . ..
' The ministets were dmap wiabing to ocmpy Cadadie, lo 
Wellington thinks tbis a folly, Cndh wrts rather a burtlien Lu 
him, but eitlier general Spencer or general Anstrntlier was 
intendcd to comrnand there, thinke it was Anstmtber, he carne 
out with ]lis appointment." 
Now it is possible t h d  rrs Admd's arrival was dso the 
ñnhject of ccon~eaation, liis name WRS mentiond instead of 
Anstrnthcr's; nnd it is also possible, as tbo note shoms, that 
Rpencer wihs the man, but the main fa& relative to the 
government could not have been mistaken. To balance tliis, 
liomever, tliere undoubtedly is an error iw to the situation of 
general Amtruther'a brigade at fhe battIe of Vimiero. It 
appeam by an extract from his joum,l, thnt it waq Jispo~cd, 
not, as the reviewer says, on the right; af &e's brigde, biit 
at rariou~i plaoes, part being on the right of Fane, pnrt upn 
liis left, part held in reserve. The forty-ihid were on the 
le& of Pme, tho fifty-semnd and ninety-se-renth on his riglit, 
tbe Gnth in rcseme, t2ie crror is therefore very trivial, hei 
simply the degcribing two negiments as of Fane'e brigxi 
wlien they were of Anstruther'g without dtering their po 
tion. V'liat doea the publio care whetlter it w a ~  a gene8 
cnlfed Fnne, or a general mlld Anstmther, who ma on t 
right hmd if t.he. important. points of the action are c o m i  
described? Tlie fig-hting of the fifty-second and ninei 
seventh hw indeed been h t  sligitly noticed, in my Histo - 
niider the denomination of Fane's riglit, wlierms tilose regi- 
nieiits makc a good fipre, and jnstly so, in Anstruther's 
jourrral, because it is the ~itol"y of the brigade; general Iiistuy 
ought not to enter into the details of regimenhl fighting, 
save where the efects are decivive on the general result, as 
In the case of the fiftieth and furty-third on this occnsion. 
The whole lom of thc ninety-scvcntli and fifty-aecond together 
tIid not exceed sixty kiIled and wounded, mhereas the fifti~th 
alone lo& ninety, and the f o e - t h d  me hundred. e 
cighteen. 
Wliile on thei subjed of Amtmther's brigade, it iri r i g  





as the reviewer says, that Ánstruthir l m d d  at Papayo b 
and not at Bhceint beiy. Tbe distmce between tliose plai 
m q  be ahut Gve d e s ,  and tlie füct M no iduence wk 
ever on the opemtions ; nevertheless the error was nof drnwn 
frorn Mr. Suuthey'i I~istory, though 1 readi l~ acknowlatlge 1 
could riot go to  tb more capious soume ef  error. WiBr rcy~ect 
to  tlis imputd mistake as to  timo, vir., the da7 of h s t r i i -  
ther'~ lending, it i s  cict do~vn in rny fir* erlition as tho lgtli, 
wlierefure the lSth in t.he third edition is simply an error o f  
tlie press! Alas! for bhe revieuvr. 
But tliere are gmver cliarges, 1 Lave inaligned the ~vortIiy 
biqhop of Oporto; and iIl-used the patriotic Gallicinn junta ! 
Jtedcr, the Liisltop of Oporto and tlic pntrifirch of Liahon are 
onc and the same person ? Examine then mg Ristory nnd 
especidly its Appendix arta jntlge for yourself, wlietlier tlie 
reviewer may riut justly Iis arldressed as tbe pope wna by 
Richrsrrl 1. wlien tia mnt him the bishop o€ Beauvais' bloody 
ñuif; of mail. CSee now if thia he tIiy son's coilb.' But thc 
junta? IVhy it is tme tbrtt 1 %id kliey glossed over the 
battle o€ Rjo Seco afkr the Bpsnisli mnnner; t b t  thejr policy 
wus but ta rlesire to  obtain money, and to avoid peruoiul 
inconveniente; tbt they gave sir Arthur Wellesley incarrcct 
stntements of tlie numher of the Portupese nnd Spnniiards 
at Oporto, and a more i n a c m t e  estimatc of the French a m y  
d e r  dunot. Al1 tliis is true. It is tme tht 1 have said it, 
trua that they did it. Tlie reviewer smy8 my ataternelit i s  a 
'gratuitoua misrcpresentation,' 1 will pwa thnt the revicwer's 
rcmasl; is w grirtuitous impertinencc. 
lo. The junta informeti sir h h u r  Wellesley, that B~eierea 
liad twenty Uiousmd men in the battle, whereas lie lid Lut  
I'ifteen tli~umud, 
2 9  Thnt Cuesta lost only two giuq wherens he lost 
eighteen. 
3O. Thct Bessieres lost seven tliousand men and gix p n s ,  
mhereas lie lost only three hunhed and fifty rnen, aad no 
guns, 
4'. That the spanih army had retired to  Bonevente as if 
it still prescrvctZ its consistcnce, mhcreiis Blalrc und Cucsh 
liad quarrrdlcrl and separated, al1 the mqnxines of tlie latter 
Iiad been ciptured, md tlie whoIe country mas ah the merey 
of the Freiich. TLiis was glossing it over in the 8pnnish 
manner. 
Again the junta prctcndd thrtt tlicy desired the delivcrnncc 
of P~artilgat to cntrble them to unite witli the southcm pra- 
v i n c ~ q  in a general efforh; biit &fr. Stuart'6: letters lirove tli J 
tl~ey would never uiiite at nll with any otlier province, ~ n r l  
that tlieir aiin was t u  sepwate hrom Spain ultugetlier aiitl join 
Portugul. Their wish to avoid personal Incunvciisiicc was 
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den* &a excites hie morbid spleen, and asuming w h t  i~ not 
truc, namely, that 1 selected that period ns the time of the 
greatest impmvement in Ameriean discipline, Iie aays, thcir 
sddiers there wwe few, as if that bore at al1 upon tlie 
question. 
But my expremion is cfe Valley Forge not <a$* Valley Forge.' 
Ric dugion was usa1 fimrBtively to show that an armcd 
pesaantry cannot resiat regular tro& and JTashington's cor- 
respondence is one continued enforcement of the principie, 
yet the expression mas be also taken liherally. It waa with 
t l ~ a  battalions ofVa11.e~ Forgs th t  Wmhiigton drew Howe to 
thc Delawarre, and twice ciossing that rivcr in winter, ~ n r -  
prised the Uermans at Trenton and beat the Eritish at h c e  
Town. It witri with those battdions he made his attacks et 
M a  T o m j  with those ii~ttitlions he prevented Hswe 
from sedmg rtauistance to Burgope's army, which woa in 
corisequence captured. In fine, to use his own expmasion, 
The Britieh errgle's wings were spread, and with those ht- 
hlians he clippett tlrem.' The Americiul general, 
liowever, at one time occupied, close to Valley seefiedm" 
Forgc, a mmp in the Jcrscp, benring the odd ~ ~ ~ ~ . y m ' @  
name of Qzcihbb Town, on which probably the 
reviewer7s eye was fixed. 
Uut notwithabiling Quibble Town, enthusimn wili not 
ami1 in tbe long run against diaclpline. Is authority wnted  'l 
We havo hnd Nnpoleon's rand Wasliingtonk sud now we heve 
wellington's; for in +he Hth volume of his Despdclm, 
p. 215, as compiled by wlonel hrwood, wjlI be found the 
followhg pwsge upon tlie rarming of the SpaniSh and Yortu 
p e s e  people. 
' Reflection and abovc aIl expperience have ahown me tlie 
exsct exkent of this d v m t a g e  in a military point of view, md 
I only beg that those who have t o  mntond with t.he Frencli, 
will riot h diverted from the bumnees of raising, rnrming, 
equipping, nnd training regular bodics by any votion thnt 
tlic pcoplc mhen armed and nmyed, will be of, 1 aill not sny 
any, but of much me to tliem. The mibject i a  too large for 
discussion in a paper oE this description, but I can shom hun- 
dreds of instantes to prove the truth oE as many reasons wby 
esertiow of tliis dewription ought not to be relied on. At all 
events no oficer con c~lculate upon an operatiun to be per- 
laimcd a,gnsb the French by person8 of th i s  description, aud 
in the ñret editiw th88e w d  were by mistake t r a n a p d  
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1 Lielieve that no offioer will enter upon an operation apinsi 
the Fronch without caldating his m c m  most nnxiouslj.." 
- It. is wid that some officer of rank hiis f~rnialieíl tht 
reviewer's military cri ticisins; I can understand why, iif tht 
fact be h e ,  but it is difficult to believe t h t  any officer woulc 
even for the gratification of a conternptititile jealuusy, liave lent 
himelf to tlis assertion that sir h t h r  ITcllealcy coukl no! 
Iiave made a f m i  or a a w e t  MCII from Virnlero to IilafIa, 
Lecause he mas encumbered with four liundred bulloclr-carts. 
Si Arthur did c s h i n l y  intend to make tIiat 
3eehln march, aria be would as certninLy not lzave at- g,dr2 tempted such s flank movcment o p d y  a d  
~iiqutry delib&lo/ while thw encumliered, and moving 
~ " l ' e b -  at tlie rnte of two miles &n hour, iritliin a short 
ventiou of 
cintni. distance of a general having a more exyerienced 
army nnd an ovcrnhelmiug crs~al l .  The sncei 
ii therefore directed more ngainst sir ArthurlVellesley tliat 
e,minst me. 
This supposed oEwr of mnlr aays, that 'because the memj 
h d  a slmter road to move iri retreat, lii~ lino of march could 
not even be manwed, still Iess intercepkd by his opponent 
moving on the langer rotite! How then (lid Casar iiitercepb 
Afranius and Petreius, Pompey's lieutenants, on the Simris? 
IIow Pompey bimself at Dyrrachium? How did Napoleon 
p w ~  h u l i e u  oa tlie Po and gain Lodi! How did 113sriena 
dislodgeTVeliingtan from Busaco? Hom (lid Mnrmont turn 
him on the  Giinrena in 181;3? How did lVellington Iiimself 
turn the French on the Douro oind an tlie Ebia in 18131 
And above all, how did he propose te turn Torres Verlraa by 
the ve y mar& in question, seeing that from Trii~ea Vedres to 
Mafra ia onIy twelve miles, and from Vimicro to Mnfra i a  
nineteen milcs. tlie ronds l ead in~ besides over n river and 
through narro; ways ancl defilesc But who erer cornmended 
such dangerous movements, if tbey were not m d e d  or their 
success insureJ by some peculiar circurnstances, ur by some 
straWem2 And what is rny spcculation but a suggcstion of 
tlik vature1 ' Under certnin circumstanoes,' said sir Arthur 
wellefiley at the inguiry, ' an army might have gained three 
bours' stwt in sucli a msrcli.' The argument of tlie supposi- 
titiou~l oficer of runlc is therefore a foollah aophism; nor ia 
tlint rclntive te sir John 3Aoom'a moving upon htarern ,  nor 
tlie msertion that my plan was at variance with al1 sir h h u r  
Il.'ellesley's objects, more respectabla 
My plan, as it is invidiouely and EaIsely called, was simply 
e, reasoning upon tlie nrlvautagm of sir Arthur Wellealuy'a 
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~ l a n ~  and the almilation of dajrs by tlie reviewer % mere mp- 
icism. Sir Arthur wished sir John Moors ih go to Bantmm, 
-1 ifJsir Arthur'ri recommendntion h d  been follañrbrf, eis 
in Moore, mho instead of taking 6ve days as this w17ter 
uld bave him do actually diaembarkecl the greatest part of 
troops in tlie hfondego in h l f  a day, tlint ia bafors one 
~ c l o c k  on tho 22n4 miglit hnve been at itntarem the Bi'tli 
even accorcling to the r ~ e w e r ' s  ~mte of march, ten rnlleri a 
d q !  Wa, he te remain iclle therc, if the enemy did nut 
aliandon Lisbon and the strong positions covering that cityl 
Ii'he could stop Junot'~ retreat eitlier at Santareni or in tlie 
Alemtejq a mvalry oountq-, he couId surely as snfcly opernte 
towrirris hcavern, II ñtrong eoantry. Wlmt waa ~ i l "  A. Wel- 
lesley's obrrerration on that beadl 'If the march to btafirs 
bad been made a9 1 had ordered it on the 21st o€ Augiist in 
tlie inoiming, the position of T o m a T e d r ~  would have beeii 
ttirned, md there WM no positien in the enemy's powession, 
excepting that in our frant rh Cabeqa de Montocliique nnrl 
t h o ~ e  in rear oof it. And 1 mnst observe te the eourt tlmt if 
sir John Moore's corp~  liad gone to k n h r e m  as proposed as 
soon m it disemharlced in the hfondego, tliere ~vould have 
been no great safety in those positions, if it  was, as it turnid 
ont to be, in otir power to bent tlie French.' Lo! then, my 
plan ig not at variante with sir Artlinr Wctlesley's object 
Rut the whole of tlie reviemer's ~opliist'y is directed, botli t l s  
ta  this rnerch md tIiat to M a f q  net aKainst me, l iut  tlirougil 
me ~gainst he dukc of Wcllington whom the mitcr darc not 
nttack openly; ñ i t n e ~ s  his c~inning defence of that 'we& 
blmkd' councd which stopped sir Astliur Wellesley's pmuit 
of Junot from the fieId of vimiero. Officer of rankl Ay, it 
iounds p n d y  ! but it was a ~lirewrl tliing o€ Agesilaus when 
my one was strongly recommended to Iiirn to ask, ' who wiil 
rouch for tlie ~ai lcher! '  
Prissing now from the uEcer of rruik, 1 &m, notwithstrtnrl- 
ing Mr. Southey$ 'magniiicent chaptem' and sir Cliurlcs 
TTiiughan'a "~rief and depi i t  work,' tliat itbe statement aiiout 
Pnlnfox md Zarngoza is correct. My autliority is wcll h o r r n  
tu  ir Charles Va~~ghruq and is mch as he is not Iilcely to dis- 
pute; t l iat  gentleman \vil1 not, I feel me11 msu~ed, n ~ m  
firi~hmntee the accurracy of the tales he was told nt Zaragoza. 
Eut my real offenw is not tlle disparagement of Falafox, it i s  
f lie bving gpoiled some mngificent romances, present or to 
come; foi I rcnicmbcs tlic Homn saying about tlic 'Lyiii,n 
Greek fitble,' and enrfewouretl so to record the glorioiis fexts 
of iny cliuutrymen, thrit even our enemies should admit the- 
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fscts. And they have hitherto done so, with n, mtapnnimity , 
becoming bmve men who are conseious of merit in misfortwie, 
tlius putting to sliame the grwelling spirit that would make 
alumny md vituperation the test of ptriotkm. 
Since wf%Eng tbe above, ti second wticle hm q p m d  in 
the samc rcview, wbicli tha only reply necessarg, is tho 
giving of more pmofa, tl~at the peseages of my History, con- 
tradicted by the wviewer, are strictly accurste. Bnd to begin, 
it is necessary t .  iinform him, that a man may be perldtly 
disciplincd nnd a auperb soldier, and pct bc a raw 8oIdicr as 
to real aemice ; and fiirther, that atrtff officers may have been 
a long time in tlie English servicc, and get be quite inexpe- 
rienced. Even a quarter-master-general of an army has ben 
lrnown t o  commit al1 lcinds of errors, 8nd discover negligente 
and ignomnce of liis duty, in hia first c runp iqp~ ,  wlio y& by 
dint of long pmctim hecnmc a very good oficer in h i ~  Iine, 
tliough perliaps not so p t  a general m he hvould pasa him- 
self off for; for it was no ill-stlyiq of a Sootchman, tbat 
some men, if bought at the world's price, migl~t be profitably 
sold fit their own. Kow, reqaesting the render t o  ob~crve 
that in tha foIloffing quotations tlie impugned passqes of 
my &hry are Sirst given, and ara followed by the autliority, 
though iiot al1 ths authority wliicb might be adduced in 
support; of ench fact, 1 sliall procced ta expotre the reviewer'm 
fallacies, 
lo. Histoy.-c A r u p o h ,  acwmpmkl 6y t7aa MI 
D d d i o  a& N&&, pitkd Baymm tJag wwmiy of th 
8th d MCM Vitwh in t t ~  evming.' 
flia rcviewer contmdicta t.his on tlie rauthority of S~LYO,@~ 
MernoZr~~ quoting twEce the p a p a  md volume, nslmely vol. iv. 
pages 12, 40, md 41. nut Savary is a &ter so carelem 
aliont dates and small Cacts, as to have made ermw of a 
month as to time in afaira wliich he conducted himself. Tbus 
lie snyfi lring Joseph abandoncd Mdrid on the 3rd of July, 
1808, ~vheretw it was on tlie 3rd af Aupat. He also s a p  
ttie landing of  ir AItliur Wellesley in 1'artupI was m d e  
kriown to  Itim, befnre the council of war rehtive to  tlie 
evacuatiun of Madrid was lield at th& capital ; but tha oouncil 
waa hcId the 29th of July, and sir hrtl~ur did no* Iand until 
the 1s t  of Auystl E L V ~  is therefore no autliority on snch 
points. 'But there i~ no such p s a g e  as tlie reviewer quotes, , 
in hvary's work. The reader wil l  look for it in vain ia 
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pws 12,40, and 41. it  ia neithes in the feurkh volnme nor 
in sngr other voliisne. At pnge 8 of the second volume, 
semnd part, he will indeed find the following pnsaage. 
'L'empereur prit la ronte d'Espqpe avec touk con mmée. 
Ii amiva Bsyonne avec la rnpidité d'uu trait, de m&me que 
de Bayo- TTittoria Ii fit CB rlemier tmjet h cheval m 
d m  c m m ,  de la premiCm il aIleb 5 ToIosn ct do la secondo 
h Vitork' The words ' dmx coiirsea' the reviewer with bis 
usud wdour trnndatea, tlte &st dosy to  T o b ~  tJze sectnad 
da9 lo Pi!mic' But notwithstandilig this I repeat, t h t  trie 
emperor made his jonrney in one day. Xy authority is the 
assurance of a Frcnch officer oT the general st~ff wwho ww 
present; and if the 1-alue of the fact mere wortli tlie paiag, 1 
could ahow that it was very easy for Napoleon t o  da so, 
iiiiismuch as a private gentleman, the cor~spondent of one of 
tlie newspaperB, haa recently performed the same journey in 
foiirteen hours. Rnt rny oniy ohject in noticing it st al1 alli so 
sliow t t e  Aqmt Mseness of the reviewer. 
23 Histary.-'Sir Jolm Xom ?~ad b wg& m m y  of
mw aoMiw8, d i 7 ~  a p w  ume1M C&J &t wlimd 
fim .fh Jrr88M8 of a 7wah a d  griphzg mmy, h3 Jle to 
JWMtWe ~ J M  t v O 5 %  W C t X m J  f~ IhIk 8tVPB, LY&W~&%&?~, 
lrvrtd em for the m w e y m d  of ~ J M  oficer6' bagguge. E u q  
brapach of t7ss adnainLdrdcm clvel m d  mditmy zoas emnpd 
of 9n.m z&s and e0iU.i~~ iPldeacE, ye¿ et .& a s m k e  whwe 
no m g y  cmpwslat th B$&B o/ i f n m p d  bgVng smmdq 
- J, * 
Y. 
AuMties.-Ext- fmm sir John Moore's joma1 and 
tters. 
'1 am equipping the troops here and moving t h  towards 
the frontier, but I found tlie army without the le& prepwa- 
tion, without anp pre&e informat'ron with rwpect to rmd% 
and no arrangement for feeding the troops upon th& march." 
-' The army is without equipments of ang kiid, either for the 
carriage of tbe liglit hgrgase oof regiinents, ~rtillery storee, 
comniissariat &res, or any othw append~ge to an m y ,  
and not a m@no is formed on nny of t11c routca'-'Thc 
commisqarint hm at its liead Mr. Erskine, a gentleman of 
p a t  integrity and bonour, and of considerable aliiity7 but 
neither he nor any of his officers h ~ v e  any experience of what 
an amy of this magnitude requires to put it in motion.- 
' Everythi  ia however going m with zeal; there is no mnt 
of that in an English airny, anrI tliougl~ the dificultim are 
' 
considerable, and we 1im-e t a  move tliiriugh :h aves imptac- 
ticable oountry: 1 q e c t  t o  be past the frontier early in 
Navember.' 
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Extract from a memoir liy sir John Colborne, militay 
secrctnry to sir John Xoorc. 
' Tlie h e d s  of departments were al1 zeal, but they liad but 
little expeienoe, md tlieir rneans foi sapplying the wants of 
tlie army about to enter on an active minpaigii were in many 
rcspects limited.' 
3". Hist,ory.-' &e Sfitm, the m pwm P~?M F,u~P hai~ 
~ h d y  aa an agmt ef Junot s in t7ae ltegotiatlons 
mqaged to g ~ d y  IIN m j ,  but dkIionestlyfi2i7sg ~ T L  Iiis wn- 
&aCt 80 &W~SB&' t?W OpWUtl0~;  $C. $C. 
A ~ ~ t l m ' t ? .  -Eirtract from air Jolin Colborne's memoir 
quoted abore. 
' Maro,  a contractor at Liabon, l i d  a p e d  t o  supply the 
didsions on the marcli tlimngh Portugal. He failed in his 
contrmt, md riaily cornplrht~ were transmitted to head- 
qnartem of want af provisioas on this rtccount. The tlivisions 
of generals Frmer and Beresford were halted, rtnd hed it not 
b e i i  for the exertiuna of these generds and af the Portu- 
guese mngktrates tlie army would llave h e a  long rlelaywl,' 
4". Bistory,-' G d  8 mt& had e v n a d d l y  h k d  
t 7 ~  hol ing colzum78s in A W a . '  
A~!~tp.-l;;xtract from sir Jolin Yoore7a janrnd. 
' Br.-genero,! Anptnitl~er, who took possession of Almeirla 
from the Frencli, and wlio Las been tliere ever since, and to  
d o m  1 had written to  malre lireparritione for tht? peengc o€ 
tlie troops on thia rouk and Coimbrri, bari stopperl theni 
within tlie Portupese fmntier inaead of naking fhem pm- 
oeed as 1 lid directed to Ciudad Rodr ip  and Sdamanca' 
5'. Ristory.-'&Y Johm ~lfoore  did mt hmr of t l~e  btd 
defe~t and dispermm af Behdm's ~ s ~ d w a r z  amyr ?enti1 
a week a& i t  Iqyemd, m d  onEy throzyh m qflCeal 
cTmm1.' That c h a m ~ l  was %fr. I3tiim-k. Sir 301111 liad lieuril 
indeed that ihe Estremadurans Iid been forced from Biirgus, 
Iiut nothing af tlteir utter defcat and ruin: the differcnce is 
cunningly ovcrlooliecl by the rcvicner. 
Autlidy.-Rxtract o£ a letter from s:r John Moore to Mr. 
Prcrc, KQV. L Gth, 1 808. 
' I liad last iiight the honour to receive your letter of hhe 
13th, together witL letters of the 14tl1, from Mr. Stunrt and 
lord William Bcntinck.'-'1 did not lznow until 1 received 
Mr. Stulart's letter that the defeat of f he Estremadnran ermy 
had been so complete.' 
Now tbat a m y  was destroyed on the rnorning of the 10tI1, 
and hera we see that the intelligenee of it did not m c h  sir 
John Moore ti11 tlic niglit of tho 1 [ítli, whicli if not xbsolutcly 
a whole week is near enough to  justify the exprernsion. 
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. 69  Hlstoq.-' .2bmm& of a m  m e  s t d  wp ia tha 
g m t  i!dWm8.' 
AuUb0rity.-Extract from sir John Jloore'a letter to Mr. 
stmrt. 
1 s t  Decemhw, 1808. At Zarnon there are &m or f~ 
&owand stand of rirm4, in otlier placa t?me wmy be mm. 
If they rernltin collected iii t o w q  tliey will be &en by tlie 
enemy.' 
7". Bi&org.-'S+ J o h  Ec-pe'a divikm WM omkd to 
p . 9  % e w o  ot Tde~iIkas? 
A ~ ~ ~ h A t y . - r a  of  letter from sir John Moore to a b  
David Baird, f 9th Decemher, 1808. 
' Lord Paget is at Toro, te which placa I have sent the 
reserve and general Beresfoda'e brig.de, the rest of t h e  troopa 
from thence arc moving to tlic Duero, my qu~rtcra to-morrow 
will be at Alaejos, I;rop's & Torah21Fm.' 
Now it is true tGat on the 14th sir John Moore, writing 
from k l ~ e j o s  ta  sir DaviJ. Baid, wys that he l i d  $/m resolved 
to  chnge his direction, nnd instead of going to Valladolid 
sl~ould be at Toro on the 15th with al1 the troops; but ra 
Ilope WM to havc been at Tordesillas tbe same dsiy that Moore 
uFas at Maejos, namely, on the 13th' he must h v e  mnrclid 
from thence to Toro: aad mli~re m s  the rlangr'l The cavalry 
o€ his di-rision undergeneml Ci Stewart had nIrertdy s q r i s e d  
the French at .tuedn, higlier np the Duero, nnd it m s  well 
h o m  no infantry were nearer than the Carrion. 
8'. Ilistory.- Sir John itim~e m mtpt in tmwmm'cr& 
tion m'iI~ amy zo,Bon with wlwm IM C& c m r n m i d e  at dI.' 
d&mity.-l;lxtrncts from sir Johu Moom's letters md 
joernal, l9th and 28th Novcmber. 
1 am not in communication mith my of tlie Spanidl gene- 
&, and neitlier knoñ tlieir plans nor those of their grirpern- 
menL No channal of informnt.ion has been opened to me, 
and I have no howledge of tlie force or sitiiation of the 
cncmy, bnt wliot ns n strnngcr 1 pickcd up!-'1 &m in com- 
rnunication with no one Spanish amy,  nor am I acqiiaintecl 
with the intentions of the Spanish government or any of  i t s  
generals. CwLafios wlth wliorn 1 was pub in correspoiidence 
is deprived of liia command at the moment 1 miglit liave 
expccted to henr from him, and La Romrina, with n-hom I 
euppme 1 am nom to eorrmpond, (for it Iias not bccn officidly 
commanicated to me,) is  absent, God knowa wliere.' 
9". Hist~ry.-~ S& JoJ~~"ejmt in ention mas &o m e  wpm 
PaECadr.Gq but a.f ALw'os ana i~~.$w@ IEesplctd~ of tha pri..mce 
vf Xeufddel w brougla t~ J&~W&TS, md #as aon&.&a 
w m  hpwtuuti m g h  to c h g e  tfbe di&& of & .nawrcfA 
 val&^ wa9 gtm m d h  pmnt of mwla d h  B a i d  
Authdttt.-Extmct from sir Johrt Moore's joumal. 
' 1 marched on the 13th from Sdnmmca; herid-quarterq 
Alaejos ; time 1 saw an intercepted letter from Eertliier, prince 
, of NeufehfeI, to ma~shd Soult, duko of Dalmdia, rvliicli 
dctermincd me to mite the army without loss of time, 1 
therefore moved on the 15th t a  Toro insted of IXatlolid. 
At Val&as 1 was joined by sir David Baird with tm bri- 
gadw.' 
109 Historgi-S Xo m & ~ e  d mpwtd fvom 120- 
mtam-l He dX not tlae W,qe of J I m ~ - ~  Cov,- 
trmj t~ I b i s  pmke Iw plmomu@d A s t o g a ,  umd mJm thera 
p v d  qfeitszve pkam of l z ~  dmrd naium.' 
Bd?wl.il&.-lo. Sir John Moore to Mr. Fr~re, Dec. 12th, 
IdOB. - 
. E have heard nothing from the maquis de la %mana in 
anmer to tlie letters 1 wrote to him on tha 6th and 8th 
instanh. I m U L U ~  dbappoinled of Ii& c~~~ w o j  
k h n g  wlt~t  plan IM proposeal 
3'. Colonel Symes t o  sir Ilirvid Raird, 14th Dec. 
' In tlie morning 1 maited on the maquis md preaed Km 
LM far as 1 cou'ld with pmppriety on tlie subject of joining sir 
Sohn Noore, h wliich he evaded giving any more than general 
~ I S B U ~ C C B . '  
3". Extract from sir John Moore'g journal. 
' At two 1 received a letter from R o m a ,  bmught tome by 
his a:de-rlecnmp, stating tlrat he tiad tweilty-two tliausand (he 
only btonght up six thousnnd), md wauld be happy to m-ope- 
mtc with me.'-4At Cadm Kr~evo ir D. &id ~ e n t  me n 
Ietter he had addressed to him of mther a Iater date, stating 
tEiat he was retiring lnto the Gallicias. 1 sent Lis aide-de- 
cxmp back to liim witb I letker requesting to know if auch wa8 
Iiis intention, btit without expmssing cither approhntion or 
disitpprol~r~ttion. In tmdJ¿ Y p l d  no d t p d m c a  m Jrim M 
I b h  amy.' 
4'. Sir Jolia hioure t o  lo rd CastIereagh, Astorgri, 31st 
December. 
1 nrrived hcre ywterclny, when c m ~ ~ m /  .h 7& prnh nnd 
ta my esptations I find the maquis de la Rrimntt rith a 
great part of his troops.-'He said to me in direct terms that 
liad he kiiown how tbings were, lie neitlier would llave aiccepted 
the commmd nor have returned to Xpajn With dl thic, 
liowe~er, he tnlks of nttncks nnd movcmcnta which are ~ i &  
ccb8wd1 and then returns t o  the lielplsss &ate of his ~my!- 
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IEe d m t  bBpW to das~royth b d p a t M a n a -  
dm, he posted some troops at it wiiich were forced snd t&en 
prioonem by tlie Pmnch on their mnrch fram Meyorga' 
The reviewer must nom be contcnt to swalbivbis diagust at 
finding Napolcoii't3 genius aclmired, Soult's authority raccepted, 
and Romana's military talents contemned in my Histosy, 
Tlieae proofa uf niy nccumcy air: more $han anoqh, and insteud 
of adding to thm, nn apology i s  nwessary for liaving taken 
so much nnotice of two artieles only remarkable for a malevo- 
lent imbecility and a systemtic violation o£ tnith. But if 
tlie reader miclies to  llave a good stanclard of value, let him 
tlirow ra~vay tliis silly fellow's cwpinp, and Iook at thc dukr, 
af ITellingkon's Dqatcheg, 6th arid 6th volumes. BE will 
there find thttt my opinions are g e n d y  comoborated, nerer 
invaIidated by tlie diike's Ietters, and t h t  while no fact of 
consequence ifi left out by me, newlight lixs been thrown upon 
mnoy wcnts, the tmc bcnrinp of which wcro unknom nt the 
time t o  tlie Englisli general. Thua at page 337, vol. 4, of 
the Dqdclm,  lord WelIington speaks in doubt about some 
obscure negutiatitious of rnarslial Yictor, whicli I h w  sliown 
in my History, boolr ni Jlap. iii., t e  be a secret intrigue for 
tlie treachcmus sunvender o€ Badajos. In the pmr~wfings of 
Joaeph's cound of war, relatd by me, and 1 am tlie 6rat 
miter mho wris ever informed of them, are to be fonnd tha 
real Fauses of tlie wriouti athcks made by the Frencli at tlw 
htt le of Talavera. I have shown aho, and 1 am the R r s t  
EngEisli writer wlioliart ahown ik, that tlio French had in Bpain 
one hundred thousand more men than the English general 
knew of; that Soult brought down ta the valley of the Tagus 
afkr tlie figlit of Talarera, a force ~rh ich  ivas stronger by 
mole tlian t~veventy thouennd men than sir AFt.hnr Wellcsley 
estimabeti -it to 136; and witliout this knowlcdge thc immincnce 
of tho danger whidi the Engiish ihmy escapad by crossing 
the bridge of Arzoliispo cannot be understood. 
Agaiii, the mems o£ correcthg tlie error which Wel- f 
lington feU into in 1810 relative to SouIt, whri &+ wd- ' 
he supposed to have been nt tlie liad of tlie 
secontl corps in Placentia whcn he was really at T ~ ~ . Y . P . ~ ~ ~ ,  
Sevilla, hns been furnished by me; insomuch as 1 et pwiim. 
luive shown thut it ivzts Mermet wlio was at Uie head of tlint 
oorps, and tlmt Wellin@on was deceived by the nnmc of the 
younger Sonb mlio eommnnded lfemct's cawilry. 
Tmo facta only llave been rnisstated in my Hidory. 
1'. Trcaiing of the conapiracy in hult's camp at Oporto, 
1 mid t h t  UArgwtou, to savs hk lXe, readily tolrl dl he 
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knew of the Brit%h, but &tA ~ q w c t  o fi ~ m ~ ,  w 
i r n m d b .  
29  Treating of Cuesta's uonduct in the Talslsverri mmpaign 
I hibve enumernted amongrtt his rensons for n,ot fighthg tliiit 
it was Sunday. 
NOW the duke of Wellington says D'Argentou did betrq 
his accumplioes, md yet my infomstion wras drawn froin 
anthority only second to tlie d u l ~ ~ ' ~ ,  via. nwjor-general sir 
James Dondas, who conducted the interviewri with d'Argentou, 
and ms tlre suggester md attendant of bis journey to  tlie 
Britisti headqwrters. He vas probalily deceivd that 
conspimtor, bnt the following extract from his nnrmtive provea 
that the fa& warr noE Iightly atated in my ñistory. 
Q'Agentou was willing enough to saae his life by rereal- 
ing eveqtling he h e w  about tlie English, md amoug otlier 
things assumd h u l t  it wauld be. nineteen drip before aay aeri- 
ous nttack could he made iipon Oporto; and there can be little 
doubt that h l t ,  giving credit to thifl information, lost his 
formidable barrier of  the Doum by surprise. As m h k m  
thd part af maE W %me B'A~q&tc lo m m b  tb 
mnw nf hia omompZim, he was tffice hrought out to be shot nnd 
remmderl in the expectation that between hope and intimida- 
tion he might be led to a full confession. On the morning of 
the attack he nras hurried out oE prison by tht! gens-d'arines, 
rand, no O ~ I E O F  convcyame for liim being nt lirtnd, hc ms ploced 
upon a horse of hi~ owo, and t.hat one the vcry hest he hatl. 
The gewd'armes in their hurry did riot perceive what he very 
smn fouad out Iiimadf, t h t  lie wtts the best mounted man of 
the party, and wrttching his opportwiity lio spning hi horse 
oter a wall into tlie fi~ltls~ anii made hia ascape to the Finglish, 
who were follawing close! 
For the second error so p o d  a plea casnot be offered, and 
yet there m authority for tliat dso. The dory was circii- 
lated, nnd ~cnerally bclieved nt &he time, ari being quite conso- 
mnt mitFi the temper of tlie Spaniah general; and it h~ isince 
been repextetl in a narrative a£ %he campaigft of 1809, pub- 
lished by lord hIunstcr. Neverthelas it i lp3w~ from wlonel 
Gurmood'~ compilation, 5th vol. pagc 343, that it is nok true. 
Having tLus dippmd of tEe ~ h E y  ~& I request the 
reacler"s ntt.eiition tli the fo1:owin.g corrections of emim aae t p  
facta, wliich have lately ~ m h w l  me, and are inserted here in 
preferente to waiting for a new edition of the volumm ta wE,ich 
they refer. 
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19 T h  s t m i n g  of Badajo& 
General Yiellande, aiid Phillipon wlio was wounded, ~ee ing  
nll ruined, passed the bridge with a fem hundred ~o'ldicrs, 
rrnd enkrcd Shn Chri&oral, whero tlicy al1 mirrcndered tlie 
next morning to lord Fitsroy Somerset.'-Eistory. 
C&bm by cdml  Wam, mmteck ta by Pita-m~ 
8 ~ 8 d .  
' L i e u t ~ ~ l o n d  Warre was the armior officm prment tht i l i ~  
surrendcr, having joined lord Fitaoy Somerset, n~ho ~ 8 w  in I search of t he  goveinor and the missiiig prtrt oE t e gnnisoii) 
j u d  a9 he wag collecting a fen- men derewith to suniinon in 
Iiia cnpcity of aida-de-camp to  tho mmmander-in-chicf, t,Ilio 
&e-dii-pont of San C%risto~al.' 
2 9  Assadt of T~,ya.-~ %'he Spaniards and the forty- 
seventh Uritish regiment g i i d e d  tlie tirmcli.' 
C m e c t h  h3 &T IIq7h G o Y ~ L  
' Tlie only part a£ tlie forty-seventh engaged ctm'tq t ? ~  
asmult were t ~ o  c mpanies under mptaiii Livelcsly, stationed 
on tlie east bmtion onc liundred and fifty paces froin tlie brea&, 
and the Spmiards were niowhere t o  be seen, except behind a 
pirliaade in tlie ~Greet, a considernble wny from tho brencli. 
TIM &gJLty-sev&l& mcl the ebgh ly -mth  c&w, defended th 
hd1. Tha two companies of tlie Torty-seventll, I before 
mentioned, and the two cornpanies of tho rifles, wliich Intter 
were utiitioned on my Icft, but nll under my ordcm, did d1 tIittt 
diseiplined anrI brave troopa couId d o  in mippoiort, and the fwo 
six-pountIers under lieut.-colonel Mitcliel of tlie artlllery, most 
ettectively Jid their duty while tlieir fire could teii, tlie h e -  
dinte front of tlic breacli from the great dip of thc ground not 
bciiig under their range.' 
Tllis correction mders  it proper tIiat 1 should give my 
autliority Eor saying tlie Spaiiittrds were u t  tlie breach. 
Extract from a letter of sir Charles Xmith, the engineer wlio 
dcfcndcd Tniifa. 
' Tlie next grent mensnre of  opposition was to r~qslgn to the 
Epaniarcls tEie defcnce of tlie breach. Tliis would llave beeu 
iusupl~ortiible : the ablo dvocacy of lord Yroby proved that iit 
woiild be a positive insult to tlie Xpnnisli nntion to dqrire jta 
troopa of thehoi~our,anrlali mysoleinn reinonstmces couldpro- 
duce, mas to slilit tlie diKerence, itnd take upon myself to deter- 
mine wliicli Lalf of the Iireacli sLould be entrusted, to  oim aliy.' 
The dicwpancy bctmcen sir Cliarlm 8mi tlih and sir Hngh 
Gntigh5s statcrnent js hnwever casily rcconcilcrI, heing more 
appwent than real. The Spanimls were ombed to defend 
half tlie breacli, but In fact did not a p p w  tllere. 
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To the above it is proper here to add a fñct, made L ~ o w n  
to me Ince my nccount mas puhlished, very honourable to 
major Henry King, of tlie eiglity-second reginient. Being 
commndant of tlic tom of Tnrif~, a coinmmd distiiict frm 
the island, be \vas mlled to a clouncil of war on tlio 29th of 
Decembcr, and when most of thosc present were for abandon- 
ing the placa Jle gava ín t11~  followiilg note: 
' I am decidedly of opinion that the dcfencc of Tanfa mi11 
itfford tlie Britirh gsrrison an oppurtunity u£ gaiuing eterna! 
liouour, and it oughhto be defended to tlie lnst extremity. 
L E. S. Rrm, 
' Cmmnclant of Tanya' 
3'. Battli! of Bmm-l  Tlie Spanisl~ WWoon gulirds, flie 
regirnent o€ Ciudad Real, and aome perilla cnvalry turnerl 
indeed without orders, cominfi np just as tbe sction c w r l ,  and 
it was expected that mloncl TVliittinghm, nn Englishm, 
commantling a poiverful Iiody of liorse, would h ~ ~ e  done as
rnuch; but no ~kroke in siri o€ tlie Xritigh ihm ~tniclc by r 
Spanish sabre that day, dthough the French mvalry did not 
exceed two I~undred xnd fiity nicn, and it ifi eviclent that t le  
ciglit h d r e d  under 'It'hittirrglii~ru iniglit, by s\ireeping ruuliil 
tlie left of Ruffin's dirision, hurrc rcndcred tlie dcfcut ruinous,' 
-Bisitory. 
Extisact o€ a letter ffmm Sir Bmford Whittingham. 
' am free to cunfess thnt the shternent vi' tlie liistorian oE 
tlio Pcninsuhr War, ns r e p d s  m y conduct on tha dny of thc 
battlc of Barosa, is jn t  :ind correet; Iiiit 1 owe it to mpelf, 
t o  declare tllat my couduct mns t he  result of obediencc to tlie 
repented ordcrs of tlie general commaiiding in cliief under 
wliosa commaud I acfed. In the given strcn$h of tlic Spanisli 
m~nlry under my commnnil on that dng, tlieri: ia an error. 
Tlie t o td  numlier of  tlie Spmisl~ camliy, nt tlie commence- 
ment of tlie expedition, is corredy s t a t ~ l ;  but so many 
detachments liad takcn place by orden froiii liead-qumters'tliiit 
1 hatl oiily one squntlroil of S p r t ~ l i  ciivulry under niy cor~i- 
rnvnd on t hat doy.' 
R E P L Y  
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'Now tliere are two of tliem ; anil one has becn d l c d  
Oawicy, liid the other is B& ~ ~ o . ' - Q L D  PLAY. 
TRIS Article is tbe tliird of its fnmily, and like its pmde 
ccssors is only rcmarlmb2e for mnlignant imbecility antl sys- 
tematic violation of truth. Tlie malice is aliparent to all; it 
remnins to s h  the irnbecility ancZ falseness. 
Tlie writw coniplains of rriy ill-bredng, and with tbah 
vnlour which bclengs to  tlie incmpito mcnncm me Nitli )lis 
literary vcngeance for my fomrr crimments. Ris vengeancc E 
Bnli i me asa' ears peep too fnr beyond tlie Iion's hide. He 
slid1 now lenrn thst I almys adapt my mnnnws to tlie leve1 
of tlie person 1 arn addressing; and though Iiis p t t y  industry 
iiicticatcs ts mind uttcrly incnpblc of ttalUng an cnliir~cd viem 
of anJr sub-ject, he dz~ll feel tliat chnstisemcnt nmnits liis mde- 
volence. And first with respect to tlie ama11 sketches in m? 
work nhich he pronouiices to be the Tery wowt plan3 possible. 
It i s  mp~asly shted on the faca uf ewh thnt they nro ody 
'h'xpI!tmatoy SJietcJ4 bis obscrvations th~ .mfor~  xre e mpre 
ebirllition of contemptible spleen; btit I \vil1 now sl~oiv my 
rvatlcrs ~ h y  they are only sketches and not accumte plnns. 
Wlien I first commenced niy ivork, nmongst tfie i:iany ~icr- 
sons from mhom I aoiight information sns sir Gteorgc BIurrny, 
aníl this in conscquencc of tl mcssage f ~ o m  liim, dalivcrcd to 
me by sir dohn Colborne, to tlie effe'ect tliat if I i m l d  cal1 
upon him he mould answer any question 1 pnt t o  him on the 
siibject of the Peninsular Wxr. Tlie interview took place in 
tlio presencc of adniirul ciir GruIium Noore, but sir George 
s n B  

topographical drawings, whether they be considered for nccu- 
mcg of dstail, perfection of manner, or beauty of execution, 
evcr excacded hfitchell'~ But those drawings belong to tha 
public and were merely placed in sir George Jfurray's official 
keeping. 1 believe tliey are still in hia possession and i t 
i v o u l  be well if some member of parliammt were to  ask why 
thcy m tlius m d e  the property of n private man 8* 
Here I cannot refrain from obscrving thzt, in tlie coumc of 
mg lahure, 1 have asked information of' many persons of 
variolis iiations, even oE Spaniarda, efter rnp first voIume was 
published annd when the unfitvouml,1e view 1 h o l ~  rif their 
C X C ~ ~ ~ O ~ R  wns Irnem. And from Spaniards, Portuprñse, 
Englisli, French, and Gsrmans, whcther of high or low rank, 
I have inmriably met with the giratest kindiiess, and found 
an eager desire to aid me. Wir George Murrg only has 
tlimwn ob~itacles in my my; ruid if Z am r i ~ l ~ t l y  informed of 
the foIlowing ciicumstance, his opposition lias not been con- 
frned to  what I h a ~ c  stated above. Mr. hlurrag, the boolr- 
sellcr, purchased my first volnme with ttie rigl~t of refusal ror 
tJie sccand rolumc. Wlien tlre l~tttter was ncnrly m d p  a friend 
informed me thnt he did not thiinlr N u m y  would purchwse, 
bmause he had heard liim say tht &ir George Bfurray h d  
declared it wm nut ' T/M Uoak.' IBe Jid not point out ariy 
particular cmor; buit it wns not 'TleBoolc;' mcnning doubL 
less t.11at hia onn production, when it appmd, would be TJM 
Bmk.' hI J friend's propostic was pod. I wm off'ered just 
balr of tlie mm given for 1Fie h t  ~cilume. 1 declined it, tind 
publkhed on my own account ; and cerhidy 1 have kadnoreason 
t o  r e p t  thah itM. Mnnri.y waitcd for 5% 3ook:Yndeed he 
lirig since told me very frankly tbat he had mistalcen his omn 
iuterest. Now wlietlier k13rec articles in Y'/* Qzk&Iy, and a 
proinise of more,+ be ti tribute paid t o  the impurtunce of ' N y  
Baok,' or whether fhey be tlic puff preliminary t o  "/m Bwlc,' 
3 know not; hilt 1 &m eqtiallp bound to Mr, Editor k k h a r t  
fur tlie distinction, and only wish he h d  not liired su& s 
stnmbliling sore-lacked liwkney for tlie work. Quitting tliis 
digression, I return to  the I I 'mh.  
3Iy topogrnpliid ignorante i s  a favourite point; with the 
* Since this was writtwi Mr. Lerider did put *he qudion in the hou~e 
when sir Geoqe fi1urrayos conrluct u= strongly aniiundverted upon by 
lord NoPiick, nnnd Iiía lurdsliip's o h m t i o n u  were loudly clieererL Sir 
h r g e  is now publishing these maps, but tliey belmg t o  tlie public. 
t Another has appeared sinoa, but 1 haye not r 4  it, bbeing informe4 
that it antr  praeisely like its pdecwsom 
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writer, 8nd he mentions tliree rcmarkable examples on the 
prescnt accnsion:-l. Sbat 1 have unid Oporto is btiilt in R 
hollow; 2. Tliat 1 Iinve p l w d  the Rnrcn cle A~intxs only 
tliree miles Srom tIie Serra Convent, instead of nine miles; 
3. That L llave described a iidge of land nezr 1IerleIEin \\,here 
no ~ucli  rirlgc exist.9. 
'rliese nsuertions are nll 1iamr.rrlcd in the hope that they mil1 
pass current witli those wlio knorv no better, and mil1 be iinno- 
t iced by tlioae who do. But fimt a town mar be m a hiEl and 
yct in a hollon~. I f  thc rcadc~ d l  laok nt limtciiant &FI- 
ivin's Atlas," or at Gñge's Plan of Oporto, or 5it Alpis' Man of 
tliat city-al1 t11.lire.e putilielierl by Mr, Wyld of Charing Cross 
-he will find tliat Oliorbo, wliicli by tlie way is situated very 
much lilre tlio hot wclls nt Bnstol, is built piirtly on t,hc slopcs 
of certain heiglits partlg on tlie banks of the river; tha t  it $8 
nurrounded on every sidc by superior heig1,lits; and that mnse- 
quently mmy description oi it, Ziacing relittion to  the Uishop's 
lincs of dcfencc rtnd tlic nt tnc l~  of cha Frcnch arm, mili- 
tarily correct. Again, if the reader will bke hi~i cempasses 
and any or al1 of tlie tliree rnrtps nbove rnentioned, he will find 
tliat tlie Barca de Avintss is, as I have said, jnst three miles 
from the Serra Convcnt, md not nine miles as the reriemer 
asserts. Lord W c l l i n ~ o n ~  dcspatch celled it iour miles- pmn 
Oporto, bnt there is A bend in tlie river which makes the dis- 
tunce peater on tbat aide, 
8uch bcing ths accuraey of this very correct topogrnphid 
mitic upon two or tliree examples, let ns see how Iie stnnds 
with respect to the ttiril, 
' MedelIin is aihated upon ti10 left banIr o f  the Gnadirina. To 
urrirc thcm, a bndzomc utnne-bridcr: is pnsscd. On the le& if 
the ton-n ia a v e y  high bill (mamelm trh el&&), whi& ccom- 
rnands aJJ the plain; on the right is a, ridge ar steppe (&&as), 
~l i i r l i fomw flie bnsin of' ?be Guadiana. Two ronds or openinca 
(dé¿5ot~hFs) rcsent tlicmselv~s on qnitting Ikdrllin; the ono 
couducts ( o  %inTnbii, the dhrr  to Dan U~nito .  TUey tm~eras 
a vnct plain, lio~iuded by a rirlqe (rideam), n bich, fmm tlie Bglit 
nf the Ortigorrs, i~ prolongcd i i i  the dir~ction of Don 'IIrnito, nnd 
IriZla Nuern de la Sercna.' . . . ' me ridge wlucb confinc~ 
the p h  of Medellin has mmy &es md'i'alle (mwmms de 
Thb work haa been since climntinued by lieutan~nt Godwia iti 
oohseqnence aa he tolri me d fod play in n Iilgh quascter whore he 1 4  
expected it, in trutli, whert! 1 also liad. met with i t  
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tmaim) m o ~ e  or leas apparent. D completely c m m a n l  ((lo- 
mine p q f u i f e w n f )  iIb iia17~11 of fhe Cuadim'~ir; nnd it wris 
rat tlie foot oFtliis ridgc tlie encmy's citvalry RILB poabd. Not an 
inraiitry man Ras l u  be secn; liut LILE presencc of tlie cavillry 
m ~ d e  na believe Uiat t l l e  enemy's armg wns mwked behiarl this 
P.id*qc of Don Bonito.' . . . 'Favanrcd h j  this ridgc, b 
coald manmmw His i~oops, and carry Iliem upon any point of 
Ihe line he plensed tuithout Eieirrg seem by w,' 
Nom 'rriceaqs' can only be rendered, wlth respect to gronnd, 
B 8tqc)re n i  B &ge; tiiit, in ttiis ase, it coiild nnt Iiicxn a 
. 9 f q p ,  sinw tl1e &pnnisl~ o m ~  wns liidden bch,i:l,d a, antt nn R 
stcppe it woirld lime been Reen. Agnin, it must llave been a 
1Lgb &+a, because it not onEp pwfidl?~ com~naded tia bcbsin 
uf the Guadilina, overloolíing tlie stcppe wliicli fumed tliat 
Iiasin, but lvaa itsclf not orerloolrcd liy tlic vcry liigh hill oon 
tlic lcft of Medellin. Vlint is rnp clescription of tlic pound? 
- Tlie pIain oii the side of  Don Benito w ~ s  boiindcd by a /&$?A 
rirlga oy'lnrd,'-in:trli, reader, uut tt rnoiintaiii ridge,-' beliind 
wliicli Cuecita kept tlie Spani~li infiiiitry eonccnled, showing 
nnIg Iiis cavnlry rind ~ m ñ  in ndvancc." Rcrc tlicn wc Iinvr: 
anotlier rneasura of value for tlie revieiver's toliogr~phical pra- 
teilsions. 
Tlie referenco to Frencli militaiy repork and registe1.s has 
nnt bcen, so fur, mucli to tlit: nrl\-~~nf,~:r: nf t2ie revir:iv~2; anrl 
j e t  he rests tlie maiii pnrt of Iiia criticisms npon sudi docu- 
~nents. Tlius: havitig got hold o£ tlie divisjonal register of 
jieneral Hcuilelet, wiiicli reqinter \Y- ti~keu, vcry much rnuti- 
l:ited, in tlie pursiiit cif Sorilt frotn Oporto, he is so datcd 
witli Iiis ncqiiisition that Iie l i i s ~ c g  and cnclrlcs o ~ c r  it likc I 
p o s e  with a single goslin~. Dut 1 liavo in my possessinu tha 
general rcport nud rgicter of Soult's ~rrny, mliich enables ine 
tii slioiv ivIiat u, very little cnlIow tini hib: treawre is. And 
firsr,,  as 1ic ncciises m nf finiiitiiig tlie ivrctclicrl stntc nf BnuIt's 
anny at R. J;ayu, prwI~>u~  to t i ~ c  invasion of Portugd, for tlie 
aiile purpoee of giving a false colourin~ to the cüinpaign, I 
*vil1 eutrwt Suult's own i~ccuui i t ,  niid ttie acoouiit of Le rl;& 
Ii;atorisn of tlic cnnipnig, aurl O ~ ~ O ~ ~ B ~ B U T  ss el~f or comp- 
troller uf tlie civil ttrlmiiiistrution of tlie nrmy. 
'Under thcae circumstauces tlrc enterprise ma2 trine of the most 
diflciilt, mnsirlcring tlic naturc of 6Eie olistiiclc* to he aiirmounted, 
Ilie siicsttcrcd und cxlaasbd stritc (' drlxTalirerncnt et epuisement') 
of tlie 'colps rl'(irn&e,' aud the insulllciency oF the meaiis ot 
whck it could dispose. Biit the order nLtLs positive; it was iieces- 
sarg to obey! , , The march was directed Ton  St. Jm 
whcie tho troopi &k the 3rd repose it U d  hccn oysiblo to P giv0 tllem since tbey quitted the &irion River in Caeti le. . . 
' $Imshnl Eoult rested p i x  d q s  at &t. Jqo, during wliich he di% 
tributed ciome shoes, Iiad tlie tWtill~Ty c a r r i v s  ~epxired and tha 
horsea riliod; t h  pnrc, nbichsinco thc Cninrion liad not Eiocn ñecn, 
non mme uy a ~ t t  ailh i t  some arnmunition (wliicli Iiad bran 
j)repp"~ed a l  Coruiia), togetlier mth variuus detnclim~nts thnt ihe 
~wevioris Iinrdshpa and the ehlinuation o£ th men Iirid ennstd to  
rrmniii heliind. He muld hnl-c pprolongcd his s t g  until tha end 
uf Pebruary becanso he could uot hirlv from l~imself tlirit Lis 
troops hd the most wgent need of  it; bnt 4is operations rcre 
coonected witli the ditke o f  Bell~ino's, &c. &c.. nnrl Ile fliought it 
Iiis duky to go m dthout regard to time or difficultiea.' 
Ezfradfrorn Xe 806Wi Hwtmj. 
' TI10 arm was witbont money, without pro~inion, withont 
clothing, wit 9 ioiit cqiiipa,~lea? rand thc man (personnsl) belongin~ 
to tlio Ia t tc~,  me cven ordinuriiy complete, whca they eLould 
liave been Jnubled to profit f~wm tLc feeble rescureea of tlie 
countq-.' 
M%o now is the fdse colourist? Biit mhnt can -bc cspectd 
from a miter so shamdess in his ~tatements a9 tlils reviewerB 
Let the reader loak to t,lie effmntery witli wliicli he werts 
that 1 hwe oclebra.td w s I d  Smlt for the reduction of two 
fortrcsses, Fcrrol nnd CariiRa, mhicli wero not  even defcndd, 
whereas my whole pasriage is a, censure ripon the Spaniarrls 
for not Ylefending Llietn, and without one word of p i s e  
tomards thc Fiench mmslial. 
To retiirn t o  general Heridelet's register. Thc tirst notable 
di~cwery £rom tbis document is, that it makeri no mentiou of an 
action descrilied by me ns liappening ori tlic 17th of Fcliriiary 
~t Ributlrrvin; nnd thcrefore tiie reviewer mys no such actiun 
liappc~~ed, though 1 have been ao particular ns to mention flle 
strengtli of the S p i s h  position, tlieir probable numhrs, and 
tlie curious fwt that twerily priests were killed, with many 
otlier circurnstances, al1 of whicti he contrdicts. Now this js 
only the olrl story  of ' €h Iiig 60ok w?hich cim.taim aJJ t7mt s l ~  
Gwrgs does m¿ kmw.' For, first, H~utlelet's regist er, being 
only divisional, ivould not, as a matter of come, titlie notice 
of an actien in wliicb other troops were ulso engnged, and 
where tlie commander-iii-cliief wm present. Bnt thrit tlis 
nction did taIw place, as 1 have bcr ibed it, and on the 17th 
Februaiy, tlie following extracts wjll prove, and iaIso tbe 
firtilihy of thc rcvicwer's other objectio-m. And S requuest the 
A e r ,  both now rtnrl $maya, t o  look at the passiiges quoted 
frorn my work, in the work itself, and not trust the garbled 
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extrncts of the reviewcr, or he will have n vcry false n otion of 
my meaning. 
'The f i c h  army found each day peater ~ c u l ~  kl snbaist, 
and tlia S anisli insurrcction feeling itwlf siistaincd by the 
ii~iproach o r ~ a  Uomnnnb corps, orgaoised i t d f  in tLe prowioo 
oi' (Irense. 
'The inaurrection of the province of Ownse, directed by ilie 
monlcs and by oiEiccrs, b e m e  cnch dny more entcrpi.ising, nnd 
extended ilself Lo tlie ~U¿%1der8 oí'geuerd La Houeuaye a l  Salvti- 
tema. It was said tlie mlys of Romana mas at Ormre (on disait 
le corua de Romnnn k Oronsc). and his ntlvanced mnrd at 
upon Ribdsvia. 
The lieft colamn. undm ecnerd Heudolet, found the routo 
intercopted by bz~~iiades o n h  bridges liet~een Pranquiera md 
Canixnr; and deEended besídes by a pwtg of iinsurgenta e i~I i t  
bundred ntron~.  Tl~e b r i ~ n d o  Grainrlor~e, arriving in tlie ni& 
orertLrew them in tho marniny of tBc 171h, and p m e d  tltem ta 
the lieidita of Ril-idavia, m-here tlie united tliemselvea witli a 
3 m o .  c ~ n e ~ n i  be idelet liarin como op 
rih iho rcst of his diviaion, nnd boing aurhinod b %aransin's 
higade af dragoons, overthrea tlie encmy rnd eilled msny. 
Ytcmztg w m b  a$ i ' / ~  Eemb pm+sLed, and iRe towa war d e r e d  
The reviewer farber mys tliat, mith my Iiatik~d ínaccnmcy 
as to datea, 1 kavo eoncentrated a11 Suult's division at Orenso 
ontlicS0th. Rut Roult Iiimsclf saya, 'Tlic 19th, Francesclii 
and Heudelet marclied upon Orense, and seiwd the bridge. 
Th 20tJ1, tlie o t h o  divisicm f o l L d  tlm wwvemmt zcpm 
Ormm.' Herei tlien, besides increasing tlie btilk of the book, 
containing wlint H ~ F  Gcorge &e8 mi k rm~ ,  ktlic reviewcr has 
only proved hia own 'IinliitiiaI want oE trirtb. 
In the above extracts notliing ia said of the '&yJit m- ten 
lJmand Spnniarde j' notiiing o f the ' strong m y g d  ?bitI' on 
mhicli tliey ~lvcre postcd; nothing of S d t k  ppresm in tlhe 
actMa.' Xirt tlie reader will find al1 t h c ~ o  pnrticiilms in thc 
appendix to tlie Vht0i .r~ st Cmqu2t.w des Frmpi3, and in 
Le Noble's I l h y  of X d b $  Canapaign. Tlie wnters in 
each mork were preaent, ruid the latter, notwitlistanding th.a 
reviewer's snecrs, and whnt ia of mero mnsequence, notwvith- 
atanrling mrany seriotia errors as is thc projscts and n~~rnliera 
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of his cncmie~, i~ I~jgl~ly cstccmd by his coiintrymcn, ~ n d  
tlierefore good nutliority Por thosc operations oa liis ciwn side 
wliicli Iio witnesacd. 'IVell, Le Nolile says tliere were 15,OUi) 
or 2n,OQO insurgcnts xnd somc rcgulnr troops i i i  position, snd 
lie descrihw tliat ponition as very n~ngerl antl strong, wliicli 1 
can confirm, h a v i q  mrelied over it orilp a f& w e k s  befure. 
Nevert l ic l~s ,  as Iliis estiiiinte w ~ s  ncit borne out by Soult's 
rcyiort, 1 sct tlic Apnninrrk rlorvn nt PO00 or 10,000, prouncling 
m- estimate on tlie follo\ving d~tn: 1st. Soiilt stays tliiit 800 men 
fe11 baclr on a body jh- more fiumous. 2nd. It rquired a 
considerable tiorly of troops and sevemi comliinations to dig- 
loílgc tliem from nn extensive podtion. 3rcl. TTms or f m ~  
tlm.wandf.litives wemt oJhp  one rood only.' Finally. tlie 
arression eiglat or t ~ r ~  tlwusa./¿d sFioncd tliui. I l i d  diiiibts. 
Let r ia  prowed witlr Ucudelct's rcgister. In my Bistciv it 
is said tlitit itoult softcnccl tlie people's feeliiigs Lip kiutlneas 
nnd by enfurcing strict discipline. So disyirore tbis tlie 
revicwer qiiotcs, fruiti Heudclet's tegiskr, ghtemerite o€ 
ccrhin cxcccses, committed priiicipnlly by tlic liglit cavdry, 
and wliile in slct~~.iinl p m u i t  o1 tEle enerny-exccssa, hoiveirer, 
wliich he wlmits tliat count Rciidelct Lilltnied mtl riprously 
r~liressd, tliun proving the tmtlz ot rny statement jiistead o l  
Lis own, for verily thc slolv-worm is strong witliin him. Yct 
I wilI not rely ivon this curious stiipiciity of tlie reviewer. I 
wiIl give tilisoluts autliority Eor tlie Lwt tlirit 8oult succeeded 
in soutliing tlie people's feclings, hgging tlie reader to observe 
tlint Sotth Bcudclct nntl my Hiatory spcak of Soult's stny nt 
Orense immedintely after tlie uction at Ribadavia. 
2hdrrnffro~. Sou?b$ k a r  RT&. 
' At tl& period tlie ~ ' s o l s e r s  of Xomana'u cwps (note, the 
w v i e ~ c r  says none of Romana's corps werc tLere) bad nll 
tlrniantlcd to tnkr: ilia oath of fidcli , md to scrvc king Joscph. 
Tlie Ppxnkli p e r a l  Ilinisclf was '7 nr o f  lforl Cluigd) .  Yho 
iiilialiiiaiits oi tlle prevince of Orense were retiirniug to theiin l 
Iiouscs, lirlinking tlieir nrms, and cnwing the ewitement and 
tlir revolt n*liicll lbmnua lid fomcnted. Tlic pricsts eTen 
rncor~ragetl Ilieir gubrnimiun, snd ofered tliemsclrcs sts ~urctics. 
Shese circumstmccs appcared favourable for tlie inviteion of 
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bnimated by n t l i qpce fu l  ansietp ivliicli hns almnys distim 
guished tlie Quort'dy l2cuiew t u  pnder  t o  ttiu burl feelings of 
~nankind hy mnlrin: tlic vitupcnition of nn ciierny thc t e s t  of 
pntriotism, tliis critic acct~ses me of an winatiiral bias, anri an 
iiiclinxtion to do iiijurjtice to tlie Spaniarrls, becnuae I llave 
not mltrle tlie report of Borne outruge$, coiiiilii tted by iyoult's 
ca~ralry, the ground aF n fdse nnd infamous charge a,dnst thc 
whole Frcncli army and Frcncli nntion. Tliüsc outrrigea, 
wtiich 1 did notice, nntl whicli 110 admits hiinself \vere vigor- 
ously rcpresserl, were comuiitted by troops iii a couiltry npliere 
u11 the inlsubitanfs were in a m ,  wliere no soldier could 
stmqgle witkout meeting itcnth by torturc nnd ruiitilation, nntl, 
fiually, where the nrmy liwd from day to day on what thay 
could hkc in tlie coiintry. I slinll now pnt tliis gort o£ losc 
to  a severe test, nnd leave ttie seviewer's patrio& to settle 
the mutter a-; tlicy can. Tlmh is, X biliall give from lord Wcl- 
lington's despntchc.;, tlirough a series of yews, extracts touching 
tlie conduct af British o5cers and solrliers in tlik aame 
Peaiusuln, wliere tliey were d s d t  nit.11, not as enemies, not 
mut,ilnted, tortnred, assassinatcd, but well proded and kinrlly 
trented. 
S i p  A. WelleshJ to M r .  Elliprs. 
EX~TGT~, Muy l. 1809.-' 1 have lonn been oP opinim that a 
Britisli nrmy could bcar neitlier sancess nor Cailme, mct 1 hnva 
had rnmifcat proofa of thc trilth of this opiniion in tlio first o i  its 
Sianchos in tlie reccnt condiict of tke soIdiera of tliis artny. 
They have lundered tha country most tsrrili1y.'-' Sliey havo 
pi~indmed k people of huliooki, nmonqat other praperty, for 
nhnt reason 1 am sure I do not know, eecept it be, a3 I under- 
stand i s  Uiev prnctice, ta  sell tLem to tlis people again.' 
ArtJhuv VeZksley do Iwd Cmtleraagh, May 31, 1809. 
"he mmy beha~e t e r r i  ill. T h g  are a mbble who cannat 
bcar soecoss more tlian sir .hn Uoai-ra nrmy mald bonr failnru. 
I am ondoavourin~ to  tnmo tliom, Lut if 1 skiould not succcod I 
shall mrtlce nn oll icid wmplaint of thern and seud ono or two 
mrpa home iu disgmce; thcy phndder in nll direetion~.' 
HT A&=T Felhsley to M?,. F i I E k 8 ,  Jum 13,1809. 
"t is o b ~ o u s  that onc oP tho prj~ato aoldiors hns bccnironndcd; 
it i s  probulila tlial all thrse Iiuve bcen put t o  dealli by tlie peü- 
santry oE Nartedc; 1 am sorry to ang tiuit from tIie conduct d 
thc soldiera of L I I ~  mmy in pcn[:lsril, 1 nppnliend that tho pea- 
santa mny llinrc lind some provocalion for thoir animouky ag-ninst 
tlio soldicrs; but it mwt  be obvious to yon ond tlie general, that 
thcse cffEct,g of Bi~ir animositp must be diarourmged an<l even 
puniaherl, othcrwise it m:ty leud to uonsequeiices zettnl t,o the 
p~asantry o f  he country ín general tl well ua to  t h  army. 
Sb A.pth~t~ Wcllaply io co¿'anel BanL-ifi, June, 1809, 
* 1 troi~ble yon nom iiyon snhject w1iir.h Iias ~ i v c n  me the 
p n t e s t  pnin, 1 mc,m Uie aeeounts wliicli I rcccivo from ntl 
qiiarters ui' ~ h o  ilisorders comniiltcci by, mcl the geiieral irregu- 
liu.ity of tko - nnd - reginitnta.' 
SáP Adhu'~ Welhsly to  lord CmiFereagB, Jüme, 1W. 
' It ;R irnpssible fo deec.rjbc t o  on fhe irredaritiea and oub 
~ C B  committcd by tho troops. 8hcy aro novcr out of thc sight 
of ilieir olficcrs, 1 may almuat aay vcver out of thu sight o f  tEia 
commanding oflcers of tlie rcgiments and thc general oficers of 
the amy, thilti outragea me not eommitted.' . . . 'Rota 
post or a c o w k  comcs in, not m officer anblves f m  the renr of 
tlie arrny, tlial does noC bring me accounhs of oulmges com- 
rnitted by the ~oldlers who l ime been left Zichind on tlie marclz. 
mwe {t B O ~  afi auti.aí,e of o q  dt38(7"9$fio?A ~uBPch Iius .not been 
conemitted ola a pwple wRo hauc w8,?fwinly m i u e d  us m frienda, 
.y ~o ld fers  wlio ~evuer yet fw OAB wiionaerit suffered the slightest 
rr-ant or the smallest rirntion.' . . . 'le is most d%cult t o  
con~ct a y  pri.onm Rarore s rcg-imcntai court-martini. for I am 
aorry to say that soldicrs hnre littlo regard to tlie onth admi- 
nidered to tliem; and the officers who are srorn, 'weU and 
truly to í q  md determine aecw&wg fo mádmm, &c matter 
Iirforu: thcm,' bwe toa much regard to the strict letter of t l in t  
administered to  thm.' . . . 'There ouglit; to be in t2ia 
Biitish m y  a regular provmt estnblislmeni.' . . ' bll 
the foseign m i e s  have sn& an estiililisliment. The kiench 
gmdamcrfe nalionw~e to the nmoiint. of forty or fiPy nith 
each corps. The Spanids  h v e  their poIice militia tu a ~till 
lorger aniount. 7Trhile me wko t.eguire s~celb un aid more, I 
am sowy So soy, than any 0 t h ~  mtim uf EmrojwJ hare notlunfi 
of tlic liind.' 
' We dl knaw &at the disejpiine md redarity  of alE m i e s  
must dcpcnd upon thc diligcnce o f  regimental officers, pariiculsrly 
@ubiilteins. I mny order i~hnt  Ipleaer, biit if they do not cxccub 
ñhnt 1 order, or if t h y  exccuk ~ t h  ncgligenw, I cannot 
ypect thiit Uritish E O ~ ~ ~ P P B  will he olvlerly or replar.' . . . 
I believe I should find it w r y  difficult to con~ict any officm of 
doing this dcscription of duty aiiii ncgli cncc, moro $rtioiody 
m 110 is to lie tried otliers p ru~ ia~!y  guil t ,  o ilis l a m e  
aknce.' . . . ' >Ve are an sxocllcn~ mmjr on parade, an 
crccllcnt one to fighh, h t  pos are rrurse tlinn un mmgi i m  a 
rnmty, and tako mg sord for it that cithcr dofcnt ar aumsa 
wouid chissolve ua.' 
Sir A~tlnur Welledy to N9.. EZlkr8? $u$, 1809, 
' W e  must have some general rnle o£ roceeding incwea of 
criminal loutragcs of British officera and a&liers.' . . . 'As 
mattrrs arc now wnduckd, t l io  govcrnmcnt and mysolf stand 
~uimplimenting e d  ~Wier ~ l i i l e  no notico is a e n  d the 
murdcrcr.' 
Sip Artlmr do loid Wclk&y# A~l,prt, 1809. 
'Eut a stnrring army is actually worrie thnn nom. The aoldjers 
l o ~ e  tlieir discipline nnd spirit; t h g  pTundcr even in tha resence 
oF tkcir &ccrs. Thc olIiccrs aso dismntentcd nnd aro imost  irs 
Ziad as tlio m e d  l 
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& Adhw WeEb~key to Mr. EUe'ers, i .pfem6er,  1809. 
' In rr~pect  fo the complaints you have aent me of the mnduct 
of d~taebments, t tey me only a r etition of ottcra which I 
reoeive every &y Erom sil quartera 2 Spain snd Portognl and I 
canonlylnmentmyjnabilitgto npply any rerned . In the f imt  
pir~m, onr l n ~  is not whot it ouglit to bc snd ?cnnnot prcrrtil 
upon government even to look at a remedp; secoodly, our 
mil iby courts liaving been eshl~lishecl sol el^ for the pnrpoae of  
mnintnining m i l i t q  discipline, and with thc StlmQ wisdom whicii 
has rnurked ail our proccedigv of lnle yeara we have obliged 
t l e  of%cms to awear t o  decide mcording te tho evidencc bmught 
before thrm, and we hnve oliliged the witnesses to give t,hvir 
evidonce upon oath, tLe witnesscs b o i n ~  In dmosf, overy in- 
dance mmmon solriiers whose conduct this tribunnl wns con- 
etituted t o  control; tJa c o w q m c e  k, t h t  p ~ r j u y  Lv rainsost m 
emnmm an of'ce ua h&mnesri mnd plund~r.' 
Lmd Welli~fion fa Ni-. E l Z h a ,  A'eptm,hw, ISW. 
'1 reaily believe bt mcre pl~cler  a& out~aye hawe Bem 
mmi t tad  !$ Il& m y  tlm lq amy 0 t h  that a e r  was in t6.e 
$eld.' 
h d  WeIIinoytm to l o d  Evqmol, Janwy, 1810. 
'1 am concerned to te11 yon, that notwi th~t l tndin~ the paino 
taken by the general md 0 t h  offimm of  the arrny $8 oondur t 
o£ tlie ~ o l d i e r ~  is infamoua." . . . ' At this monient tliere are 
thme genwnl eourta-martid ~itting in Portugal fw ihe triiil of 
soYier~ p i l t y  of wmton murders, (no les# than faiir pooplc hnvc 
been kil ed l ~ y  t b m  since uTe returned l o  l'orlugal,) rolilieriea, 
tliefta, rolibing convoys nnder thei; c h q ,  $c. &c. I'erjury i a  
ns common ns rohhcry and murder. 
h d  TcEIRx~~A ia $he a(¿jufaIz£-geneml o f t h  fcWtd8, 1810, 
'It i ~  Troper I shmld inform the commander-in-cliief thnt 
desertion ia not the only crimo of wLch the soldiera o£ tlie nrin j- 
huve I-ieen guilty ta an extrnordinnry dcgrcc. A clctaclmcnt 
seldom marbhes, padirlicularl.rly iE under I l i s  oonimand of a non- 
commiasioned o5cer (which rarely Iiappens,) that a murder or a 
liigliwny rolihery, or Poma act of oiii,rngr, ia nnt coinmitted h 
tlio Briiisli soldiors cornplsinc it: thcy hnuo kiilod oight peop$ 
~ince'llie -9 returneci io Porlugal.' 
Jord Welli~gtm tu Eovd Z v w l ,  1810. 
' S e ~ m l  ~eldiers have lately been conPicted before a general 
court-martid md hevc been exeontcd.' . . . '1 nm stilI 
apprehensive oi' I l i e  consepuence of trying them in any nice 
n eration before the enern-y, foor thcy realIy forgct everythg 
w\cn plnndu or aioc is mtli~i rcaoh.. 
h d  WeZliwgtm to r i ~  S. C o h ,  1810. 
'1 have r e d  complaints from different quders of the mduot 
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of the hnssam towards t h ~  i d ~ a b i h h  of the cmníq! . . . 
' It hna p n e  RO fm, tlrat they (tho pebple) have inquired wheflier 
they mimiglit Id1 the Germans ia our servics as weU iis in tha 
service of the Prerick,' 
' Zlie o u t r y  sornrnitted by the Ilritkli soldiers Lave been ao 
enosneow, an t h y  Iim-e produmd nn offect on the minds of the  
peoplc oF tlia country so injurious to tllc ame, and likcly t o  ho 
eo Injurious h the m m  it~elf, tlult í mqucat your 1~rhLp's 
enrly stientim t o  «ie sukject.' 
Nany more extracts I muld give, but let as now see wlmt 
m s  tlie conrluct of +,he French towarrls men who did not 
aurder and mutilate prisoners :- 
' Since 1 h ~ e  comm~nded tlie h o  s in thb connl;ry 1 have 
alanps treated the Tronch ofioors m! ~oldicrs w110 Uow boen 
mide priaoners wiils tlie u h o a t  Iiummit and at'cention; and iri 
numero~w inatanaeg I haíe sawd tlioic ETM. The oniy motive 
d u c h  1 liavc Had Por tliis condnict hns bcen, tliat thry millit 
trcat onr offimm and soldim wcU. viJ1o might faII into tlicis 
liands; and I must do thc FrcncL tlie justice to eny tliat Ilieg 
h a ~ e  been uni~erb;allp weU hcated, and in recent instmces ths 
t c w d e d  p&o?un:~ of ~JLC BritisJi, amy have bm m q f  
lrefre tRs eamde8 o f l h  Fmch wmj.' 
' 1 oonfesb however, that as the Frencli treat well the pri~onem 
whom the takc from na and the Portogric~e t reat their priaonem 
racecdiap6 iii, pnrtimlarl~ in poht o€ food, I a h d d  prcfor on 
zirriuigeinent, by ~ L c h  p6soners n bo have once come into tLe 
himds of the p r o s t  mmshl of the nritish tuny ~liould avoid 
f i i l l in~ undcr t,he care of any offieer of thc P o r t u p ~ e  p e m -  
ment. 
Hriving thw displayed the condrict of tlic British wny, aaii 
ciescribed by its own genera1 througli a series of yema; and 
hving also from the s m e  nuthority, s h o m  tlic Iiurntuio 
treatnitsnt En~l is l i  ofizers and fioldicrs, wEen they hsyipened 
to be rnade 111-isoners, experienced from t l ~ e  Frencli, 1 dsmiind 
oP auy man witli ib particre of honour, truth or wnwience in 
Jiis ccimpositiun,-of any mun, in fine, who is not nt oncc knare 
nnd fool, mliether thme outrages perpctrrtted by British 
troops upon a frienclly people can be auppressed, and the 
outrages of Frencli soldiers qainst implacable enemies enlarged 
upon with j d c e !  Wliethcr it is right and demnt ta imputa 
rclcntTcsri fcrocity, atrocimrs villenj-, t a  the wholc Frcneh 
army, ancl stigmiitize tiie wliole French nation for tbe clicessw 
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twenty actiom of the descrjption of that at tbe I>nc$e ot Ami. 
bispo. . . . ' In the battle of Talavera, jn which tlie S p a n d  
army witli ve tFiffing cxcr tions m-ns not engaged, ñbole corps 
t h r  a w q  zir am18 m[ rnn off i~ N/ p c m a  ahcn tbay 
s e r e  neitlier attaclted nor threalened with m attiick, liut 
frightened! bdieve by their own fire.' . . . '1 bave found, 
npan inqiii and fmm expencnce, the inutmu~ of tlie mis- 
belin~iour g i h c  Spnnish iraops t o  be so numcrous md tiioac of 
their good belia~piour lo  be EO few, that 1 miist conclnde lhnt 
thev are troops by no menns to be depended upon.' 
'T]IP Spaniñh ctlvalry are T brliere nearly eniirrly without dis- 
ciplino ; tlicy aro in gencrd well clotlied t ~ m c d  and nccoutred, 
and remarkably well mounted, and tlieir hors~s  are in gmd wn- 
ditron; but I n e e r  heara anybod pretend that in one instanea 
tiiq have behaved as ~oldieri ouJ t tci do in the reeencc of arr 
memy.' , . , 'In res ect to iliat y c a t  body o! di amies-1 P mcnn the infantrg-it i s  amentabIe to  aee how bad that of the 
Gpaniards is.' . . . 'It i s  snir l  that sometimes they bebave 
wcll; tliongh I aeknowledge 1 I~ave nmw EeCn them behrive 
othcPwiae +han U,' . . . 'Nothing can be wono thm tho 
oi2icsrs of tLe Spmisb a m y  ; nnd it i s  cxtraordinary t l a t  when 
a nntion haa devoted itsclf to  aar, as thi8 nation haa by tlie 
meami~es it hna adopted in the lmt ttao yem, BO little prOgreEB 
has been mnde in any one branch o£ tLe m i l i t q  profession by 
anyindi~dd.' . . . '1 cannot ~ n y  thnt tlicy do nnytbiug 
as it oucht to be done, 6 th  the exception of ninning a i r y  and 
msmnhling ngain in n date of nntiirc.' 
' Ths Spaniards have neit hcr numbers, oficiency, diaciphe, 
bravery or asrangement to  carry on tlie contest.' 
&fradsI 1810. 
'!l!he misforbc tbmugl~out tho war hne Icen thnt tbe 
Spaniards are of a &sposition too aangiune: they Lave invarialily 
expected only wecess in objecta far tthe attaintiient of ahicli they 
liad adopted no measu~~n; they hnre nevcr looked to or prcpnrcd 
f'Or 3 lengthencd contest ; and al1 tbosa, or nenrly al1 who 1 3 ~ e  
liad anytlzng to  do wilh them, hnve hbibed  tLe same spirit and 
ihe P;IVT~C scntimcnh.' 
'Tlioso wlio EBO tha dienltica nttmding al1 communicationbi 
with Spaniards and Portuguese, and are uzl are bow liltle depen- 
dence can be plnced upon thern, and t h n t  they (le end entlrely 
iipon us fm m e  thin . rill be astoniahad «int vi& ao md a 
Toree sa I h r o  YsliJd Unrc bccn abio to  maintaio mpsrlf so 
l o n ~  in tlijs comlry. 
' The character of the B a n i d ~  has been the same throngliout 
the wnr; they haw neTerf>ipn equd to the adoption of nny solid 
plnn, orto the exccution of man$ ~ystem of gtcndy msistmce to 
ilie enemg by which thejr sitndion might be ~ a d u a t l  lrnprov~d. 
T h e  leadinp ppoplr amongst them huue in~ailnldy Leeiued t l e  
l o ~ e r  orders; md instead of making them acqunintsd s i th  tlicir 
real situation, and c&g upan t h m  to makc tke cxel~ians aiid 
macrificee whioh rere necessav even for their d ~ f e n c ~ ,  bhey hnvo 
aniused them with idle stories of imyinary successes, rtitli 
riaionary plantna nf off~nsira oper~tionn ~ l i i c l t  fhone wlio offer 
tliern for conaideration lrnm that tliey h a ~ o  not the mems of 
exececuting, and with ho es of drinng tlie Frencli out of &e 
Feninada by mmo nnloo%ed-for god.  Tlie consoquence ia, tlint 
no evcnt fri pravidcd for in timc, c ~ c r y  mi~fortnnc is doubly fclt, 
nnd tha eopls will at Inst become hligued with t h  succesaiou 
oF thrir gsartcrs whibioh iomrnon pmdenee and foresighk io their 
lraders wanld Iimc prevenhd.' 
.TPellinytwn ko  si^ B. Welksky, 1810. 
* In maer to ~hom- yon how tlie Rpnish armir~ ara going m, I 
meloso yoir u roport wliieh sir Killiam Beresford has rcccircd 
from general Marlden thc officer eommnnding the brigade of Por- 
tupese cavalrp in Eatrcm~dnra. X m convinoed that there is 
not onc word In thin Irtter tiiat ia not truc. Yct lAem are dfie 
atdi6-r;~ wlio arn ik ha€ tBe Frenelb out oythe PeniwEa!!!! 
'There is no rerned for these evils exceptinq u, vigmouir 
q s t m  af gmernmont, ~ y r l ~ i e l i  n revenile oF aomc kind or otlier 
can he msed i% pay and find rcaources for an &y in whieli 
discipline c m  he eetablished. It i$ ~ o ñ s m e  ia  tulb of ~ o u t i n g  
o e l  Ilie %eh, m of cawrjnng om the w a r  im any o t l m  mmw. 
Xndccd, if thc dcstructlan occnsioncd by thc qerillas and 
by th Ypanish amies, rtnd tlis expense ineurred by rnain- 
t n i n i q  the h n c h  trrmies, are cdtlcalated, it wiii be obvroiis tllat 
it xill be mrtch ehenpcr for the country to maintaiin 80,000 or 
100,000 regulw troops in tlie field. 
'Dut tl ie Spmish nation will not sit down ~oberly and work to 
protliica m c f f ~ c t  nt ib ftlhirc: periotl. Y71m-r w r u q e ,  and mm 
tlieir a&w~tg i'a of a pmavi mtwo, it mwF ba fd van thm 
Iy Ik# ~iecesse'b ff ¿heir cimt.llartme~ a& is nww a rnaller of 
choice or of fmesr'ght.' 
Wollingfm io tor& Welles7q, 1810. 
' There js nerther mbordination nor discipIine in the army 
either amonpt of6ccr6 or soldjer~; asd it l e  not eren atkm ted 
(as, indeed, i1 aould be in wio t o  attempt) to ostabiisli ,&e,. 
It; ho* in my opinion h e n  tlie canse of  tlia dmfavdly m d ? t c t  
which we haw BO Prcqn~ntly Ritncsscd in Spanish troope, and 
1 6 ~  haae bemme odr'oirr lo tXe m d y ,  Tke peuceuble ánlmlii- 
tanta, mtrf 0.7 tfiq d d e d  aluE swfm fmm ;the P~cncJi, crlnlost iuI.~fi. 
for t h  ~tafilisltmmt of JoqJL's g m m m b  to he p~o.olecled$wm 
Ilie otctmges of tk&r oum Irovpx.' 
Wellin$m £0 A+- H. Welkwley, Dec. 1810. 
'1 am nfraid that tke Spaniard~ mil1 bring ns al1 to ~ h m e  yet. 
It i~ ecandalous tbt in ilic third elsr of t11e Tar, m d  hamng 
hppn more thm z yenr in a sinte oLranguillity, and Iinrinp roa- 
tnined no loas of jmportunee since the batt e of Ocnna, they 
iiiould now be depenrliog for the safety of Ca-ikc seat oE 
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thek gwernmentnpon having one or two, more or les#, Briti~i 
regiments: and khat after hnving heen shut in for ten months, 
thcy liaac nok prcyinrcd thc worlrs neccs~ary for tlwir dcfcnc:nce, 
notwitlzstmding tlie repcated ~ernonstranwa of generd Giaham 
and tlie Briliuli olricera ou h e  danger of omittiog thcm. 
a The Cortes q p e a r  to suffer nnder the nat,i,ionxl diseme in aa 
grent n dcgrco ne ~ h c  other authoritics-tht h. Iioasthg ef th 
ctwnfih a i ~ d  pmer of $he i3pam;sB n a t h  till ala<$ ayo rm'mily 
c o n u i n ~ d  1L y we ia m dmqw, asd tlam d i w q  &um guietly 
a ~ d  idulg ing  th&r leatwml idolence.' 
"he conduct of tlie Spaniarda thmughout tbis q e d i t i o n  
(Barosa) i s  p c i a e &  tlw aunse as 1 Ifiatte m e  o f i ~ m d  it Zo be. 
Tliey march the tmop~ ni& md day witheut provisiona or rest, 
and abuse evcrgbody who pmposea n moment's delay to dord  
eitlier to the famislied and fatigned ~oldier~. Tliey reach the  
enemy in sucli e ~ h t e  tu to be unable to  makc my esertion m 
l o  exccute any plan, e ~ e n  i f  a q  plan liad been formed; and thus, 
when &e moment of action mives tliey are t o M  incapable of 
mi,rrmint, and they rtmd hy t o  see their allies &strqed, nnd 
ahrrrards abuee tliem bomuse they do not continne, unsupported, 
exorlioris to wJGcli Liman nritnra ia noh eqd . '*  
So mnch for We1Fington's opinion of the Spnnish soldieiui and 
statesmen; let us now hear him as ta the Bpanish generala:- 
18M. 'Altho h the Dnque do Albn aorqno is p o n 8  by 
rnany, amoneat oxcrs by Wiuttingham au 3 l'r'rrre, you riii Bud 
hiin out. I tliinlc the mar niu de la Romana the best 3 b e  
seen oE tbe Spaniads. I &ubt hi. talents st the bead of in 
m y ,  bilt hc i6  ccrtainly a sensible mnn md has seen mnch of 
t h o  world! 
Nom, render, t l ~ e  following is &e character given to Romana 
in my History ; wrriliare it with the aliove;- 
'Romana, ~wio a man of tdent, quicl~nesq and informatiun, 
but disqualificd by nature for militxry crimmanrl.' And fipin, 
spealring o€ Iiis death, 1 say, ' IIe was a worthy man antl of 
quick parts, dtliough deficient in milita7 talent. His dwth 
i iaa a grcat IOSE.' If the expressions rtre more positive than 
Wcllington'e, it i s  bccaiise t'iiis wnq tlie dukc's first notion of 
tfie inarquis ; he was more positive aficrwml9, and prwious 
circumstaiices unknom to  b, iind after circumshices knuivn 
* That very micceasful Spnish g m d  snd very tempenrte Englifili 
politician, sir De h c y  Evans, pronouncen dl m h  gnimadversions u p o ~  
the Spxnish amios to he ' m  m& dq/mmbh &ftd fa a Cktohn, a ~ d  at 
w l t  uf &u:tnt partkditawi.' X dal. iu aacy the Spniards will maii 
him. 
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to him, gave me ti right to be more decid~d. The following 
dditional proof~i, joincd to thme alreatly given in my former 
replyj miist m%ce for the present. Sir John Moore, in one 
of I i i ~  letters, says, V I s m g  to $m? that ~ o m m o  G a 
a11uj%r,3ntE. Nr. Ehnrt, tlie British envoy, u~iting al~out 
the mrne period to general DogIr? to iirge thc ndvancc of 
I'nlafox and Infantado, s a p ,  ' 1 h fiat R m n a  has mt 
mppwted tlae DritZsh casi k ougJd i%~ ?tuve done, and Im left 
mr army to aet dm w h  KB mt$I~t have mpported i t  &t?b 
a tohnh+! iofixient fome.' 
In 2812, during the siege of Bu~urgoq fi. Sydenham, ex- 
pressing lord I.Vellington's opiniona, atter saying tliat Welling- 
ton declared he l i d  never met witli a, really able man iu Spaiii, 
while In Portugd he had friund ~evertal, procccris tIius:- 
'It i a  indeed clear to any person who is naquainted with the 
prcacnt shta of Spain, tliat t l ~  Spaniorih are i q d k  of 
forrnjng e f l k w  <m ood a q m m ~ m t  w a o& amg.' . . . 
' Kitii res cct to t fe  amy here  m e  c e r t s 4  in Spaiu abundant B r n n t ~ r i d a  nr good common addiem. Biit wherr ja one general 
of cvcn modcratc ~ k i l l  nnd talontsl I know notliing u€ Lncy 
niid 8mficld, but assrircdlg tl ~ o o d  generd i s  not to be found 
nmongst Gsstañaa, Ballcstems, Pdacior, McndizrabeI, Santo- 
cildcs, Ahnrlin, niique del Pnr uo, T,i1 Pcfin, 3110, Bfnl~p, or 
Joaph O.Donnol.> . . . ' gar cmwt rnaka pod @erra in 
Epain.' 
If to thia the reader will add what 1 have set  forth in my 
H i s t o ~  abmt Vives, Imas, Contrcras, Campo Verde, Cue~trr, 
and Areyasaga, and that be ir nol get satisfied, 1 cm still 
arlminister to b i ~  craving. In 1809 Wellington spenlrs with 
d r e d  af ' Bomna's c o m m n t a  flpying inta Pmhgd; nnd 
s q s ,  'tliatjo0?&7~ f e h  t l ~  Dzqw & P a r p ~  lias Eieen en- 
deavouring t~ get his corps destroyed on the frontier.' Againb 
' T h e  Duque do1 Parque Lns advmced, becnnac, whahvw may 
be tlie msequences, the Spaniards al--ays think it necassrirg to 
a d m c e  d i e n  tl~eir front is clcar of an enerny.' 
m e r e  never wau anytliinc like thn  wadnegs. the &qwdmce,  
and tlie p s u w y t i m  O$ tlir Spnltish t f l m 8  in the w q  they rlsk 
thrir corps, linnn-irig tliat tlir: natimol aun* ntili prevent them 
from witkidran~ing thcrn fmm a sitriation of' dangm, mtl that if 
altaclted iliw niusl be io(dtllg destro ed. A retretct is Ilie anly 
dimcn of s a f e t ~  for the Dvgoe del J!mqrquezs rorpa; but iostcad 
of mrnaking i t  he cn1Ie upan yon for cavalry.' . . . ' 1  bavc 
orciered mapzineo to be prcpared on tlicr Donro nnd Mondcro 
tn ~ a f i i a t  in roairling Ihem vngcriioiads if they ahould retire into 
Poiliigal, wIiili I Iiope t b q  will do as tlioir anly ciimoc o f  
6alifat ion.' 
A g i n  in 1811, Jcfending himself frotii au aems~tiun madt 
cul :  
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by the Spaniard- that he had caused the lo= of Valencia, he 
snyri, 'tlie misforLuncs of Viileiicia are to  be attributetl to 
BlnMa ~pmance of I& pro fe~6.im and t o  Mahy'~ m m d k  
and t~eaciiert~.' 
Now if any pasqage in my Histoy can be pointed out more 
dispnmging to t l ~ e  Spaninrds tlinn tlie expressions of lord 
ITellington and the otlier pcrmna qiiotetl abuve, 1 m oontent 
to be clrarged with an unnntural bias' against that people. 
But iE tliiu cnnnot be daug it is clear that the reiewer hm 
provcd, not my unnaturnl bias t o  thc Frcnch, but his o m  
natural bias to  mluluinny. He has i n d d  a wonderful ravercion 
to  truth, for clme under hrs eye, in my volnme wl~icl~ Le ww 
t l~en  reviewing, the following pnssage occnra, and there are 
many of a like tendencp in my ~ o r l c  relative to t.hc Spnniards 
al1 of mliich he leaves unnotited. 
'Undcr sneh a syatcm it mas impossiblo t h n t  the peasmtry 
muld be rendered energetic soldiera, md ELey eertainly were not 
active supportem af tlieir conntryh ccnuae ; but vuifh a wondqf~tl 
eon.~fanq t f iq  wffer~rl for {f, %,zuppZUPPvg fnfi-qw artd as'elw~,  
wakdaeüs alid firnsñe with patiesece, m d  diylm$y ;VJ all tkh 
a c l r m  a& ~ y n  all Ifieis- 8mtimenis a dislénct md p~cwg~l 
nutemd c7ramder. 2 % ~  m t a n q  and dhe iniqaity of EJe t6n1r- 
patim, Imllowerl l s r  iifurtR ifi d~,yPfe nf thioér ferociiy a& 
w&ts r e ~ e d ,  thouph thc  ECOS and follg of the juntas mdtha 
leadiig mcn rcndered tlic eirect nugabry.'-fiishy. 
1 wnnld stop here, knt tlic i n t e rwh  o€ trntfi and judice, 
tini1 the interests of society require that 1 ~ho~iId tharoughly 
expose tliis revjewer. Let t t e  reader el~erefure mark Lk 
ressoning upon Sonlt's guvernment of Oporto and Gha i n t r i ~ e  
of thc A d b B r q m a  pi~rty. Let Iiim l~owever Ionk first at 
tlie whole mtcment of tliese matters in my 6 4  and nd 
tmst tlis garlilerl extrncts mntle by the reviewer, ht him 
obserre liom Heudeletb expetlition to Suy is by this sliarnt- 
las witer, nt one time m ~ d e  to nppear ~4 i£ it h o k  place 
n$m Soult had remived tlie rleputations md ddresses c~lling 
fiir a eliange of dynasty ; and this to show that no benelisiul 
effect had been produced in t,hc tcmpcr of thc pcoplc, 1 hnd 
asserted, anrl of wliich 1 sltall prcsently give ample p r ~ f .  
Haw at aanatber time this same cxpetlition of Hendelet is iised 
as liappeni~g kfm tlie arrival of tlie atldresses and depnto- 
tions, with a view to sliow tliat Sonlt had lebourcd to procure 
tEio~e arldrecse~, a fnct wliicl.1, frir fmm denying, 1 lid are- 
fully noticed. IRt Lim mark how aa expression jn my 
Bistory, naniely, that Soult wm qcwpepand i'or oiie eff'ect of 
his own vigorous. oonduct, lw Leen pervert~d, for the p u ~ m  
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of deceit ; and al1 t h i g  16th a spirit at once rio malignant and 
stutupid, tbat th reviewer is uit~ble to see tliat tIie grrrbled 
extra& he @ves from Heuddct'a and Riccarrd'a rcgisters, not 
only do nat contra<lict but absolutely codirm the essential 
poiiit of my statement. 
Certairily Sotilt was not nnpmpred for the sulimission al 
the Porttigucse ta thc Frcnch nms because it wrsri the object 
and bent of his invasion to mdce them so unbmit. Birt therz 
i4 a great difference betw-een that sulimission of wliich Reudelct 
and Riwart2 slieak, sud tho proposnl oorning frorn the Portu- 
guese for the establishment oia m arad a p e a &  dpmty; 
n stfll w a t e r  rliff erence tietmeen t8hat, and ?fii1S:m,q tJte C ~ ~ L Y I ~  h 
S d t  h i m l f ;  and it w a s  this 1st n+Lich tlie word uflp-epared 
refared to in my Uistory. So far froni thinking or sajlng 
tliat 80ult wris unprepared for the depuhtions w d  ddrcsuw, 
I have expressely unid, tlint lie ' emoo~~ryrd dlre &qjn,' tlint 
he ' cscled W z t l c  gwut dm~4?y,? and1 callcd tlie whole aKair tin 
'imhgue.' Dnt if I llad mid tliat he was unljreparecl for tlie 
wliole atiair it would have been corred iil onc smae, ITe )vas 
nnprepared to accede to tlie extent of the dnti-Braqanm 
perty's yicws. He liad only recrived aiithorlty from liic: aovc- 
r e iq  to conpuer Portt~gal, not to  establirrh a new and indcpen- 
dent clpnasty, placing tt Prencb pnnce upnii tlie tlirone; still 
less to aocept that thr0n~  for himself, Tlieoo mere duiigertius 
mattcrs to meddla witli undcr mcli a monarch as Nnpolcon; 
Iiut tlic weaknesa of Sfiult'~ militerv nosition m d c  it a h s ~  
lutely necessmy to catch at every aid, knd it would h a ~ e  been 
a proof tliat tlie duke oE Dalinlitia was only n cemrnon man 
sud unsuited for tlie great afIaim confided to his d i x p  if tie 
liad rejectcd such ai powcrful nuxiliary to  hia militnry opem 
tions: wkely, therefare, and eren maqxnimoudy did Iie 
encwrage tlie A mci-Brqmm pnrty, drawing al1 thc military 
Lienefit possible Gom it, ttnd trusting to Sapoleon's srigacity 
and pndeuuruf so111 for liia justificrttion. Nor \vas tie tnis- 
hken in eithcr. Yet 1 am m d p  to atImit tlmt a11 this m u ~ t  
q p e m  very strange to Quarterty reviemerfi and parasites, 
wliose knomledge of the hurnnn mind is confined to an ncctir:tte 
measure of the sentiments VE patrona, ricli aiid liowerKu1, but 
equaIIly with tliemwlves hc~tpeble of tme peatness arid tliere- 
fore nlways ready t o  ridicule it. 
Tlie fnctri atnnd thiis. Heudelet'a sxpeditinn throuqh t,he 
h i r e  Jfidw a Qouro te& plucc between the 5th of A~iiil nnt" 
tlie 27th of that month, and klie ceuntry peolile tieing tlicn iiil 
a state ofexss~~ration pposed liim vehc~iieiitly; in iny llistory 
the combata he ~iustained are inentiond, a ~ d  it is said triut 
300 . REPXIP. ETC, 
previons to the AnEirB~-qmm in t r ip~e  tlie hcmlle w d ~ r e  
of assassinatioiia l i d  been mrried on with infinite activity. 
But the intrigue of thc malcontent~ wns not completed in t i l  
tlie end of Aprit, nnd tlie goorl cffect oE it on the militnry 
operations rvas not nlipnrent uiitil JIiay, consequentlp could not 
liave hen felt by Heudelet ir1 tlie tieginiiing oC ApriE. In my 
Ristory thc difcrcnce of timc in tliesc tlvo &irs iu  expressly 
marked, inasmucli as I say tliat in trenting of the intrigue 1 
liave anticipzted the chronolofiical order of events, TmIy 
if &Ir. Locltliart hns pud for tliis pnrt of the review aa cri- 
ticimn Mr. Murray slioitld disnllow tlie nnfair charp io hm 
acconnts. 
I slialI now give two extrncts from Sodt's general report, 
before quotcd, in mnfirmution of my shkmcnts:- 
' Mmhal Soult s a s  led by nccestrit~ to fayour the party of t h ~  
malconhnh, which he hund di-eady iomed in Porluad whn lio 
srrired. He encoumprl them, anrl soon tliat party thonght 
itsclf strong onongh in tho provjnec of Entre 1llenRo e Do~rro, iu 
propose to Ilie mmlial to approve oT the people dechrin: for 
the deporiitfon of the houae of Braganza, and that tlie emperor 
of the French ~IiouId be nskerl to name rr prince of bis family to 
r e i p  in Portu~al. In a polilicnl vicw, rnaruhnl Soult aould not 
wihout expresa aulliorily, psmit  such a ~moeeding, md he 
could not ask for snch antlioritg, Iiaving loet us own communi- 
ciltion nitll France and being witlioiit news of tlie operations of 
ang o£ the otlicr corps whiA were t o  aid him; but considered 
In a mili* point of view the propoiiition took anotlier character. 
Marshal Sodt h e r e  saw the mems of escaping from liis em- 
hnrrngsments, and he eieizcd tliem eq~rErly, wrtnin ihnt whatcvcr 
irre ~ulari@ there u-as in lús prmeedings nltimte juslice xould 
 ti^ kone ici him! 
"hese dispositioas rodneed it rrmarkitble chmnge, tranqi~illity 
aae re.-ostablished, on! io the p v i n o o  of Entro hlinho o Doiuo 
&e inhbi~ants relurned to thcir labuurs. auwalicd the markets. 
and fmiliarized tliernselvea with the idea of m a p p r ~ w h g  
clinn~c.' . . . ' Mnrfihd Soult reeei~ed numemus dcpiirn- 
tiona of  the clergy t o  thank him for hia attentione, md for tlie 
order which he h a  reslord B f o m  this no Prcrieliman could 
strsgglc without bcing mntilnbd nnd llilled. The Portugnesc, 
believing that it was g l 0 r i 5 ~ ~  and atchl to God t o  do nll 
the misehicf possihle to  tiie arm Ecl pperpetrsted tlie most 
rlreadful horrora on tho wretehe8lgoldiers who fe11 into t he i~  
hQndE.' 
It wauld be too tediouri nnd unprofit~hle te the render to 
continue thus following the reviewer step by step Wherefore, 
neglecting.liis farrago about tlie priliciplea of WRF, aun hhis 
applieation of them to show th error of my statement, vk,  
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Ithd o &atep> poinE of &ew 3 was betw b adtcsck: P h ,  
h.$ qm'd r w m  IBd &- Adbwi- to fdl upon Soult,' I 
proceed to lay sir Ar#ur's own statement More the reader, 
anci lave him to wmpare it with mine. 
G$Bon, AMi! 24,1809. 
<I inknd to move h ~ l a r d ~ i  Soulh and attack liim, ir J. ahould 
Iw able im make any arrangement in the neighbonrhood of 
Abrantea, whicIi citn give nc any sccurity for tlic safcty of th ia 
place during my absence to the northwasd. 
' 1 am not quite wi-tah, iiowever, that I shonid not do more 
pcl t o  £he generd c ~ i i s e  hy w m  hining with gencrnl Crrestn in 
un o emtion agninst lTictor; and 1 bclicve 1 should prcfer the 
iwt # soult RX not in possession of a part of this eouoirg rerg 
fertile in rasources, and of the t o m  of Qporto, and if to ronceh 
tho operations aith Cucstn would not tnkc time which :hght bo 
rofilably emplojfed In operations against Soult. X tELink il pro- 
Lble, Iiomver, that Soult aill notremain in Portugal &en l ahall  
pnss the Mondego. IF Iie does I s3iall attack him. Q he slwtald 
retire, I a m  eomi~wd 1hat it wmld be moat udi)awtagemj%r thrire 
cmnmon cawe tRat we ~ R m l d  m a i m  ?ym tlae d@ike.e i% ttke 
m 1 J ~  of Pdzyal, and act a i g m s l y  {m co-operatiasa laith h t a  
agaimnst Trictor.' 
'h operation ainat Victor is affendcd by thess dmn'qes  
-3 smm..ful ik %ctudT ireiieve~ s d c  md Lisbon, and in 
oase affnir~ ahould tnke such a tnni ns to enablc thc Iring'a 
minisleni lo malte moher  treat effort Eor the reiielof Spnin, 
the eorpa undor my eornrnan! in Portugd nUl not be removpd to 
sneh a distance from tho scene of  opcmtioa m to  rcndcr its 
co-operation im ossiblo; and we ma liope to see tha eíLecl of a 
grest eífert mage by a coinbined lrnfconcentrsted foreo.' 
The asserbion of the revie-iver tliat I have ovemted 
Cae~tab force, inasmnch as it was only 19,000 infantry and 
1500 cavalry, instcatl o€ 30,000 infmtry nnd 6,000 cnvalry, 
ris 1 hrtve stated it t o  be, and that oonsequently tlie peates t  
numbem cauld not be brought to bear on Victor, is one oE 
tliosei mrious examples of elaborate mimpresentation in 
wliich this writer nbuunds. For fir~t, admitting thnt Cuestla 
Iind onIy 20,000 mcn, sir Arthnr mould have Iiroii~lit 24,000 
to airi Iiim, and Victor had only 30,000. The allie~ would 
then have bad donble ths numlicr oppoad to Soult. J3ut the 
pith o£ the misrepresentation lies iri tliis, that the reviewer 
has faken Cuesta's aocount of his actual force on tlte 23rd of 
April, ond wppressea the fncts, that reinformments wcre con- 
tiniialty pur ing  in to him at t h ~ t  time, and tliat he actually 
did dvauce against Victor lvith rather greater nurnbem than 
tlioao sttited by me. 
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Kv Bdur  t o  lord CaitZweng6 ApiE 24,1180. 
' Cnesta is at Llerena, collecting rt force qaiin, whioh it is wid 
will soon be 25,000 infantry and GOOO cavahy.' 
Yo g m a Z  M c h d c ,  Muy 1,1809. 
' They "ctor's b g i s )  have in their front a Spanish army 
with general Ciiesta at J~lllerena, w!iicFi nrmF r a s  rlefmterl in t1:e 
montli of Marcli, nnd hns sincc bccn rcinforccd to th arnount of 
twemly tlwwand m.' . . . ' They mil1 be athcked Ly h e & ,  
who M rem'vhg &fmements.' 
Ni-. .?+me bo SiT Arfhar IVeikshj, rSaiilk, Nuy 4. 
' We Iiave here 3 W  cavnlry, considcrcd m part of the m y  
of Estscmndnra (under Cuesta), Cuesta I i a ~  with him 
cavalry.' 
Sir A r t h u ~  Welhl ty  to  lord Cir~tlmuqA, Jzm 31, 1809. 
' We had every reason to Iielieve lliat the fiach m y  con- 
sided of abont 27,000, of which 7000 were cavalry; and tlre 
eomhined Briti~h and Porhip~so force mliicllI was in hopeti I 
~hoald h a ~ e  been enabled to march npn tliiu eqcditim wodd 
have amounted to about 24,000 mcn.' 
Zb Imd W~Elesly~ Aupst 8, 1809. 
' The m y  of Cuesta, ~ h i c h  m a s e d  the Tagas th+& m 
thihyeiyht thorsand sfnmg, does not now mnsist of 30,000.' 
Elrtratt~m aMm&r Jn/ .GT A. WeIledq,  1189. 
' The Spanish army nnder general Cueaita liad Iieea mivfwced 
witA mval a& infamty, and fiad hem mj5ttd with extra- 
wdimry m L t y  aflrr the d m a  qfNedellin3 
Ati t,he reviewer's remarks about Cucsta'~ls numbem, 3rd 
abuut the nnfordable nature of the Tagus, are a reproduction 
of misrepresentatiuris and objectiuns tiefore exposed and re- 
hted by me in m;v wntrovcrsy nith m n h l  Bercsford; biit 
ZE it is now attempted to support them by garhlorl extracts 
from better nuthoritiw, 1 will ap in  and completely expose 
and cmsh them. TLis will Eiowever be more cunvenioiitly 
done farther on. Meanwhile, 1 r e p t ,  that tlw Tqus is only 
nnfordable during tlie winter, and not t11cn if tliere me a few 
daya dry meather; that s K  montlis of the year it Is alwajs 
fodable In many plnces, and as low dowu as Miilvaterra n w  
Lishn; finally, thnt my espression, a &ver fwddle at drnogE 
mwy wamn,' is st.rictly comect, and is indeed not mine but 
lord Wdlington's exprerision. To proce~l  with the r e s t p  
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Witliout offering anp proof beyond liís own assertion, ths  
4 d e w e r  cliarges rrie with  having exagpraled inapoptlvnc~ 
af DArgeniou's co+rng fw leal8 ~ L ~ ~ O R R  of m&g 
SmJf i  rmbmes~ im ymrding & DOUTO. But m7 ACCOUU~ uf 
that conspirwy l a s  compilcd Erom the dtike of Wellingkon's 
letters-aorne yulilic, aome pmute ticlrlresaed to me; mid from 
n nnrrntivc of thc conspimey ~ai t ten exprcssly for my guidmco 
by major-general sir Jaxmes Doriglltis, who wau tlie ofticer 
employcd to meet and conduch D'Ar~ntou t o  and from the 
Engli:li -y;-frv~n Goult's own uficiüI report; from Le 
Noble's history ; and from secret informatian wliich 1 ;received 
from a Frcncli offcer who wns himself one of the pRn"n1 
movers-not of that partimilar conspiracy-but o£ B general 
one of which the oile at Oporto wus but a brancli. 
Again, tlie reviewer deiiies that 1 am oorrect in sqing, 
thnt Soult tliought Hili's division lind been disembarlíed froiii 
the ocenn ; tliiat Iie expected the vessela would come to tlu: 
riontli of the Doure: and that considerinv tliat rrirer securo 
D 
alwx tlie town his personal attention was directed to tlie lrne 
below Oporto. Lct Soult and Le Xoble answer tliis. 
Xxtm&fm Soetlfs G w a l  Eqowt. 
'In the nkht of the 9th md 10th tho enemy made a msicla- 
a6b d i m h a r l a t i m  al dtwiro, yzd anotter at Qviar. Tlie 101 h, 
at  daybrenk, tlioy a t t d e d  tlw xigl~t flnnk of ~.enoral FianoeecFii, 
while the c o l m a  m i n y  f r m  L.isbon by L'Qi'nlJra athcked Iiini 
in front.' 
Ed~aclftiom8 Le nToLk. 
'The honse occupi~d by the general-in-cliief situnted 
beyond tlie tuwn oii tlie r o d  to the sea Tlie site mas very high, 
and from thmce hr muId ohsrrve tlie left bnnkof tlie Doiiro frnm 
thc convcnt to tho Bca. Bia ordcrs, given On thc Bth, to 8COiir 
the lei't bank o£ the river, hose whicli he had expediled ui (lie 
morning, md the position of his troops, rcndered him confiderit 
.tlint no pnssago sould hka plnco aliovc Oporto; iie Iielieved bkut 
1Be emmy, marlm @¿he wa, w l d  Iy a dimliurkalim Bear  tI* 
mutla # ' t b  Dortro.* 
Euch is the mlne of thiu mrping disingenuous eritic's 
abscrvatioas on t h i ~  point; und 1 sliaI1 now rlemolish his other 
misritatements &out the prtsriage of i ; h ~  Douro. 
1st. TLe poor barber'a share in the transaction is quite 
true; my aulliority ia major-general sir Jolin l k t e r s  whu 
wm tlie compenion of the btlrbw in the dnring exploit of 
bringing ovcr t l ~ e  hoata And if TVatcrs Iinil rccollcctctl Iiir 
name, i t is not the despicalile a~ictoerat~ic sneer o£ the reGervcr 
about tlie LPleli&n' tliat would liave prevented me trrim 
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I givinp it. 2nd. iPIe Rurm de A ~ i d m ,  where air John Murray 
crossed, has aIready been shom by a reference to  the m q s  
and to lord Wellirigton's despatch, to be not nine miles from 
the Sem Canvent lis tbe revieww says, but three miles as 1 
bave ~tated: moreovcr, twa Portiigiicfic leapcs would not 
make nine English miles. But to quit tllese minor poinu, 
the revienwr asks, ' Why colonel Bmpkr depwkdfim trg 
ummd of tb mcats en ira tA,e@ratcli. of id rt7mr n'~l-I~8Lyl' 
This is the anly decent pnssage in tFie mhole review8 and it 
shall have a satisfactory answer. 
Public d~patclies, written jn the  humy of the moment, 
immcclintely aftcr the cvents and bcforc aecumte infomnticin 
can be obtalned, are very cuhject to errors of detnil, and are cer- 
tainly not wliat a judicious liistorian woulrl rely upon fordetaiIs 
withuut endwvouring to olituin otlier infcinndoa. In this 
case 1 discovered severa1 discr~p#neies between the despxtcl~ 
aiid the accounts of eye-witnesses and wtors ñ~ritten 10% 
aftermrds and deliberately. 1 knew also, that tlie paawp of 
the Douro, though apparently a very r d  mtion and littIe 
considered in Rngland, wns a vey remarkable eñploit, pmdent 
skilful and daring. Anxious to knoiu tlie.true secret of the 
success, I mote  to the duke of Welliiigton, putting a ~wiety 
of qucstians relative to the wliole estpeditiona. In rcturn I 
receiverl from him distinct sna'R;'R;ers, with a s m d  diagram of 
tlie geminary and ground &out it to rcnder the explxnation 
clear, hing  thns put in possession of dl the lending poínts 
relative to tlie passagc of the Douro Iiy tlie commanrlers on 
each side. for 1 liad Iiefore ~ o t  SouItb. 1 tnrned to the written a 
and printed statements of severa1 oficem mmed in the 
action for those detnjls wlUch the genernls liad not touched 
upon. 
Now the principal objections of *he reviewer to my atate 
ment are,-1st. Tliat 1 l iav~ gven too many tmopa to  sir 
John IIurmy. 2nd. That I h m  unjustly accuscd him of 
want of military hardihood. 3rd. That 1 bave erroneouslg 
described tlie cause af tlic loss suatained by the fourteentli 
dragoon~ in retiring from theii charge. In reply 1 quote my 
nutliorities; md first, as t o  tlie numbers with Mumy. 
'irJle&gJb3 of the troops ~ I i i c L  passed aver to the seminmy, 
which in fact made an admirable l%te u 5  pvnt, mas protected 
bp tlie aseage of the Douro higher up by 1ient.-general a i ~  
donn ond $ 1 ~  kingi Gcrrnan l e g i r m , v w ~ t c d  b~ O~D* 
ih5ps.' 
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ilmd wiirith this niithnrity, T did set asfcle the desptch, 
because, though it s ~ i d  that Yurnty was smE mith a batta- 1 
lion and a squndron, i t  did not soy tlint Le was not followecl by 
otliers. And in lord Londonderry's narrative 1 f m d  tlia 
folloiving pessagez- 
' Ganerul Nurray, too. m-ho ha& been detached with FLG divi- 
sim ta a f e q  higlier up, was fortnnnte enongli to gain posses. 
p ion of as mmy bortta nn rnnliled bim to pasR nver with fino 
6aftaliola~ of Gmmm a& two s p a d m  of tJa f o w f m f h  
dragms.' 
And bis lorrlsbip, further on, says, tbat Iie liiinself charg-ed 
serera1 timea and Taith advantage at. the Lead of t h o s ~  
sqnadrom. His cxprascion is ' thd d ~ a q o m  fmm Meurrap'a 
w p s . '  
. With xespecf t o  the Ioss of the dmgoons mtained by hitnng 
to tiglit tlieir way Iiack ti@, 1 fiud t11e following acwuut in 
the narrative of #ir James Douglglas, writtcn, as 1 havc bcfaro 
said, expresdy for my gui&ance:- 
' Toung mldiem like yming p-e honnda m n  beadlong on their . 
rey; wbils enpirhnoe rnnkcs olJdags of di rorts riin ounning. 
fwo spadvon* mtuaily rade *ver the chuk mur &mli 
guard, mhieh laid down npon tlie rond; and was, tonso tlieir own 
tcrms, m& sar le umtm: but no support to thc dqoons  bcing 
at han3 no peat caecutiou was done; and the lwo spuoi l rm 
Um~elzies mferecll s ~ e l y  i m  ge fting back aya;= dIErmy71 t h  
iafanfy*' 
Thu~i, even in this smdI matkr, the revimver ifi not right. 
And iiom with the above fmts fixed I ahall prooeed t o  rcbut 
tbe criarge of Laving calumniated sir J o h  Mur-. 
First, the review~r's risserhion, tliat Murrafs troops were 
ncvcr mitliIn ~evcral miles of  thc scminary, nnd tliat tbcy 
mould have been cruslied by Soult if tlicy l i ~ l  attaclierl tlic 
enemy, is evidently false from tlie followhg facts. Lord 
Wellington exprcssly says, in hia nnswer to my quwtious 
quotd liefore,-'17'haL tlie .ngId: of tlie troops in tlie seniiiiury . 
umjwotactd by the troop undcr BIuriny; whieh cuulll not 
bc if tlle 1ntt.r were aevernI miles off. Agnin, if the dragoons 
of Ifurray's corps could cliarge repeutedly rvith iwlvmtnge, tlie 
infwnts snd guns ot t.ht corps mighlit have foIlomed up tlie 
attnck withouk danger upon a conhsed, flying, pniiic-strickpn 
body of men wlio liad Leen aurpriaed al111 wrri at tlie saine 
time taken Iioth in t l d  ancl rewr. But if llurray dnrcd not 
pFith any pn~dence even appro~cll tht! cncrny,-if it wcre 
absolutely necemarg for hirn to retire as lie did,-wliat 
Iirought Jüm there at aU3 Is the duke of WelIingtDn a 
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general to thmw bis troops wantonIy into wch a situatiun- 
and oii gound wliich his elevatcd post ah tlie Serre Convent 
cnabled him to commnnd perfcctly, and mime the men and 
movements of b t h  sides aere a8 much beneath hr% eye os the 
men and movement;~ on a chess-board? 33ah l 
But the fact is thak s pnrt of the Gerrnan~ under hfumy, 
ay!-ta very small pnrt? did aetudly ensxe  the enemy with 
success. Major neamish, iil his ITistorgr of ~ T M  G m ~ 1  
Legic-n, on the authority of one of the Germiin oficers' 
journds, writes thus:- 
"me skirmisherg of the fimt lino under lieutenant Ton Hoflc, 
md two compnnice of tho samo ro~imcnt undcr onlgn Hodon- 
berg, were slone brought into íire. Tlie slcirrnislim n i d e  seved 
prisonera, and one riflemm (JIenry Ihuer) \vas lucky snough to 
capture a Frmch lieuten&ilt-colonel. Seven of the l e ~ o n  wera 
wounded.' 
Muri-ay mantcd hnrdihood. And it is'no ansmer to ay 
lord 7 V e l l i i o n  did not talre notioe of bis conduce. A 
cammander-iii-chief is  ,nnicFd by many circumstancca distinct 
from the mem mi l ihy  facts, and it might be, thnt  on this 
ocension hc did not choosc to judgc ~raslily or hnrdily a man 
mho had other good qudities, for an error into mhich per- 
hsps a very bold and ahIe man miglit have fallen by acci- 
dent. And neither would 1 h v e  thuti judgecl sir John 
Miimy from tliis fhct alonq altliougb tlie mliole nrmy mere 
disgsted at thc! time by his ivant of daring and openly 
exprescetl an unfavoumble opinion of his inilitary ~4gonr. 
But mhen 1 fiid tbat tbe snmc want of bardiltood me win 
sppiarent in him at C ~ s t ~ n %  as 1 have zlrcndy s h o m  in n y  
Ilistol, anJ still more glaringly display4 by Iiim a t  Tarsk 
goua, as ~'na1l Le shwn liereri'ter, tlie matter I-iwme quite 
diffmnt, and tha duty af tka liistorieu is to spcak tho  trntin 
even of a general, strange as h t  mi+y and I bave no donbt 
does xppear ho this revietver. 
Huving disposed of t,I~is rnratter, 1 shnll now set down some 
~EIS-~CS cvincing :he babbling S ~ ~ ~ O W ~ A S S  md wlf-conceit of 
t he  critic, and beneritli them my authorities, wliereby it 1d1 
appear that the big book contai* rill sir @orge does not 
know is iiicming in bulk :- 
' Sir drthnr Wolleeilcy wna dctnined nt Oporto neithcr by tho 
inslructions of the XngIisli cabinet nor lip Lis own tvmtit of 
generalslup, but m q l y  by the wunt of prdse'oias.'-B&. 
Indeed! Rentler, mark tlie following qnctition to, and 
answer fiom tlie duke of lJrelliigton. 
@&'m ta dde of JYcKwrn bp mTmd Ra@. 
Wliy did tlie duke halt the nest day after the p ~ s a g e  of 
tlie Douro l 
Ame~.-'me hdt w a ~  mado next dny,-fi&, became tha 
whole army h ~ d  not crocsed tlle I)onro aiid none of its s~ipplies 
and hiiggage l i d  ~ ( P M R ~ P ~ .  Srcnndlg, on nccorint: of thc greet 
cxcrtion nncl f a f i p ~  of tho preceditig days p.articulnrly tlie last. 
Tliirtlly, lii?causi. s e  liad no accounl oT lord Bercsford heing in 
posspssion o f  Arnarnnte, or even acroarr tlie Douro; me hnving, in 
fuirt; oiit-mnrclicrl crcrotl~ing. Fonrthly, the horses nnd mirnda 
required a a l ' s  rest as well aa Itie men.' 
And, in tlis answer to anotlier quefitioiz, tlia following 
obscrvntion ocmrs :-' The relative nuiiilicrs nnd thr: nut.u.ure 
of the troops muat be corisidered in al1 tliese tliings; a d  tl~is 
jkct mrrreovwF tF~,at w p t i y  to attnin a r#y peat abject w 
c& noi  riak t l ~ e  lo$# u j a  cwp8.I 
1 pnss ovcr the reviewcr's comrncnts upon my description 
of Snirlt:a retreitt, becaiise ie simple refererice to my wnrk mili 
nt once shom tlieir folly .md fidseness; but 1 b ~ g  to infcim 
tliis acutc and ~irofourid Iiistorietil d i i c  tluit tlie first fiel& 
marslral captured Iiy an EngIish genernl was  marshiil Tallad, 
nnd that tlie Rng!i~h general wlia cnptiired hini was called 
John, dukii oF Rlnrlbomugli. bnd, with respect t o  Iiis sneers 
iibout tlie 5ttb &wrr qf l~civams;' 'S&s tfieatrkal p&;' 
'tlie WM o j  t?g twenty-fws Iwsemm;' ' t / ~  l c s r ~ a i r s  of tha 
Ponte ~Vova . ' nnd tllc B o w w  ~ompoeied by cnlmel 
asid Le xoble;' 1 slinll, in answer, only oEir tl~c folluwing 
authorities, none of which, the reder will o b s e ~ e ,  are taken 
from Le Noble, 
' Slie 15th, in the morning, the enemy tippcsred ona leagno 
from Rrngn; our colnmn n-ns cntnnclcd in ilie dcfile ; thc min 
rame down in torrents; and tlm w i n z  was fri~litful. On reactiinq 
Sa lmonde  wc Iearned t l in t  ths L~idge $ li'uivaenx, tbs 
liltlt m?:w (rniseeau) of fltd aam.e 2nni c d ,  awd Ih f mRdye p a ~ J c d  Zg 1200 mm m'lh cavnm. It  xns I r n o m  a so tbnt 
the Pmte Xoua os tBe rouD qf MmieTeqre, wliicl~ tliey had 
b ~ ~ t n  ta  d e a t r o ~ ~  waei feebly ~ i a r d c d  ; md tho innrshnl gave to 
mnjor Dulong thc commnd of 1m bruvc mcn, of lus own 
rlioice, tu carry jt. The v ~ l i a n t  Uulong unilpr cover of tlie 
niglit renelied ihe brid~e, patiaed it notn itbstandiny: the cuts in 
it, surprjaed tlle pf ird,  and pirt to the ~ w o r d  tliosc n Iio muld not 
escape. In JVFLT Rmrs tlie bridge was r~tpairetl; ~cncra l  Loigon 
nsscd it and mnrclied iipon the bridge of  filis*erells, near 
Pilla da X'onfe, wiiere RN l>oriiigiicsc ~ e l l  relrnrhed def~ndrd 
the paBsage, A lattuliola and a m  k u a e  men, again led Iiy ths 
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&q'd ~ g , ~ d  the ab6ati.s m h d  tfie eai%ndim~k a;od 
s&ed Gridge.' 
BXIP& fm &b ' Twl0e:mg eb C0mpdte.a daP Fra*.' 
"Ih mnrsliul hola Q oouncil, nt tho end of which ha oalled 
major Dulong. It m nuie o'clock in the evenin~. '1 have 
selected p u  f1m the tarmy, he said to that bmre officer, to  s&e 
tlie bridge of I'onte Nova which the enemy are nnw cutting : 
you mWt mdcavour to aurprise them. The time is favom~1ile. 
A l k k  vigorowly with the Liavonet, you w i ü  succeed or you will  
die. 1 want no newa save thut of your success, send me no 
ntlier rltport, your ailence will be sufficient in s contruy c a e .  
T k c  a hundrcd mcn at yonr choice; thcy wil1 bc 8níEc.icnt; dd 
twea€y;jzue dragoopas, a& kill thir h ~ e s  10 make n ~ampml, 
ij' il be paeces8a~y, rm tlw mi& of the br idge Ira w t & n  pursel f  
und wmuim m&r qf tbpm~rrqe." 
"he major dcpnrted with ;ictcrmined s o l d i e ~  and a Portn- 
gueao guido irho was tied wilh tke leallier s h g ~ , o f  tha muskets. 
Amived witliin pisbol-akot of tlie bridge Iic saw thc enemv 
cltffhg tfilie hst bmm. I t  aas then ono o'clock, the min feil 
licnvily nnd tlic cncmy's labonrors boing fa t ipcd t.hought thcy 
mi& hke  sorno rapose Iicfore they íiuiahed Ilieir work. Tlie 
turrents desceiiclmg from tlte mouutaina and tlie cavado itself 
madc eucli noisc tliat the march of tlie Frcneli KM not henrd, 
tho scntincl at the bridge wn8 hiilcd without giving any &m, 
and BuEung wilh Iweay-Jvs pmadiws pas~ed craa-ling on tRe 
Lmm, m of tlim fill into tha cau& hut Rappily rix faUpri- 
dumd no ~ffmt. The enem 'a advanced pont of tweiity-fonr men 
was doatmycd, &o. &a. ?be mmnrsl~al. informed of this hr py 1 evenl, camu up lu haate with the lirst troopa he muld fin lo 
d q n d  the bridge amd accelerate tbpus,uags ortJae amy;  l l ~ t  bhe 
rgcairirq a m  watker su$cimtJypmmpt or solid to prn~eny m n y  
haew so/rljera p&h.iv. The rnmliiil embraced major Dulong, 
s g i n g  lo him, '1 Iliarilr you in tlio r i m e  oE Prmce lirave rnrtjor; 
you have aa~ed the mmy." 
Then follows a detailcd emunt of the bIisscrch bridge, 
or Saltdor, and it9 aljbatis and nther obstncles; of Duloiig's 
attaelr; of liis being twice repulsed; and of liis winniug 
thxt bridge, tlie Leaper as it was calIed, a t  the t h i d  wmult, 
fillling dredfnlly wounded at the rnoment of vietory; finally, 
of tlie a r e  nnd derwtion mith wliich his soldiew mrried liiin 
on tlieir slioulders during tlie reat of tlie rctrcat, Bnd tlie 
retider will observe that Lliis wcoutit is riot mere deacript,iun 
in tlie borly of that ivork, but a scparutc pepcr in tlie Bppcitdix, 
written by somc officcr evidently well acíliiaiilted with u11 tlia 
Lcts, yrliaps Dulung liirnself, riiid for tlic express purpose o€ 
correcting 1110 error8 of dehii in tlia b o l  of tile mork. 
Tlia~ti.icu1 t o  tbe critie, nnd cven ridieuluuv it mny likcly 
enougi~ appewr; tlie noble cournp and se1Ldevof;ion of 6ucli 
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a soldier as h l o n g  is a subject which no persw wiU ever 
expect a &uw¿w¿y 1-viewer to unrlerstand. 
In the foregoing comment~ X hnve foltowed the stream of 
my own thoughts, ratther than the oder  of the revícwer'a 
eriticisms; 1 must therefore retrace mg stepa to notice some 
points wliich llave been pnsaed over. Uis obsetratioas about 
Zaragoza have been dready disposed of ia my publislied repIy 
t o  hiu firat articles, but Pis comments upan Catdoniaa affairs 
&al1 now be netieed. 
The assertiun that lord Collingwood was incapltbIc of jutlg- 
ing of tlre efforh of  the Cataluns, although he wtts in daily 
inte;rcoursa witli their cEiiefs, co-operating with their annies 
and sugplying thcm with arma and &ores, because lae was o 
seamm, is cerhinly ingenious. It Fias juqt so nitidi of pert- 
nesa in it m ttan Admirirlty clctk of the MelviiIe school might 
be supposed 'LO acquire by a long habit of  o8iciul insdenm tu 
naval oficera, whosa m n t  of pxrliamentary i~itewt sxposed 
them to thc mortifrcntion of Iiwing intcrcoursa with liim. 
And it Iias just ea mnch of cunning wisdom as to place it ulion 
a pm witli tlist which dictated the inquiry which we have 
heerd WM sent out to  sir Juhn  Warren duriug tlie late Ame- 
rican war, nrimely, ' wlietlier ZipI~tuwp Z¿ght frig~tes, could 
not sail up the St. hwrence to  Lake OntarioY-md with 
that ~ ~ r p r i ~ i n g  providence, which did aend out bircli-homa 
and tanks t o  holdfmh water for the use of the ships on the 
s a i d h k e  of Ontilrio ! But quitting thcse matters, the reviewer 
Insinuatc~ whnt is rabsolutely u n h e )  namely, that I Imvt: only 
quotcd lord Coltiiigwoocl RS authority for my statemcnts nbout 
Cxtalonia. The readew of my work lrnow that 1 b~v1: addueed 
in testirnony the Spanish general$ themselves, mmelj-, Con- 
treras, Lacy, md &vira; t h e  testimony OS sir Edward G d -  
rington, of sir Edivmd Pellew, of colonel Doyle, and of otlier 
Englishmen. That 1 h a ~ e  refcrred t o  St. Cyr, Such~t, IfiLille, 
anrl otlier French writen; that I have quoted Vacani anrl 
Ctibltnek Histories, the first rtn Xtalian serviag lvith tlie Frenck 
army in Cadoniü, tlie lwt a Bpaniard and cluef of tlie s t d T  
to the CataIm army: and now, t o  complete tha reviewcr's 
discomfiture, I will udd the clukc of Wdliilgton, ivlio 19 a Iniitlq- 
mair nn d tliercfore aocorrling to  this reviewer's rltlctriiie, cntitlerl 
to judge :- 
Ldtm do lord Zwqool, 19th Dac. 1W. 
' In CataIonia the resishce ia more general and re,dar; bnt 
ntill thopeople me of a description witli wliich your nrmirs could 
etit co~operatta with any prospct of sucecas, or cFen of safcty. 
Yon aee what Uurglier~h saya of the wmatenes; amd il iS 
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mtm'mt ffiaf ihe CotlcTun3 hace at aU limes &m tAs m wl im- 
gtl!ar, and bJte least do de dqmded q o n  .qf aryof ths  Spaniara~.' 
So much for light litri.pte5, bimh-lirooma, frecll-water hnkg 
antl Collinpvood'ri incapncity to jiirlgc of the Cntalans, hnwe 
b .was a, smmm; anri for Rrdingvs smpln inh  of the 
Spjpnniards mben dying, tliey niust go ta sir &*eorge'~ big book 
with thic; marginal note, that Sr. Cyr i4 nat tbe autliopity. 
Bi~t  fax the graiid flourisli, tlie tlirmt to proeeat anot.her time, 
' f iom TVtflington's U~+atcI~/w; tllne thc Spanida  @ve excel- 
Ieut iutelligeiice iiiiJ rriade wJabv vepwt~, let t l i e  reader t a l e  
tIic following tcst,imony in nnticilintion:- 
Ext~mt~fmna lord WeElimgtm's h e . p m d m i  1809, 
'Bt preaent 1 have no intelli rnee whatei-er, erceptirq the 
aonsenso 1 recoiva oconsionnlly %om -; ar t l r  Sponiorh 
Alice dcfcated al2 my syallemplu t~ ofilatla my 1y s t p ' y  t7m 
aclaom 1 sent mi! i'o mrtke iags;ries.' 
'1 do not doiibt tlint; thc force leí% in Ratrcmadnrn dosa not 
e~cccd 80tiíJ infnntry and $00 cevnlry; and you hnve bocn mado 
zac uainkrl with the evact estent of it, hmwe, ilie Duque del 
A#uquerque, d o  ia nppointed to eammand it, ir intwmled in 
rnal<fly bmum tke h t h ;  but they haae lid about tlie cavalry 
ordcrcd to the Duqtic del Parque,' 
' It might be advisalile, liovwer, to frighten the gentIemwl at 
seville mith t k i ~  mrrf¿he infslbigmce.' 
'It, iis m o ~ t  diffimilt ta obtain ~ n y  informntion r m p ~ c t i n g d ,  
or my local eircumctmccs, which must bo eonsidorcd in the 
deciriiun~ to be í i i e d  respectinn the rna~cli o€ troop.' 
1810. ' We are s d g  deficicnt in good information, aud all the 
eforts which 1 have marle ta  obtain it lime failecl ; and al1 that 
s c  know i s  tlic movemcnt of troopa at tlie morncnt, or pmbalily 
ahr it ia MX~LI: 
'1 have liad mcounta from the marquis de la Romanl*: he 
telis me that khe siege of  Cadk was raiscd on tlle 23rd, wiia'rb 
cmnot he h.&.' 
' 1 believe thene waa no trntli in lile stories of tbe insurrection 
at TvIaclrjd.' 
'Thae  is BO fm a fonndiltion far &e report of O~onnel'a 
action, tw t l iat it nppmrs t l r ~ t  Snclict'~ advmecd gunrd wns at 
Lerida on tlie 11th uC llpril. It is rloubtfiil, Eiowevcr, accwiding 
l o  n ~ y  cxpmmm of &misl& r p d s ,  wlictlcr O'lloiinel mas beakn 
or p~inprl a victo+' 
' 1 rccomrncnd to yon, howovc, to pmcccd with grmt cantim 
in reqec l  to inidlijieiice transmitted to  priu by tlio ruarquis da Pa 
lbmana,  a ~ d  aC1 flae S ' u n d ~  oJicws. It 1s oliviom there is- 
nolliinq they wieh for rro mrich ns to involce oi~r troops in tlieir 
opcratrons. This is evidcnt both from ththc letkrs of the marqnis 
hunaelf, and from ihe falso q o r t s  mada lo lieukniint Beath- 
oote of tho Eiring heard h m  Badnjos at Alliuquerquo." 
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Welli-$m Ilo lord Liwerpwl, 1810. Carlwo, 
'Tho circurnstmces x%ieli I ham related above d l  show your 
lord~liip 1haC the rnditary system of the Spanish nalioii is not 
much impmved, and h t  i t  is not verg easy to combine or rew- 
l a t e  operntions aitli n corpe so ill-orgmized, in, pox~e8SRon Of $0 
Gttfke iri?eI1iqm, and upon whose actions no relianco can be 
placed, Z t  will ecarcely be credited that the $rst ZnteLLi,ymce 
wltich g ~ i w a l  Mendimhal received of t h  assd l i iag  of tke 
enmy$ ~ T O ~ ~ D B  at Sciille aasfhta t8moDo.' 
Welliytun to  & E. Welle~lPy, 11810. 
' Yeridizztbel, &c. &c., bave sent us so rnsnpfuls~ m p d s  tlirit 
f cmnot mrtke out what tlie French nrre doing. 
* This i a  n part af tlic systrm an whicli a7L the iq)a~2*~h mth- 
&&S Haw bem aciiw-q, to induce us to lako a zr1 iu tlie d e ~ d -  
tov  opernhons abich tUey are earrging on. klsc report,~ and 
dew tions o f m ~ s g  desm@tion are tried, and thcn poptilar insulta, f to n iow us w h t  the geueml opinion is o€ our conduet.' 
' The Spaniards tiako such bad cae o€ thcir posis, aud Lave so 
lit¿Ie intelligcnce, thnt it is diflicult tu say by what trcup tlie 
blow has been stwck.' 
' It js strange thnt the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo shmtld have 
no intelligcnee of t l i ~  cnemy's movements ncnr h ia  gamison, of 
ahich i c  llnrc mccircd so rnnny nccounts.' 
' TITe hear also a gwac dcal of' BIake's zirmg in. tIie Alpujarras, 
and of a corps from Valencia o erating upon the enemy's com- 
municatirins Rith Madrid; but fmndude thnt tlicre 29 ns littlo 
foundaiion Yor Lhis inteb~enoe as í'or t La l  reItilini l o  the iuiiur- 
rection of Ronda.' Q Q 
' 1 enclosc a Iclhr to eoncral Carrera. in which 1 ltavo 
ques ted  liim to communicab wilh you. 1 licig you to observe, 
hoñcver, tlmt pery little relimce can be placed en tlie report 
mude to you Ey uay SpaiahB yewcxb ut t h  Iiead of ri body of 
tiwp#. fieY g-enerrally exaggerato on one sids or tho otlier; 
a i~d  m k e  no s m p l e  of c u m m ~ t n i ~ a l i y  SY~~IOSBLI: intdliyenre, in 
odw to Iedwe f7u1~r: fo mbom fhej cumn~uisicute j F  io ndg t  a 
certaim lim of mduct.' 
The rader must be nuw somemhat tired of quotations; let 
us therefure turn for relnxntion to the reviciver'fi oliscrvations 
about light troops,-of whicli ho sccms inrleed to knoiv as 
much as tlie wise gentleman of the Admiralty did aLoiit tlie 
fwilitp of sailing up the St. Lawrencs to Lake Ontnrio; but 
tliougl~ tliat wise geutlcman did not h o w  inucli aliuut sitiling- 
craft, tlie re~ieiver knom sometlii~~g of anotlier kintl of craft- 
nauicly misreprcscntntioa T h s  he quotcs a passtige from 
mptain Rincaid" Mnll~iTI~ and c?cver work, as if it  told in iiis 
favour, whereas it in no rnanner supports hia foolish insinzita- 
tion-namely, tbat tke forty-tliird md Bty-semnd rcgiuleiits 
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and bad pamIpd many mps. me mr with Austria had 
drnwn NnpoIcon himaelf nnd the imperial pinads n.wny fmm 
tlie Peniasula. Josepli was eshblishing bis ooiirt at Riadrid; 
Tictor remaiiied very inactive iu Xstremadura ; Suulb rnarrhed 
into Purtugül j-in fine, tliis was precisely t h s  periotl of tlie 
whole mnr in which thc! Frcncli nmy were most inert. 
Nitpoleon has fixed u p n  the fo~rr nontha of FeI)ruclry, Xnrclr, 
ApiiI, and Xay, I809, as tlie period in ahich the I&g let the 
Peuiiisula ~ l i p  from Iiis feelile liands. 
Let ua sce tlten wliiit the Sprrniarda did during that t i m ~  
And firat i t  Is fnlsc to r i q  tliat tlicy wcw unnirlcd. T h ~ y  were 
aidd against Tíictor 11y tlie vicinity of sir John Cradock's 
t roop;  they were aided on t11e Gallician coast by an Englisl~ 
squadron; tbey were aidd on the Beira froritier, against 
Lnpisso, by tlic Portupcse troops untlcr sir Itobcrt Wilson; 
t h q  mere aided on the Catdnnian const hy lord CoIlingwootlk 
Acet; they mere aided at Cndiz by tlie presenca of general 
hliKenzie'~ troops, sent frotn Libun;  anrI tliey were aicled 
evetywhcre by cnormoua supplies of money arms rand ammu- 
nition sent from England. Pinally, thcy wcrc airled, mcl most 
poiverlully so, by sir Jolin hioore'~ pneralsliip, wliich Iiad - 
enaMed tliem to rally aiid keep ~everal considerable armies on 
foot in tlie sout.lieru partti of the wuntry. U'bat diti tliese 
arinies-diese ia4ncilda Spniiiards-do7 Tlicy lost Zaragor~, 
Jlonwn, and dnm, in tlia rmt; the fortrrsses oof F~rrol nntl 
Coruña, and flieir fieet, in the north; tliey lost Estrematlurq 
La ltnnclia, Arugoii, the Astnrias, iind Gallicia; they lost tIie 
hrtles of Ucles aurl of Val!#; the lmttle of Monterrcy, that uf 
Ciiidad Real, and tlie bnt.tla o€ Msdellii. Tliey won notl i in~? 
t h y  did not Pave thrmst>lveri, it w x s  the B&th/¿ n m y  md t l ~  
indolente m d  emms nf t l ~  P m h  tlmt suma¿ tlmn. 
E x i d  fmm 11%pohn'a Mmms'rs. 
' A f t e ~  tho ombnrkntion of tho Endish a m y ,  thc k i n ~  of Spnin 
did nolliiiig; he 7 0 ~ t  Jvirr m o n t l i ~ ;  Iic u u ~ l i ~  l o  Lave mclicci 
i:prin Cndiz. upon q d e n c k  upon Sisbon; politicnl meana rroii~il 
h:ive donc thc rcst. 
Xrtru&frona lopd R e l l i n g h ~ ' ~  Com.yomdmee. leOD. 
'Lt is obkons tliat the longer and tlle moro intimatrl~ ñ e  
become acqiiainted with tlie ailairs of Spain the lcss prospect (le 
tliey Iiold oiif; of  anptliing like a gloriniis res~ilt. Tlir grrat.extrnt 
oí' tho connt tLc nnturnl difficdtiea wliicli it opposcs to nn 
memy. nnd g~ pnrnity ai' (he people toirrr<?a tiw ErenrU may 
spin ont tlie sw iuto Iengtli, and al, last tlie Frenrli may find i~ 
1111pm6ible tO e ~ t a b i i ~ h  n ~ o ~ c m r n c n t  in the coiiniry; Ilut there i8 
no prospecl of n glorious lern~~nalion [o the ~vuicsl,' 
n n f  
the pemaial of these dehila, nnd of Sodt'a Iettera, cm 
any ono doubt that tlio evuctiation o€ Gnllicia ints oecasioned by 
ihc operritiona of Clie Eritisli troops En Portiy:alP' 
' Tlke fnct is, that tlie Britiah army Rag s m d  &ain and Pm 
tugat dnring Ni ~ear. '  
The reviewer is noh only A pcnt  critic, ha is a vnt ganeinl 
also. Be ha3 discovered that tliere are no positioiis in the 
mountains of Portugrtl; nny, he wdl smrcel y allow that there 
are mountnins ut ull; and Iia iiisists tliut tliey ofrer no defeuce 
~gainst nn inmdcr, hut thnt thc rivcrs do-tlint tho Bouro 
defeiids the mtern frontier of Beira, and t h ~ t  lie fronticr of 
Portugal generally ia very compnct and atrong for defence, and 
nell suited for a >ve& army ta fifiglit superior niimberii;-tltiit 
thc wml~ army mnnot bc turnccl antl crit off f r u d  Lisbon, nnd 
the strong army must i n d e  in mnss and hy one line. 
Now firnt, it so happenetl, iitilncltily for t l i i  lucid military 
notion of Portugal, that ia Jfassends inmsion lord Wellington 
stoppod Go fight on tl~c monnti~iii of Rusneo, and stoppcd 1fn.q- 
scna altogetther at the moun&itis of Alhandi-a,A4nirlqh.joliraT,and 
Torres Vcdra-in other words at the lines, ailrl tliat he did 
iiot once st-op him or nttempt to stop Iiirn by defending a river. 
That Masscng in bis ietrcat, Goppcd lord Wdlington on tI10 
mountain of fhntiirem, atteiiipterl tn atnp Iiim on tlie mountains 
of &,al Nms, Moita, md Guarda, but never aktempted tu 
~ t o p  him by defencling a river, save iit 8atiuga1, ami tlien he 
 as inst~nt ly  Iienten. Oh, cahinly, 'tia a most nolilo geneiil, 
al111 x very acute critic? KevertIielerie, I miigt itupport mg 
uwn opinions nbont the fmntier of Portugml, the non-iiecasity 
uf invatlirig this coliutry in one mass, and the unfordrlile 
natirre of the Tagirs, by t he tehstimony of two geueials as dis- 
tiiiguislicd as l~ionest Itlgo. 
' 1 m not prepared rtt thia momcnt to  ansmer minutely aur 
1or<lship3s qiiestion respedinq Uic defenw oP Portugal; but {enn 
any grnernlly tha t  tlie fmnticr o f  Portiigal ia not deicnnihle 
againsc a superior f m ,  It; is an open froneicr, all eqwlly 
riigged, but dl equallg t o  be penetrated.' 
' In whtevcr 8ehSOn thc encmp mrly ontm Portugal, hhc w i l  
probnbly make his atttick by tu0 disIiinct limes, tlie oiie north Qie 
othcr ~outh of the ragu#; md the nystcm of defcncr mnst be 
founded u on this general bnsis. In tbe surnmer ~senqon, bon,- 
.ver. tb $uF 1ein fmdabie, dio. Be., tare murt be lakrn ihut 
Uie rnsrng does not fy his attaek directcd from tlie south of tho 
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h t  g: liad pnoped of a &$me fw t l s  5!hyua. 1 think 
that jf caplain Chaprnan'a facte are true Lis arguments aro 
unnnsweralile, and tliat it iu VP r l ~ ~ l > t f i i l  w h ~ t h ~ r  any h e q  
o r b m  sliouid bo pinoad in tboTnttcrics on «io  uppor ~ n g o s . .  
'But if tlie invnaion sliould be made in summcr, d e n  f h  
Taagw i s  ffordable in maay pkmes.' . ' In the event of 
thc attnclr bcing mnde &cttcee* ti3e m&&of JUW n T w e m b ,  
nheu ihe I'agt~s e fordahle, aE kmt c ~ s  low d o m  as Suluaitrra 
(near the lines).' 
Szr dohn Cr,acElid to lord Casflmeqh, A d 1 .  
'There is a fmry at S~lmterra, nmr Almtarn, and ~nothor np 
tho lcft bank of t l ~ c  Tqus in the Acmtcjo, w ? m  t J m  i s  &O a 
fwd and the river may be easily passed.' 
Bdrae t  f k m  a N m b  7,y BZT Bm D' Urh, gutder-mastw- 
genmal io .Bereflidls amy:-' Fhe %ps, beheen Oolepno 
~ n d  Rio Moinlioa waa b w  to  offm mmaiforda ujtw afma 
rlay~' d y  weather.'* 
Thus we veee tliat, in nearly wery rnonth in the year, this 
unfordrible Tagus o€ the reviewer is fuidrll,le in many placs, 
and t hn t  in fwt it is no barrier except la very lieayr mina. 
But t o  render t h i ~  still clearer 1 will hcrc g4ve one more nnd 
conclusive proof. In an elaborata mannacript memoir upon 
the defence of Portugal, drawn up by the celebmtd general 
Dumourier for the dulce of Welling~oii, tliut oflicer aigues like 
thia revimer, that $he T a g s  is uiifnnlablc nnd a strong 
berrier. Rut R mar~inal note in Wellingt,o<~i handwriting 
runs thus :-t LTs (hmurier) &es mt 8 m  to  68 m,we o j  IILC 
reaE stale of IIl8 Z f ~ #  a€wny s m m '  
Rliat cnn 1 say more8 Notliing upon thia hmd, but mnch 
upon otliew. I can cal1 npon thc render t o  trace the doccitful 
mode in which the reviewer perverts or falaifiea my expressions 
tliroughout. Eow he represents the Spaniards ~t one mment 
BO formidable ns t o  resist successfully tlis utmost efforts of 
morc thnn 300,000 soldicrs, thc ncxt brmth calla thcm n poor 
unarmed hordc of pmtsants incapble of rnnlring any i ~ i s h u c e  
at all. How he quotes me as statitig that the niiiiiste1.s bad 
unbounded confidenee in the success oof tlie struggle in Spain; 
wlierens my wortls are, that the ministem p o f ~ ~ d  unhunded 
confidcnrx. Ruw he repmqcnts me as mying, thc G&wt 
were tou much dazded t o  d y s e  the reñl ceittses of tlis 
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dntain no more troopa in Qermnny tlian should be foud 
rncessary; but the army of thc confcderation iisust be kcpt 
i as a constitiitional force, and it wm irnpossible during tha 
ir Mtk England to rediice the French troops In otber 
larters. To thiliis aueceetied an attempt xt a triple trwty, Iiy 
hich thc territorics of Austria, Rnssia, rtnd Friince, wcre to 
: mutuallp guiiranteerl. Cliamprtgny and Rornanzow mg- 
g&ed this plan, but tlie Austrian minister did not conceive 
Hu~sia ditrong enuugh to giiai-dntee Austria @nsD France. 
Stadion's projcct vns  mora ngrccnlilc, and n notc of n dcclnrn- 
tion of war i ~ m  sent to Mettemich, then at Paris, t e  del i~er 
ie Frencli governtnent. The nrclid~ke Criarles set off for 
nrrny, and wae followed by the emperor. 
TIien the wnr was tliits rmolved npon, jt remained to settle 
.ther it ahould be carried on tor the sola benefit of Austria, 
or in such w manner ns to  interest other nations. Contreiry 
to lier usual policy Austria decidd for the latter, and con- 
tra- to   he^ usiial pmimony tihe w r t ~  extremdy lilieml to her 
general officers and spies. It was determined tht the wm 
iId be one o€ mstitution, and in tliat view secret w n t s  
gone to Italy, and wwe said t o  have made gseut progresa 
mxciting tlie people; officew liad beeii &o sent to SieiIy 
Sitdinia to urge tliose courts to attempt t1dr o m  
~ration to the eoutinental thrones. The complete restora- 
of Naples, of Tusmny, md tlie Pope's dominions, and 
E dditiona to tlie old kingdom of Piedmont wcic pro- 
d, md Austria herself unly demrtnded a Recure frontier, 
namdy, tlie Tyrol, tlie river Po, and the Chiusa, wliiclr ww 
not much more thnn the pmce of Campo Furmio hd left 
lirr. ..... 
Snch were her 6ews :n the moutli where k ing  were to be 
her coailjutors, but in the nortli she mas intent upon a di- 
ferent pIan, There she expected help from the peoplu, lvho 
mcre dismntcnted tlt being pmccllcd wt by Napoleon. 
Treaties were entered into 4 t h  the elector of Hesse, the 
dukes of Brnnswick and Oeh, and it was understood tliat the 
people there and in tlie provinoes taken from Ihissitb, were 
redy to r k o  on tho fimt appcarancc of an Austrian soldicr. 
Hanover wns to he restored to  Engiand; but Austria was 60 
discontented witli the M s i a n  king, that tlie restoration of 
tlie Prussian pmvinces, especidly tlie ductiy of 'iJrarstaw, was 
to depend upon hia conduct in tho war. 
The mmiis of effieting this mighty p m j d  were the pczt 
Rsources which Stdion lid fauud or created; tliey were 
peater tlm Awtrie hud ever behre ~iroduced and tlie entlu- 

received fmm England, was lying uatouched by the Spaniads. 
Tliey were absolutely glutted nith specie, for tliey bd, at 
tllat rnoment, o£ their own money, nntl lying idle in their 
t r e a s u r y , f o u ~  miIIim7 of rkoU1t~8, and dere r n i I J h  mors 
w m  m th wuy frona Pera Cruz mí& B u w  Ayres. Such 
ww tlie n'dorn, aucli tlie pnividenoe o€ tlie Engfi~li rniniskm! 
henping rnoncy ulion niouq nt Cndirr, wherc it wnc not 
nanted, and if it liad been wanterl, ill h t c l m e d  ; but refusing 
it to Austria to foriwd tlie explosion of the enarmolis mini  
prepmed against Napoleon in Qurrnany and ItnFy. Tlieir 
qent, Mr. Frere, alisiiluteIy rcfu:fusctl evcn to nslr. for s lonn of 
some of this m o n g  fmm the Spuniaríls. This is Tvliat tbe 
reiewer, wilfully pervertiiig rny exliression, naniely, ' m & L e d  
t l ~  d m m t  spirz't of coalitim,' m1 Is ' t l ~  f m i n g  a comKrm 
tim of t l ~  s t a t ~  of K ? L ~ v ~ / '  TEle Rn~l i sh  ministem wcre 
trented as meie puse-liarera, to be Iiullied or cajoled as the 
case migtit be; a~id in these two instancea, iiot willioub 
rwon, for they neitlter lrnow how t o  givc nor how to refuse 
in the rigl~t time or place. Nor were their m i l i b y  dispmi- 
tians liettcr arranged, ns.wc shnll presently see. 
'I'o proceed wi~ l i  tkie narrative. Stntliun, to prevent tl~e 
misclilcf mhicli this dcspntch from England might hmvo 
prarluced, l y  encoiirn~ng the ppace pwty at the court, anrl 
~lismumqing tlic: otherri, only impat%cd it to the emperar and 
liis secret council, but liid it from tlicise rnembei.~ of tlie 
cabinet vho were mavering. Even t b i ~  maa like to llave cost 
him liis plncc; and Rome rnernlias of the council actnnIly 
proposed t o  reduce o n e - t l d  of the m y .  Iu fine, a cry wnsi 
arising ngainst tlie war, buut tha emperor declmecl himself on 
Stndion's side, and the mbinet a w i t d  the rcdt of count 
lhirnoden's mivsion to London. TIiñt nobleman hnd becn 
despa~lied with fulI powcrs t o  conclude a treaty of alliance 
and subsidy wjth England, and to leurn the feeIing o f  the 
EiiglisIi cubinet upon nn extrnordinq mensire wbicli Austria 
lid rcsortcd to; for lieing uttcrly unablhle to piiy her msy nt 
the or~tset, and trutjting to thc imlwrtiince of 8 i e  crisis, nnd 
not a little t a  the kuown facility witli whict the English 
miaisteis lavibhed tlieic subsidies, slie h d  resoIwd t o  r~iee, 
through the principal bnnkcrs in Vicnna, 150,0001. n month, 
by mnkiug draft# througli Hollannd upon their correspntIents 
in London, to be vepa~2 ficnn t l ~  d d y  TO ns granted Liy 
Englandl Prince Shreniberg was seiit at tlie anine time 
with 8 special misdon t u  London, to  arrange s defiuite treaty 
for rnoncy, nnd e convcntion regulating tlie future object auit 
conduct of $he w b r 4  verg curious proceeding- h w e  
Btaremlierg Iid bem tecalled beíore bar conduct ofensive to 
tlie Erigliali czbinet; but he was well acquainted with London, 
nnd tlic cinperor wished So gct liim aivrty lcat lie should l~uut 
liimself at tthe head of the pwe-pilrty in Viennrt. Tliua the 
English miiiisters continued so to  contluct tlieir aE~irs, that, 
wliila t h q  guve tlieir money to Xpein una tliejr dvice  tu 
Austria, and liotli unprofitnbly, thcg only excitcd tho con- 
tenipt of both countries. 
From tlie conference of Erfurtli Frmce had been earnest 
with Russia to take an active part wcvrcling te treaty apiainst 
Austria; and Romanzam, wha ww an enemy of EngEaud, 
incrensed 12lexanderk sasprity toward tlmt mnntry, bnt notl~ing 
wns done agniast Anstria; anil when Caulaineourt, tbe Frencli 
ambnssdor at Petersburg, b m m e  clamosous, Alexander pre- 
teniled t o  talce the Atistrian ~mhnaa~t lor  Xwartzenberg to ta5k 
for the mcasiires of his court, but really gave Iiim encourap 
ment, by repairing iimmediately nfterwards to FinIand withont 
in,ting Caulaiiiconrt. X contemporaneons oíñcial note f r m  
Xomnnzow to Austria, wns indeed couchwl in tcms to  rcndcr 
tlie intention of Alexnnder ~pprarent~ly doiibtful, but this wvs 
only a blind for Napoleon. Sliere mas no doubt of the favour- 
abIe wjslies and feelinp of  tlie court, tlis Russim troops in 
Poland clid not stir, and Stadion, far frotn having any dread oT 
tliem, calculrtkd iipon t.heir assistiince ii i  caw of any nirark~d 
succew in t he  outsct. The ernperor Alex~nder wnia bowever 
fnr fmm ht ten t ive  to Lis omn iuterests, for he sent general 
Hitroff at this time to Turkey to denutnd Molduvia and WaL 
lacliia as tlie price of R trmty, hopiiig thiis to snatch tliese 
coiintñes during the general ceminotion, He was foiled by 
the Austriau cabinetJ which secretly directed tLe Ttirks sent 
t e  meet Hi troff te ossiime a higli ttone and a-we to no nep-  
tintion in whidi R n ~ l n n d  was not n party: lie~im, wlien tlie 
Russians demancled tlie dismissd of Mr. Adajr from Constan- 
tinople Tlitroff wns Limself sent sway. 
Wliile tlie añtiirs ivitli Kuwia were in thia &te, the prsent 
Iring: of Holland arrived, incopita, nt Yiciina, to ofcr Iiis 
~ervices eitlier AS heir t o  tlie stadtlioldcrship, a~ a prince of t l ~e  
Geihnian empire, or as a near an(l contidential connexion of 
t i ie l iuiis~ ol Ereandenbiiiirg; Lut it was only in tlie lattcr viem 
he corild be usefiil, and it wzs evident he expected tlia Austrian 
c4iiii.t would make tlieir policy in the nnrtl~ coincide 6 t h  tliut 
of the Prussinn murt. He said bbe secret voyage oi' Ilie roya1 
f~rni ly  t o  Petersliurg had exposed them to mort.ifications and 
sliglits wliicii hacl ciitiugvd tlie seutiments uf hoth tlie king and 
queen towards Yrance, and tlie queen, bowved down by misior- 
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thraugll tlie Anstrian power, separater1 lier armies, drove them 
in disorder betorc Iiim, snd scincd lricnnu; nnd h t  for un 
accident, one of those rninor accidents so freguent in war, 
wliícli enabled tlre arcliduke Charles to escape over tlie Dmuh 
at Eahislion, lio would have tcrminntcd tliis gignntic cunted in 
ten (?ays. TIie failiire tliere l e ~ l  to thc iiñttte of Esling, wliere 
tlie sudden swell of tI~e Danube agiun h H c d  him, and prw 
duced anotber crisis, wliicl~ inigltt Iinw bewi turned to l i i  
hurt if the Englisli aray had bern in the north of Qemany; 
but it WAS tiien peridiiiig arnongxt the staprint ditches of 
TValclieren, and the only com biiiittion of tbe I~iiglisb miuisters 
to  tu: discovered wae 8 camliiriatiun of folly, arropce, sntl 
canceit. I have nuw donc witFi tlic rcvicw. Hurl nll the 
objections conhined in it been true, it would have evinced 
tlie 1iettY indiistry of a maliciuus miud rnore tlian any jush or 
generous intcrest in the wuse of tmth; but lieing, ns J. Iiave 
demunstrxted; false even in tlie minut~at; linrticular, 1 ju~tly 
stigmattize it as remarlcable only for malipant imbecility aiid 
syskrnatic viohtiun of truth. 
The reviemem having waertcd that 1 pick~d out of Fay's 
l i i s t o ~  tlie chnrp  apinst  Iord Melnille of snying ' the wo& 
meii niade tbe best soltliem,' 1 i~p l iad  tliut 1 drew fur it on 
my otvn cIenr recollection of the fuct. 
Since tlien a friend, the Rev. Mr. Rowlatt, hrio sent me lord 
Melville's speech, extraeter1 from tlie Annucd J1epitm (&Id- 
\viri1s) ILiOb', 11. 112; snri Ilie Followiiig IitlsMge pruvea tlie 
efroiitery with wliich tIie rcviewcrs dcny facta. 
What rras meant a better sort of menP Was it thrit they 
shoiild be taller or shorter, bronder or thinnerP This might he 
int~lligililc, Fiut it wns not thc fart. Tlic mcn tltnt hnd hitherto 
formcd l l io  Hriti~L armierr were men of' stoul 1iemt.s md liabita; 
men ot apirit aud corirnge; lovew of bold enterprise. These 
mere the mnterinls of wliirh an nrmy m u ~ t  be composed. Giuo 
bim siich men tltougli not of tbe better dr~criptiun. i w ~  
rnmt were # i e f i l l e ~ t J ú ~  soldiers. Keep t b  Lcllw sort at kme.' 
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'Msny thore a w  that tmnble rno xnd pemernite me; yet do 1 not 
meme from the ~ ~ ~ i m u l i i e ~ . ' - ~ ~ h L M  mrn. 
TRIS writcr of ~ltl Englirili genernl's life is un entirelp 
nnacquaintod with Eriglisb military customs, thnt he qu0te.s 
a common order of the day, accrediti~ig n new st& oñicer 
tu the mrny, as a remarknble testimouy to thnt 
staff officer"e talents, And lie is ~o unacquainted ~ ~ l q i c t o ~  
wit8h French military custorna, tliat, trettting of tlie 
httle of 13usaco, he pli~ces a French mawlia1, Marmont, who 
by the way lrna not tlien even iii Spxin, nt tlis 
head of a di.diaiolz of Ney's corps, Hc dogmatizes Pap 825. 
*pon milita~y movements freely, aníl is yet ao incnpable of 
forming a right judgment upon the materials wit'nin Iiis rench, 
$S to auy, thilr sir J o h  Mo. 'i-e sliould not llave retreated, be- 
cause ~ i r i  he wris alile to h ~ t  tlie Prencli iit Conilis lie could 
al80 have henten thcin in the hmrt of Spnin. Tliiis mtting 
mide tlie Lct$ tl~at at Com11a Rloore liad fifteeii tl~oirsnnd 
men to figlit twenty thousand, und In tFie beart of Spain 11e 
Iitiil only twenty-tliree ttiouswd to klit more tlim tliree 
hundrd thou~imri f 
And Iwt tliis display of incornpetency slionld not be sufi- 
cient, he afFírms, tlittt tlie same sir Johu hluore liad, com- 
partitively, grm~tcr ineans ut Siiliugun to Lwt tlie eiieniy 
tiiun lord Wlellington h d  in thri limes of Turrea Vedras.* 
* In a recent nitmhcr nf the Qtrn&i.ly &+a tho writer of an 
Mcle u p n  tlie mrrespontlenm of lmnis tlie XVIII. qnotes me zq wing 
alirit M w e n n  h d  me I r ~ c ~ d r ~ d  anrl Ekii-ly-jka tkozwwiad nrm uurler his 
rirdew. M it' hc U invedd Portugal with :rn nrrny of thxt uamounb, 
r l i e rw  I hwe expressly wi.iil that he invnclcd l'artiiqd witli mk/?l:/i%e 
Shwmd, tt r ~ s t  bhng extendcld as hr  aa Biscg.  Tho &ion of the 
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FOW thm lices, which Wellinghn harT been fortif$ng,for 
more bbn a year, offered t b e e  iiripregnable positions, defended 
by more than a hundred thourtand mca Therc w ~ a  s fortFc~s, 
that of Bt. Julian's, and a fleet, close st hhand as a final 
resource, and only eiKty tl~owand Frencli commrtnded b y .  
h l ~ s e n a  were in front. But sir John inhoore Lsiving only 
t,ipenty-thrce thou~nnd men at Sdinpn,  liad no lince, no for- 
tifications for deience, and no time to form thcm, he was 
nearly three hundred miles from bis fleet, anrl Xapoleon in 
person had tunied one hndred thousand men against km, 
while two hundred thousnnd more rcmnincd in mcrve!  
Any Iengtliened argument in opposition f o  a miter 80 
totdly unqualified to  treat oT warlilce sffairs, would be a 
sinful wastc af words; but Mr. Robiason litas been at paim to 
qucstion tlre accuraey of certain p a w p s  of my work, and 
mdth what justice the readcr shdl nolv learn. 
19 Coonabat on ehs Cm.-Sbe subshnce of Mr. Robinson'a 
complaint on t l i i  subj ect is, that I havo impu td  to genernE 
Picton, the odious crime of refusitig, from pessonnl animosity, 
to aupport general Craufurd;-tliat siicli tb seriouq nocusation 
should not be made without; ample proof ;-that 1 cannot say 
whetlier Pictons instructions did not forhid him t o  aid 
Crau furd ;-tlint the rods  were ~o hrl ,  the distante so great, 
and the time so short, Picton could not have a ldd  him;-that 
iny trccount of the action differs from general Craufurd'a;- 
tliat 1 ww only a lieutennnt of the foity-tliirrl and conse- 
qtrently could Irnom notliing o€ tlir mntter;-bhdt T have not 
praised Picton-that he was a h m a n  hmo uncl so forth. 
Pinally it is denied tliat Picton cvcr quiarrelld wi th  h u f u r d  
at dl; and 80 fm from hwing an altercation witli him on t l ~ e  
rlay of tlie action he dirI not e,ven qi i i t  Iiia own qiiarten D 
Pinhel, SometlUng &o there is about general Cole's reusing 
t o  quit Guarda. 
To al1 this 1 repIy thnt 1 never did acmieo gcnernl Picton 
of acting from personnl aniniosity; ncithcr tIic lctter nor the 
ieviwer is therefme wsentially fnlse wiih the qpeamnce of hL. 
De m e  writer, while reliuking the Fditor of t l i~  Correpondence for 
ignomnce, awerts, that the hxttle of R i i w  WM frntght hatween the  9th 
oT October nud thw 5th of Roveiuhr! Xt waalluglit on the 27th of 
September. 
Annther w r i h  in the same Yo. treñting of Professor Diumann'a work, 
speaks of ' j b l l i i d ~ g  an irnpnlrie which is h m  befiind,' a f i p i w  uf speeoh 
which mnat apperr sinp~lnrly felicitous to those who liave m t c h ~ l  a 
puppy dog c b i n g  bis own tril; but your Quartwly reviewers are your 
only mcn for ucu1'~y of hct and expresairni? 
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ppirit of my statemenf will bear oiit mch a meaning, wwhich is a 
pure hallucination of this author. Thnt the light division wag 
not stipliorterl is notorious; that iteuglit to have teen supportad 
1 hnve endeuvoured to prove; why it ~ v m  not supported L hnve 
not attempted t o  divine. Yet it was neither tiie distance nor 
the bndness of the roa* nor the m n t  of timq mts Mr. Robin- 
son gratuitously supposes; for tlie wtion, wliich took place in 
July, lastcd from daybreak until lrato in tlie cvening, the rmcls, 
and there were severdJ wrre good at  tllat  ton and the ilic 
tance not more than eight miles. 
It i~ quite tme, as Mr. Hobinson observes, that 1 cannot 
affirm o£ rny o m  knouvedge rvliether the auke of Wellington 
forhde Picton to succour Cmufurd; but 1 can mtainly 
a6rm that he ordered him to ~upport  him, because it i s  so 
set down in Iiis gracds BqakIies, ~olume 5tli, papa 836 
rrnd 587; ond it i~1 not prolirable tlint tliis order should lmve 
lieen rescindcd and onc of  a contmry tendency ~iibstitriterl, to 
meet an event, namely the mtion on the Coa, whicIi Craufurd 
liad been forhidden to fight. Picton acted no rloulit upon tEie 
dictates of his jud,ment, but nll mcn are not bound to 
Rppmye ol that jiidgemnt; and SLT t o  £11~ cliarge of faintly 
praising hia miIitary tdents, a p i n t  was forced by me in hig 
fcivour wlien 1 comparecl him to general: Craufurd, of whose 
nbility there was no qiieation; more muld not be done In 
conecience, even under Mr. Robinsen'g assurance tbat he WM 
a Roman hero. 
The exact ohjcct of Mr. Robinson's reasoning npon the 
sinbject of general Gole's refusal to quit Guarda it i s  difñcult 
to  discovcr; tlie pwW to which it relate% is tIie simple 
enunciation of a fa&, which is now repeate'd, namely, tliat 
general Cole being requested by g e n a l  Craufuril t o  come 
duim with his wliole division to the Coa refused; raiirE 
lord Wellington al~proved of that dusal ,  thougli he ordered 
Cole to support Crniifud untler certwn citmmstances. SucEt 
however i s  MI. Robmson's desire to monopolize al1 cumcct= 
ness, that he \vil1 not liermit me to h o w  anytliing about the 
action, though was present, bacause, as he saysys, k n g  only 
8 lieutmiant, I muld not know mythlng nhout it. Hc is yct 
ahundantly satisfi~l with the aceumcy of his o m  knowledge, 
dthough he was not present, and vas neither a a p h i n  uor 
lieutenanh. I happenedto be a captain of seven years' stand;. 
hg; and ~urely, tliough ws should d m i t  aii ~uba1,lterns to le 
1iIind like goung puppies, and that m k  in the one carie M 
age in the other is absolntely necessary t o  open tlieir eys, it 
ni ight stiN be asked, why 1 ahould not have been able, aítw 
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hadng obtxind a rank d i c h  gave me the right of seeing, to  
gnther as good inforrnntion from 0tlie.r~ as hlr. &l)inson lias 
dme t Lct us t o  tlic proof. 
In support of bis viervs, he has produced the rather vase 
testimony of nn anoujmous officer on general Pictcili'a staff, 
wliich he deems condusive as to  tlie fvct tliat Picton never 
quarrelled with Crraufiird, that he did not even quit Pinbel on 
tlie d q  of tlie &ion and consequently cotilrl iiot I iae had 
any altercation with him on the Coa. But the following 
lettem from officers on Craufurdb staif, not anonymous, shuw 
t 113  Picton did al1 thesc tliings. In fine, tlint Nr. lhbinson 
lins undertaken a task for which ha ia not qualified. 
T @ s t i m y  of I ~ t ~ k c o b n e ~  fl~w Kmnedy, wJto w;m m 
gmd GmuJ.rd'8 ata# cd t l ~ e  a e t h  cj '  tig Coa, July 24. 
1810. 
' 1 bxve received yonr letter in whieh you rnention R d i s  
m ' s  Life of Pietm; that work I have not seen. It sur- 
prises me tliat any one ~h,bouId rloubt tliat Pichn mcl Cmufurd 
rnet on the rlay the French nmy invested Almeida in 1810. 
1 was mnundcd prcviously, nnd did not thcrcfore witncas tlicii 
intehew; but 1 consider it certain tliat Picton and Crtiufurd 
did meet on tlie 24th July, 1810, on the high ground on the 
left bank of Uie Coa during the progresfi of tlie action, anrl 
that n hri~k altermt,ion took place betivecn them. Tliey were 
primerl and r e d y  fnr siich aii altermt!on, as nngry commu- 
niations had pasced between them previously repdinp  the 
disyiosxl o[ sorne sick of the liglit divisiun. 1 kzve henrd 
h u f u r d  mcnt,ion in jokc liis and Ficton'~i testinms with m11 
otlier, nnd I considerc.d thnt he dludeci both t o  the quarrel as 
to tlie aiclc, ancl to  t hibh which occurred when thcy met during 
tlie action nt Almeida. 
'J. KENNEDY. 
'COZ. h7ap.w, $c. +c. Qc.' 
"l'nr~r lrt.ter fmm Frrsliford 1iaq not bcen maiiy miniitpq 
in my liands; I hasten t o  rcply. General Ticton laid cuine 
out of Piuliel on tlie day o1 tlie Coa comliat;, as gqu term jt, 
'Xt maa in the afternoon of that day whcn a11 the reg-iment~ 
w m  in retrcnt, and gencrril Craiiftird wt~s with Iii~ stdfqknd 
otherei on tlie beights above, thst, 1 think, on notic? being 
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giva of general Picton'~ approach, general Gmufurd hrned 
atid moved t u  meet liim. SligLt ivaa tlie converse, ~lhort the 
intervlew, for upon Crauf'urd's asking inquiringly, whether 
general Picton did not consirler it advisnhIe to  moTe out 
aometliing from Pinhel in dcmonsttation of ~upport, or to 
cover ilie Iiglit divisiun? in tems not Liand, tho general m d e  
it understood that 'Iie ahould do no wc6 thing.' T b  as yon 
may tiiippsc put an end to the meeting, f~irther tlian some 
violent rejoinder ori tlie part of my rnnch-loved friend, and 
fierj+ hoks returuerl! We went our severa1 ways, general 
Picton, I thinlr, .procccding onmrds n hundrcd yards to tnke 
n pcep at tlie.bridge. Tbjs ia my testirnony. 
' Yows truly, 
' WILLTIWI CLWBELL. 
'GOW m*- b. g.c. +! 
Bdth of Bwm.-Mr, Ilobinson, upon the authoriv of one 
of genemi Picton'a letters, lias endwoured to show tliat my 
deamiption of tliis battle is o, mass of error$; it slinll lioivever 
be proved tlmt hb criticim is soj mil that general Picton's 
letter is veq bad autbority. 
Iii my work it is wid tliat thc dliesi reJ8ted vip1'0wly, 
yct the Frciich gnined tlic crummit of the ridgc, and rvMc tlle 
leading battalioiis established them8elves on the croivning 
rocks, athcrs wheeled to their right, intcnding t o  meep tlie 
summit o€ the Sierra, but were driven down a3&n in a 
despcrntc cliargc mnde by thc Icft af tha third clivision. 
Picton's letter sap, tliat the Jiend of the enemy'a colnnn 
got posseasion of a rocliy point on the creat of the position; 
nnd thah tliey mre folloived by tlie remainder of a lmge 
wlumn which was drivcn down in e despcrntc chargc mníla 
by tlrc Ieft of tlie third divicion. 
So fh we are ngreed. Rrit Picton @ves the merit of tlie 
chnrge t o  the liglit compaiiies o€ tlie seventy-fvurkh a ~ i d  
eigbty-eightli regiriments, and a wing of tlie forty-fifth aidcd by 
Ilu: &/A~/A Pmtugires~ vq i~nmi  undm nmjor Bimniqlial, 
npliererair, in my Iíistory tlie wliole rnerit is given to  tlie 
eigbty-eiglitli and forly-fiftli regiments. Lord JVellington's 
dcspntd @ves tlie merit to the i'urtyfifth and eiglityeightii, 
aided by tlie cightli Portupcsc rcgirnent, andw coEolaeL 
Bmglas. The B&n,&mw of a Sulinltq raitten by an 
oficer of the ei&-eighth regiment, and published in the 
Vniied S& JoumI ,  in lilre rnanner, gves tlie merit t o  
the c i g h t y ~ i ~ h t h  and forty-fiftk Britisli rcgimenta, and tbe 
a$&h P o r t u p ~ e .  
 BE^ 
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Tt will presently he eiem w11y I took no notide of tbe 
share the eighth Portagueae me said to h a ~ e  bad in thh 
brilliant wcliievement. Meanwlde the reader will observe 
thnt Picton's Ietter indicatea the of his diviaion as being 
f o r d  by the French, and he aKms that he drove them 
down again with his lofl wing wjthout aid from the fifth 
division. But my shtement makes botl the %Id and wtm 
d liis rlivision to bc forccd, and giws the 6fth divjdon, and 
especially colone1 Carneron nnd the ninth British regimcnt, a 
very lnrge share in tlie gIory of recovering the pmition; 
moreover 1 ssy tliat the eigIct?~ P w h ~  k o k  to 
Mr. Robinson argnes thnt thia must be wrong, for, 
snyfl he, the eightli Portuguese wme raot ho?m,  and if the 
right of  the third division had been forced, the French would 
have mcountered tlie fifth division. To tliis he dds ,  with a 
confidente sinplarIy rash, bis scanty knowIerlga of f d s  con- 
sidcred, thtat coloncl Cnmeron and the nintlh regimcnt; would 
doubtlesa have made ss god a charge as 1 have d&bed, 
~a!y #&??J UJWd t 7 m '  
In  replp, it is now a l m e a ,  distinctly and posltively, that 
the French did brcak thc cighth Portuguese regimcnt, did 
gain the rmks on the snmmit of the pmition, and on the 
+ l ~  of  tlie tliird divieiion; did ensconce themselves in those 
rockw, ant1 were going to  sweep the surnmit af the Xiem 
whcn the fifLli division nndcr gencraf Lcith nttacked thcm; 
and the ninth reglmcnt Icd by colenel Carneron did form 
under fire, as described, did charge, and did beat the enemy 
out of &ose roclss; and if they liad not done so, the third 
ditision, thon errgaged with otlier troops, rrould haoe been in 
a vcrg critica! situntion. Not onty is al1 this i~afñrmed, h t  
it shall be proved by the most irrefragable kstirnony. It 
ni11 then follow thnt my Eistory is accurate, tliat general 
Picton's letter is inaccnrate, and the writer of hii life incom- 
petcnt +,o eensnm otliers. 
&fr. Robinson mny ndwithstanding choose t o  abide by the 
autliority of geneml Pictoa's letter, wbich he "ortunately 
foiintl aman@ that  general'^ manuscripte,' but mhich othem 
less fortunate hd found in p'nt many yeam befoie; and he 
is the morc likeIy to  do 50, bscnusri hc has mertcd that if 
genera1 Picton'~ lcttera are false, t h q  are wilfully no, m 
assertion which it i g  impossible ta ment to. It would le 
hard indeed if a manSs veracity was to be called in queation 
bectluse liis letters, writtein in the hwry o£ service *ve jnae 
curate detuils of a buttle. General Picton mote whet he 
belie~ed to  be the fach, but t o  @ve any historial wcight to 
bici letttr an tliis occ~sion, in opposition to tlie teatimony 
which shll riow be dlluced agaiiitit i t ~  awurwy, wouId be 
umknerca. And with the inom reneen it is rcjcctctl, becnase 
%Ir. Robinson htmself admits that motlier letter written by 
general Picton on tliis occasion to the duke of Queensbury, 
was so inaccurate as to give geeml ofence to tlie army; and 
hmuse his lettcm on two otlim occrisions ara as incorrcct M 
on this of Busaco. Thua writing of the usault of Ciudad 
Rdrigo, Picton crays, raliout tliis time, namely, when t he  
tliird clivision carried the main breach, the Iight division 
wliich was rnthcr late in thcir athck, algo ñueoeerled in 
getting possession of tfie breach they were ordered t o  athck! 
Som it has been proved to demonstmtion, tbat the liglit 
division mrried ths s m d I  bmacli, and were uctually attacking 
tlie flank of the French tiroop defcnding tlic grcst brwclq 
when the t.hird division camied that point. S h i ~  indeerl ia so 
cerLGn, ehat Mr. Uniake of tEie ninety-lift,h, and otherfi of the 
liglit division, were destroyed on t h  rampada close t o  ttie 
grmt breech by that xYery explogon whicli wns said to b e  
killed geneml Jl'Kinnw; and some h w e  gone so far as ,ta 
assert tlrat it is donbtfuI if the g e a t  breach wonld have been 
carried at all ht for the flank atta& of the light division. 
bgrin, general Pieton, sriting of the buttle of Fuerth 
Onoro, srrgs ' the liglit division under geneml Cmufnd wiis 
rather mtgh& 7 d l e d  by ths mmg's c&y, and had tliat 
arm of tlie Frencli uriny been as daring and active upon tliis 
occssion, as they were when foIlowing us to the lines of 
Torres Vedras, t h e ~  wodd doubtla~ liavn cut off tlie light 
dhision t o  a rnan.' Kevertheless aa an eye-witness, and 
being then a fieldaficer on the atafl1 was by Mr. Rubinson'rr 
nile sntitled t o  see, 1 declare most soI~mnly that tlie French 
cavalry, though they often menaced to cliarge never carne 
within mre sliot dktance of the light clivi&on. The ltattcr, 
witli the exception of tlie nincty-fifth rifles, d o  werc fikir 
misliing iu tlie wood of Pozo Yelho,  vas fonnetl by regimentv 
in three pquarm, flanking and protecting each other, they 
rctircd wer the plain leirrumly witliout thc loss of n man, 
without s sabre-ivound being received, without giving or 
receiving firc; they moved in the most majestic mniiner, 
, 
secure in their discipline antl strensli, wticli ~ V R S  U I I C E ~  HS 
mould Iimc defied al1 the cavalry that ever charged iiiider 
Ta~~ierlnne or Genghia. 
But it is time to give the proofs relative to Rusaco, tha 
reader being requested to compare them with tke desciiption 
o£ tlint battIe in my E s t o r ~ ,  
' Gmmmmt  I7ou.q Devonpcrt, Aug. gth, 1834. 
- 1 am s n v  to  perceive in the recent gublkation of 
lord Deresford, Iiis Bflutraiion of  OUT J&$%atima of yacr 
t?ti~d volwme,' some reinarks on tlie bettle of Busaca wliicli 
disfigrire, not int,ciitioiinlty E shozild Iiope, the opemtions o£ 
tlie British brigadc in majos-general Leith'c corps on thnt 
occmion, of wliicIi 1, as comriiandi~fi. officer of one of the 
rcgiincnts composing it, may perhapi tic pemitted to know 
saiiietiiing 1 shiiF1 however eontcnt rnyrielf at prmcnt witli 
giviiig p u  a dctail of tlie operations of the Eritisli h igade  in 
innjor-genernl Lei th'a o m  2 m & ,  extrncted from a document 
in  iny possession, every syllabie of wliich cnn be verified by 
many distingished officem now livinz! sorne of thern actora 
ili: al1 of tliem eye-mitilesseu to tI1e affair. 
' "'lie ground where tIie Britisll Lrigade wm now moving, 
wns behind a chain of rmlry ernincnce;: lvhere it 11d nppeared 
c le~rl  y thc cncm y wns onccrnssfiilly piirihing to  establich him- 
aelf, and precludd mnjor-general Zeitii from ~eeing nt that 
n o m w t  tlie propss  tlie eneiiiy w a ~ i  rriuking, but by the infor- 
matirrn of stnff officcm stationeri on purpose whe con~mnnicnted 
liia direct,ion anrl pmgress. lixjor-gcnc~aE Leitli rnovetl tlie 
Rritisli brigade so as to endeavour t o  meet and check tlie 
eneniy dien he liad goiined tlie mcendancy. At this time a 
lieavy fire of musketry waa kept up on ths heiglit, tlie amoh 
of wliidi prwented a dcnr view af thr! eitiite o€ th inp .  W ~ F R  
liowever the roclr. forming tlie higli pad o€ the Sierra became 
visible, tli0 enemy appeared in full possession af it, and a 
Frencli officer wns in t lie wt oT cbeering witli liis liai of, whiIe 
a continua1 fire >vas ltept up from thenoo and along tlie whole 
fnee of thc Eierrn, in a diagonal direction towards tlie bottom, 
by thc enemy scendingr rapidly from the successiye columm 
formeil for tlie athclr oe a mass of soldiers from the eighth 
a i d  nintli Portupese regirnents, who having been severely 
yressed bnd i v c n  way and were mpidly r~tiring in complete 
confusion und diwrder. lfrijor-genera1 Leitli on tiiat occasion 
spolre to ma,jqlor Bimingham (wlio aas on foot, having liad his 
l i m e  killed), wlio stated tbat ths fugitives were of t l i e  nintli 
Y o r t u p ~ e  as wcll as thc eighth rcgimcnt, and that he hnd 
ineñectunlly trieil tu check tlieir rctreat. Idajoveneral leith 
addressed and succeeded in stopping them, nnd they cheered 
wlieii be orderd tliem to be collected and formed in tlis remo 
They were passing a9 they retired diagonally to ttli rigkt uf 
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the nintb Brikish rcgiment. Tho fwc of affnirs in thia quartcr 
riow bore a difFerent ilcpechy for tlie enemy who had becn 81e 
sssailnnt having dispertied or driven evergthing opposed to 11im 
was in posseseirin uf tbe rocky ernieence o i  tlie Gierm at this 
part of rnnjor-general Picton'u position witliout R d o t  then 
lieing fired nt him. Not a momcnt mas to 3ic lnst. Major- 
general Leith resolved instantly t o  athck the enemy witli tlie 
Lrayonet. I le  tlierefore ordered tlie cintli British regimeiit, 
wl~ich J~ad Iiitlierto been moving ritpidly by ik. left in column 
~ I I  ordcr ta  gain tha most radvnntggcous ground for ehccking 
the enemy, ta form tlre line, wliich t h g  did with tlie greakst 
prmptitude, wuracy, and coolness, nnder tlie fire of t l ~ e  
enemy, w110 Ilad j ~ ~ a t  p p e d  formed ou tLat part of tlie 
roclry eminence whicli overloolra tIle bnclr of the ridge, and 
ñvho had then for the first time percelverl the Britisli Iririgde 
nnder him. Major-general Leith bnd intended thnt tlie tliirty- 
eiglith regirnent sliou!d Lave moved on in rear of and to tlie 
IeR of tlie ninth British reegimcnt, to have turned the enemy 
hcyond tFio rocky eminence wliicli was qitite iitnciccessible 
townrds tlle renr of tlle Sieirn, while tlie ninth should have 
p i n d  tlie ridge on the riglit of the rocky hight; the roya1 
Eco& to have been poseed (ns tl~ey mcrc) in raerve. But tlie 
cnemy having drivcn wcy-thing h&re him in  that quarter 
aRorded him tlie advantage of gztining tlie top of the rocky 
ridge, whicli is wessible in froiit, before it was possibIe for 
the nritish brjgde t o  have r e d e d  tlat position, although 
not n rnomcnt had been lost in marcliing ta support tlie point 
rrttmked, and for that purpwe it liar1 m d e  a rdpid movemcnt 
of more tlisn two miles ~vithout halting, snd freqnently in 
rloulle-quick time. Tlie tlrity-eiglith regiment was tlierefore 
directed to form also and support when mttJor-general Leitli 
led tlic ninth rq'mcnt to nttack the wemy oii the wcky ridge, 
wllich they did witliout firing a sliot. That pwt mhich lookr. 
behiud the Sierra (as aIready stated) was iriaccessible mi 
afkrded the enemy tlie advantage of outfi anking the ninth ori 
the lcft as t l~ey  advanced, but tlie ordcr, celerity, aiid ooolness 
with which they attacked panic-struck tlie eliemy, who imme- 
diakly @ve way on lieing cliarged with the bayonet, and 
tlie whole was driveii down the face of tFie Bierra in oonfasion 
and with immense los& from ra destructive fire wliich tlie nintli 
rgimfint opened upon him aa he fled with preciliitatjon after 
the charp.' 
'1 JiaIl merely add two obmrvations on mhat 1- beeii 
maerhed in tlie 1b~fitahm. 
m 'First with rcgard to tlre codusion and setreat of a portion 
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the wing of the regirnent under major Birmingbam fled, from 
wb&t thnt ofioer snid t o  gc~neml h i t h .  Sir Jamea Douglati 
&ates also that (no cantlid man will deny that he supported 
the rop l s  an<t ninth regiment, though before that he my~,  
diat 'by an oblfque movernent he jojned in tlte charge.' I: 
rnigh:ht safely declnre on oahl~ that the Portupese nevcr showe<l 
tiiernselves beyond t h e  ridge of the Sierra that morning. 
Very faitlifully yours, 
JOHK CAMJCKON.' 
Ae these letters fmm general Cameron refer to  some of 
marshal Beresfod's errars, we1l aq Yr. Robinsonh, an 
extmct from A letter of colonel Thorne's npon the same snbject 
wiU not ba misplaced here. 
' B a r h  IfockgB, 28th Beag. 1834, 
Extracto-' Tiscount Beresford in the Ref~i07d of y m  
Jwt;fiu&m of y m  &ird wurlm,' has doubhd tha accnracy 
of the st.rength of tlie third d rqoon  g;i~arda and fourth 
dmgoons on the 20th llarch, 181 1, as ext;ractd by you from 
the journal wliich 1 lent t~ you. As 1 felt confident 1 liad 
not insefied anytbing therein, whieh I did not obtnin from 
om dcmmm%, tliat were in my psae~eon at the time it 
w~ written, 1 have, since the perusal of the Refuhtk, 
llmked ovcr Rome of my P~ninsuIa pwpers, and I nm happy to 
say I have succeeded in finding amongst t h m ,  tbe monthly 
retans of q ~ t ~ f t e m  of the division of crivalry commandcrl hy 
briqdier-general Long, rlated Loa Santos, Bpril 20th, 1811, 
wliicli >vas tben aent to me by the deputy asaistant quarter- 
mmw-general of thnt division, and wbich 1 bcg t o  endose for 
~ O U T  peru~ai, in nrrler t h ~ t  you may set! tho ~itaternent 1 have 
madc of the strength of that atorcc in my journal Pe to be 
elid upm, ~ I ~ o u g I ~  I b i s  lvrdsI~ip iminw-es lo ths mirmj, 
aniF that iit contains mnetJ~ing w w ~  t?~m ¿ I l a ~  d p d q  of tlw 
~ u ~ w e  of a colv.' 
k ' d ~  from mnrraad~vna of thd brnt& of Bwmeo, &N, c o f d  
Rr&r, us&M partw-mmtergmwal to t l ~  a e c d  di& 
s k  
'-me attack commeuced on tlie right wing, consisting of 
Ficton's fivision, by the enemy opening 8 fire of artillel upon 
the right of the British which (lid but little injury, the mnge 
behg toa peat to prove etfwtiwe. At this mement were seea 
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tbe heads of thc ~evcral nttncking columns, T H R ~  1 rrtrrm, 
in nurnber, and deploying into line with the most benntiful 
precision, celerity, and gnllttnty, 
' As tlwy formd on tlie plxte~u they wepe mnnonrided fmm 
orrr position, nnd tlie r@mcnt of Pnrtzip~eiese, either tlie eighth 
or thc lGth infantry, wliich were fornicd in advance in f& 
of the 74tJb wyimm¿, tI~re~v in some vulteys of musketry into 
tlie enemy'ci culumns in a fi ank direction, tiut tlie re,oiment waa 
quickly clriven into the positian. 
' More umhurded courage never wm display& by Frmk 
troops than on tltk occasion, it couid not huve been surpassed; 
for their colirmns advanced in despite of a tremendous firs of 
grape md miisketry from our troops in position in thc roeks, 
and overcoming al1 oppsition altliough repentedly chargd by 
Liglitburne's brigade, or rather by tlie wliole of Picton's 
division, they advanced, nnd fairly drove the B m r s ~  3ucur~ 
wing from t.lie rocky linrt of the position. 
' B&ng m ~ 2 p ~ t 5 - 2 ~ 8  of this critica1 rnommit, md seeing 
that unless the ground m a  quickly retorered tlw m$IJ ~&49& 
of tlie army wouId infdibh be turned, and the pd md, 
t u  Coirnliro m w b d ,  gccing nlso that 1icnvy d u m n s  of t,hhc 
enemy were desccnding hito the valley t o  operwte by the PO&, 
and to support the attack of the Sierra, and ta  cut off I o d  
Wellington'a communication with Coimbra, I iustsantly p1- 
loped off t o  the rear to bring up gcncrrtl Hill's corp  t o  
Picton's xnpport. Having proceederl abibont &o miles along 
the upper edge and rcverse side of the Sierra, T feii in mitli 
the Iieart of general Litli's cohmn moviag Ieft &.m frmd, at thc 
heud of whkh mas colonel C~meron's brigade, led by the nintli 
regiment. 1 immedintely rode up í% coloneI Carneron, and 
addressed him in an acxions tene as folloms. 
' ' Fray, sir, who commands this brigde2' 1 do,' replied 
tlie colond, ' 1 am colonel Carneron." 
Thcn for Goci's rralre, sir, move off instnntly at d& 
w&k ~ 6 t h  your brigwfe to Picton's support; not ans r n n a e p a b  
is to bc lost, the encmy in graat force are already in pogsession 
of tlie P.igJlt of €!te pocn'taon on the Sierra and Iiave clriven 
Pictonk itoops out ofit. Move on, and when the mar of 
your hripde has pmed tlie Cojrnbm road wheel into line, and 
~ O U  will embmce tbe point of a ~ a e k '  Colonel &meron did 
not hesitate m balnnce an ~ S T A N T ,  but giving the word 
doubIe-quick to Iiis brigade noblp led fhem to battle and to 
nctory. 
' TEie bmve coIonel athcked the enemy with mch a gdlnnt 
and irresistible impetnosity, that afkr some time fighting lis 
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recovered the grountl R-Lich Picton hnd lost, rnflicting 7 m j  
rluugl~ter oii tlie Clile of tlie enemy'n t roop.  Tlie nintll re$- 
nicnt Iiclinved on tliis occasion witli conspicuous gallnntry. aa 
kdeed dicl AL[, tlie RRGrMRNTR engaged. Crei~t nurnbers of 
biie enerny hsd descended low dona in tlte rmr of tlie position 
tu~vllrds the Coiruliizi road, tint? wero I c i I l d ;  tlie wliole positian 
\vas thickly strewd wit.1~ tlieir lrilld twirl woiinded; amongst 
\i.liicli m e  numy af o~ ozmb troryia. Tlie Frcnch wrt* t lie 
iinest mcn I crcr saw. 1 s ~ a k c  to several of the wountled 
inen, ligLt infantry and genradters, wlio were bewding tbeir 
iinliappy fate on hing defeltted, ttssuring me they were the 
Iicnies of Austerlitx d i o  lrnd ncvcr ticforo met witti defknt ! 
'R~REET W u m ~ ,  Liad.-whd* 
'DFAR SIR-1 I~avc j ~ s t  received a letter from colonel 
6hw,  in mhich he quotes a passnge from one of yoiirs t o  l k ,  
expressive of your wisli, if neceetiary, to piint a passage frou 
ü, statement wliicli 1 marle recpccting the conduct of tbe ninth 
refirncnt at I~I IR~~CO,  %nrl in refcrcncc to whicli, 1 lime alludrd 
ta the dismmfrture of die eightli Portupese upon the same 
occncion. I ilo nat exactly recollect t h  terma 1 made use of 
to  colonel S h w  (nor ludeed tlie ~linpe wliich my commuiiica- 
tion worc) hut, my objcct naa to  bring to  light tlie dis- 
tinpislierl conditet oI the n h t h  without any wish to unnece.9- 
s~rily obscure luurele which otherc wore, even a t  tlieir 
expense I 
'To acconnt for the &ir in question, 1 muId not howewr 
well omft to  state, that i t  was in conseqiienoe of the overthrom 
of the cig1itIi Portuguese, that sir J a m a  Leitli's British 
brigade was called upon, and it i s  remarknMe, tliat at the time, 
tliere was- a considerable force of Portuguese (1 tliinlr it !vas 
tlic old Lusitanian Lcgion whicli hnt? just becn mo(2cllcd intu 
two battalions) b e h m  T ~ i t h ' s  Britisli and wl~ere tlie eightli 
were being engaged, Leitli pushed on his brjgade douliIe 
quicl~, columii of sections left in fronh, past these I'ortuguese, 
nor did he Iinlt until he carne in contoct witli the enemy wlio 
h ~ d  r r o d  tJw JwiyIb rand were firina fmm beliinrl tlir: mckg 
tbe ninth wlieeled up into line, fired nnd chargetl, antl al1 of 
tlie eightb Porhguese that was to be seen, at lemt by me, 8 
cunpuny oficer at the time, wm some ten or a dozen men a t  
tlae m&&&, ~ 4 t h  tbcir conimanding officcr; bnt lic and thcy 
were amonget the very foremost in tlie r& of th ninth 


' Pd N&, 10lh Hay, 1833. 
Amrding to the first arrangement made l ~ y  lord Welling- 
ton, my lingnde only, of the tliird division, ivas destiued t o  
attack the castle Ziy acaltatle. Tlie two otl~er hripdcs wcre to  
have attaclretl the bastion adjoining the caqtle, and to open a 
commnnication with it. Zmever, un t 7 ~  duy &&-re the awazllt 
took place, this arrangement m e  clianged by lord WelIington, 
A French descrtcr from tlic mstle (a scrgcaiit of sappcr.s) gavc 
information that no communication could be estaliliaiied 
between hlie castle anrF the adjoiiiirig bastivn, tfiere Iieing (lre 
iitilted} oniy OnB communication hetwaen the mstle and the 
h w n :  upon larning tliis, the  diol le of tlie tliinl division vera 
ordererl by Iord Wellington to aitncIc the cnstlc. But. as my 
brigade only was originaFly destined for tlie enice, and wus 
t o  lead the attuck, tlie arrangements for the eqcdade wme in 
a g p n t  ~ ~ R I I C C  confided tJo me by gcnerd Pieton. 
"he division had t o j &  acmss a very narrow bridge t o  the 
attnck under a fire from tlie cnstle and the troops ia the 
covered way. It was orclered to commence nt ten o'clock, but 
by meam of fire-ha1Is the formation of our troopa nt thc head 
of the trench wa9 discovered by the French, d o  opened a 
heavy fjre on them, ñnd tlie a t h k  wns comintonced fmne 
mwsi l y  newly Iialf an liour before tlie time orrlered. 1 w 
sc~crcly wounclcrI in t110 foot, on tlic glnciis rtftcr p s i n g  the 
Ri~ilIas, almost at tIie commencemcnt of tlie attack, and in$h 
 es. 1 met f cton coming to the front on my Iieing 
crarried to tEie rear. IFtlie nttack had not ccimmencwl ti11 tlie 
hour ordcrcd, lic, I havc no daiilit, would hnvo bccn on tlie 
spot ta toirect in person t1ie mrnrnencement of the oyieriltinns. 
I have no pergmutl knowlcdge of w h t  took pIace afterwarcls, 
iiut Iims informed. tliat after sulmounting tliti most formidable 
dificulties, tlie escaIntIe wna effectcd by mwus of two lnrlders 
only in the first instance, in tlic mitldle of tlie night, and tliert! 
.can be no qnestion tlirit Picton wsgpresent in tlie sssaiilt. 
Iii giving an account of tlus operation, pmy benr ir1 inind 
ttiat IL comniantled $he ciivision, =id to hi?n nnd tlie enthu- 
siiistic vrilour nnt1 dctcrminatlon of the troops onght its suo- 
cess alone t o  be astributerl. 
' aours, $c. 
'S- K m .  
' C o h d  Napier, &,' 
'Phe other point t o  which 1 wonId &de b the bsttle of 
Salamana Mr. Robinson, d t h  bis baton of rn i l i t q  criti- 
cism belahours the unfortunate hirtrmont unrnercifully, nnd 
mith an nnliappp rninuteness of Jottiil, fimt place8 general 
Foy's troops o11 thc hft of tlie Frencli army and tIicn dcstroys 
tEiern hy tlie bclyonets of tlie tliird clivision, althoupli tlie píiiir 
man and liis unluclcy soldiers mere al1 the time on tlie rkht of 
tEw Fmncli amy, wrl were never etigagd witli tIie tliird 
tlivirrion at all. This is lron-cver but a slig1it blernisli for Mr. 
hbinson'a book, and liis compctencc to criticiss Marmont's 
niovements is no wliit impaired therebp. 1 wish liomever to 
pssure Lm, I l ie expression lie puts into tlis mot~th of the late 
sir Edmnrd Palcenliam i~ ' t t 2  c m  & 6m trova&.' Vulgnr 
swtlggcring wna no part of tlint arniahlc man's eliamter, 
whicli mas composed of a8 mucL gentleness, as much gen& 
rosity, as much frankness, and as iiiucli spirit arc cver coin- 
mingled in a noble mind. AIns ! tIiat be sliould have fallen 
so soon and so sndly ! ! Hia ansmcr to lord Wellington, wlicn 
tlie latter orderd liim t o  nttack, was not, 1 will, ing lord, by 
Godl' Rut witli the beitring of a gallant g ~ n t h m  d i o  hud 
resolved to wiin er perisli, Le ieelilied, ' Yeti, ii' you will give 
mc onc pq of that conqnering right 11~ud.' Rut thcsc fincr 
lines o€ chnractm do not suit Mr. Itohinson's caming of a Iicro; 
his mnnncr is more aftcr the cosrsc menacing idols of  the 
SoutJi-Sea jalilntls tlitln tIie delicate graciuus Iorma uf Greece. 
Arivice to  nuthore is p n e ~ l i l l  y thronn nway, yct &ir. Robin- 
aon would [lo iitell to re-ivritc liia hooli witli feir-cr iiiaecurncicq 
and fewer military disquisitions for wliich Iie is diaqmlietl, 
avoiding to  swell its bulk witli such long extracts fiom my 
worlí, csnd rcrnembering also tIiat Endisli coiiimissnrics Qra 
not fwm I U ; E ~ U P ~ '  to hc hnnged, or otlicnvise de~troycd nt t l ie 
pl'leaaiire of divisional generals. This will yave him tlie trouble 
of nthibuting to sir Tlioinas Picton a11 the standard jokcs aiid 
siriart sayingq,. for t l le  sciuing of those gentry, wliich havvu 
becn current cvcr sinee thc llmericnn war, aiid lvliich have 
prirrih~bly come down to  us from tlie GreeIrs. Tlie reductiori 
of biilk wliich an attentimt to  tliese mxtteis wiIl prodiice, inay 
Iie conipensated lq giviiig us more iiirorrntitiou of Pictun'ri 
r e d  servieag towads whicli 1 contribute tlie follorving infor- 
mntinn. Picton iii Iiis yoiitli serverl as 11 mnrine, troo~xs Iriciii: 
tlieu uset? iii tlirtt cepacity, and it is Iielieved lie ma5 in one 
of tlie peat naval victories. Mr. Robinson has not mentioned 
tl~is, and it would be ivell alaos ir Iie were to learu itnd tiet 
forth aome of tlio pncral's gcneroua nctions towarda tho 
wiaows of officerci who fell under his command: t h y  to 
be dismvcred, and would do more hononr to his rnernery Lban 
tl~ousand blustcring medotes.  With these climpe and 
irnpmvernents, the life O€ sir Thornw Ficton may pcrlinps, in 
futiire, epcape tlie quivocd cornpliment of the newspper 
puffcrs, namely, that it i i  ' a  military romance.' 
COUNTER-REURES 
9'0 
NR. DUDLET MONTAGV PERCEV A L'S 
UMiN SOME PASSAGBS IN COLONRL NAPIEñ'S HISTORY OF 
TKE PENINSULA WAR 
'The e d  thrit men do, livea after tliem.' 
IÑ my Hisisto~ of t he  Peninsula W B ~  I ~siailed, rtnd very 
jugtly, the public characki of  the Iab Nr. Peroevd. His 
t son has publi~hed a ddence of ib, dter having vainly endea- 
v o u d  in ra private correaponrlence to convince me tht my 
attiick m s  unfoundcd. Tlie yeunger Mr. Perceval's motive is 
to be respected, and hnd lie confined himself to  argument and 
auttiority, it \vas my intention to h v e  mlied on our correspon- 
dence, aua Ieft the siitiject mattar in dispute to the jnd-ment 
of tlie public. But hfr. Ferceval uqcd expre~~iong 11*11ic11 
compelled me to seek personal explanation, yet fmitles~ly, 
because he, unalde to see any difference between invecti-ve 
directed agtlínst the pnblia acts of a rninister, and t m s  of 
insult addresacd to  a private person, daims a right tn use ~uch 
expressions; and w M c  he emphatimlly ' rlisa~oms al1 rneaning 
or pnrpose of offence or insult,' does yet offer most grievous 
iiisult, denyirig my title to  redresa rtfter $he eustomary mode, 
and explicitly dccliniiig; he says from prineiple, an a p p d  to 
any otlier meapon t h a ~  tbe pen. 
It is not for me to impugn this principle in ang case, dill 
7.ss in t l ~ t  of a son defeiirling tbe memory of bis ht1ier j Lrit 
it @a me the right which 1 now msert, t o  disre,pd any 
verbal insult which Mr. Peroeval, lntentionallg or unintention. 
dry, has offmd to me or map offer t o  me in fature. When a fi 
gentleman relieves himself from persond responsibllity hy the 
adaption of this principle, kia l a n p g e  can no l o n p  mnvey 
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and we were obIiged to pay for evergthing in ths o m n o y  of the 
eountry which waa tho aeat o€ &e operations. It muat nok he 
foyotten, however, that nt that period the hrtnk WB restricted 
from malrinn ita papents  in spm'. Thut mmmodi a becam"" tlierefore exceedhgly s m c e  in England ; and ~ e r y  regnently 
wrts not fo be procured at d. 1 l idiere, tliat Smm the com- 
mcncemrint of tlie war in S p b  rip to tlic period o! the Inmentcd 
death of  Ni. Perceval, the ciiüiculky m procurmg ywae iras 
rnucli peater iban it wag found to be from the ear 1815 to  the 
end of L e  aar;  becnuse st tlie forme* p e r i d d l  intercoiirre 
sritli the continent wns  sus ended: iu the latter, cs soon os tbo 
war in Ihasia eornmcnced, &e mmmunication ni& the contiiicnt 
was in some degree restored ; and it became lese diíñmilt to pro- 
me spcRe. 
Bnt i t  is obvions th3,  from ~ome  canse or othor there vas rt 
want of money in. tho army as the pa of the tm s naa siií 
month in m a r ;  it drmimstanoe d i c 1  had never Len-heard 
of in a Britifih m y  in Europe : and lnrge mms werc due in 
dflerent parts of t h ~  country for supplies, moaw of trnns- 
-. 
port, &c. &e. 
17 on other points referred im in voiu let.ter, 1 hnve r~allIy no 
reooleation of hrving mndo oom l&i. I nrn wnvinced chat 
there vas no real gi'ound for t f iem, ae, I m u ~ t  repeal, ihu t  
thronghont tha mar 1 reccivcd from t h o  king'a servitnta wery 
enconregcmcnt and ~iipport lint: tIicy hnd in thcir pawcr to givo 
Uelieve me, dem sr, 
Ever ~ o u r a  most faifl~fully, 
7vIr~tt~ñe~oñ. 
B d l y  Mmtap Pmecual, Esp. 
T h i s  letkcr importri, if 1 rightly undenrtand it, that nny 
complainb, by whomsoever preferred apinst the ministers, 
and especialIy against Mr. Perceml, cluring ths war in tlie 
Peninsula, had no real foundatiun. Nevertheless liia pace  
and othcr~ clid malro many nnd vcry bitter conililaints, as tlie 
following extracts wlll prove. 
No. 1. 
M Wclliigtm t o  d f ~ .  Stwarf, Hhkter h t i p o t d ; a y  al 
fi86rn. 
' Rsea, T e b m a q  10€h, 1810. 
' I a prised govemmant moro t h  two monils oí' ow 
probad ra i i t  of mono and oE tLc neeessity t h t  a*e siiould I>r 
aopplicd. not only +t? n I;tr e ium h t  wjHi a rcgnlm aiim 
manililv, eys l  in amauot to tfe inmooso d capense oorasioned 
by tbc 'jnmeased subsi* f;o the Porhpese, and liv tlic jncreaw 
QF our 0n.n nrmy. llcy Ba~s ~ o t  aífended to e;'ther "f &se 
donnnn'~, and T mnd mite iteaeain. n n t  1 wish you n-ould mcn- 
tian tlic subject in gour letter to lord ZVeUedoy. 
F F ~  
No. 2. 
' FcLmaq 23rd, 1810. 
' It k obvioas thxt the m s  will fa11 aliort of ihom d i c b  
7iie Mg>sly'8 Gocwnmcnt Rape smgqed l o  mpply i.o the Por- 
Zugucm go~ernment, Iiut that & €he afusZt of bis Jiqkdyb 
C o m m w t  in RngTand, afid tJrq laave leen yeatededyl Pnfurmed 
that it wcss ?aeccssuy t i q  s7mlld send out m o n q  Ylie 
tiincb for the expcnsev aP tLe Britisli army are i n d c i e n t  in tlie 
srme proportion, md al1 tImt T can do is to dividc tlie deficiency 
in i ts  diic ppor t ions  hctwcen tlic imo bodica wliich nrc t o  h 
aupported by tlie f u d a  at our disposd.' 
Eo. 3. 
' Id, 1910, 
'In respect te [he 15,000 men in adrZition to those wLch 
Govmnmcnt did opose to maintnia in tliis country, 1 hnve onlp F to sny, ththnt I r on't carc hom mnny mrn tlicy sena here, pw- 
vidid tfiy m.11 svpp[y . i ~  wftld propwtionatc mana to fcd  ralsd 
pay ¿ h m ;  bitt 1 siispect ihey -ni11 füll skort rathcr t h  excecl 
*he thi* thusand  rnen.' 
No. 4. 
' Mamh 5th 1810. 
3 4 ~ "  Sdua*, irpeaking of tlie Portupese emipating, saya, 
' If L'ha detemination of ministws at heme or et.ml.9 Jm b&g 
mati'era to  t l d  extrcmi 3.' 
No. 6. 
h d  WeelZim$on to  Mr. S M ,  ;m reJerenw Go Cdiz. 
30th MarcFs, 1910. 
' 1 don't nnder~tmd &e arrnngment whicli Govcrnment h ~ e  
made of tLa command of tho trmps thcre. I hava hitherto con- 
aidered tliem as a pnrt of tlie arm-y, and from tLe arrangement 
~IiEch 1 mnrlt? with tlie Spaniñh government tho cost ns iiotbinp 
bot thiir png, nnd dl tho rnoncy praoured by i>iB was applimblo 
ta tlie servicc iu ths count~y. 11%e in~towdimollti lo ymiul 
&aRam alter t h i ~  entire[y, and t A  y LVB euw gcm so f i ~ r  as 
to  &*;re hirn io take rnmmres !o s~pp.?y flae k+@~iards mitb p o -  
m<sim.v f ~ u m  iAe ATlredilmuwa~, wlaeiatw 1 Imd insktod tbat th 
F'asiards eAo~&Fd feed mr h q x .  I Be jirst cmsequmce of thG 
a i - ra .qmt  wijli! be t k a t  4oe skall have no more m m j  from 
Cdiz.  1 had considered thc  troop at Cdix  50 rnucli a put of 
m m y  that I liad wiitten to my lirother to denire liis opinion 
wkeiher, if t h a  Tirmali aithrlre~ h m  Cadiz d i e n  tiiej shovld 
attnck Portugal ho thonght I m i ~ h t   brin^ into Portu~ul, ?t 
least the tmops ahich 1 has sent tliere. But L consiricr this 
now to be at m end' 

has dccided the donbt declaring tliis apart of  lorJ Welluigton's 
arm7, find saojng it i s  7 t le w i ~ h  of Gnvernmcnt t h ~ t  tliougli T am 
accond in command to liim 1 ahould bo left here for thc prcscnt' 
-' I l k  29 odd mougi; I m a n  lRal i t  dmld no£ Waw Iiea IpSl i o  
bis jwlpamt fo decide w b r e  Iww to .he mplqyed ; oiie moitld 
tfiink Re d d  j d q a  fully beft'w a d i n y  $0 C i Y m t d a ~ ~  t/mt8
pmph in '.tmagZu~d.' 
No. 10. 
h d  Wellinyhn fo XF. 8 h a d  
' 5, 1810, 
LHer &II s h  ,yoti iAe d&mlties mdm ~Aicla .ioe 
Edozc~  fx= wanl oJ' p v M L o w ~  m d  of m-/ to  hwy $hetn.".'I 
am ~ c a l l y  eslia~ncd tf w ' t i ~ y  20 dhc govmm*t Porti;pEse) 
upon this aul!jcct (d tlie rnil~tia), feeliiig as 1 do ihal me owa 
t h m  so miidi rnoney whicli r e  are imnble to pay. According to 
my uccount tlic militnry cheiit is now inclohtcd to tlic chrst of 
tlie üids nettrlp dW,#I. At ihe aame Lime I have no mono 
to pny *he army, n~hicli is approaching the end of the ~econd 
mhntli in xrrears, and which ouglit to be peid in advxnee. The 
hht and fmve  to the officrem for March 1s 8tiU due, and ws are 
iii debt everywhere.'-" The  mneiseralile and piliJhl manf fl m m g  
yrmenh me fmm dm'ng manr ~ H ~ ' I I ~ . P  whJI1i-Ii plñight and riiyht 
to  h. dona Sor t h  q f i l y  &le r ~ w i l r y . ' - ~  Thc oorps ought 
io Iio assembled nnd placed in liieir s~utions. Bu1 want of 
provisions nnd moneF oliligcs me to lclivo them in vinter- 
qunrters ti! tho last moment. Yef  anyll~ing faile, I8hmIL a01 
he fo rga'm. 
No. 11. 
Nr. Stmrt t'o hd: Welliigtas. 
' June 9, 1810. 
' 1 Iinva mceived 4x0 Icttcrs from &remen t ,  tho one rela- 
tivl: to Iimces, tlie other contnin in~ a lecter from %fr. Hamison 
of thc Trcasurp, nddrep~ed t o  colonel Bnnliury, in which, after 
rcfci~ing to the diffcrent eslimatea liotli for tlie Dritish sud Por. 
tuniese, and stxting the aiirn8 at ilieir dispond, t k q  not on(y m- 
elude tiiat P V ~  hctz~a more lham is absolutcly m w s s m y ,  baf sfutc 
q e c k  iu ha su scarce in. Xnglu~pid U¿ul we musl aol r e &  cmfu~lliw 
szcppliea fvmb homea and m c r f  contmt ourseZves with ~mii  sicnti ~ r s  
ro~nt..from Gtbralta~ and Cl~dix," &c. $c. 
' From lisnrl lo moutli wo may perhaps mke sliift, tnking caro 
te pny &e Portupese in kind and not in monep, iintil i l ie  
sup Iic9, which thc 'heas suv in t h r c ~  or four months dl Iio 
re,$, are fortlowing. T i ~ r n m e n t  deairc ma ta report to 
them any explnnation riehlcli either your lordshi or myself rnay 
s i  nhie t o  eommiiniratr on tlin a~ ib j~ot  f Mr. Rwriwn,a iotter. 
As it principully relates t o  m m ~  finunee, I do not fce3 myself 
g~uto competent to risk an o inion in opposition to what ihut 
gentleman has lsid dom. f ln,, A m m ,  so @en and r. 
strnn$y writtem to  f h m  fhe em6arrasmmt me al1 ldour  ande?, 
b d h  ~ e ~ ~ r t i n j  come I G ~  m q ,  that tbere rnii.oit. Iie some miscon- 
cel~tioii, or some: inacciirncy lias tnkcn pllice in calpulntioiia 
a!iich aro ao ftbr bull~alitlated by tlie Ekt ,  witllont olrliging ua l o  
gu iiito llic dctsil necessmy to  Gnd out whnt part of the atate- 
ment i~ erronmua.' 
n o .  12. 
Elle'mgtoa lo X I w t .  
' June, 1810. 
'1 remived from tlir! Secretarg of Shte a copg of &fr. Hamil- 
ton'@ letter to coloncl Bunbury, and wo bavc complctcly rcfutcd 
IiEm. Ho toolc rin ostimntc m d e  for Sopternber, Octobei; urid 
R'ovemlier, as the rate of expease for ciglit montlis, FFifhout 
ndverting Q blie nttwation oF cimirmahnces ocr~isioned by elmnge 
of position, incrcaao of  pricc, of numbcra, &c., and tAea con- 
clttdcd epun bis won slalement, that  we ougkt l o  huw vnoney in 
S m d ,  (Iiirving iacludeid in z t  by ~ I M  hye some a i t m  wltic8 we Jad 
aoi ~wRI:aed,) noiwitlutaadi7og €Iba% owr ddp'~em had bmn c m  
p l a k d  of L m i q  po~ t ,  and I hiad parriicuhdy &&ed i z  
h e m ó m ,  lfat eJíM,&M migiLi he seni out. and u m m  m n i l i i  
epml iia a m n t  t o  the inmemed Yortugicese szhidy.' 
No. 33. 
Diti% to  atto. 
' J m ,  18 10. 
'AIl our militia in theae provinces %m Q.Y 1 ? d e 8  and 
F3tTe ~7FinAo y &um] are disposnblc, an h wc midit thmw them 
npon tho cnemy's f i ad  in advanoe in thsss qurirters i h ]  
aud increase our means of defence kere and to ihc north of tlie 
Tapa  ~ c r y  much indeed. Br~t wc aean*o$ colila~.t fkem GX an 
amt flor m v c  I h  ~ c i t h o d  moncy a& magaziw~, a& I m WLW 
my kt legs in rqga~d lo doB.' 
B t t o  to Dato, 
* Dam8eT 22. 
'It iri useleser to oxpect more nwcy h m  EngIhnd aa ihe 
dcsirc of ooonomy hns ovormma cvcn tlls f c m  of tho Mlnishrei. 
and llc y Rava yone so J ~ T  as to deRre me i% smd R m w  ibe Iraas- 
pwts i m  mder do $ame m- I' 
No. 16. 
WelZim$on to R W .  
' 28th Jm*ay, 1811. 
'1 think the Forhgaañe are h l l  looking to msiatnnce from 
Englnnd. and 1 hwe sritbn to the king'a rmvernmont stronglv 
upon tha subject in Uieir favour. Bu( 1 rRoi~ld dwti2ie myseIJP 
iJCIbelímed .toe sbEl get aqthing, am7 IAm. if Xlcere to  tell ijicna 
me sIwt61d; t ñ q  muat, ti%ew$ore, look Eo their own wsources.' 
Ko. 17. 
Qetto to  Ditta. 
Jn m f w w  to t h  Portugxese iwwg~e ayat:mt Aim. 
'18th Fchwary, 1811. 
'1 think also t h ~ f  fhey will ba supported in the Brmils, 
and 1 hcswti m aoaam i o  &clicvs t h t  I akall l e  mppcrtcd in 
figland.' 
Ro. 18. 
' Ditta f o  Ditto. 
"330 Ap'l,  1811. 
'lf tfie Gwlmmmt choose t o  udedake lnrje snviees and 
mt mpp!g w* m'f A mflPi.mt peruniary mmns, aind leme i% we 
tke distnb&ion qf th wiees  &£A mhid  t h y  do m, T 
whwt ~ ~ C z b e v  o m  judgmmt apim Sbe distraliulimt jbr whicls 1 
mn bo Be mpmmilik.' 
No. 13. 
Bitto ¿% B # o .  
' 4th J*, 3811. 
Tho pny of the Bri t i~h troops is novi nearly two montha in 
arrears, instead of bejng paid onc monih in acivance, wconiing to 
his Majesty's regulntions. The mulcteers upon whose aervicee 
tlie nrmy dr ends dmoat as rniich m upon those af the aolrliem, 
aro sir mantcs in nmnrs ; t i la eco now v l l s  t o  a Iarp a m m t  
druwn by 16e cum.llaisire'uam in ffke ccrasatty o a  1Rs cumvn~~~~awj  
of LFsLon efi l l  wmait~íttg ampnid, $ wmikich delay thc eredit qf 
17u: Rre'tbh a m g  a& , y o v : m r m f  I-9 much impaiwrl, and yo11 BTC 
maro of the prcssing domnnds o€ tho Portuguesa govcrnmont 
l'm specie. Tliere is but littlc rnoney jn haiid to be applicd tu 
the ~ieveral srrpiees ; t h m  Rs no prosped tRut nny *vi61 be snel 
f r m  E~glmfid,  a& tho wlupliccs dm'eicd fmna tb mgulktios of 
lrilks Npon fhe treuwy at &diz a& LLám Bme 21- grlulu~aik7, 
&e~~a-ing.' 
Ko. m. 
i5.d WcIEhytm to lwd Welhley. 
' 26th JwfyS 1811. 
'dlthough fhere are, I undarstand, pmvi~ions in Lisbon, jn 
sdicient guantitias to lnst tko inhmbitants and army for a yar ,  
~ h t  12 ar 1 4 , M  F o ~ t u p a e  trmps which I have on the right 
bank of t l io  Tagw m literally stnrving ; even tliose in the can- 
tonrnents on the Tragus cannot get bread, because h e  govern- 
ment llave not money to pay for means of transport;. TJm 80 Zdiws 
Px fhe Rosjpifatals die hecatcoc %Jae a y m m m t  Imeie mi momj to pny 
far tlx Im.pi&al mceessaries fw tfam ; m$ i t  rcally d isg&iny 
!o r$ec¿ ,dipor Oe &*taiE oJtde distmsses owm'med i+/ tlae Lunaet~l- 
&le 2oa.lat of f m d s  to rwpport t b  rnm?~i$~e whiclc we huve put Am 
mfim.' 
' Eithcr Grcat Britain i s  intcrested in rndntainbg the war jn 
the Península, or slie i a  not, If ahe ia, t h r e  can be no doul~t of  
tlie expcrlicncy of making rtn effoort t o  ~ u t  in motion q-ainst tlie 
encmv tlie Ini~ge_rrst forcr: vrhich tlia Pcninaula cnn prodiicc. SIir! 
Spaniards would not allow, 1 belisve, of that active interfersncu 
by us in tlieir a&iss wKich rnight d c c t  and ameliorztc. tLeir 
cimmetances, bitf tJiad ca%*at be a r e m  flw doiny m t h i : ~ .  
Snbsidica given without ~tipulnting for tho pcrformancc of 
specifie serrices would, in m7 opinion, answer no purposo.' 
No. 31. 
Xr. Syddam ta MT. StmvE. 
' 27th S e p t e m b ,  1811. 
'1 take g e a t  &ame to myself for hping  neplecied so l o n ~  
mitin4 to you, &c., ht in tmth 1 did not w i ~ h  to mite to you 
unti11 could give you Borne nokion o€ the reaiilk of my mission 
md the mcaurcs which mr pvcmmcnt ~ o u l d  hnvc ibdophd in 
conseqnencc of the in€ormation and opmion which I brougl~t 
mith me from Portugal, Sut &d h a s  Iawa long I am fo wait i f  
1 do wt pam:fe h ~ O Z C  1n&iE 1 c o ~ l d  yive ~ ~ 0 t h  lm i ~ f o m t l n ~ ~  
~ohicA oec mwt natu~u'ally fi0 BO a m ~ i m  to ~eceiwe. &>om socelc 
*o Y M ~ I  hac. vnsiowly eapclcd t k l  sometdinnq iaould be mn- 
clzcderl, and 1 m reqrdarly deferred sors'ting ; Imweum 1 a m  noto 
so much in ymr de6t l h t  I ana u f ~ a i d  you will &~-ihate my 
8a'lenc4 fo inaltmfim rather 1Aam So t k e  m&aint?/ mul ;de -  
cisfun of vur urJ¿wfher poceedings. Durin the ton days agree- 
nlila m7qe in tho Amidr J mnnged  al1 fle ypeTn of informa- 
tion wliieh 1 lind procured in Portiigd, and m d e  ont FL paper 
on ñluch 1 expressed in ylain and sirong terms uii 1 thuught 
regnrding the s&to of n f a m  both in Portiigd and Spain. Tlicse 
npcrs, togetlier with tlic notes ñhieh 1 procured from lord Wel- 
Eiigtan und yourself, appesred to ma to comprehend everything 
irIiF1i the ministcrs eould possibly require, botli to form a deli- 
' bcrxte opinion upon evcrg p r t  OS the suhject; nnd to ~Ilape t h ~ i r  
fniure memurcs. Thc lcttcrs wliich I hnrl mittcn to lord 
JVeiiesIey cluring my alisenue from Englmtnd, md which :lid dcen 
regdarly subrnitted to tIie pirince, l ~ a d  prepai'ed thcm for most 
of 6hn opinjons which 1 hkad to enfriw~ on my nrrivnl. Lurd 
Veilcskg perfict h~ coimided ha al1 the Eeuding pm-ntB, and n 1 siiort papr 01 prvpasals ras  prepared ior h e  conaidcra~ion of 
Ilio cabinet, su portcd by tko most iotereeting paperrs wwllh 1 
urouglit fram 3 o r t u g ~ . r  
Tlwn followed an abatiact of tlie proposala, after wLich Mr. 
Sydenhm continues t h s  :- 
' 1 mnlly conccivcd that al1 this would have bccn conchdcd 
in a weelr, h t  a monfii Rae elupsc& and nottimg km yco h 
&me.'-'Campbell s i l 1  be aMe to tcll you that I Iiave done 
ereqthing in rny powar to pt pegilo Bew fo aftend to tJreir 
real interc~h im Pwtaga l ,  nnd 1 Iinvc clnmourrd for mone 
niouey, monoy in irery oEcc to rhiuli I hzva Lnd nocess. Ji 
nU niy clamour arid nll ing n~pmenta  X havo iiivarirtbly rcceiped 
fl ie snme msver 'tJu~t; iho tliing is impo~siblc.' 3 Iie prinm 
Iiimsclf cnrtainly npFcnrs to bo b &a k a u h r  des ci~cowtmecs, 
und lias ex re~aed I i ia detcminaiioii t o  rn&e cvery cxertion to 
promote t% gaod eams in «ie Peninsula. Jard TPeliesinj hua 
a pr@t compreAm~ion. of tfie n~!iject in i& fffille8t mlent, and 
P&fUCiL-?/ aware of dhe m e r a [  mca#?wer iohicIb Grenb &ii'aifl oqgdt 
unll cowId a d q l .  JaI ala ib tlne i la le of parties and d~ Ihe 
cmdifiom of tHs presmt gouetrewmi: that I reall-y dqnair qof 
ivi:tnes&a9 any decided and a d e p t e  effort on omr part t o  srnx 
tJae Ycnirapztlu. Th pe.smJ fce1img asear& to he tbut me hace 
done miyJlt?/ f h i n p ,  ~ l l ~ i l  al  fhnt .is i 7 a  wvr pww ; llaat tfis resf 
~le?ub e Iqj'?- to  al66otlnfmu~ Pro8idcnce, md that .if we do aot 
swceed we mv.t ronsole o u r s e l ~ e ~  by the rejccl ioz tlmt Pro- 
&dé.nm has mi been w pro$iuzcs l&s me d e ~ e m d .  l'laa's fcekiny 
ynw u:;ll v.T.llow i a  rndwJ~~dI?/ moral mtd Clarisli~21~li?re, Ii~t ~ t i t l  
rilofhing will Iis dme umiil we Raue ra more W+WOIM milita>y 
~ystsm, amd a rninisfrg. capable of dirding dhs r e s o w s  of tlie 
qiafim to somelhhg mliIer ihua a WUT oj' desccnts a i ~ d  embarik; 
ats'md.' 'Nothing CBn be more satiafactory tlixn tlie state of 
~ffnim in the north ; dE that 1 am tifaid of is thnt WQ havo not a 
rninislrp capable of taking advantqe of so fine a prospect.' 
Mr. Spdenham's statcment of the opinion~l of Lonl Wellc~i- 
ley nt the time of tbe negotiations wliich ended iu that Iod'a 
retirement in Februav, is as follorps :- 
' l a t .  That lord WeIlealey waei the  onIy man in power wha 
lind n just view o f  daira in tho Peninda, or o, militar y t h o u g t  
aniongril. tl~em.' 
'-2nd. Tliat he clid not apree with Perceral tliat &y were 
to slirit thc door tho Catholics, ncither did he a p e e  wiih 
Gxciiville tliat tLey were to be conciliilted Iig emancipatiun 
n-itliout semirities.' 
'3rd. Tliat Rith respect W ths Peninsula, he rpjected the 
notion that we wem to witlidraw from tho Penin8uln to husbnnd 
aur resomes st Lome, ht IM tls07~ggJLt a gmat deal m m  botli 
P7a m and a o w y  cozlld & d m  2r'La.w t h  Percmals udmitted, 
md he wsld no lompw mi wnder PaceuaE m'th eredit, or mmfop.l, 
w use to th.3 co~nhy , '  
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axd mt to mdmtaiEe rs m i c ~ ~ j b -  which t,tq cmmt 
o d e p a k  rnppfie8 D f r n o ~ q  a ~ < 1  a q  othp.  wqui*itc. &ha:: 
U ~ m n  wpon me a umg mplemant tusk, 'lld lmving t o  me k 
drridr wAat p w t i i w a  nf tL mmty w~hiela comw i ~ t a  the Amrh 
of lb mmmwsa~/-gmral, sRaGl &e a;ziplz'sd to  Ih ~ e r u i c ~  of tho 
Urilish a m - y ;  crnd whal shall he paid So ihe kizyk simislw, 
ia order to m h l e  ILim ino rnah  good fke Kngf q a g m m B  l o  
f h  Prnhpese yovern-t; a& at the #ame time t h t  t h q  
A a v ~  laid wpm me t l h  tu&, axd h c  lffl Zo mw.y on tilo 
wap or 1 cwld ,  lh  y Lave &y t h k ~  wrlt~d: mt of rcme of Cha 
resmrceu tohich I fiad.' 
' The Breliah n m y  Aave mt Eiempakt fm- m a d y  t h e  mmd7ta. 
TYe ozue leear7y a year's hiw t o  tRs vnukteers of the rsmay. We 
are ie ~t ffor wppiies ila a~i!  parts of t i ts  m a t y ;  aad we aw 
m the poind of frtiling ira o w r  pn~pmts  for s o m  mpplia cssm- 
tially necesga9 t o  bath m i e s ,  wlt¿cR mnod he p m m d  c x c q t i í y  
wUh mady m n g - '  
R'o. 2-4. 
T h e  following extrnctrr are of s lntm date thnn Mr. Per- 
ceval's death, but being retrospective, and to tlie polnt, are 
propw to be inserted Lera I n  1813 lord Castlercagh com- 
phined of some prooeedinp, ddescfied in niy Histoy, as 
hraving been edopted by lord Wellington ~ n d  Mi. Stunrt, to 
feetl the iemy in 18 10 and 181 1, and his censure eliclted tlie 
l~tters from Ghich tlicse extracts are given. 
Fo. 25. 
I;ord WeZEip~gtma te N?. Si&. 
' 3rd Muy, 1513, 
' 1 bitve xead yonr Ietter, No. 2, 28th AprjJ., in mhich yon 
have enclo~cd goma pn ers fmnemitted by lord Gnstlr,r:reqh, 
includin: n Iettcr from tEe Board of Trndo in regad  to &o pur- 
diases 01' corn mads bv your autliority in conccrt with me, in 
nraail, h e r i c a ,  md Bqpt. Whcn 1 see a Ietter from tlie 
Board of Trade, 1 run convinced h t  the lattsr o~mplaint 
~riginatea with tIle jobbing British mercliants at SisPion; and 
altllougli Iana deligAted lo see Ihe G a s e m m t  Sum Ilieir aften~ 
!lo?¿ lo tBe m&jct, m wi mili ccentually Barle m a 
huble .  I a m  p i t e  emviviced lltd we 8a.d wut  a drCOd optsd, near[y 9/ 
t h e e  years ayo, tlre gstena. qf mumres  nwu d ~ ~ u ~ ~ . u v e r i l  of; aot 
nn[y .irrourd J,E#fion aad ffie army nao? tlA purt o$ the Pmiwsda. 
hare riem damrl ;  Geti if we Lad, aewdizg to  tRe 8ug.gestr'ons 
of the nimmandw-in-ckk& and tlse !lkuwry, and ¡%e &ua~d of
Trcrde, cnrrséd m tramflclions of lg 8imi?nr maf~dre i 'hmyh tiis 
E R R T ~ S  ai: Li6b018 ahm referreed te, calling thcmsohc8 &?il i8~ 
aicrrlamts, the amy  ii.wl.d clave Leen m$pled im i t s  qverations wd 
dc;nendiv.y upon iBom wíno I wm'Iy Eidieitp 1x.w the wursf ri~hjerta 
tkut ki# ,1Iaj~ty Aar, alad enmnvua as t h  twpma~ is, ii wwld 
hure been vcry ?nuclc i~weased.' 
' In regnrd to the particular subject nnder considmation, it is  
ohmfou~ t o  mo tbat tlic ~1lt.lloritic~ in England Iiam tnkon a very 
mntincd viom of the qnestion. 
' I k  appears t o  me l o  Le exlraoldinarp that whcn lord Gautle- 
reagh rcad tho shtcment t h ~ t  the commisswppeneral bad in bia 
storca a ~ u p  ly of corn and flour to lnst 100,000 mcn for ninc 
rnonths ho s10uld not have adrorted to «ie h t  tliat the gentest 
p a ~ t  of tlie Portuqcse subsiay, indeed di in &e last ear biit 
£600,000, was psid in kind, ind prinoipnlly in com, nn&lint lic 
dioiild not linvo Bccn that a ~upply for 110,OíM mcn for ni~ic 
montlis m+as not elcorhilanl mder these circmstanc~s. Then [he 
Gowrnmrnt npperani tome to havc forgotten nll tLat pmscd 
on thr pnrticiilnr snhj~ct, o f  p i i r  purchnsea. T!&M adnrmiirgto 
dm'zcdfiorih t h m  ia saviy o starniing p e q k  dx&g tZe scawily 
of 1810-1811; iw  b1.lngiyy large 81~as  infa i!he mil i fwy clte,pl 
w k R  otlimoij~e woplld aot  havs mnd tH&r w q  t kwe;  and 
t:n &he rqfid nf monq/.'-' f f nll tllia be imrnc, ~lc-hich 1 
%elf,~e Tontava it in jour gowcr t o  proue, I o m o t  undcrstnnd 
w i y  Governnient find f d  witli tliese tmsactiuns, unlesa ii is 
that tliey are betrayed into ciisapprobation of them by merchantg 
who are interested in their bsing diacontiniied. I admnzit thad 
p u ~  ti* and mino mmld be mud Lctter m p l q e d  thaa %a 
, ~ m b t h n  ?P eom, &c. Uwi d e n  {t i~ m e s g u q  tu  cawy m 
aiz e x i m - v a  spfer ic of a m  tuiih ol ie-dib.  of £he m m g  i m  y m ' e  
whkA wu?d be eecessrwy to  camj i£ m, we mmt cma~ider qam- 
i%ns w d  Qdqt  rneaswee of thz8 8 d ,  and me myht to  Imre 
the cmtidmce uikd mppwt cf 1he Govmmenl in adyi i l i~  1hem. 
It ia only thr oiher dny that 1 recommended to rny &oi_«m 
sometliing of tlic s m c  kind to arisist jn paying thc Spnniah 
subsidy; nnd 1 lavare lldopled meanureli in respeet lo corn ünd 
otlier articles in Gdillicia, with a, new te gct a little money for 
thc amy jn tlinl; qiinrt~r. ;Tf tdeaio masurm w m  sot ndo~tcd ,  
aot mly aoesld it h imposdlc t o  gi@m t h  Eny's myugcineni, 
bu$ epim to m-t w m n  army.' 
XP. sh.dd $0 MT. & E d f ~ n .  c8th Mq, 
'TIiough 1 thank yon for thc lcttrr frem the Admirnlty con- 
tainod in yours of  tho 2Ist Bpril, I propoao ratlier to  d ~ r  
Governmcnc to tIio communicetlon oE lord JVellinqlon mcl tlic 
adrniral, hy wlinw deare 1 orifiin~lly dverted tn tlie suhjert, 
than IP continuo mp rcprcscntltions of tlio consqicncce ta bc 
expected from a state of tLiugs tlie nmy departinr.nt are not 
diqposecl to rernedy. My private Eetter to lord Cast!~reagL, 
rnelosing lord Tvcllingtnn's ohser~ntiona an *he letter fmm the 
Yb~asuq, wdl, 1 thirik, satiitisfy LB Iordship thnt the arrnngement~ 
wliich had bcen adopted for tlre supply of tlie armg arid popu- 
lation of tbia mnntry nrc of more importmcr: tlian i~ grnrrnlly 
imqined. 1 am i d e e d  cmwi*zceCI 1Iwt 7 t k q  A a d  h a  Zqfl ta 
priziate w c & a n t u ,  aawd that I h u d  mt t a k n  IAe mealasures qi-hich 
a* m d m n e d ,  t t l  m y  m?& Ame ernbarht? a& a fami?a. m& 
Brwe tnken p l m .  
Now if these complaints thns made in the dulce's I e t h  
written at the time were nnfonnded Es ~ C E ' B  present latter 
1P, f o i  60 mwh, dcfence of Mi. Percevat; if they were not 
unfounderl bis present letter is morth n o t h i n ~ ~  unleas as a proof, 
that 6 t h  him the niemory o£ good i~i longer-lived $han the 
mcmory of il!. But in either supposition the cornp1aint.s are 
of historimI inhrest, ras ~howing tlie dificulties, mal or slip- 
iposed, nnder which the geneml laboured. They are also 
aountl vouclters for mJr historiad aa~ertions, because no mnn 
Iiut tLe duke could Iiave cantradicted tliem; no man could 
have doubted their accuracy w Isss nutlioBQ than hia omn 
dedairition; irnd no men cmFd have Iieen so hnrrly as t o  put 
to liim the direct question of their correctness. 
Mr. Perceval objects to my quoting loid WelIesley's m&- 
festo, because thnt sioblemnn expressed sorrow at its apperarance, 
and denied thnt Iie bd composctl it. But the vcry pmsnge of 
lord Welleslcy'a speech on which Xr. Percevd reIies, provw, 
tliat; tlie sentinients nnd opiniona cif the manifesto were really 
enteLtained by lord  WelIesley, wlio repudiatee the ptyle onIg; 
wnrI repets, not that the stritement sppcaretl but t.hat it shoiilr? 
hw0 sppeared 81; B e  moment when Hr. Peiceval had becn 
killed. Tlie expression of this very natural feelin,rr, he how- 
ever took c m  t o  g a r d  from any mistake by re-nshsserting hia 
mntcmpt for 3fra P~crc~~,aI's political clinracter. Thus he 
irlentifid h i ~  opinionq with t h o s ~  contained in the mrinifesto. 
And this view of tlie rnatter is confirmed by those extrncts 
whidi I llave given frorn tlie correspondeace of Mr. Sydeuliam, 
no mem arithority, for he wns a man of high honouur and p a t  
wpacity; and hc wris the confitlentin1 q e n t  employed by lord 
Jreilcsley to ascertain and report upon the feelinp and vie5v.s 
of Jorrl Wellington with resliect to tlie m r ;  ailil dso upun 
those obstacles to his siiccess wliich were daily arising, either 
from tlie conduet of the ministers ~t home eor from thcintripies 
of their diplom~tists abrortd. Thns it nppears that if lord Wel- 
lington's complaints, as exhibited in tliese extractrc, were 
unfounded, tliey were at lea& so plausible IW to misled lir. 
Sy(vdcnIirirn on t h c  apot, and lord 'FYclleslcy at a distante, wnd 1 
niay well be exciined if tliey also deceiverl ine. 
But wns 1 rlecei\-e<l2 Am I to be condcmned as an historian, 
becnuse lord U'cllingtoii, in tlie evening of l i i s  lifo nntl ir1 tEie 
ense nnd fulness of Iiis glov, gcneroiisly forgets tlic cmsses, 
anrl rernemhcm only the Iienefits of bygone ywirri? It may 
be said indeed tliat his dificulties were real and yet tlie 
go~ernment not t u  blaliie, sceiug tlint it could not relieve tliem. 
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To thic 1 cnn opposo the ordering away o€ the Xee EXL- 
transpnrts, on whicli, in mse of fiilnre, tlie safety x4 ' 5 -  
of the aimy depencled ! To this I can oppose tlie DO. h'o. 1. 
di~crepitncy betivecn the public and private in- 
~tructions o€ tlie rninistcrs! To this 1 can oppme DO. NO. 10. 
tliose inost hitter pnssqes, 'lf mytJ~ing fccib i s l d  
m t  be fwqivero.'-' 1 Iiwa m -m to belieeis Oaat '" 'O' 17' 
1 ~Iatall b~ swppo~tcd dm Jh.91and' 
1 say 1 mri oyiposc tliesc pnssap  from the rlrikc'a lcttem, 
but 1 need tliern not. Lord Wellesley, a mnn of acknowletlgetl 
tdent, prnctised iii gwernii~g, well aquainted with tlie re 
sources of Eiidnnd and nctuttlly a member of tke administra- 
tion at tlie time, IWM placed in e bcttcr position to  make a 
sound jiidgmcnt tlian lord Wellington; Iord Wellesley, an 
aiubitious imn, deligl~tiug in power, and naturally anxious to 
dircct t,l~e po l i t id  mcssnres while liis brotlier wieldetl tlie 
militnry ~trengtii  of the &he; lord Wcll.sley, ternptcd to 
kcep office by nntiiral iinclination, by actual possession, by 
every mutiw tliat could stir ambition annd suothe the whiaper- 
i n p  of coiisciencq mtual1y quitted tlie cnbinet. 
RBCGW~ IM c o ~ d d  mot ~irevail os ,WK Pwmal to 8etppor.t 
t ? ~  war i t  ougict to be w o ~ t e d ,  a& L c d c k  t?mjb-e no 
bngw tGct aruh  I I ~ R  m311 crBclit, w cmfort, or w e  to 2h.z 
c o m l  y; 
3?ecmus6se tAe ww mdd 6s mairztaimd on a  fa^ pa.tm- s d e  
h n  dfr. Pwcmc61 na&n.fained 2, und i d  m d b h &  i% the 
d& and w m f i  not €o do iil; 
B m a w  d ? ~  eabi&, umd l w p a r t i a  MT. Percwab aa 
qf a w n  ccqid! , ,  J~td d d m  abiiity a& kmr~~tedpe  ta
&e a good plan, mor &per and dismtion to adqt mtlm's 
plvm. 
Do I dcpcnd even npon this anthoritp? No! In lord 
Wellinghn'n letter, stress is laid upon tlie wonl qeck, tlie 
\ u n t  o€ wliicli, it is implicd, ñFas tlie only distress, Licctruse 
Iir.rik notes wuuld nut ~iws on the caritine~it; Iiut severa1 
ex:rncts spcalr of corn and hovital storcs, nnd thc trnnsport 
vcsvcIs or<fcrctl home wcre ehiefly pnid in papw. Notas ccr- 
tsinly rcould not pass on tlie continent, nor in Englland neitlier 
fur h e i r  nouiiual \&e, a ~ d  whyl Because h e y  were iiot 
money; thcy were the signs of delit; the signs tlint the lnbonr, 
fi1111 ~)roperfy md htippincss of unborn milfions, wwcrc reck- 
Eecsly forestnlled by bwl ministers to meet the exigeucy af 
tlte iuornerlh. Now ~ximitting, which 4: do not, tli:it Iliiu 
csigency ivns real und uriuvoidalib; arlmittirig, wltich 1 do nut. 
that one gcntration has a right to  mortgage the Iabour and 
prosperity of aiiotlier and uniiom generatioil, it still remnins 
a question, wllcther a minishr only cmpowered by a cornipt 
olignrclry has sucli R ridit. And tliere can h no exmise for 
a man who, while protesting that the muntq wati unable to  
strpport tbe war as it ouglib to be supported, continued that 
war, and t h s  p m e t l d  to srnlr the nation in hol>eless delit, 
a.id riñlr thc losa of hcr arn~ieq nnd hcr honour nt the snme 
time ; tliere is no excuse for that man ivlio, whiie denying tke 
aliility oE tlie counbry to support lier troops abroad, did 
yet uphold all. manner of eorruption md cxtravngance at 
hornt?. 
Tlicre mas no specie 'becrinse the fictitions ruiuous incontro- 
vertible paper money system Iirad driven it away, and wlio 
more forivard than Mr. l'erceval t o  maintain d extend tlmt 
~ystcm-tlic banc of tlic hnppine~~rrnd mornls of the coirntry- 
s system which then gave pomer and riclies to d men, and 
hs siiice pluiiged tliousands of honest men into ruin and 
rnisery; a, tiystern w b h ,  swinging lLlre a pendulum hetween 
hidi taxes nnd IOTP pricts, ah c\7ery oscillation strikcs clown 
the l f tb0ri0~~ part of the communit;y, ~preacling desoIation fnr 
and wide and threatening to break up the very foundationa of 
aociety. Aiid wliy did Mc, Perceval tlius nourisli the accursed 
fliing? RTm it t h t  onc bnd king might bc plnced on thc 
tlirone of France, another on the tlirone of Spin,  a third on 
tlie throne of Naplesf Tliat l tdy  might be the prey of the 
barbarian, or lmt, net least, that tEie hateful power of the 
English olipcliy, mliich he callcd social order and legitimate 
rigl~ts, rnig1:t bc mnfirrned? Rut lo! his narrom ciilindty! 
wliat has Iieen the resdt? In the former criuntriehi insurre~ 
tioii civil war and hostlla inmion, followed by the free use 
uf tFie nxe uud tlie cod ,  the torture iind tlie secret dungeon; 
nntl in England it would hrsve been thc same, if licr pcople, 
more pomerful and enlightened in their pnerafion, liad not 
torn tlie baleful oppreasion down to be in due time trampled 
t o  [Iust tas it deserves. 
MT. P e r d  m pm-emhmtly m l&, &alm> and a61e 
semiiznt nf t ? ~  L-iag 1' 
To be the servant of the monarch is not then to be the ser- 
vant of tlie peoplc, For if the country could not rsñod to 
support tle wai as it ougIit to be suppohd mithout detri- 
mcnt to grcntcr intcrcsts, thc war ~ l o u l d  havc bccn givcn up 
or the minister wlio felt oppmssed by the dificulty ~boulci 
h e  resigned. his place to tliose wIio thought itfferentlq*. 

the soldicrs in hovitsl dierl becriuse there vas no 
money ta provide for tlieir necessities; the funds 
oE tbe country could not supply both, and m 
he directed his economy ngainsk tlle troops, nnd reserved Iiie 
extramgnntx to nourish tlic foul abuses at home. And this iri 
to be a pre-eminently h t ,  n d . ~ ~ ,  rclad able s m m d  uf t h  
iI-;ns( 
The wari the man who projected to establish iortressea to 
awo London rtud othcr great towns. Tliis mns the 
h e  f i r t tm m m  w!io muld not sirpport the war in Spin, bnt 
on, Pcoond 
.,, who did support the tithe ms in Xrelan?, and 
NO. P. who persecutd the press of England mi t l ~  li fem- 
city t ba t  at last defented its own object. This 
m the man wwho calIcd down ~ntl ict ive  piinishment on the 
Ditto, NO. 8. head of the poor tinman, I h l p  of l?lymoutli, because in Lis ignorant simplicity lie openly 
offered mQnC!y t o  n minister for a place; and this also was tiie 
mnn wbo shelterecl hlmself fram invcstigation under the vote 
of an uunefomed House ef Commonq when >Ir. Maddmks 
~olemnly offered t o  prave at tlie bm, tthat he, Mr. Perceval, hui 
been pnvy to and connivsd a t  a transaction more cornipt 
~ n d  far more miscl~ievous mcI iIlep1 in its nim tlinn that of 
the poor tinman. This is the Mr. Perceaal d o ,  nfter msert- 
ing, mith a view to obtain heavier punishent on namyln, the 
Ditto, no. 7. distinguished purity of tlie pulilic men of liia 
dny, cnlE~l for thnt henvy punirihm~nt on HnmIp 
for tlie aake of public jiiritice, and yet took ~he l t e r  liimoelf 
from tbat public justice under a vote of an unreforrned 
hause; and suff'erd $fr. Ponsonby to defend tliat vote by 
the plea that such foul transactions wew as ' g b i y  VA 
t l ~   su^ at aoola-dwj.' hnd this mnn ;S not to  he wlld 
fiictious ! 
ñfr. PercmaI the younger in liis first letter to me says, 'tlie 
good of my fathw k the mly  idmilmae JE hfl io IiU 
cl~ZIclm.' A rncEaiicholy inlieritance indecíl if it be so, nnd 
thnt hc refm to l i i s  pnblic reputktbn. Riit 1 find thnt dunng 
liis life tlie miniuter l'ercevd Iiarl srtlaries to the amnrint of 
aliout eight thousand ayear, and tlie reversion of a place 
worth tivelve thouaand a-yesr then e~joyed by his brotlier 
lord Arden. Bnd also 1 find thnt aafter his death, hia fmily 
rmcivcd a p n t  of fiftp tbousanrl ponnds, nnd thme thonstintl 
a-year fiom the public money. Nay, Mr. Perceval tbe son, 
forgetting hia former observatiun, partly founds his father's 
claim to reliutation upon tLs Iarge m o u n t  of nioney ao given 
tu his fmiiy. Money anci p i s e  he saya were profusely 
bestowed, monv to the family, praige t o  the father, wbcrefore 
hfr. P~rceval must have been an admirable minister l Admi- 
mbIe proofl 
Rut was he praised and regetted by san dmiring mteful 
peopIe8 No! the peolile rejoiced at bis death. Bonfires and 
illuininationa signalized their joy in tha cwiitry, sud in Lon- 
don nimy would Iiavo rescuetl Lis murclerer; n multitudesven 
blesserl Iiim on the sca8olrl. No ! He ms not se further 
praiaed by the Englisli people, for they liad felt m. seconti 
Zlis Iiezvg griping hand; nor by t I ie  pcopla of Ire- 
land, for they hrid p u n s d  under his harsh, his 
unmitinated brgohry. WIzo t,hen prtciserl liim l Why his 
coadjutors in eviE, bis colleagues in mierule; the majority of 
rt corrupt Howe of Comrnolis, the noniinees of the borough 
fnction in EngIand, of the orange friction in Ireland; those 
f~ctiona by wliich he ruled abnd ha(! liis political I-icing, by 
whose support and for whme mmpt  interests he run liis 
public ' mreer of unmixed ed,' unmixed, unless tlie extreme 
narrowness oE liis cupncity, which led him t a  push Ks horrid 
systern fmward too fmt for its stability, mrry be calFed a good. 
By fhe nominees of such ftictions, by men placed in tlie 
situation but without the coascience of $fr. Queiitin Dick, Mr. 
Percevd wris pmised, nnd the p n t  of money t o  
,m, 7, Iiis family was carried ; but there were mmy to 
opposc? tIie grant even in that house of eamptiw. rFhe 
grmt wm a ininisteriat mewure, and carried as such, by tLe 
sume meane nnd by the stnme nen, wliich and mho lid ~o 
long haled the daire of tlie nation for catholic cmancipir- 
fion and parl.rliamentary ref~m~ And yet tlie people ! emplia 
tically, the peoplel: have sinoe wrung those mcasures fl-orn 
the ffactions ; ay ! snd the same people Imtlie the very 
mcmory of thc mini3tC~ who wonld bave dcnicd Goth for 
ever if it hd been In hia power. 
' Jfr. P w m h  Xgotmj hirn fo oppe88 I d d ,  t5u.t 
his relipim did mt Bottw 11im fm pwse'ng a hw to pw& 
t h  imt~acEuctiwra of d i & w  i d o  P m m  dm'ng R pmtihee.' 
Tliis Iinsaqc in rny ñistory, ia lq the yoitngcr hfr. Perceval 
pronounced to Iie utterly untme, because bnrk is only ow 
d i c i n e ,  and not rnadicim; because tliere was no rgging 
deadly g~neral pestilente in France at tho time; and because 
thc me.wure wm only rehllation Tor Nnpoleon's IIilnn and 
Rcrlin decr- retaliating war wblch even quakers might 
wiuk at. 
W h t  the exknt of a quaker'a conscience on mch occasiona 
rnay be I know not, since 1 have heard of one, who, whila 
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avowed g~ound tliat iit wns toassert our sovercipty of the SEW, 
not our actiid power on that element, but our riglit ta nile 
tliere as -ive listed, Tliat i~ £o sroy, tliat tIie otlier people o£ 
tlic world merc not to daie traffic, not to daro move upoii that 
liigh r o d  of iiatiocs, not t o  presume to pwh tlieircrimmercial 
intercourse witfi eacll otlier, nny, not even ta communicate save 
uutier tlie crrri~rol and with tlie Gcence of Eqlatld. Now, if 
wa a c  cntloivcd by hcrtvcn with sucli B right, in the nume o€ 
al1 that is p~triotic and Engliali lct it be maintained. Yet it 
seems a strange plm in jiistifimtion of tlie christian >fr. 
Wrcevd-it seemv strnnge tlint Le sliould be applauded for 
proliihiting 7,lie wc of barlc to tlic sick people of Portypl and 
Sp~in, and Prance, Nollantl, Flanders, Itdy, md ndbe Ionian 
islit~ids, for to nll these countries the piriliitition extended, on 
tlie ground ofour riglit to domineer on the wido sea; aiid that 
he sliould ulso be appl~~uded for deslsiming apiinst the cruelty, 
tEie ambition, the dominecring apirit o£ Napoleon. I suppose 
we were appointed by heaven to mle on the ocean accorlling 
to our cnprice, and Napoleon h d  oiily the devil to stlnetion 
Iiis pawcr ovcr tlie continent W F  were cliristi~tns, 'tnily 
Eritish chrktians,' as the Tory phrae goes; rind he was an 
iiiíidel, a Cursican intidet Nevertheless we joined toge- 
tlier, wch undor our difcrent diripensations, ps! we joined 
togetlier, we figreed to tntmple ulion tlie xest of tlie world; 
and tliat trnde ivhicli we would not al1.01~ to neutral% we, by 
mutual licences, mrried on ourselves until it was diacovered 
tliat the siclr manted bark, sorely n-anted it, and tl~en the tmIy 
British chrivtinns prohibitcd tliat itrticle. We dcprived tlic 
siclr periple of tlie succoiir oF barl;; and without any imputa- 
tion un our chrititianity! no doubt hecause tlie tenets of our 
faitli p rmi t  ua t u  be merci1ms to our enemies provided a 
qunkcr wiiiks xt tlic ttct! TruIythelo,pic,thejustiac, nndtho 
cliris:ianity o£ this position seem to be on a par. 
All suírerinp lead te sickness, but we must make our 
enemies sufiiir, if we wisEt to get tlie lietter of tliem, let them 
give up tIic contest and t h e i ~  sufferings: wilI case: wherefore 
t l i e i e  js nothing in tlie ñtoppi~q oF medicine. This i s  Mr. 
Cohbett's argument, and Mr. Cobbetts words are adopted by 
Xr. Percewt's son. To inflict suffehg on the enerny ms 
tlien tlie object of the measurg and of course tie widcr tlie 
sufl'ering~presd tlie more desirable the rnmme. Now suffer- 
ing  of mznd iia well as of borly must he here meaned, because 
the d e d  and dying are not those who can of  themsdvee 
oLlige tlie governmeiit of a great nation to give up s war; it 
must be the d r d  of such sufferinga Pncreasing, that dispo~eri 
the great body of t,he people to stop the carew of their ralers. 
Let us then torture our prisoners; let ns destroy towns with 
al1 their Inhabitants; burn sliips at Fiea witli al1 their crews; 
carry off children rtnd women, nnd torment thern antil their 
fiiends o f f ~ r  peace to save them. Why do we natP Is it 
Iiemue we rIread retlation? ur becauae it i~i abhorrent t o  tlie 
u q e s  o€ cliristian natiunsl The former nndoubtedly if tlie 
youiiger hIr. I'creevnlk argument adoptcd fmm Colibctt ia jnst; 
tilie latter if tliere is sucL a thing raa cliristian principle. That 
principle once sacrificed to expediency and ttliere I s  ilotliing to 
ihit  tlie extent of cnielty in war. 
Xo mueh for Mr. Colihtt upon tha Jemit'~ hnrk hill, hitt 
one awnllow doefi not mxke a summer; his ' trne Englisl~ spirit 
and feeling' brealcs out on other occs i~ns  regarding Mr. 
Perceval's policy, and tliere, being quite unalile to r~nd aiiy 
~vealíness in him I am content to t n 1 ~  liim as a s i d c .  Some- 
thing more hoi~ever t.he~e is  to arlvance on tlie airhjiject. of tlie 
Jesuit's bark bill, ere 1 yield to the temptation of enlivening 
my pages i v j th  Colibettss ' vigorons sentencea.' 
Mr. Wiltedorce, no smdl name fimorigst reliaous men and 
no Fery rigorous opponent of  miniskrs, dcscribed 
Egp tliis measirre iii tlie t ions~,  M EL llill 'wlhidb mn'pld 
add to tlis fwocify a& unfeeIing clucrmler of 
&€, bzll c d !  no¿ poskbly pt un end ¿u ¿Jae contest! 
btl: Grnt hn mid, 'm  mig?d mfwe our J ~ B  bnrk &o dte 
Frmdb aoldks, we mig?~t Pnjkt pmim a d p m b i ~ , s  hy ~IIA 
acrimnay of OUT statuih npe7a t ? w ~  who ~ 1 0  suvd f i m  €he 
seeiwily of WUT, lut ihe cd~ultdion WLW cmtm~lille.' 
$Ir. WhitbreatE cliaracterieed the bill ns 'a rnud a h &  
&le mmmre eu,l~iI~tted to IioM tJ~e mmky up to univ~sai  
mecr&'m It united i ~ i  ttse~&testabb d t y  with IlOmrd 
p2icy: 
Lord Hollarid cornbñited the principle o€ tlie biIl, which he 
said Lwmld dist~e9s ihe eiwmim m d  ciLi&m of Spain amd 
Prwrtigcsl rncre tltm tia enmy.' 
Lord Grenville ' c a ~ Z  t ? ~  imwe to look mi7 mt tJm 
d m t i m  t 1 q  ebwe 10 receive as llze ~ ' c e  of tle J m r ,  
justic~> and S¿rnnn<ty of tJw m,nfq~ . '  Shen alluiiing to tlie 
spcccli pf Lord ~Iulgrnvc (wlio, rcl~udintrng tlic fi iinsy vcil of 
tlie bill heing merely a commercial replatian, boldry avowerl 
tlint it was an exercise of our riglit to ~eriart o diatever motle 
o€ mrfare ivaa adopted qainst us), lord Grenville, 1 say, 
otserved, tliut sucll a doctrine dríl not a little surprise liini. 
0;' micE hc, ' we are ut w n ~  witin'l~a tha E& fndzanas, a?-.e m €o 
d p  OUT BBcam t h  Jradifim scrdpi owr m ? TT!m 

Snch wsbi the mligious, moral and political chnracter given 
to this bill af Mr. P e r d s  by QUL own statesmea Let us 
now liar the yet more solerndy recurded opinion of t he  
stntesmcn o$ snother nation upon $Ir. Pcrce~nl's ordcra in 
conncil, of mhich this f m e d  a prt, In $he Americnn 
president's message to Congess the following psssages 
occur :- 
' The gorcrnment of Gmt Rrihin had already introdnced 
into her commerce during lar, a wystem zulce'cl~ d ance &da& 
tJae a'qhls wf otlw nutww, u& ~wtireg ora a w a  o f p r -  
j u y  and fmgwy, m k m  io otlw times, wm naalFiq a78 
u?zfmtunut~ proOTcyses8, in wxderminiv t?wae jwinci>k of 
d i t y  and wIigim zaI tk7b me the b e s ~  f h t i o m  af 
wtW Jdappims.' 
Une more testimony. Nnpoleoa, wlio~e authority, wh& 
wer Mr. Peroevd and men of bis Ftsmp may tliiiik, will 
dwap have rr mandedul iiifluence; K~poleon, at St Rdenq 
declared, ' that postei-ity would more bitterlp reproacli hfr, 
Fitt for the hideous school Iic left liebinrl him tlim for any of 
bis O w I l  &S; a ~ch001 ~ ~ a ~ 7 J c e d  h?/ E/& ir#Olmt mocJ~ecWdUm, 
i ta  pofmnd imwrdity,  i t s  cold mptimn, da m t q t  fw t 7 ~  
%~&ei7sg of m am.d tlsei j2abice qf' i!~iqs.' Mr. Pereewl waa 
an cniinent rhmpion of tliis hiileous scl~od, mliich we tlius 
find tlie lending men of Englund, Fmnce aod America 
iiniting to condcmn. And aliall e rnnsty Latin provcrli pro- 
te& siich a lioliticim from t!ie avenging page of historyt 
Tlie Iiurnan mincl js not im Ise so fettered. AIswtdy the wofi  
al retributiun ib: ir1 progreess. 
Mr. Pcrccval thc poungcr, with sorn~thing of frituity, h f h  
called up Mi-. Chbbett to tcstify to his fatlier's political merit. 
Commending thnt nigged monitor of evil atatesmen for his 
'Ggwou9 ~erdenm; fur liis 'veal Emglid qi.id and fcelh~g,' 
he cnmot nom dcmnr to his niitliority; let 11im then rcnd and 
reffcct deeply on tlic folIowinq pmsnges from thxt cmincnt 
writer'a works, rind he may pcrliaps disco~er, thnt to defend 
his futlier's politicnl reputntiou mith success will prove a di%. 
d t  and complicahe tmk. If tlie liassages are pninful to  llr. 
Pcrccval, if tlie lcsson Xg aeverc, 1 nm I I O ~  to tilnmc. lt ia not 
1 hiit himsclf nrlio lins callec1 iip the miglity secr, md if trio 
stern grim spfrit, thus invoked, will not ceiise t o  spcuk until 
sll be k ld  it is not my fault 
BXTRA11TS FROM >[R. COEi3EWS WRITINGS. 
[History af Qeorge IV.3 
.E&& 1.-Of Mr, P m a l ' s  laarshwss. 
9 n t  there now camb aman amo@ them who B O O ~  snrpassed 
all thc rest in poírcr, a! me11 as In imgudcnm and inaolcncc 
tomrcls tlie people. Thii sas  that Spencer Perceval of whose 
~ignal death we shdl Lave to speak lo and bye. Thia man, a 
shorp Iawyc~, iniired from I i i s  fiw t days at thc bar to t l ~ e  carry- 
ing oa of strate prosscutions: is sort of underslrap er in Loiidon, 
to the nttornegs-geneneral in Lonbn, md l'rrqucntb thek deputy 
in the counties; a short, spare, pde-faced, hard, keen, aonr-loolr- 
ing man, with 8 voicc WCU anitcd to the rest, with moras in 
at i imbce at his commtbnd, with the industry of a Iaborious 
attoruey, with no knowledge of tbe great interest of the nncion, 
foreign m domestic, biit with a tlzorongh knodedge o€ tliose 
mcnns by whicli powcr is obtaincd and prc~crved in EngTand, 
ltnd with no Iroulilesomo ~crupbs as to tte employmsnt oC tliose 
means. He had Iiem solicitar-general nníler Pitt np to 1801, 
and atfmney-general rinder Addingtnn md Pitt up to Febninry, 
1806. Thi6 m n  bccamc thc advuer Qf ihe princezs, during tlic 
period of the investigatiob md coi.respndence of which we have 
'ust seentIie history; and w we are now about. to eee, the povier h. obtnincd by tlio moans of tliat oíñoc, mode Aim tlw prim 
minGter of Xitgland to  L duy of A& dsath, though no more iit 
for tliak oolce tlian m y  otlier bmrister in London, taken by tossing 
up or hy lralloL' 
i T x t m t  2.-Qf Pmmvars 'silliberal, f m h I  a& cwoibarl 
p0ZiLy. 
' W e  hnve flcm thnt tho king waa told that thc publimtkn,' 
(the pubrication of  tlia princcss of Vdes's justificztíon) ' wodd 
take p l m  on the Monduy. T h t  Monda wm iRe Y f b  of Xnrc16. 
In this dinioultp alint aas to hi. clonpg Tha Wliiq rninistry, 
witb thoiir oyca fixed Qn thc p b d k  eopeedy silccesrim qf tlte 
prime, or at bast, JGW. w.9miun [U pvww, the klug haviq recwntly 
been in a very ahatry state; the Whig minisiq, with their mes 
fixcd on thia cxpcctcd ovcnt nnd not pcrcciving as Pcrccral dici. 
tLo powm that lhe aanpbZided losB [for ' Tlie Book' it i s  now 
callcd) woesld give thm wit8 tIe priws as weli as ñith tlie 
king, the IVhi ministry mnuld not consent ta the terms of tlie 
priusesa, ih&nF tw, that in spitc aP her sngur md Ler 
tlireats ahe would not t h o w  a w y  t l o  acabbard m tewarda tlic 
king. 
Xn t h  meanwhil~~ howe~er, Percevd, wboll nnknomn to the 
Wi,igs, Iisd got tlic book aohinilyprintd auK louad np *a+ 
f i  pirblz'cmtP:lin, and it ia clwr tlint it TTBS intei~clpd to hri piih- 
lishcd on thc Xonday nrimed iii tlio princces's lcttor; namely, un 
tlie 9M of Hurelb, U V ~ C S F  l ~ r ev~n t rd .  bl* tlie kiriy'a ic ldi~t~g fa 
e e a UC did yield, thsi ia to say, E i-sul~i d 

minister~ under the rcgont thm they expected the end of &a 
world.' 
' I3ut a very aolid reason for not hmhg out PEECEVAL was 
fonnd in the power which he had with regara to tlie P ~ r s c w a  
and tho 3300K. Ho bad, as has bctn before observecl, the 
powor of liringiug lieF forwlvd sud m a h g  lier the Lriumphnf 
nvd of her hiisband. T l i i s  wer he h d  compleocly in his 
hnnds, bnckod as Iic wns hy % indipnnt feeling of on cnter- 
rising, brnuo, nnd injurcd womon. But it wsa ncoossarg far  
iin to do something to keep t l i i~  grcal m-nd tenilic pvwer m Lis 
own hnnds. If he lost tlie prinwss lic lost his only prop ; and, 
evca witliout losing her, if hr! loat the hoolr, or rather, if tho 
scorets uf tlie book esoapea md becmo pirblic;, he thcn Iost hig 
power. I[t W+M iliereTore oT Che peatest imporknce Lo k t  t h t  
nobody ~houlci posaes8 a copy of ths  liook Ibiit limsv! 
' Tlie wnder will now please to him bmk to pñrqrtaph 73. 
whicli he wi11 h d  in chap. 11. He wiii tlicre iind that P c r ~ v a l  
ousted Ilie Whip by the means of the book, and no!, by the 
means of the catliolic question, m the hoodwinked nntron wera 
tauglit to hcliovc. ! i l c  boolr had bwn pnrchascd by Pcrccvd 
his i~ l f ;  it had been printed in a considc~able adition, by blr. 
Eclwmds, printer, jn t h  Strand: the whole edition liad lieen 
piit into the h n d s  of a bokaeiier ; the da of pnblication wm 
urtmod, thilt boiog the 9th of UInrcli, 1807; buut oo the 7th of 
AInrch, or thereabuuta, the king d e t e d n e d  upon t m g  out 
the Whi~s  and takina in Perceval. Iusktly PBRCEVAL En 
preesod THX: BOOIC; took the ediiion out of iúe han% 
of t h ~  book~eUei~s, ttiinltin that he liad e m r y  copy in hin 
own possessioo. The aloryfss beeo in piiot aliod lus having 
liunierl the books in tlle wurt ymd o f  his conntry Iioiise; but ba 
thia aa it may, hc ccrhinly tb cam to  have tiionght that no ono 
but hi~nself Iid a wpy o£ $&E BOOR. In tliis howeser ho 
waa deceived; far severa1 copies o l  this book, as maay as four 
or five at leaat, were in the liands of private indivirluals.'-' Yo 
gct at theso copics advesti~cmcuts appcnred in di tlio public 
papers, as eoon as the prince l id delermined to keep Porcevd 
ña his niinist~~. Theae adi-crtiscmcnta lninly enougli dcamberl 
tho contont~ of thc book, aad containefoffers o€ high pricei far 
tlie book Lo BU& persons as might have a copy to diqioea oT. In 
this manner tlie copies vera liought up: ono was solíl for 8300, 
onc or two fot ;E200 each, ano for %lMN, and the last for 
;E1500.' 
XxtrQck 4.-0f M?. Pmcaial'~i Iara7kaps m d  illiberdity. 
- 'Tlini Perceval really rirled the coiintry in precisdp 
what manner he plcascd. %*Lole troop of viotims to  tlie litid 
Iavi were crammed ioto jzils, ths corrupt pwL oC the press was 
more audncioiis tlian ever, and the otlicr part of it (never very 
considcrnblc) was rcduecd ncnrly to silencc. But human cnjoy- 
mente of ever devcription are of  mccrtain driratiou: politicd 
power, ahen gunded un force, ia of a nature still mors mutable 
than hnmiln ~njo-penB jn general; of trliich oliqervations tlih 
hau~hty  nnd insolcnt Perccvnl was de~t inea ,  in the spring of 
1812, to affurd lo tlie world a strilring, a memor~blc, and a most 
n r f u l  exaniple. He liad got po~session ef tlie hipliest oficc in 
tlie atate, hy Rs'a s w e t ,  re la t i~c ?o t1ie princess nnd lier BOOlC, 
kud ~ccurcd bis influenco witli tho princc regsnt for tlieir joint 
iives; Iie liad h n t  tlic proiid I I C C ~ S  of IIle landlorda to fine, in- 
yriaonrnent and kmsprtat ion,  if tlicy nttemptcd to rnalce 
inroads on hia systcm to eupport thc all-mmtiptiiig nper-moncy; 
tlie ress he Lad exlinguishcd or liad rendered t 'Z, e tool of bis 
nbsoite wul; tlie mort emiuent m o n g s t  *be m r i k s  who 
op o s ~ d  him, Cobhett (tlie aiithor of tliia liistory), Leigh and 
~ o r i n  Hunt, Enncrty. Drakard, Lorel, togotliur witli mmy 
morc, Mere clooeelg sliut u in jnil, for long terms, wilL heavy 
fines on tlieir LienUn ond Pana bnii at the tcniiinntion of thnr 
jmprisonmrnt. Not contcnt vitli di tliia, lie rneditated tho 
coin Ieto aubjugation of London to  the control and cornmznd of 
a mí!itmy force. 'Toí anly did lia meditnte «lis, but liad th-e 
nud~citp to pro osle it t o  tlie arliament; aiid If his life liad not 
boon uzkcn in tic eroning oBtha 11th af May, 1811, ho, tiint 
very evenin~,  aas goiiig to proliose, in duo form, a resdut,ion for 
tlie establiñlirncnt o£ n pcrmnnent amy to be stationed in ,72w 
lionnc-pnrk, for the openly avowed purpoae o f  keqing t h  metro- 
rnlis ha rn8. 
Edrad S.-Mr. Pmemal'a uq~opularity. 
'Upon the newe of the denth of Perr~val ammving nt MOtting. 
ham, ut Lcicester, at Truro, nnd indeed all over tLe wuntr 
dernonstralions oF joy aere sliown by llie ringing of LcUs, t% 
. makiaking of bonfirec, snd tfie liltr; and at N~t~tingliarn diculmly, 
aoldiirs wcro onllod out to  disperso thc peoplc upon &o oocarion.' 
-'At ilic place of exccution, the yrisorier (llellinglianr) 
il~nnked Gad for ha~ing  enlibled Lim to meet hia fate sith so 
rnuclt fortittidc: nnd resi_nnntion. At tlie mornentwhen ths liang- 
man aañ rnaking: the usiial preparatious; at tho moment that he 
s a s  going out oi fhe woiild, at tlie moment when he mas expct-  
jng erery breat,h to be Iiis last;, l i i ~  eara were rulliited with-God 
Iilcgsyo+~, God blm ym, God Almiylify Iilesaym, God Ahiyhty 
Iile8s yi~tt! isrtuirig from the lips of niany thousmds of perauns.' 
-'With regad ta the  fa^$ of +he offender going oiit of tlie 
world arnidst Uic hk!$~ings of thc pe Ic, 1, thc audior of this 
liis~ory, oaii voiiah ior i ~ s  irutii, hñvinF?een an eye aad e u  i.iL 
ness of Qs awf~tl and most memorable ricene, standingl :,a 1 d ~ d ,  
nt tJis window rif tlint prisnn outof wlricli Iio wcnr; to hr: executcd, 
and into wlu~h 1 iiud bcen put i. consequence oE a pro~ecution 
ordered by tliisvay Perceval, and tbe: re~uli ot'wbich pmecntion 
wati a wnknce to he impriaoned faso P ~ T P  amonpt fitlona in 
Ncwgate, to p q  a fhouaond p u u d  ta di k n c e  Brgent ni  tha 
eud ol the two years, and to be held in Iiondu lbr scAoen yecw$ 
aftewarrlrr; al1 whir:li n-ns execiittd upon me to the very Irtter, 
except h t  I rsaceied mysclt from tko ~ociety of tLe feIona by a 
cose of twenky guineas a week, for the h m d d  and fw mBRs: 
and 811 ttus I Iiad to euffcr for Iiaving publiehed n a r a p p h ,  in 
vhicli 1 erprersed my indipation nt thef o: ing af%nglisliloeal 
militiamen. nt t h e  town af E! ~ n ~ ~ n n f ,  ql der u gwnuord of 
llanoueiian iioyonrk From lk:Causo I wan placed in a situa- 
tion to witness tLe execution of tkia unfortunate man. The eraxd 
wns nssembled in the open IIPRPR just unrler t h ~  window ~t which 
I ntood 1 irmv the nninow laoka, 1 saw tho hdf korrified connte- 
nances; I eaw tLe mournful tcars nui down; and 1 keard ths 
unanEmons blessings.' 
'Thc nntion wnq p o w n  hcnrtily tired of  fho war; !t despaired 
of sceing an end t o  it uwjthout utter ruin to ths countr,~; the 
expendilurc wa3 arrived at  an amouat that frightened evenloan- 
mwEers and stock-jobbeis: and the shock aiven to people'~ 
confidcnce by Perccvnl'a recent acta, whieh liad pmclamcd to 
tlie wkolo wodd the fact of the deprwiation of tlie aper money; 
thcse tliings made wen the pretended excluiirelTi>oya18eiretiy 
rejoice at I i i ~  deatlt, mhieli they codd not help hopingwould leud 
to some very rnihrid changa in tha managmg of tlie aihiirs of 
the country.' 
xxhact 6.-Cy" NT. Ijymlfl, tke T i m a  
'1 ahall now address you, thongh it. need not be much at 
length, upon the suhjeot of lord Cnstlere h'a con- 
doct. Tlie business nss bmught f o r a a x  by lord cObbtt'8 
drchibalcl Hamilton, ~ l i o  conoluded Lis a eeeh wjth 
moving tbe following resol~ions;  $lo. b l in t  it a-ppeam ta &e 
Houss, fiom 11io e~idenca on t11s table, that lord viacount Castle- 
r q h ,  in the yctw 1305, sliwtlv aftcr he had quitted Ilie sltus- 
tion of Preedent af tlie B o n d  o€ Cmtrol, nntt Iicing a Priq  
CeunciIlor and Secretary of Statc, did placa at tLe dieposnl of 
lord C!ancarty, a meniber of the same board, the nomination to 
a mitership m order to facilitate his promwing a seílt in Parlia- 
mcnt. 2'. Thnt it was owing to n dis~grccmcut amone tho sub- 
ordinate pmties, tliat this Irmeaction did nol tako elTixl; and 
3'. that by this conducf Iarrl Castlcrcagh had Seen pi l ty  of a 
groao violntinn of l i is  dnty as a serpnnt of the crown; an abuse 
of Lis pntroronnge as Besident of the Bourd o f  Control; and an 
attack u on the purit of tha t  IIouse.' " 
A ~ e l f  but wbat d d  ththo Howe v e  to P Why, !o tFa; 
' bsolvcd,  thnt it i~ thc dnty of thia House t o  maintnin a 
jealo~s ygua~d o\+er the p h t y  of eldim but consideiiog triat 
the attempt of lord viscount Gaetlereagh to interfere in the 
eleetion of n mcmlier I d  no t h m  mcce,yfut, tltia Rouse doca not 
consitlw it necessary to enter into my mimind proceedings 
ag"~st h.' ' 
'Yow. tlien. let ua see what was done in *he case of Miilia IEamlK the tinm~n of Plpmth, who offercd a bribe to 
Arldiugton, when tlie lutter wria minisler. 'I'l~e case iras tks: in 
tlie yem 1802, Pliilip Rnmlyii, a tinman of PIymouth, m o t e  a 
ietter &Ir. B c q  Addington, the Pirst h d  of thc Tremury 
and ChanoeITor of the Exchequer, offering h i i  the anm of %20QO 
to give him, Hmlyn, tlie place of Lmd Si i rve~or  of Gustorns at 
Plpmoutlr. In mnscqumce of this, n criminal information ma 
filed ag,&st the said Harnlyn, by NP. Spmcer Pwceval, who 
was then tlio ILing's Attorncy Gcnerd, and ~ h o ,  in plcading 
npinst tlie oirender, assertd tRe dbtiigsi~hcrE crify fl msvvrs 
inpomm irz Ihe prrrent do/.  Tho tinrnnn s o n  Emd' giiify ; Us 
'AW ~sontrnced to pay a iina oF 2100 to the kiag, snd lo be im- 
risoned ros tbree montlia. His tusincss was niincd, and he 
Ruiiecif ded,  in n fiw montiis a f t r r  his rricnse fmm prison. 
' 
"XIam1g.n ooiiiB~scd his gnilt; ltc stakd, in hia nfidavit, that 
he sincere* rqiented oT liis mime; i l~at  he wna forly y e m  oP 
age; that his business was the sole menna of supporting himself 
and fmily; tliat a severe fiidgmeat might be t,he total ruin oP 
liimsclf nnd that famiIy; nnd tliat, thcrcrore, hc tl~rcw himself 
unou anti implored tlio mercy o£ his proaeciitors and Elie Gourt. 
I n  reference to this, Mr. Percr~rrl, 1he prwent Cha~cellor of the 
Xzthlopm oliserre, said: 'She eirciimstmcea which the dcfcn- 
dant disclosrs, rcspocting his own aituation in lifc and of his 
ftlmily are al1 of tliem topics very mcll dapted l o  a k t  ths 
private f r~l inge of indtdi ir i ls ,  and as far as that considcration 
goes, notliinyr furthcr nced be said; Iiut, them wodd htlvc bcen 
no prosecution at  d in tlYs case, upon the groiiud of personal 
feeling; it was s e t  on foot upon p u n d s  of a public n a b e ,  and 
thm s ~ i ~ i t ;  in which tlm prosecution originatcd ~t i l l  remaina; it 
is thorcforo, submittcid to your lordsk~ps, not on a point of 
individud feeliiig, Iiut of mmxc JUSTICR, in mliich caNe your 
lorrl~ihipo will considar how Kxr tlio nffidavita ought to qcrate  in 
rnitigntion of punishment.'-' Far lord Arcliihdd Hnmilten's 
motion, the spealcers nere, lord A. Hamilton, Mr. C. ?Y. IYpn, 
lcrd Rtilton, Mr. IT. Srnitli, Mr. Grattan, hlr. Ponsonby, air 
Xiraneis Rurdctt, Mr. Whitbread, and Mr. Tierna , Agah.vf 
it. lord Cmtlarcngh himaelf, lord Uinnin &fr. Zmkmker, Me 
P ,  o raseouted Hamlyn,) k. Ilanks, hb. Ct. 
Jalinstone, &h. %. Lasoelles, Jfr. Tvindham, and Mr. 
Catining.' 
Zxtr& 7 ~ O f  Ni-. Qmtin Dick. 
(Qn ths 11th of &y, 1809, Mr. Maddocks m d e  u charge 
agamst Mr. Pcrceral and lord Castlerea h, relative to the selling 
of a seat in Perlinment to Mr. Qnentin fiick, nnd to theinfluenee 
cxcrei~ed vith Mr. Dick, us to Lis wting npon the rccent im- 
porlant que*liou.) &Ir. 3laddoclre, iu tlie course of bis speech 
~aid:-'1 affim, then, thnt m. Uick purchm~d a s e d  is f7re 
n o m e  of Commoms for the borough of CnsIiel, tlwongh tlie a g e y  
of tlie Hon. Weniy Wrllesley, m-ho acted for and on behaif ot, 
the Srensum; t l in t  upon a, remi p s t i o x  of  the last imporhce, 
wlien Mr. Bick had detern~ined to ~ o t e  nccardin~ ta hEs mn- 
scioace, tho noblo lord, Cmtlercagh, did intimate to that gentle. 
man the necesaitgr of either liis wotilig wil l~  tlre memmmt, w 
r~rigning l i s  twaf in I a t  houae; d tht hlr. ~ i c i ,  s m e r  thnn 
vate qainst principie, did make choice of tbe latter dternative, 
and racxkd liis seat accordingly. So tLis traneadion I charge 
the riglit Iionouralilp: gentleman, Mr. Pmcm>al, o* li&~,7 prs"y 
a ~ d  Aasifig mnniied ait it. Ths 1 will BNctilaE TO PUOTE BY 
ñrr~~rrsses ar Youn BAR, if ttie Bouas wjII pive me leme to cal1 
thern.' Nr. Perceval arped apainat rcc.ei- tlie chrir~e at all, 
ipiitt,in~ i t to the Ronse, t o k t l i e ~  AT RUCH A TINR it P P M E J ~  be 
w'se l o  ziiamant w h  ~(perjes of chavgcg m w e l  htrodeciwy to 
iae agitutirm dlic qrelit pucslim -+ ~ e j o r n .  kíi it l o  l i s  
X o w e  to detemicke: but as f'ar as he rnight be dlorrcd t o  j u d ~ e ,  
hr: wther tlioii<lit. i.liatj it; woiild he rnnrr? mnninienl; witli  alint 
wae due from liim ta  the HOII-o and to tlie public, ?t fie ron Tria 
PRESEKT dmlined p l l i n g  in thepleu (he could so conscienlioiisl y 
put in) antil tIat JTmlse liad come to a u k h i n a t i w o  os thspi?si- 
pritty qfemtmhinfmy tkai! e?¿m~ge rrr riot.' 
Wie House voted nol to antertzin the clargc, md Mr. Pon- 
aonby aud otheis deelíired, in the course o€ tlie debate, thnt 
sucli triinsactions ou Iit not to be inqiiired into, h~enirrie they 
ne:e notorious, anf Usd become as glwing as tho noon-day 
S U .  
NOW let tlie yonnger Mr. Femeval gmpple 6 t h  tEih his- 
torian and public writer, rvliose opinions Fre l i z ~  invoked, 
wliose ' true A ' y I i R I 6  quid CWZd fBelPLg' lie ltas eulugized. 
Let hFm p p p l c  mith thesc cxtructs from his morlcs, wliicli, 
hawvever, nre biit n titlic of tlic c!irar~cs Mi-. Coblictt Iias 
brought ngninst. his father. For my part 1 have given niy 
proofs and reasons, md nutlio~ities, and ani entitled to asseit, 
tlint my pnblic cliamcter o f  3lr. fermval, tlie niinister, k, 
historienlly 'fai~, jmt, mol m' 
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